



Common Council Chambers – City Hall Room 100
7325 W. Forest Home Ave, Greenfield, Wisconsin

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING Agenda

Monday, September 27, 2021 - 6:30 PM

1. Meeting Call to Order and Roll Call
2. Election of Chairperson.
3. Election of Vice-Chairperson.
4. Approval of the August 26, 2019 Legislative Committee minutes.
5. Discuss and adopt an ordinance to amend Section 21.04.0902 of the Municipal Code pertaining to Decks, Patios, and Porches/Breezeways being permitted in required front yards. (PC-8/10/21 Kastner, CC Date: 8-17-21)
6. Regulation of Electronic Scooters. (Sajdak)
7. An Ordinance Amending Sections 10.31 and 10.32 of the Municipal Code of the City of Greenfield as it Relates to Sex Offender Loitering and Residency Restrictions and Creating Section 1.35 to Create the Sex Offender Residency Appeal Board. (Sajdak)
8. Adjourn.

PLEASE NOTE: Upon reasonable notice, efforts will be made to accommodate the needs of disabled individuals through sign language interpreters or other auxiliary aids. For additional information or to request this service, contact the Department of Human Resources at 329-5208, (FAX) 543-6158, TDD 1-800-947-6644 (Wisconsin Telecommunications Relay System), or by writing to the Director of Human Resources/ADA Coordinator at Greenfield City Hall, 7325 West Forest Home Avenue, Room 101, Greenfield, WI 53220. Greenfield City Hall is wheelchair accessible from the west and south entrances.

MINUTES OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT THE GREENFIELD CITY HALL ON
MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 2019.

The meeting was called to order by Ald. Bailey at 7:00 p.m.

1. <u>ROLL CALL:</u>	Alderson Bailey	Present
	Alderson Lubotsky	Excused
	Alderson Saryan	Present
	Brian Sajdak, City Attorney	Present

Also present: Kristi Johnson, Community Development Manager

2. It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to approve the minutes of the April 29, 2019 Legislative Committee as recorded. Motion carried unanimously.	4/29/19 minutes approved
3. Discussion/decision to adopt an ordinance amending various sections of 13.04 and 13.07 of the City of Greenfield Municipal Code pertaining to direct sellers and entertainment (Goergen) (LC 8/26/19)	Disc/adopt ord. amend. various sections of 13.04 & 13.07 of Mun. Code re direct sellers & entertainment

City Attorney, Brian Sajdak, stated that the City Clerk's office is looking to remove licensing and fee requirements for temporary vendors (direct sellers) and entertainment as they relate to Outdoor Special Events. The amendment is designed to streamline the process and eliminate some of the fees that were associated with the licenses. It is also meant to allow some of the simpler types of approvals to be handled with the special event permit as opposed to having multiple permits. It will cut down on fees for the vendors and there wouldn't be additional background checks on each of the individuals. In some instances, the event organizers will cover the fees for the vendors and that becomes pretty costly since it's more of a community event and the organizers aren't charging the vendors a space or booth rental fee.

COMMON COUNCIL

Ald. Saryan asked if most communities have a direct sellers fee?

Atty. Sajdak stated that he doesn't believe the communities that he represents have the direct sellers fee. He is sure there are some that do, but it depends on the community and the types of events they have.

Ald. Saryan asked what fees would the event still have if these are eliminated?

Kristi Johnson, Community Development Manager, stated they would have the special event fee which is \$50 if the event is less than 200 people and \$100 if it's more than 200 people, a temporary liquor license fee if they will be selling beer or wine. There will still be an inspection fee of \$60 per inspector each time they go out to inspect the site.

Ald. Saryan asked if there will be a potential problem if we don't run background checks on each seller?

Atty Sajdak stated that arguably there could be, but in most cases we rely on the event organizer themselves to prevent that since they wouldn't want the seller's to tarnish their reputation as well. If there were issues, the Police Department could step in and deal with them as appropriate.

Ald. Bailey asked, since we will be losing money by eliminating some of the fees, would it be appropriate to raise the special event fee of more than 200 people to \$200?

Atty. Sajdak stated that there has been discussion by some of the departments, as part of the budget process, that fees may need to be looked at and modified accordingly so this could be one of them to be looked at.

It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to adopt an ordinance amending various sections of 13.04 and 13.07 of the City of Greenfield Municipal Code pertaining to direct sellers and entertainment. Motion carried unanimously.

4. Ordinance to repeal and recreate Chapter 16 of the Municipal Code – Plumbing Code (K. Johnson) (LC 8/26/19)

Ms. Johnson explained that the reason for the plumbing code recreation is that the Wisconsin Department of Safety and Professional Services is requiring all municipalities to update their municipal plumbing code to comply with the October 1, 2019 Private On-site Wastewater Treatment System (POWTS) (i.e. septic tank) Maintenance Program deadline. Greenfield has 5 parcels with POWTS systems. The plumbing inspector has done research and worked with the state to make sure the right details are in the code. While incorporating the required updates, staff made other necessary minor edits, such as correctly identifying the Inspection Services Division structure, eliminating references to the Department of Commerce, etc. The ordinance update also incorporates a section that restricts the scope of work that may be completed by homeowners when applying for a permit. Ms. Johnson stated that in a lot of instances, homeowners apply for a plumbing permit to do the work themselves and then they ask the plumbing inspector for help designing the plan. It's a conflict of interest and liability to the City to ask the inspector to design plumbing work and then also inspect it. What the language entails is that homeowners will still be allowed to pull plumbing permits for existing plumbing fixtures, for example, a dishwasher or water heater, but any new plumbing work, homeowners are required to hire a plumbing contractor to pull the permit and complete.

Ald. Saryan asked for an example of work they would need a plumbing contractor to do?

Atty. Sajdak explained if you have a basement with stubs for a toilet and shower that were never put in and you want to put them in now. Those would be new items and require a plumbing contractor.

Ald. Saryan also asked, what if the homeowner is handy and can do the work themselves?

Ms. Johnson explained that being handy and knowing the plumbing code are two different things. The plumbing inspector said 9 times out of 10, the homeowners who do the work themselves are failing the inspections. Ms. Johnson stated Brookfield, Franklin, West Allis and Wauwatosa all require the same regarding plumbing permits.

It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to repeal and recreate the POWTS section of Chapter 16 of the Municipal Code – Plumbing Code and forward Sec. 16.045(2) that restricts the scope of work that may be completed by homeowners under issuance of a permit to the Common Council with no recommendation. Motion carried unanimously.

Adopt. ord. repealing & recreating the POWTS section of Chapter 16 of the Mun. Code; forwarding Sec. 16.045(2) with no recommendation
COMMON COUNCIL

5. Ordinance to repeal and recreate Chapter 17 of the Municipal Code – Electrical Code (K. Johnson) (LC 8/26/19)

Ms. Johnson explained the Wisconsin Department of Safety and Professional Services is requiring all municipalities to update their electrical code to incorporate new commercial electrical rules. One major change includes the elimination of license classifications, as required by the State of Wisconsin. While incorporating the required updates, staff made other necessary minor edits, such as correctly identifying the Inspection Services Division structure, eliminating references to the Department of Commerce, etc. The ordinance update also incorporates a section that restricts the scope of work that may be completed by homeowners when applying for a permit and requiring them to hire an electrical contractor. Homeowners will still be allowed to pull electrical permits for existing electrical fixtures, for example, repairs, broken light switches, ceiling fans, dimmer installation, dishwashers. Because of safety purposes, anything that requires new wiring, an electrical contractor must pull the permit and complete the work.

It was moved by Ald. Saryan, seconded by Ald. Bailey to repeal and recreate Chapter 17 of the Municipal Code - Electrical Code. Motion carried unanimously.

6. Ordinance to repeal and recreate Chapter 34 of the Municipal Code – Sanitary Sewer System Code. (K. Johnson) (LC 8/26/19)

Ms. Johnson stated these are extremely minor edits which include: the removal of the line “Only floor drains which discharge or have the potential to discharge grease shall be connected to a grease interceptor;” modify the language regarding garbage disposals to say “The use of disposals which discharge to a grease interceptor is discouraged since it decreases the operational capacity of grease interceptors;” elimination of the reference Department of Commerce and modifying a number regarding plumbing code. No new requirements were added.

It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to repeal and recreate Chapter 34 of the Municipal Code – Sanitary Sewer System Code. Motion carried unanimously.

7. Ordinance amending sections 3.12(9)(a), (b) and (c) of the Municipal Code relating to license fees enumerated.

Ms. Johnson explained there is a variety of permit fee related amendments. As of today, there is a minimum permit fee of \$60 for all 3 trades, plumbing, building and electrical. The inspectors have done research for the minimum fees in surrounding communities such as Franklin, Milwaukee, and West Allis. Their minimum fee is \$75. The City of Greenfield has not amended or updated these fees since November 2012 and is purposing a \$15 increase to be at the minimal fee. Other fees pertaining to electrical that we would like to amend would be to have a \$75 charge for a commercial rooftop HVAC unit. We have not previously charged for that and it's been a revenue that we probably should have been receiving all these years. The City of Greenfield recently hired a new Electrical Inspector whose previous region was downtown Milwaukee working on the high rises. He took a look at all of Greenfield's fees and was surprised at how low they were and how we weren't collecting fees for certain services that we should have been. Some other proposed fee amendments include: charging \$50 per 100 amps for services; raising temporary wiring from \$60 to \$85; creating a fee of \$3 for light fixtures; and collecting \$5/kilowatt for solar panels with a minimum fee of \$25. Proposed plumbing code fee updates include some new fees that had never been collected (including POTWS fees that are now required with the State-mandated POWTS maintenance program), and some updated fees, all in line with surrounding municipal fees.

It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to amend sections 3.12(9)(a),(b) and (c) of the Municipal Code relating to license fees enumerated. Motion carried unanimously.

Adopt. ord. repealing & recreating Chapter 17 of the Mun. Code re electrical code.

COMMON COUNCIL

Adopt ord. repealing & recreating Chapter 34 of the Mun. Code re Sanitary Sewer System Code.

COMMON COUNCIL

8. Review of existing ordinances/procedures for update and/or clarification as the need arises.
(Bailey, Saryan)

Update/clarify exist. Ord.

There were no additional items for discussion.

9. It was moved by Ald. Bailey, seconded by Ald. Saryan to adjourn the meeting at 7:44 p.m.
Motion carried unanimously.

Adjourn

Respectfully submitted,

Brittney L. Knippel
Recording Secretary

Distributed 8/28/19



Committee: Legislative Committee

Item Number:

Introduced By: Kristi Porter, Community Development Manager

Date Introduced: September 27, 2021

RELATING TO:

Ordinance to amend Section 21.04.0902 of the Municipal Code pertaining to Decks, Patios, and Porches/Breezeways being permitted in required front yards.

SUMMARY:

Alderperson Akers has requested staff to draft an ordinance update that would allow decks, patios and porches/breezeways in the front yard of residentially-zoned parcels.

Today, the code prohibits the following in the front yard:

- Decks (open, not less than 10 ft. from any property line)
- Patios (open without roof, not less than 5 ft. from any property line)
- Porches/breezeways with roof, sides open (not less than 5 ft. from any property line)

Staff frequently receives Zoning Board of Appeals applications from homeowners who either want to rebuild these structures (old one has deteriorated, for example), or build new. The proposed ordinance amendment would permit these structures in the front yard.

Staff recommends a compromise: allow porches/breezeways to be constructed in front yards, but maintain the current restrictions on decks and patios (i.e. decks and patios would NOT be permitted in the front yard). Staff feels that decks and patios are back yard-type structures, not front yard-type structures.

Continued on page 2...

SUMMARY:

To be clear, no matter what type of front yard structure is proposed by an applicant, if it were proposed to be constructed within the front yard setback requirement, the applicant would still be required to go before the Zoning Board of Appeals for consideration of a front yard setback waiver.

This ordinance amendment would require a public hearing, which could be scheduled as early as November 16, 2021.

Recommendation: Approve the Ordinance to amend Section 21.04.0902 of the Municipal Code pertaining to Porches/Breezeways being permitted in required front yards.

ATTACHMENTS: KEY ISSUES ___ BACKGROUND ___ RESOLUTION ___ FISCAL NOTE ___
MOTION ___ OTHER ___



Private Office:
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Office of the City Attorney

To: Legislative Committee
From: Brian C. Sajdak, City Attorney
Date: September 24, 2021
Re: Regulation of Electric Scooters

Background

The City has been approached by one of the electric scooter companies about operating in the City (Bird and Lime are the two largest companies providing this service). Under a recently passed law, the City has the authority to regulate these devices. However, prior to taking any specific approach to regulation, the Mayor thought the Committee should weigh in.

Discussion

Under Wis. Stat. § 349.237, the City may regulate scooters. That section provides:

The governing body of any municipality or county may, by ordinance, regulate the rental and operation of electric scooters in a manner consistent with the regulation of bicycles in the municipality or county, except that the governing body of any municipality or county may do any of following:

- (1) Restrict or prohibit the operation of electric scooters on any roadway under its jurisdiction having a speed limit of more than 25 miles per hour.
- (2) Restrict or prohibit the operation of electric scooters on any sidewalk or bicycle way under its jurisdiction.
- (3) Establish requirements for and limitations on the parking of electric scooters on roadways, sidewalks, bicycle lanes, or bicycle ways under its jurisdiction.
- (4) Restrict or prohibit the short-term commercial rental of electric scooters to the general public.

Thus, there are two aspects of potential legislation. First, the City can decide where operation of scooters would be permitted. Specifically, you could require that the be operated only on roads where the speed limit is 25 mph or lower, that they not be

allowed on sidewalks, and also regulate their use on bicycle lanes/trails. These regulations apply to all electric scooters, including privately owned devices. The second aspect of potential regulation is whether you would allow the short-term rental of scooters, and if so under what terms.

Consistent with these two approaches, I have attached two ordinances from other communities that illustrate these approaches. First, the City of Brookfield's ordinance effectively prohibits the use of scooters on anything other than roads below 25 mph. It also prohibits the short-term rental within the community. Second, the City of Wauwatosa has two code provisions related to these scooters. As you can see, they permit both expanded use and the short-term rental of scooters.

Staff is looking for guidance as to what type of regulation you would like to see. If you search the internet for scooter problems, you will see there are lots of reports of issues ranging from dangerous speeds on sidewalks, leaving scooters in the middle of sidewalks blocking access, and driver uncertainty of how to address them when on the road.

BCS

Chapter 10.28 ELECTRIC SCOOTERS

Sections:

10.28.010 Intent.

10.28.020 Definitions.

10.28.030 Scooters regulated.

10.28.040 Penalty.

10.28.010 Intent.

Pursuant to Section [349.237](#), Wisconsin Statutes, the city of Brookfield hereby exercises its authority to regulate the rental and operation of electric scooters. (Ord. [2596-20](#) § 1 (part), 2020)

10.28.020 Definitions.

The definitions of Section [340.01](#), Wisconsin Statutes, as amended, are hereby adopted by reference and used within this chapter. (Ord. [2596-20](#) § 1 (part), 2020)

10.28.030 Scooters regulated.

- A. No person shall operate an electric scooter on any roadway under the city's jurisdiction having a speed limit of more than twenty-five (25) miles per hour.
- B. No person shall park electric scooters on roadways, sidewalks, bicycle lanes, or bicycle ways under the city's jurisdiction.
- C. The short-term commercial rental of electric scooters to the general public is hereby prohibited. No person, firm, partnership, or corporation shall participate in the short-term commercial rental of electric scooters. (Ord. [2596-20](#) § 1 (part), 2020)

10.28.040 Penalty.

Any person, firm, partnership, or corporation who violates any part of this chapter shall be subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions in Chapter [1.12](#). (Ord. [2596-20](#) § 1 (part), 2020)

[Mobile Version](#)

Chapter 11.50 - ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AND DOCKLESS MOBILITY DEVICES

11.50.010 - Definitions.

The following definitions apply to this chapter and to Chapter 11.51 - Dockless Mobility Systems:

- A. "Bicycle lane" means that portion of a roadway set aside by action of the common council for the exclusive use of bicycles, electric scooters, and other vehicles specified by the common council under the authority of Section 349.23, Wisconsin Statutes.
- B. "Bicycle rack" means a stationary fixture affixed to the ground or other permanent location, to which a bicycle can be securely attached for purposes of short term parking and to which such bicycle may also be locked by the bicycle owner, if so desired.
- C. "Dockless mobility device" means a motorized vehicle, including a bicycle, an electric scooter, a skateboard, or any other micro-mobility vehicle which is exempt from state registration under Chapter 341, Wisconsin Statutes.
- D. "Electric scooter" means a device weighing less than one hundred pounds that has handlebars and an electric motor, is powered solely by the electric motor and human power, and has a maximum speed of not more than twenty miles per hour on a paved level surface when powered solely by the electric motor.
- E. "Multiuse path" means a public way, not part of a highway, that is designated by official signs or markings for use by persons riding mobility devices except as otherwise specifically provided by law.
- F. "Parking box" means an area designated within the public right-of-way, typically delineated with traffic grade stripping or paint, where dockless mobility devices may be parked when not in active use. Parking boxes in the public right-of-way must be approved by the board of public works.
- G. "Pedestrian path" means a paved walkway along the side of the street, specifically designed for walking.
- H. "Public park" means a public playground, public recreation center or area, and other public areas, created, established, designated, maintained, provided or set aside by the city, for the purposes of public rest, play, recreation, enjoyment or assembly, and all buildings, facilities and structures located thereon or therein.
- I. "Public playground" means a place specifically designed to enable children to play.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. I, 9-3-2019)

11.50.020 - Use of electric scooters and dockless mobility devices.

- A. No person may operate an electric scooter or dockless mobility device in the city upon any public sidewalk, any pedestrian path, or upon any public school grounds or public playgrounds.
- B. This subsection shall not apply to such devices when operated on multiuse paths, on school grounds or playgrounds when officially sanctioned functions are in progress, bicycles operated by police officers in the necessary discharge of their official duties, or to sidewalks or sidewalk areas designated by the common council and identified by signs or other clear markings as a bicycle way.
- C. When operating an electric scooter or dockless mobility device every driver of such device shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian and shall exercise due care and give an audible signal when passing a bicycle driver or pedestrian proceeding in the same direction.
- D. No person may operate an electric scooter or dockless mobility device in the city upon roads with designated speed limits above thirty miles per hour, except that a person using a dockless mobility device may use crosswalks to cross streets with higher speed limits, or may use marked bicycle lanes on such streets.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. I, 9-3-2019)

11.50.030 - Parking of electric scooters or dockless mobility devices.

- A. Electric scooters or dockless mobility devices shall only park in the following areas when not in use: bicycle racks and parking boxes in public places, or other areas not impeding use of the public right-of-way.
- B. Electric scooters or dockless mobility devices may only park on or near sidewalks or pedestrian paths when leaving sufficient space, not less than five feet in width, for pedestrians and other users.
- C. Electric scooters or dockless mobility devices may utilize on-street-bicycle parking areas approved by the board of public works.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. I, 9-3-2019)

11.50.040 - Impoundment of electric scooters and dockless mobility devices.

- A. If the chief of police or director of public work finds any dockless mobility device parked for more than twenty-four hours, the chief, director, or other authorized agent of the city may have the dockless mobility device immediately removed to a suitable place of impoundment. If the operator can be informed, a notice informing the operator of the location of the dockless mobility device and the procedure for reclaiming the dockless mobility device shall be sent to the operator within twenty-four hours after removal.
- B. The fee for redemption of an impounded dockless mobility device shall be one hundred dollars or as otherwise set in the consolidated fee schedule.
- C. Upon impoundment, a dockless mobility device shall be held a minimum of thirty days unless earlier redeemed by a system operator, owner or owner's representative upon payment of the redemption fee provided. The commissioner of public works may dispose of impounded dockless mobility devices that are not redeemed within thirty days in any of the following ways:
 - 1. Public auction or sale.
 - 2. Donation to a suitable nonprofit.
 - 3. Scrapping a dockless mobility device if it cannot be disposed of within reasonable means.
- D. The owner of any dockless mobility device removed under this provision shall be responsible for all costs of impounding and disposing of the dockless mobility device. Costs not recovered may be recovered with civil action by the city against the system operator. The city assumes no responsibility for damage to dockless mobility devices impounded under this section.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. I, 9-3-2019)

11.50.050 - Penalties.

Any person violating the provisions of this section or Chapter 11.51 of this code shall, upon conviction for such violation, be subject to a forfeiture of between fifty dollars and five hundred dollars per day for each dockless mobility device operated or parked in violation of this section or the program. For each second or subsequent conviction, the forfeiture shall be between five hundred dollars and one thousand dollars.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. I, 9-3-2019)

Chapter 11.51 - DOCKLESS MOBILITY SYSTEMS

11.51.010 - Definitions.

The following definitions apply to this chapter and to Chapter 11.50 - Electric Scooters and Dockless Mobility Devices:

- A. "Dockless mobility system" means a system of self-service mobility devices, made available for shared use to individuals on a short-term basis by agents who place self-service mobility devices in the city for use, which may be rented through a smart-phone app, vendor website, vendor customer service number, or a pre-paid PIN and which do not require structures at permanent, fixed locations where rides must begin and end.
- B. A party "operates" a dockless mobility system in the city if it is placing its self-service dockless mobility devices in the city for use or rental, through its employees or agents, in order to make such devices available for rent. "System operator": means any person or company who owns, leases, offers to rent, collects, distributes, repairs, services, charges, or otherwise controls a dockless mobility system.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. II, 9-3-2019)

11.51.020 - Operation of dockless mobility systems.

- A. No person may operate a dockless mobility system in the city without permission to participate in a dockless mobility system program administered by the board of public works. Participation in the program may only occur upon application and approval of the board of public works.
- B. If a company's devices are brought into the city by users or others, but the system operator actively redistributes the devices to another location outside the city within twenty-four hours, the company would not be deemed to be operating the system in the city.
- C. Board of public works may revoke right to participation in program based upon repeated or continuous violations of program policy.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. II, 9-3-2019)

11.51.030 - Use of devices in a dockless mobility system.

- A. All relevant rules and regulations applicable to bicycles or other devices, and specifically those

provisions contained within Chapter 11.50 of this code related to electric scooters and dockless mobility devices, shall apply to those devices used as part of a dockless mobility system.

- B. If the chief of police or director of public works, or authorized agent of the city, finds on any alley, street, highway, or public place within the city, any dockless mobility device belonging to an operator who is in violation of this section or in violation of the program requirements, including, but not limited to, improper parking of a dockless mobility device, the chief, director, or other authorized agent of the city may have the dockless mobility device immediately removed to a suitable place of impoundment subject to the provisions and procedures described in Section 11.50.030, above.
- C. If the operator can be informed, a notice informing the operator of the location of the dockless mobility device and the procedure for reclaiming the dockless mobility device shall be sent to the operator within twenty-four hours after removal.

(Ord. No. O-19-24, pt. II, 9-3-2019)



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Office of the City Attorney

To: Legislative Committee
From: Brian C. Sajdak, City Attorney
Date: September 24, 2021
Re: An Ordinance Amending Sections 10.31 and 10.32 of the Municipal Code of the City of Greenfield as it Relates to Sex Offender Loitering and Residency Restrictions and Creating Section 1.35 to Create the Sex Offender Residency Appeal Board

Background

The Common Council previously adopted §§ 10.31 and 10.32 of the Municipal Code which regulates loitering by certain sex offenders and also where they may reside within the City. In 2017, a federal judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin issued an order finding that Pleasant Prairie's sex offender ordinance violated the *Ex Post Facto* and the Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Following that decision, multiple other communities in the State were threatened with litigation (or were sued). To avoid lawsuits (either those that had been threatened, or to avoid being the next target) numerous communities amended their ordinances because of similarities to the Pleasant Prairie ordinance.

Additionally, in response to the proliferation of these residency restriction ordinances, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted 2015 Wis. Act 156 in 2016 which preempts local ordinances as it relates to the placement of sexually violent persons on release and supervision under Chapter 980. Thus, ordinances that were in place prior to this enactment should be updated to address the preemption issue. Of note, a lawsuit was recently filed alleging that some of the regulations adopted in Act 156 are also unconstitutional. I have attached a copy of an article from the Journal-Sentinel.

Based upon these issues, before you is a proposed draft which addresses the various issues related to the City's sex offender residency restrictions. This was drafted to reflect what I believe to be the most restrictive we could potentially be. However, a case may be made that being the most restrictive is not the correct approach to take. Below you will find my discussion on the various points which may assist you in determining whether changes to the proposed ordinance are appropriate.

Discussion

1. Chapter 980 Preemption

Of the issues identified above, the easiest to address is the Chapter 980 preemption issue. Under Chapter 980, certain “sexually violent persons” may be committed for treatment following a petition and hearing process. In 2016 the Legislature changed the law to provide that local residency restrictions do not apply to those sexually violent persons that have been released into the community under supervision of the Department of Health Services (similar to probation in the criminal context). While this preemption may raise some concerns about safety of the public, Chapter 980 does include restrictions applicable to these offenders. Specifically, under Chapter 980, a sexually violent person may not reside within a 1,500 foot radius around “any school premises, child care facility, public park, place of worship, or youth center.”¹ Additionally, for a serious child sex offender (an offender whose victim is under 13), the offender may not be placed into a residence adjacent to a property where a child’s primary residence exists.² These restrictions apply only to offenders who are under active supervision of the Department of Health Services.

There are three ways of addressing this preemption issue. The first would be to simply create an exclusion in the City’s ordinance for “a person who is released under Wis. Stat. § 980.08, so long as the person is subject to supervised release, is residing where they are ordered to reside, and the person is in compliance with all court orders issued under Ch. 980.” The second would be to amend the ordinance to create restrictions applicable only to this class of offenders that match the state restrictions while leaving the remaining restrictions in place for all other offenders. The final option would be to amend the ordinance to adopt the state restrictions for all offenders.

Cautiously, my recommendation (as reflected in the proposed draft) is the second option. The primary reason for this is that if we did a wholesale exclusion of these offenders under option 1, then all enforcement for violations would be left to the department of corrections, the department of health services, the department of justice, or a district attorney. If the code includes the same restrictions found within the statute, then we can have a more direct role in enforcement proceedings (including likely having a more direct voice in any placement hearings). The final option is less desirable because it only limits residency around schools, child care facilities, public parks, places of worship, or youth centers. Our restrictions include more locations where children may be left with limited adult supervision. Note that the second option as drafted extends the distance from the specified locations beyond the 1,000 foot radius for other offenders to the 1,500 feet in the statute. This makes sense in that these offenders are the most

¹ Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4)(f)(2).

² Id.

dangerous. However recognize that the lawsuit mentioned in the article challenges this distance restriction, so we might need to change again in the future.

2. Pleasant Prairie and other Caselaw Considerations

The constitutional issues raised by the Court in the Pleasant Prairie case centered on two primary issues. First, the Village's ordinance created a situation where 90% of the Village was off-limits to offenders. The area where offenders were allowed was mostly non-residential, and most of the low-income housing was excluded. Second, the Village's ordinance did not offer a method for a sex offender to obtain an exemption or an individualized inquiry into the risk of each sex offender to the community.

In the case of Greenfield's ordinance, it is unclear whether the current restrictions would run afoul of the first issue identified by the Court. Looking at the City's map, while there are areas where homes exist that are available to offenders, large portions of the available housing, including areas of more affordable housing, are restricted. Unfortunately, the courts have not established any bright-line rule for what percentage of housing needs to be available to withstand judicial scrutiny.

With that said, the City's 1,000-foot distance is in line with what we are seeing throughout the State. Most other communities use the same distance used by the state (1,500 feet), although there are some who use shorter distances (e.g., Mount Pleasant – 1,250 feet, Waukesha – 750 feet, Hales Corners – 600 feet). So while the code appears to be more reasonable when purely comparing distances, I think a court would ultimately look at the percentage of available housing if it were to consider the City's restrictions. Accordingly, while the proposed ordinance retains 1,000 feet as the designated buffer, the Committee should consider where a shorter distance might be more appropriate.

Concerning the second aspect of the Pleasant Prairie case, Greenfield's ordinance clearly is in conflict with the Court on this point. The lack of due process and/or an individualized assessment of an offender, according to the Court in that case, presents a constitutional issue. In the aftermath of the Pleasant Prairie case, this issue was a significant topic of discussion among municipal attorneys throughout the state. At the time, communities fell into two camps. Those who wished to continue to have relatively restrictive ordinances created an appeal board to offer offenders an individualized assessment. Those who decided to amend their ordinances to be less restrictive generally relied only on the less restrictive nature of the code and did not adopt an appeal process. On this point, my recommendation, as illustrated in the draft ordinance, is to create an appeal board to hear cases where offenders wish to seek exemptions from the ordinance — regardless of how restrictive the code may be. This due process component is a key component to avoiding potential liability for constitutional violations.

3. Other Topics of Discussion

An additional discussion point is the original domicile clause. In short, this provision provides that someone who was not a resident of Greenfield at the time of the offense is ineligible to reside anywhere in the City. This provision was included in the Franklin ordinance (which became the model for most other communities, including Greenfield) because they were primarily attempting to block the state from putting a group home for offenders near the Milwaukee County Jail facility located there. However, when you read the concerns about banishment in the caselaw, it becomes increasingly difficult to believe that this restriction would survive judicial scrutiny on its face. Further, some of the research suggests that an offender is less likely to re-offend if they have a solid support system. Accordingly, there may be instances where it is better for an offender to reside in Greenfield than other places because, for example, they have close family connections in the City. The appeals board allows for an individualized assessment of an offender and also represents something less than outright banishment from the community thereby limiting the risk of being overturned by the courts. However, it is unclear as to whether an appeal board would be sufficient to survive any challenge.

Another topic of discussion is whether the list of places comprising child safety zones is appropriate. Following the Pleasant Prairie decision, many communities reduced their list of places to more closely match the state's list ("school premises, child care facility, public park, place of worship, or youth center"). Looking to the City's list, there are some locations I would removed or modified:

Location	Basis for Change
Home Schools	Expressly excluded them to avoid any confusion. If they were included, they would be difficult to track and require regular staff time to update list and map. Plus, the lack of obvious indications of its existence makes compliance harder.
Trails	Clarified to exclude sidewalks and bike lanes on a public road as the larger threat is a trail through a less frequented location
Golf Courses	Eliminated because children do not regularly hang out at golf courses unsupervised
Day Cares	Eliminated them as a separate category because they are already included in the broader definition of a facility for children under subsection (a). Unlicensed home-based locations are impossible to

track and generally have no obvious indications of their existence making compliance difficult.

Dance/ Music Schools	Required that they have a City zoning permit to be counted because otherwise they are difficult to track and their lack of obvious indications of their existence making compliance difficult.

Lastly, the Court's frequently make note of communities that have (or have not) done a thorough analysis of the problem in their decisions. Quite frankly, the available research on sex offenders and recidivism rates is a bit all over the board. The common element does appear that the risk is far more individualized based upon a wide variety of factors including proximity, familiarity, support, and the like. For this reason, the exemption/appeals process outlined in the proposed ordinance requires an analysis of all of these factors. However, I need to emphasize that as the policy maker you should familiarize yourself with the available information. You will note that the proposed ordinance contains extensive findings set out at the beginning – and as a result the packet also includes a rather voluminous set of documents which are referenced therein. These findings are a significant part of the defense of the ordinance against future challenges because it helps establish the seriousness of the City's inquiry on this matter and, accordingly, the weight that the Courts will give to the legislative decisions that are made based upon the information provided. While I believe the findings accurately reflect the various conclusions from these documents, you may wish to review them nonetheless to familiarize yourself with the various issues on this topic.

BCS

ORDINANCE NO. _____

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTIONS 10.31 AND 10.32 OF THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF GREENFIELD AS IT RELATES TO SEX OFFENDER LOITERING AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS AND CREATING SECTION 1.35 TO CREATE THE SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY APPEAL BOARD

A. The Wisconsin Statutes provide for punishment, treatment and supervision of persons convicted or otherwise responsible for sex crimes against children, including their release into the community.

B. Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides for the civil commitment of sexually violent persons, a more dangerous type of sex offender, and specifically, at Wis. Stat. § 980.08, following such commitment, under certain conditions, provides for the supervised release of such persons into the community.

C. According to a 1997 report titled *Sex Offenses and Offenders*, by the U.S. Department of Justice, the median age of the victims of imprisoned sexual assaulters was less than 13 years old and the median age of rape victims was 22 years; and 19% of those serving time for sexual assault and an estimated 24% of those serving time for rape had been on probation or parole at the time of the offense.

D. In 1994, it was estimated that 12% of imprisoned violent sex offenders had a prior conviction for rape or sexual assault while 61% had a prior felony for other crimes.

E. Furthermore, the Common Council has reviewed the findings of a number of State Legislatures across the United States, including, Pennsylvania, Alabama, Iowa, Florida, Maine and Louisiana, as they pertain to laws enacted which relate to, and in part impose restrictions upon sex offenders with respect to residency.

F. The Common Council has reviewed the decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, in *Doe v. Miller*, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th Cir. 2005)(Citations omitted), providing in part:

“The record does not support a conclusion that the Iowa General Assembly and the Governor acted based merely on negative attitudes toward, fear of, or a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. Sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and the parties presented expert testimony that reducing opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing the risk of re-offense. Even experts in the field could not predict with confidence whether a particular sex offender will re-offend, whether an offender convicted of an offense against a teenager will be among those who “cross over” to offend against a younger child, or the degree to which regular proximity to a place where children are located enhances the risk of

re-offense against children. One expert in the district court opined that it is just “common sense” that limiting the frequency of contact between sex offenders and areas where children are located is likely to reduce the risk of an offense. The policymakers of Iowa are entitled to employ such “common sense,” and we are not persuaded that the means selected to pursue the State’s legitimate interest are without rational basis.”

G. Since 2007, there have been three Wisconsin state court cases addressing the legality of sex offender residency restriction ordinances: *City of Franklin v. Steven R. Hanke*, 07-CV-9978 (Milw. County Cir. Ct. 2007), *Village of Menomonee Falls v. Ferguson*, 2011 WI App 73 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011), and *City of South Milwaukee v. Kester*, 2013 WI App 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).

H. In each of the three Wisconsin cases, the courts upheld the legality and enforceability of sex offender residency restriction ordinances.

I. The City of Greenfield is a place of residence for families with children.

J. The Common Council has determined that the establishment of sex offender residency restrictions is reasonable and necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents and the Community.

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING RECITALS, THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF GREENFIELD, MILWAUKEE COUNTY, STATE OF WISCONSIN, DO ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

PART I: Sections 10.31 and 10.32 of the Greenfield Municipal Code is amended to read as shown on the attached Exhibit A (NOTE: added text is double underlined; deleted text is ~~struck through~~).

PART II: Section 1.35 of the Greenfield Municipal Code is created to read as follows:

1.35 – Sex Offender Residency Appeal Board

- (1) *Creation.* The city shall have a board known as the "Sex Offender Residency Appeal Board." The board shall consist of three citizen members and one alternate citizen member nominated by the Mayor and confirmed by the Common Council. The Mayor shall designate which member shall act as the chair.
- (2) *Powers and Duties.* The board shall hear appeals taken from a decision of the Police Chief or their designee on any application for an exemption from the provisions of section 10.32, and shall have the powers specified in section 10.32(5).
- (3) *Meetings.* Meetings of the board shall be held at the call of the chair and at such other times as the board may determine. The chair may administer

oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to vote indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other official action, all of which shall be filed in the office of the City Clerk and shall be a public record.

PART III: The terms and provisions of this ordinance are severable. Should any term or provision of this ordinance be found to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms and provisions shall remain in full force and effect.

PART IV: All ordinances and parts of ordinances in contravention to this ordinance are hereby repealed.

PART V: This Ordinance shall become effective the day after its publication as provided by law.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Common Council of the City of Greenfield on this _____ day of _____, 2021.

APPROVED:

Michael J. Neitzke, Mayor

ATTEST:

Jennifer Goergen, City Clerk

EXHIBIT A

10.31 Loitering by sex offenders. (Cr. #2640)

- (a) *Definitions.* The definitions delineated in section 10.32 of the City of Greenfield Municipal Code shall be applicable to this section. In addition, the following term shall mean:
- (1) *Child safety zones* shall include any real property upon which there exists any facility used for or which supports a use of:
- a. A public park, parkway, parkland, park facility;
 - b. A public swimming pool or other aquatic facility;
 - c. A public library;
 - d. A recreational trail, but not an on-street bike path or a sidewalk;
 - e. A public playground;
 - f. A public or private school for children in grades pre-K through 12, but not including homeschool locations;
 - g. Athletic fields used by children;
 - h. ~~A day care center~~;
 - ih. Any specialized school for children, including, but not limited to a gymnastics academy, dance academy, swimming school, or music school, excluding any such facility that is located within a residence for which a home occupation approval has not been granted by the City;
 - j. Any facility for children (which means a public or private school, a group home, as defined in § 48.02(7), Wis. Stats.; a residential care center for children and youth, as defined in § 48.02(15d), Wis. Stats.; a shelter care facility, as defined in § 48.02(17), Wis. Stats.; a residential care center for children and youth, as defined in § 48.02(15d), Wis. Stats.; a shelter care facility, as defined in § 48.02(17), Wis. Stats.; a foster home, as defined in § 48.02(6), Wis. Stats.; a treatment foster home, as defined in § 48.02(17q), Wis. Stats.; a day care center licensed under § 48.65, Wis. Stats.; a day care program established under § 120.13(14), Wis. Stats.; a day care provider certified under § 48.651, Wis. Stats.; or a youth center as defined in § 961.01(22), Wis. Stats.
- (b) *Prohibition.* It shall be unlawful for any sex offender to enter into, congregate, loiter, wander, stroll, stand or play in or near a child safety zone under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes flight upon appearance of a police or peace officer, refuses to identify himself or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or other circumstances makes it impracticable, a police or peace officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this subsection if the police or peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the police officer or peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm.
- (c) *{Participation in Halloween activities involving children.}* It shall be unlawful for any offender, as defined in this chapter, to participate either directly or indirectly in distribution of candy or any other items to children on Halloween. Registered offenders shall remain indoors or shall remain away from their residence a minimum of one-half hour before locally scheduled trick-or-treat event(s) to one-half hour after locally

scheduled trick-or-treat event(s). Registered offenders or other occupants of their residence shall not give any indication to the public that they are participating in trick-or-treat activities.

- (d) *Penalty.* Any person who shall violate any provision of this subsection shall pay, upon conviction, a forfeiture not to exceed \$1,000.00 per violation, together with the costs of this action, and upon default of payment thereof, shall be imprisoned in the Milwaukee County House of Corrections for a period not to exceed 90 days, or until such forfeiture and costs are paid. Each day during which a violation of this section is permitted to exist shall be deemed to be a separate violation.

10.32 Sex offender residing within 1,000 feet of schools, day care centers, parks and other specified facilities and uses prohibited. (Cr. #2641)

This section is a regulatory measure aimed at protecting the health and safety of children in Greenfield from the risk that certain convicted sex offenders may reoffend in locations close to their residences. The City finds and declares that certain sex offenders are a serious threat to public safety. When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault. Given the high rate of recidivism for sex offenders and that reducing opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing the risk of reoffense, there is a need to protect children where they congregate or play in public places in addition to the protections afforded by state law near schools and day care centers. The City finds and declares that, in addition to schools and day care centers, children congregate or play at public parks, libraries, etc.

(1) *Findings, Intent and Purpose.*

- (a) The Common Council has the power, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5), to enact legislation promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the public.
- (b) The Common Council has reviewed the holdings and findings of the following court cases: *McKune v. Lile*, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002); *Smith v. Doe*, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003); *Doe v. Miller*, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); *Vill. of Menomonee Falls v. Ferguson*, 334 Wis. 2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011); *City of S. Milwaukee v. Kester*, 347 Wis. 2d 334 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013); *Hoffman v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie*, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951 (E.D. Wis. 2017); *Evenstad v. City of West St. Paul*, 306 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (D. Minn. 2018); *Vasquez v. Foxx*, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018); and *City of Werner v. City of Green Bay*, 743 Fed. Appx. 10 (7th Cir. 2018).
- (c) Based upon a 2003 study by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, titled *Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994*, sex offenders released from prison were four times more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime as compared to non-sex offenders released from prison. Of those individuals included in the study, forty percent (40%) of new sex crimes committed by those sex offenders released from prison had occurred within the first twelve (12) months of release. Further, child molesters who were released from prison were at least six (6) times more likely to be rearrested for another sex crime against a child as compared to a non-sex offender released from prison. Based upon a 2019 study by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, titled *Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from State Prison: A 9-Year Follow-Up (2005-14)*, released sex offenders were more than three times as likely as other released prisoners to be arrested for rape or sexual assault, and released sex offenders accounted for 5% of releases in 2005 and 16% of arrests for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period.
- (d) The Common Council has conducted a review of other reports and studies related to creating and implementing specific desistance factors to reduce recidivism of sex offenders. The studies and reports that have been reviewed include the following: *Recidivism After Release from Prison*, State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Tatar, J. & Jones, M. (August 2016); *Examining the*

Effects of Residential Situations and Residential Mobility on Offender Recidivism, Crime and Delinquency 61(3), 375-401, Steiner, B., Makarios, M. D., & Travis, L. F. (2015); Examining Sexual Offenses through a Sociological Lens: A Socio-Cultural Exploration of Causal and Desistance Theories, European Journal of Probation, 8(3), 170-184, Kyle, D. (2016); Criminal Careers in the Short-Term: Intra-Individual Variability in Crime and Its Relation to Local Life Circumstances, American Sociological Review, 60(5), 655-673, Horney, J., Osgood, W., & Marshall I.H., (1995); and An Exploration of Protective Factors Supporting Desistance from Sexual Offending, Sexual Abuse: A journal of Research and Treatment, 27(1), 16-33, Mann, R.E., de Vries Robbe, M., Maruna, S., & Thornton, D. (2015).

- (e) While acknowledging that literature on sex offender recidivism, sex offender desistance, and sex offender residency restrictions contain studies which report varying effectiveness of certain strategies, the Common Council intends to use these strategies and studies to best create a regulatory framework which protects the children of the City of Greenfield, yet allows for a constructive and safe assimilation of designated sex offenders into the community.
- (f) The Common Council finds that the risk of recidivism decreases over time from the date of the last conviction, especially in circumstances where offenders have community connections, goals, and employment. The Common Council is also aware that absent a domicile clause, the City would have open doors for non-resident sex offender residency when other communities have closed doors, inviting a substantial increase in child sex offender placements, thereby increasing potential negative impacts on the health, safety, welfare, and additional cost to the City and its residents. Studies show increased recidivism rates for offenders who frequently move or do not have established community networks. These studies support maintaining a domicile clause thereby limiting designated offenders with no ties to the community and increasing the likelihood that a designated offender implements appropriate and existing community support while allowing the community to remain intelligently attentive, aware, and provide adequate and appropriate intervention if needed.
- (g) Given the high rate of recidivism for sex offenders, and that reducing opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing the risk of re-offense, there is a need to protect children and youth where they congregate or play in public places in addition to the protections afforded by state law near schools, day care centers and other places children and youth frequent. The City also finds and declares that in addition to schools and day care centers, children and youth congregate or play without parental or adult supervision at public parks, pools and other public and private places of enrichment activities, recreation, entertainment and amusement.
- (h) Accordingly, the Common Council has created this regulatory measure designed to protect the health and safety of the children in the City against the threat posed by certain designated sex offenders. Sex offenders who prey on children represent a substantial danger to victims, target a particularly vulnerable group within the community who are less able to articulate or report abuse, and create a significant impact on law enforcement time and community resources to investigate abuses and mitigate risks. This section is also intended to demonstrate the City's resolute goal of protecting children in areas of potential vulnerability and impart the community's necessary expectation that designated sex offenders released into the community must maintain the community's confidence by demonstrating safe, productive, and law-abiding behavior while residing within the City. It is the intent of the Common Council that this regulatory scheme is civil and non-punitive in order to serve the City's compelling interest to promote, protect, and improve the health, safety and welfare of all citizens of the City.

(2) Definitions. As used in this section and unless the context otherwise requires.

- (a) A crime against children shall mean any offense requiring registration under § 301.45, Wis. Stats., and any of the following offenses set for within the Wisconsin Statutes, as amended, or the laws of this or any other State or the Federal Government, having like elements necessary for conviction and involving a person under the age of 18 years, respectively:

940.225(1)	First Degree Sexual Assault
940.225(2)	Second Degree Sexual Assault
940.225(3)	Third Degree Sexual Assault
940.22(2)	Sexual Exploitation by Therapist
940.30	False Imprisonment—Victim was minor and not the offender's child
940.31	Kidnapping—Victim was minor and not the offender's child
944.01	Rape (prior statute)
944.06	Incest
944.10	Sexual Intercourse with a Child (prior statute)
944.11	Indecent Behavior with a Child (prior statute)
944.12	Enticing Child for Immoral Purposes (prior statute)
948.02(1)	First Degree Sexual Assault of a Child
948.02(2)	Second Degree Sexual Assault of a Child
948.025	Engaging in Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault of the Same Child
948.05	Sexual Exploitation of a Child
948.055	Causing a Child to View or Listen to Sexual Activity
948.06	Incest with a Child
948.07	Child Enticement
948.075	Use of a Computer to Facilitate a Child Sex Crime
948.08	Soliciting a Child for Prostitution
948.085	Sexual Assault of a Child Placed in Substitute Care
948.095	Sexual Assault of a Student by School Instructional Staff
948.10	Exposing Genitals or Pubic areas to a Child
948.11	Exposing Child to Harmful Material or Harmful Descriptions of Narrations
948.12	Possession of Child Pornography
948.13	Convicted Child Sex Offender Working with Children
948.14	Registered Sex Offender and Photographing Minors
948.30	Abduction of Another's Child
971.17	Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease—Of an included offense
975.06	Sex Crimes Law Commitment

- (b) *Offender* means a person who has been convicted of or has been found delinquent of or has been found not guilty by reason of disease or mental defect of a crime against children and further enumerated under § 301.45(1g), Wis. Stats.
 - (c) *Residence* means the place where an offender sleeps, which may include more than one location, and may be mobile or transitory.
 - (d) *Original domicile* means the offender's true, fixed and permanent home, to which the offender intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.
- (23) *Residency restrictions.* An offender shall not establish a residence in any location on a parcel of land which, in whole or in part, is within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any of the following:
- (a) Any facility for children (which means a public or private school, a group home, as defined in § 48.02(7), Wis. Stats.; a residential care center for children and youth, as defined in § 48.02(15d), Wis. Stats.; a shelter care facility, as defined in § 48.02(17), Wis. Stats.; a foster home, as defined in § 48.02(6), Wis. Stats.; a treatment foster home, as defined in § 48.02(17q), Wis. Stats.; a day

care center licensed under § 48.65, Wis. Stats.; a day care program established under § 120.13(14), Wis. Stats.; a day care provider certified under § 48.651, Wis. Stats.; or a youth center as defined in § 961.01(22), Wis. Stats.; and/or

(b) Any facility used for:

1. A public park, parkway, parkland park facility;
2. A public swimming pool or other aquatic facility;
3. A public library;
4. A recreational trail but not an on-street bike path or a sidewalk;
5. A public playground;
6. A public or private school for children in grades pre-K through 12, but not including homeschool locations;
7. Athletic fields used by children;
8. ~~A day care center~~;
98. Any specialized school for children, including, but not limited to, a gymnastics academy, dance academy, swimming school, or music school, excluding any such facility that is located within a residence for which a home occupation approval has not been granted by the City;

The distance shall be measured from the closest boundary line of the real property supporting the residence of an offender to the closest real property boundary line of the applicable above-enumerated use(s). ~~A map depicting the above enumerated uses and the resulting residency restriction distances, as amended from time to time, is on file in the Office of the City Clerk for public inspection.~~

(34) *Residency restriction exceptions.* An offender establishing a residence in any location on a parcel of land which, in whole or in part, is within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any of the uses enumerated in subsection (23) above, does not commit a violation of this subsection if any of the following apply:

- (a) The offender is required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility or other correctional institution or facility.
- (b) The offender has established a residence prior to the effective date of this section on February 6, 2009, which is within 1,000 feet of any of the uses enumerated in subsection (23) above, or such enumerated use is newly established after such effective date and it is located within such 1,000 feet of a residence of an offender, which was established prior to the effective date of this section.
- (c) The offender is a minor residing with a parent or legal guardian or is a ward under guardianship residing with their guardian and ~~is not required to register under §§ 301.45 and 301.46, Wis. Stats.~~

(4) *Original domicile restriction.* In addition to and notwithstanding the foregoing, but subject to subsection (34) above, no person and no individual who has been convicted of a crime against children shall be permitted to establish a residence in the City of Greenfield, unless such person was domiciled in the City of Greenfield at the time of the offense resulting in the person's most recent conviction for committing the crime against children.

(5) *Maps.* A map depicting the above resulting residency restriction distances shall be adopted by resolution of the City Council which map may be amended from time to time and is on file in the office of the City Clerk and Greenfield Police Department for public inspection.

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- (6) *Violations.* If an offender violates subsection (23) above, by establishing a residence or occupying residential premises in any location on a parcel of land which, in whole or in part, is within 1,000 feet of those premises as described therein, without any exception(s) as also set forth above, the City Attorney, upon referral from the Chief of Police and the written determination by the Chief of Police that upon all the facts and circumstances and the purpose of the section, such residence or occupancy presents an activity or use of property that interferes substantially with the comfortable enjoyment of life, health, safety of another or others, shall bring an action in the name of the City in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County to permanently enjoin such residency as a public nuisance.
- (5) *Appeal.* An offender may request an exemption from this section.
- (a) Procedure. An offender may request an exemption from this section by submitting a written request for exemption, including any pertinent rationale for an exemption, to the Greenfield Police Department prior to establishing a residence that would be in violation of this section or within fifteen (15) days after notification that the Offender is in violation of this section. If the exemption requested is to the Original Domicile provisions of subsection (4), an offender may make a generalized request to reside anywhere outside of the 1,000 foot residency restricted zone without a specific address. All requests within the 1,000-foot residency restriction zone shall include the specific address at which the offender intends to reside. The Chief of Police or their designee shall conduct a review of the request for an exemption using any pertinent information and the criteria set forth in subsection (c) below. The Chief of Police or their designee shall approve, approve an exemption subject to necessary conditions (hereafter "conditional exemption"), or deny the request. The Chief of Police or their designee shall issue the decision within thirty (30) days of receiving the request for exemption and shall provide a written copy of that decision to the offender, the City Clerk, and the City Attorney. Any request for an exemption which has not been approved, approved for a conditional exemption, or denied by the Chief or their designee within thirty (30) days of the request shall be deemed to be denied for the purposes of this section.
- (b) The decision by the Chief of Police or their designee may be appealed by the offender within thirty (30) days by submitting a written appeal to the Sex Offender Residency Appeal Board (hereafter "the Board") via the City Clerk's Office. The Board shall hold a hearing on each appeal, during which the Board may review any pertinent information and may accept oral and written statements from any person.
- (c) The Chief of Police or their designee and/or the Board shall base their decision upon any factors related to the City's interest in promoting, protecting, and improving the health, safety, and welfare of the community, including but not limited to:
- a. The nature of the predicate offense causing the appellant to be a designated offender including the relationship of the offender to the victim, the presence or use of force, and the presence of enticement.
 - b. Police reports related to the predicate offense if available.
 - c. Proximity of the requested residence to the victim or a child safety zone.
 - d. The age of the offense, offender, and victim.
 - e. Recommendation of the probation or parole officer, if one exists.
 - f. Recommendation of the Police Department.
 - g. Recommendation of any treatment practitioner.
 - h. Proposals for safety measures and assurances by the offender.
 - i. Conditions to be placed on any exception or variance from the requirements of this section.
 - j. Support systems in place for the offender.
 - k. Who the offender will be or is living with at the prohibited location.
 - l. Statements of the surrounding community or victim.
 - m. Treatment, sobriety, or rehabilitative measures taken by the offender.
 - n. The offender's current employment or social activities.
 - o. The offender's criminal history.
 - p. The offender's level of credibility and remorse.
 - q. Alternative options for housing.
 - r. The need to protect the victim or similarly situated individuals.

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- (d) The Board shall issue a decision by a majority vote. The Board may decide to deny an exemption, issue an exemption, or issue a conditional exemption. A written copy of the decision shall be provided to the offender. The offender must consent to the terms of the conditional exemption for the conditional exemption to be valid, and must demonstrate acceptance of the terms of the conditional exemption by signing and dating a copy of the Board's decision and conditions. The offender must provide a copy of the signed conditional exemption to the City Clerk's Office and the Greenfield Police Department. The offender will have fourteen (14) days from the date the written conditional exemption is issued to accept and return a signed copy to the appropriate locations or the conditional exemption will be deemed as void and the appeal denied by the Board. The offender need not sign an exemption that has been denied by the Board or an exemption approved without any necessary conditions by the Board.
- (e) A conditional exemption may include, but is not limited to, the following terms:
- a. Curfew restrictions.
 - b. Cohabitation restrictions or requirements.
 - c. Sobriety restrictions.
 - d. Conduct restrictions.
 - e. Residency restrictions.
- (f) If an exemption or conditional exemption is granted by the Chief or their designee or the Board, that exemption will only apply to the specific offender who had applied for the exemption at the requested residence and shall not be transferable to any other offender or to any other location.
- (g) An exemption expires when the offender who was granted said exemption changes their domicile and/or changes their residence, whether within the City or outside the City.
- (h) An exemption or conditional exemption issued by the Chief or their designee or the Board may be revoked by the Chief or their designee if the offender is found to have violated the conditions or there is probable cause to believe the offender has committed (an) additional act(s), which had occurred either before or after the exemption or conditional exemption was issued, that would cause an offender to be classified as a designated offender. The Chief or their designee shall provide written notice to the offender that the exemption or conditional exemption has been revoked. This notice shall be deemed properly delivered if sent by either first class mail or hand delivered to the offender's last known address. If the offender cannot be located, the notice shall be deemed to be properly delivered if a copy is left at the offender's address which had been exempted in the presence of some competent member of the family at least fourteen (14) years of age or a competent adult currently residing there. The revocation of an exemption may be appealed to the Board pursuant to the above procedure.
- (i) For the purposes of this section, pursuant to Wisconsin Statute Section 68.16, the City of Greenfield is specifically electing not to be governed by Chapter 68 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
- (j) If the Board denies the request for exemption or upholds a revocation of exemption or conditional exemption, the offender may appeal the decision within thirty (30) days to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.
- (6) Exception for placements under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980. To the extent required by Wis. Stat. § 980.135, an offender who is subject to supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08 shall not be governed by the foregoing provisions of this section restricting or prohibiting an offender from residing in certain locations, but shall instead be subject to all of the following:
- (a) An offender who is on supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08 shall not reside within 1,500 feet of the real property comprising any school premises, child care facility, public park, place of worship, or youth center. An offender is not in violation of this provision if any school premises, child care facility, public park, place of worship, or youth center is established within 1,500 feet from the offender's residence after they are placed in the residence under this section;
 - (b) In addition, if the offender who is on supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08 is also a serious child sex offender, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 980.01(4m), such offender is further prohibited from residing on a property adjacent to a property where a child's primary residence exists. For the purpose of this subsection, adjacent properties are properties that share a property line without regard to a public or private road if the living quarters on each property are not more than 1,500 feet apart. An offender is not in violation of this provision if a child

establishes primary residence in a property adjacent to the offender's residence after the offender is placed in the residence under this section; and

- (c) This subsection (10) shall apply only so long as the offender is subject to supervised release under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980, is residing where they are ordered to reside under Wis. Stat. § 980.08, and the offender is in compliance with all court orders issued under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980.

Sex offender law challenged over urban/rural release disparity

The Wisconsin law that keeps certain sex offenders locked up long after they've completed their prison sentences is facing another constitutional challenge, this time over a purported fix that has led to disparities based on whether cases started in urban or rural areas.

Three men who remain under civil commitment at the [Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center](#) in Mauston — even though judges have cleared them for supervised release in the community — have sued in federal court to have part of the law declared unconstitutional.

The suit contends offenders from urban areas wait longer — perhaps indefinitely — for releases that get approved much easily in rural counties.

The 1994 law, known as Chapter 980, allows prosecutors to ask that certain convicted sex offenders nearing the end of their prison sentence be declared "sexually violent persons" subjected to indefinite confinement and treatment at Sand Ridge.

But it also requires the men — called patients once at Sand Ridge — be released once they are deemed to be making progress in treatment and no longer a danger to the public.

The enduring bottleneck in the process has been communities' objections to having the offenders live among them, even under the very strict supervision imposed by the Department of Health Services. Judges in a variety of cases over the years have warned that if those entitled to supervised release don't get it, the law itself could be in jeopardy.

But in 2021, no solutions have emerged.

Dale Peshek, Hung Tran, and Brian Threlkeld all won judicial approval for supervised release well over a year ago, but remain in custody because no residences have been found and approved for them in Kenosha and Racine counties

Their federal lawsuit says the law violates their rights to due process and equal protection and seeks to represent approximately 40 other offenders facing, or about to face, similar roadblocks to release.

"Plaintiffs are unable to find housing and will likely be forced to spend the rest of their lives in involuntary detention waiting for housing that will never become available," the suit states.

The lawsuit names the Department of Health Services Secretary Karen Timberlake as a defendant. Department officials did not immediately return an email seeking comment about the suit.

In 2018, the legislature required that any 980 patients serving supervised release must do so in the county where they had been convicted of their underlying offenses and made the counties responsible for finding housing. Despite some promising starts brought about by the pressures of that law, many large counties still lack available residences for 980 offenders.

RELATED: [A Wisconsin county's plan for soon-to-be-released sex offender: A trailer with a view of a landfill](#)

RELATED: [Latest sex offender placement rift pits Milwaukee vs. small rural town](#)

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Three factors have made it impossible for the plaintiffs — and others like them — to get approval, according to the suit: The requirement of residing in the county where they lived when convicted, the ban on living within 1,500 feet of a school, church, daycare, park or youth center, and the ban on living next door to a child.

Together, those restrictions effectively make it impossible for the men to find approved housing during supervised release.

"The difficulty of securing compliant housing is exacerbated by the byzantine statutory process for obtaining approval of a release plan," the suit states.

Ad hoc committees of local officials, working with the DHS, are supposed to find housing and prepare a plan for a judge to approve, within 120 days of a judge determining a 980 subject is entitled to supervised release.

For each of the plaintiffs, the suit states, the deadline has come and gone several times. The suit contends that officials would find housing much faster for offenders returning to low-density, rural counties where it's much easier to stay 1,500 feet away from prohibited facilities.

Before 2018, offenders did not have to return to their home counties for supervised release. In densely populated urban counties, the 1,500-foot restrictions made it virtually impossible to find housing, and so some 980 subjects were placed in more rural counties.

Because residents in those areas [felt as if they were becoming "dumping grounds" for sex offenders](#), the Legislature added the home county requirement. If the county is Milwaukee, offenders must reside in the municipality where they lived when convicted.

Winnebago County was one of the first under the gun of the new law, and was facing \$1,000 a day fines if it didn't find a placement for Dwight Chouinard. It came up with the idea to put a mobile home near the county's landfill and jail in Oshkosh, but a judge said the plan, while a good one, would take too long and ordered that Chouinard live in rural Fremont.

Peshek, 49, has been at Sand Ridge since 2006, after serving eight years in prison. A judge approved him for supervised release nearly two years ago. But at a hearing in July, Kenosha County officials described their many blocked efforts to find Peshek a place to live.

Judge Mary Wagner shared the frustration, saying the process was denying Peshek's civil liberties, and ordered the county to now explore buying land and building a residence where he and future released 980 subjects could live.

Threlkeld, 40, has been at Sand Ridge since 2008, also after a prison term on a Kenosha County conviction. His supervised release was approved in February 2020.

Tran, 51, went to Sand Ridge in 2007, after serving about 15 years in prison for a child sexual assault in Racine County. His supervised release was approved in February 2020.

They are represented by Chicago civil rights lawyers Mark Weinberg and Adele Nicholas.

Weinberg called a law that results in indefinite detention "almost certainly unconstitutional," but understands that lawmakers see no upside in standing up for people labeled sex offenders.

"This is one of those situations where it's up to the courts to protect

the rights of a despised sub-class of people," he said.

According to Weinberg, 5,000 sex offenders are currently under indefinite confinement in about 20 other states with laws similar to Wisconsin's Chapter 980.

Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center has had as many as 366 patients, but currently houses 279, according to a DHS spokesperson. There are 70 former residents now living on supervised release in 23 counties. Since the start of Chapter 980, 240 former residents have been discharged from civil commitment, 89 of them after having transitioned during a period of supervised release.

*Contact Bruce Vielmetti at (414) 224-2187 or bvielmetti@jrn.com.
Follow him on Twitter at [@ProofHearsay](https://twitter.com/ProofHearsay).*

405 F.3d 700
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

John DOE, I, on their own behalf and as representatives of the class of all sex offenders in the State of Iowa; John Doe, II, on their own behalf and as representatives of the class of all sex offenders in the State of Iowa; John Doe, III, on their own behalf and as representatives of the class of all sex offenders in the State of Iowa, Appellees,

v.

Tom MILLER, Iowa Attorney General; Appellant.

J. Patrick White, as representatives of the class of all county attorneys in Iowa;
Michael Wolf, as representatives of the class of all county attorneys in Iowa,
Defendants.

No. 04-1568.

Submitted: Nov. 4, 2004. Filed: April 29, 2005. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 30, 2005.*

Synopsis

Background: Sex offenders brought class action challenging constitutionality of Iowa statute that prohibited person who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Robert W. Pratt, J., granted judgment for sex offenders, 298 F.Supp.2d 844. State appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Colloton, Circuit Judge, held that:

- 1 statute did not violate due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment on its face for lack of notice;
- 2 statute did not foreclose opportunity to be heard;
- 3 statute did not contravene principles of procedural due process;
- 4 statute did not infringe upon constitutional liberty interest relating to matters of marriage and family in fashion that required heightened scrutiny;
- 5 statute did not interfere with constitutional right to travel;
- 6 statute did not implicate alleged right to intrastate travel;
- 7 prohibition was rational way of promoting safety of children; and
- 8 statute was not retroactive criminal punishment in violation of ex post facto clause.

Reversed and remanded.

Melloy, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring and dissenting.

West Headnotes (22)

1 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not violate due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment on its face for lack of notice, although some cities were unable to provide sex offenders with information about location of all schools and registered child care facilities and it was difficult to measure

restricted areas, which were measured “as the crow flies” from school or child care facility. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

2 Constitutional Law Vagueness

The judicial doctrine of vagueness under the due process clause requires that a criminal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.

3 Constitutional Law Vagueness on face or as applied

A criminal statute is not vague on its face unless it is impermissibly vague in all of its applications; the possibility that an individual might be prosecuted in a particular case in a particular community despite his best efforts to comply with the restriction is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire statute. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.

1 Case that cites this headnote

4 Constitutional Law Conduct of Police and Prosecutors in General

Due process does not require that independently elected county attorneys enforce each criminal statute with equal vigor, and the existence of different priorities or prosecution decisions among jurisdictions does not violate the Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.

5 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not foreclose opportunity to be heard under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment, although statute did not provide process for individual determinations of dangerousness; due process did not entitle any person legislatively classified as sex offender to hearing to establish fact that was not material under the state statute. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

6 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

States are not barred by principles of procedural due process from drawing classifications among sex offenders and other individuals. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

7 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not contravene principles of procedural due process under Fourteenth Amendment, since restriction applied to all offenders who had been convicted of certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future dangerousness might have been proved in individualized hearings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

13 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not infringe upon constitutional liberty interest relating to matters of marriage and family in fashion that required heightened scrutiny; although statute restricted location of sex offender's residence, statute did not directly regulate family relationship or prevent any family member from residing with sex offender in residence in manner consistent with statute. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

23 Cases that cite this headnote

9 Constitutional Law Rights and interests protected; fundamental rights

Substantive due process analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires a court to exercise the utmost care whenever it is asked to break new ground in that field. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

10 Constitutional Law Criminal Law

Constitutional Law Criminal law

Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not interfere with right of sex offenders to travel under substantive due process, Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and Privileges or Immunities Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, since statute did not impose any obstacle to sex offender's entry into Iowa, it did not erect actual barrier to interstate movement, and it did not treat nonresidents who visited Iowa any differently than current residents or discriminate against citizens of other states who wished to establish residence in Iowa. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 2, cl. 2; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

11 Constitutional Law Sex offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not implicate alleged right to intrastate travel, since statute did not prevent sex offender from entering or leaving any part of state, including areas within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility, and it did not erect any actual barrier to intrastate movement. I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

17 Cases that cite this headnote

12 Constitutional Law Personal liberty

Mental Health Sex offenders

Sex offenders, who were subject to Iowa statute that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not show that United States Constitution established right to “live where you want” that would have required strict scrutiny of state's residency restrictions, where sex offenders did not develop any argument that right to “live where you want” was deeply rooted in nation's history and tradition or that “living where you want” was implicit in concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

10 Cases that cite this headnote

13 Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, was rational way of promoting safety of children; although no scientific study supported legislature's conclusion that excluding sex offenders from residing within 2000 feet of school or child care facility was likely to enhance safety of children, state legislature had authority to make judgments about best means to protect health and welfare of its citizens in area where precise statistical data was unavailable and human behavior was necessarily unpredictable. I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

14 Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, rationally advanced legitimate governmental purpose of promoting safety of children, since convicted sex offenders had distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests that state had authority to implement, Iowa General Assembly and Governor did not act based merely on negative attitudes toward, fear of, or bare desire to harm politically unpopular group, and policymakers of Iowa were institutionally equipped to set such parameters and were entitled to employ “common sense.” I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

15 Criminal Law Compelling Self-Incrimination

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, did not violate right against self-incrimination under Fifth Amendment, since statute did not require any offender to provide any information that might have been used in criminal case; although separate section of Iowa Code required sex offender to register his address with county sheriff, offenders did not challenge constitutionality of registration requirement or seek injunction against its enforcement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

16 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Iowa statute, that prohibited persons who had committed criminal sex offense against minor from residing within two thousand feet of school or child care facility, was not retroactive criminal punishment in violation of ex post facto clause, since statute was designed to be nonpunitive and regulatory, and sex offenders could not establish by “clearest proof” that Iowa's choice was excessive in relation to its legitimate regulatory purpose given challenge in determining precisely what distance was best suited to minimize risk to children without unnecessarily restricting sex offenders and difficult policy judgments inherent in that choice. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; I.C.A. § 692A.2A.

23 Cases that cite this headnote

17 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

States are prohibited by the ex post facto clause from enacting laws that increase punishment for criminal acts after they have been committed. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

8 Cases that cite this headnote

18 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

When determining whether a state statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law is necessarily punitive if the legislature intended criminal punishment; however, if the legislature intended its law to be civil and non-punitive, only the clearest proof that the law is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the state's nonpunitive intent will transform a civil regulatory measure into a criminal penalty. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

14 Cases that cite this headnote

19 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

On an Ex Post Facto Clause claim, where a legislative restriction is an incident of the state's power to protect the health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

20 Constitutional Law Purpose

Whether the regulatory scheme has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is the most significant factor in the ex post facto analysis; a statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

9 Cases that cite this headnote

21 Constitutional Law Power to enact

The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a state from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences, and, therefore, the absence of a particularized risk assessment does not necessarily convert a regulatory law into a punitive measure. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

22 Constitutional Law Constitutional Prohibitions in General

The excessiveness inquiry of ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy, but rather an inquiry into whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*704 Gordon Eugene Allen, argued, Des Moines, IA (Thomas J. Miller, on the brief), for appellant. Philip B. Mears, argued, Iowa City, IA (Randall Wilson, on the brief), for appellee. Before RILEY, MELLOY, and COLLTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

COLLTON, Circuit Judge.

In 2002, in an effort to protect children in Iowa from the risk that convicted sex offenders may reoffend in locations close to their residences, the Iowa General Assembly passed, and the Governor of Iowa signed, a bill that prohibits a person convicted of certain sex offenses involving minors from residing within 2000 feet of a school or a registered child care facility. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional on several grounds and enjoined the Attorney General of Iowa and the ninety-nine county attorneys in Iowa from enforcing the prohibition.

Because we conclude that the Constitution of the United States does not prevent the State of Iowa from regulating the residency *705 of sex offenders in this manner in order to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Iowa, we reverse the judgment of the district court. We hold unanimously that the residency restriction is not unconstitutional on its face. A majority of the panel further concludes that the statute does not amount to unconstitutional *ex post facto* punishment of persons who committed offenses prior to July 1, 2002, because the appellees have not established by the “clearest proof,” as required by Supreme Court precedent, that the punitive effect of the statute overrides the General Assembly's legitimate intent to enact a nonpunitive, civil regulatory measure that protects health and safety.

I.

Iowa Senate File 2197, now codified at Iowa Code § 692A.2A, took effect on July 1, 2002. It provides that persons who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses against a minor, including numerous sexual offenses involving a minor, shall not reside within 2000 feet of a school or registered child care facility. Iowa Code § 692A.2A(1)-(2). The law does not apply to persons who established a residence prior to July 1, 2002, or to schools or child care facilities that are newly located after July 1, 2002. *Id.* § 692A.2A(4)(c). Violations of the statute are punishable as aggravated misdemeanors. Iowa Code § 692A.2A(3).¹

Almost immediately after the law took effect, three named plaintiffs—sex offenders with convictions that predate the law's effective date—filed suit asserting that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. The district court certified their action as a class action, with a plaintiff class that includes all individuals to whom Iowa Code § 692A.2A applies who are currently living in Iowa or who wish to move to Iowa, except for any person who currently is the subject of a prosecution under § 692A.2A. The named plaintiffs, identified as various “John Does,” had committed a range of sexual crimes, including indecent exposure, “indecent liberties with a child,” sexual exploitation of a minor, assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and second and third degree sexual abuse, all of which brought them within the provisions of the residency restriction. A defendant class, including all *706 of Iowa's county attorneys, also was certified.

During a two-day bench trial, plaintiffs presented evidence concerning the enforcement of § 692A.2A, including maps that had been produced by several cities and counties identifying schools and child care facilities and their corresponding restricted areas. After viewing these maps and hearing testimony from a county attorney, the district court found that the restricted areas in many cities encompass the majority of

the available housing in the city, thus leaving only limited areas within city limits available for sex offenders to establish a residence. In smaller towns, a single school or child care facility can cause all of the incorporated areas of the town to be off limits to sex offenders. The court found that unincorporated areas, small towns with no school or child care facility, and rural areas remained unrestricted, but that available housing in these areas is “not necessarily readily available.” *Doe v. Miller*, 298 F.Supp.2d 844, 851 (S.D.Iowa 2004).²

Plaintiffs also presented evidence of their individual experiences in seeking to obtain housing that complies with the 2000-foot restriction. Several of the plaintiffs, including John Does III, IV, XV, and XVIII, have friends or relatives with whom they would like to live, but whose homes are within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility. Many, such as John Does VII, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII, live in homes that are currently compliant, either because they were established prior to July 1, 2002, or because the homes are outside the 2000-foot restricted areas. These plaintiffs, however, testified that they would like to be able to move into a restricted area. Still others, John Does II, VI, VIII, IX, XV, and XVI, are living in non-compliant residences that they wish to maintain.

Plaintiffs testified that in many cases they had a difficult time obtaining housing that was not within 2000 feet of a school or child care center. John Doe VII testified that he investigated 40 residences, but was unable to find any housing that would not place him in violation of § 692A.2A. The evidence also showed, however, that while the residency restriction may have exacerbated a housing problem for the plaintiffs, not all of their difficulty was caused by the statute. For example, John Doe II had difficulty finding housing in part because of his credit problems. John Doe XIV testified that the only available compliant housing in his hometown, Waterloo, was too expensive, so he and his wife purchased a rural home about 45 miles away. The mother of John Doe IV made efforts to help her son find housing, and she testified that she was able to find two potential residences for her son, but neither residence had any vacant units. John Doe VI was renting an apartment in compliance with § 692A.2A, but had to move out when the landlord decided that he did not want to rent to a sex offender. Similarly, John Does VIII and XI each found at least one possible compliant apartment, but their applications were denied because of their *707criminal records. In apparent contrast to this testimony from the plaintiffs, Dudley Allison, a parole and probation officer, testified that while the statute made it more difficult for sex offenders to find housing, “virtually everyone” among the covered parolees and probationers whom he supervised between July 2002 and July 2003 was able to locate housing in compliance with the statute. (T. Tr. at 285).

In addition to evidence regarding the burden that § 692A.2A places on sex offenders, both plaintiffs and defendants presented expert testimony about the potential effectiveness of a residency restriction in preventing offenses against minors. The State presented the testimony of Mr. Allison, a parole and probation officer who specialized in sex offender supervision. Allison described the process of treating sex offenders and his efforts at preventing recidivism by identifying the triggers for the original offense, and then imposing restrictions on the residences or activities of the offender. According to Allison, restrictions on the proximity of sex offenders to schools or other facilities that might create temptation to reoffend are one way to minimize the risk of recidivism. In the parole and probation context, Allison also has authority to limit offenders' activities in more specific ways, and he testified that he attempts to remove temptation by preventing offenders from working in jobs where they would have contact with potential victims or from living near parks or other areas where children might spend time unsupervised. In addition to the limits that he imposes on offenders under his supervision, Allison also testified that there is “a legitimate public safety concern” in where unsupervised sex offenders reside. In Allison's view, reoffense is “a potential danger forever.”

The State also introduced the transcript of hearing testimony by Dr. William McEchron, a psychologist with a general practice that includes sex offender patients. Like Allison, Dr. McEchron testified that there is no cure for sex offenders and that “there are never any guarantees that they might not reoffend.” In his

view, the “biggest risk is what's going on inside the individual,” but reducing the opportunity and the temptation to reoffend is extremely important to treatment. He explained that because there are “very high rates of re-offense for sex offenders who had offended against children,” he believed it would be appropriate to restrict places where sex offenders might come into contact with children. He thought the appropriateness of such a restriction was “common sense,” although he said there were insufficient data to know “where to draw the marks.” Dr. McEchron also testified, however, that in his view, life-long restrictions like § 692A.2A do not aid in the treatment process, and could even foster negative attitudes toward authority and depression in offenders who view the law as unfair.

The plaintiffs offered the testimony of Dr. Luis Rosell, a psychologist with experience in sex offender treatment. Dr. Rosell estimated that the recidivism rate for sex offenders is between 20 and 25 percent, and like Allison and Dr. McEchron, stated his belief that the key to reducing the risk of recidivism is identifying the factors that led to the offender's original offense and then helping the offender to deal with or avoid those factors in the future. Dr. Rosell testified that reducing a specific sex offender's access to children was a good idea, and that “if you remove the opportunity, then the likelihood of reoffense is decreased.” He did not believe, however, that “residential proximity makes that big of a difference.” Moreover, Dr. Rosell thought that a 2000-foot limit was “extreme.” Like Dr. McEchron, he worried that the law might be counterproductive ~~*708~~ to the offender's treatment goals by causing depression and potentially removing the offender from his “support system.”

After hearing the testimony of all three experts and of the individual plaintiffs, the district court declared that § 692A.2A was unconstitutional on several grounds, to wit: that it was an unconstitutional *ex post facto* law with respect to offenders who committed an offense prior to July 1, 2002; that it violated the plaintiffs' rights to avoid self-incrimination because, coupled with registration requirements elsewhere in Chapter 692A, it required offenders to report their addresses even if those addresses were not in compliance with § 692A.2A; that it violated procedural due process rights of the plaintiffs; and that it violated the plaintiffs' rights under the doctrine of substantive due process, because it infringed fundamental rights to travel and to “privately choose how they want to conduct their family affairs,” and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Although the district court believed the law was punitive, the court rejected the plaintiffs' final argument that the law imposed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Having found the statute unconstitutional, the district court issued a permanent injunction against enforcement. *Doe v. Miller*, 298 F.Supp.2d at 880.

II.

1 We first address the contention that § 692A.2A violates the rights of the covered sex offenders to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellees (to whom we will refer as “the Does”) argue that the statute is unconstitutional because it fails to provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and because it does not require an individualized determination whether each person covered by the statute is dangerous. This claim relies on what is known as “procedural due process.”

2 The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The requirement of “due process” has led to the judicial doctrine of vagueness, which requires that a criminal statute “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” *Kolender v. Lawson*, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).

3,4 There is no argument here that the words of the statute are unconstitutionally vague. Rather, the Does contend that they are deprived of notice required by the Constitution because some cities in Iowa are unable to provide sex offenders with information about the location of all schools and registered child care facilities, and because it is difficult to measure the restricted areas, which are measured “as the crow

flies” from a school or child care facility. We disagree that these potential problems render the statute unconstitutional on its face. A criminal statute is not vague on its face unless it is “impermissibly vague in all of its applications,” *Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside*, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), and the possibility that an individual might be prosecuted in a particular case in a particular community despite his best efforts to comply with the restriction is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire statute. A sex offender subject to prosecution under those circumstances may seek to establish a violation of due process through a challenge to enforcement of the statute as applied to him in a specific case. Nor do we believe that the potential for varied enforcement of the restriction, *709 which was cited by the district court, 298 F.Supp.2d at 878, justifies invalidating the entire regulatory scheme. Due process does not require that independently elected county attorneys enforce each criminal statute with equal vigor, and the existence of different priorities or prosecution decisions among jurisdictions does not violate the Constitution.

5,6 The Does also argue that § 692A.2A unconstitutionally forecloses an “opportunity to be heard” because the statute provides no process for individual determinations of dangerousness. This argument misunderstands the right to procedural due process. As the Supreme Court recently explained in connection with a comparable challenge to Connecticut’s sex offender registration law, “even assuming, *arguendo*, that [the sex offender] has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the [state] statute.” *Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003). States “are not barred by principles of ‘procedural due process’ from drawing” classifications among sex offenders and other individuals. *Id.* at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting *Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, 491 U.S. 110, 120, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis in original).

7 We likewise conclude that the Iowa residency restriction does not contravene principles of procedural due process under the Constitution. The restriction applies to all offenders who have been convicted of certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future dangerousness might be proved in individualized hearings. Once such a legislative classification has been drawn, additional procedures are unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential exemption for individuals who seek to prove that they are not individually dangerous or likely to offend against neighboring schoolchildren. Unless the Does can establish that the *substantive* rule established by the legislative classification conflicts with some provision of the Constitution, there is no requirement that the State provide a process to establish an exemption from the legislative classification. *Id.* at 7–8, 123 S.Ct. 1160. Thus, the absence of an individualized hearing in connection with a statute that offers no exemptions does not offend principles of procedural due process.

III.

8 The Does also assert that the residency restriction is unconstitutional under the doctrine of substantive due process. They rely on decisions of the Supreme Court holding that certain liberty interests are so fundamental that a State may not interfere with them, even with adequate procedural due process, unless the infringement is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). The Does argue that several “fundamental rights” are infringed by Iowa’s residency restriction, including the “right to privacy and choice in family matters,” the right to travel, and “the fundamental right to live where you want.” The district court agreed that § 692A.2A infringed upon liberty interests that constitute fundamental rights, applied strict scrutiny to the legislative classifications, and concluded that the statute was unconstitutional.

The Does first invoke “the right to personal choice regarding the family.” They cite the Supreme Court’s statement in *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), that “certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role *710 of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to

our constitutional scheme,” and the Court's discussion of “marital privacy” in *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). They also rely heavily on the Court's decision in *Moore v. City of East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), which held unconstitutional a zoning ordinance that defined “family” in such a way as to prohibit a grandmother and her two grandsons from living together in an area designated for “single family” dwellings. A plurality of the Court in *Moore* reasoned that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and concluded that the governmental interests advanced by the city were insufficient to justify an ordinance that “slic[ed] deeply into the family itself.” *Id.* at 498–99, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on other grounds. *Id.* at 513–21, 97 S.Ct. 1932.

9 We do not believe that the residency restriction of § 692A.2A implicates any fundamental right of the Does that would trigger strict scrutiny of the statute. In evaluating this argument, it is important to consider the Supreme Court's admonition that “ ‘[s]ubstantive due process’ analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’ ” *Flores*, 507 U.S. at 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting *Collins v. Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). While the Court has not directed that an asserted right be defined at the most specific level of tradition supporting or denying the asserted right, *cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, 491 U.S. at 127 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (1989)(opinion of Scalia, J.), the Does' characterization of a fundamental right to “personal choice regarding the family” is so general that it would trigger strict scrutiny of innumerable laws and ordinances that influence “personal choices” made by families on a daily basis. The Supreme Court's decision in *Griswold* and the plurality opinion in *Moore* did recognize unenumerated constitutional rights relating to personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but they defined the recognized rights more narrowly, in terms of “intimate relation of husband and wife,” *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, or “intrusive regulation” of “family living arrangements.” *Moore*, 431 U.S. at 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (plurality opinion).

Unlike the precedents cited by the Does, the Iowa statute does not operate directly on the family relationship. Although the law restricts where a residence may be located, nothing in the statute limits who may live with the Does in their residences. The plurality in *Moore* emphasized this distinction, observing that the impact on family was “no mere incidental result of the ordinance,” because “[o]n its face [the ordinance] selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not.” 431 U.S. at 498–99, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (plurality opinion). Thus, the reasoning of the *Moore* plurality does not require strict scrutiny of a regulation that has an incidental or unintended effect on the family, *Hameetman v. City of Chicago*, 776 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir.1985) (upholding requirement that firemen reside within city limits), or that “affects or encourages decisions on family matters” but does not force such choices. *Gorrie v. Bowen*, 809 F.2d 508, 523 (8th Cir.1987) (upholding regulation requiring that applications for public assistance for dependent children include siblings living in same *711 household). Similarly, the Court in *Griswold* disclaimed authority to determine “the wisdom, need, and propriety” of all laws that touch social conditions, but held unconstitutional a state statute that “operate[d] directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.” 381 U.S. at 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678.

While there was evidence that one adult sex offender in Iowa would not reside with his parents as a result of the residency restriction, that another sex offender and his wife moved 45 miles away from their preferred location due to the statute, and that a third sex offender could not reside with his adult child in a restricted zone, the statute does not directly regulate the family relationship or prevent any family member from residing with a sex offender in a residence that is consistent with the statute. We therefore hold that § 692A.2A does not infringe upon a constitutional liberty interest relating to matters of marriage and family in a fashion that requires heightened scrutiny.

10 The Does also assert that the residency restrictions interfere with their constitutional right to travel. The modern Supreme Court has recognized a right to interstate travel in several decisions, beginning with *United States v. Guest*, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966), and *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618, 629–30, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). The Court subsequently explained that the federal guarantee of interstate travel “protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: ‘the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement’ and ‘being treated differently’ from intrastate travelers.” *Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic*, 506 U.S. 263, 277, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (quoting *Zobel v. Williams*, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982)). Most recently, the Court summarized that the right to interstate travel embraces at least three different components: “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” *Saenz v. Roe*, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999).

Although the district court, like some other courts, considered the first component of a right to interstate travel under the rubric of “substantive due process,” the Supreme Court has not identified the textual source of that component. The Court has observed that the Articles of Confederation provided that “the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,” and suggested that this right “may simply have been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.’ ” *Id.* at 501 & n. 3, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (quoting *Guest*, 383 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1170). The latter two components of the right identified in *Saenz* arise from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Id.*

The Does argue that § 692A.2A violates this right to interstate travel by substantially limiting the ability of sex offenders to establish residences in any town or urban area in Iowa. They contend that the constitutional right to travel is implicated because the Iowa law deters previously convicted sex offenders from migrating from other States to Iowa. The district court agreed, reasoning that the statute “effectively bans sex offenders from residing in large sections of Iowa's towns and cities.” 298 F.Supp.2d at 874.

*712 We respectfully disagree with this analysis. The Iowa statute imposes no obstacle to a sex offender's entry into Iowa, and it does not erect an “actual barrier to interstate movement.” *Bray*, 506 U.S. at 277, 113 S.Ct. 753 (internal quotation omitted). There is “free ingress and regress to and from” Iowa for sex offenders, and the statute thus does not “directly impair the exercise of the right to free interstate movement.” *Saenz*, 526 U.S. at 501, 119 S.Ct. 1518. Nor does the Iowa statute violate principles of equality by treating nonresidents who visit Iowa any differently than current residents, or by discriminating against citizens of other States who wish to establish residence in Iowa. We think that to recognize a fundamental right to interstate travel in a situation that does not involve any of these circumstances would extend the doctrine beyond the Supreme Court's pronouncements in this area. That the statute may deter some out-of-state residents from traveling to Iowa because the prospects for a convenient and affordable residence are less promising than elsewhere does not implicate a fundamental right recognized by the Court's right to travel jurisprudence.³

11 The Does also assert that § 692A.2A infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right to *intra* state travel. The Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, see *Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County*, 415 U.S. 250, 255–56, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), although it observed long ago that under the Articles of Confederation, state citizens “possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom.” *United States v. Wheeler*, 254 U.S. 281, 293, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65 L.Ed. 270 (1920).

During the same era, the Court also commented that “the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty ... secured by the 14th Amendment,” *Williams v. Fears*, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900), but as the Third Circuit observed, “[i]t is unclear whether the travel aspect of cases like *Fears* can be severed from the general spirit of *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905), now thoroughly discredited, that was so prominent in the substantive due process analysis of that period.” *Lutz v. City of York*, 899 F.2d 255, 266 (3d Cir.1990).

Some of our sister circuits have recognized a fundamental right to intrastate ^{*713}travel in the context of a “drug exclusion zone” that banned persons from an area of a city for a period of time, *Johnson v. City of Cincinnati*, 310 F.3d 484, 496–98 (6th Cir.2002), an ordinance that outlawed “cruising” and thus limited the ability of persons to drive on certain major public roads, *Lutz*, 899 F.2d at 268, and a law that created a durational residency requirement as a condition of eligibility for public housing. *King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth.*, 442 F.2d 646, 647–48 (2d Cir.1971). The Second Circuit, for example, reasoned that it would be “meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” *Id.* at 648; see also *Johnson*, 310 F.3d at 497 n. 4; *Lutz*, 899 F.2d at 261. Other decisions have held that there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel in the context of a bona fide residency requirement imposed as a condition of municipal employment. *Andre v. Bd. of Trs. of Maywood*, 561 F.2d 48, 52–53 (7th Cir.1977); *Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ.*, 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir.1976); *Wright v. City of Jackson*, 506 F.2d 900, 901–02 (5th Cir.1975); see also *Doe v. City of Lafayette*, 377 F.3d 757, 770–71 (7th Cir.2004) (en banc) (holding that city's ban of sex offender from all public parks did not implicate fundamental right to intrastate travel, where offender was “not limited in moving from place to place within his locality to socialize with friends and family, to participate in gainful employment or to go to the market to buy food and clothing”); *Hutchins v. District of Columbia*, 188 F.3d 531, 538–39 (D.C.Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that there is no fundamental right for juveniles to be in a public place without adult supervision during curfew hours).

We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel under the Constitution, because assuming such a right is recognized, it would not require strict scrutiny of § 692A.2A. The district court and the Does cite the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Johnson* for the proposition that there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel. Accepting that view for purposes of analysis, we believe that any fundamental right to intrastate travel would likely be “correlative” to the right to interstate travel discussed in *Saenz*, see *Johnson*, 310 F.3d at 497 n. 4, or would consist of a “right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways.” *Id.* at 498. Therefore, the Iowa statute would not implicate a right to intrastate travel for the same reasons that it does not implicate the right to interstate travel. The Iowa residency restriction does not prevent a sex offender from entering or leaving any part of the State, including areas within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility, and it does not erect any actual barrier to intrastate movement. In this sense, the Iowa law is comparable to the municipal residency requirements that have been held to implicate no fundamental right to intrastate travel in *Andre*, *Wardwell* and *Wright*, and less restrictive on freedom of movement than the ban on access to public parks upheld under rational basis review in *Doe v. City of Lafayette*. By contrast, the decisions finding infringement of a fundamental right to intrastate travel have involved laws that trigger concerns not present here—interference with free ingress to and egress from certain parts of a State (*Johnson* and *Lutz*) or treatment of new residents of a locality less favorably than existing residents (*King*).

¹² The Does also urge that we recognize a fundamental right “to live where you want.” This ambitious articulation of a proposed unenumerated right calls to mind the Supreme Court's caution that we should proceed with restraint in the area ^{*714} of substantive due process, because “[b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena

of public debate and legislative action.” *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). Some thirty years ago, our court said “we cannot agree that the right to choose one’s place of residence is necessarily a fundamental right,” *Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D.*, 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir.1974), and we see no basis to conclude that the contention has gained strength in the intervening years. The Supreme Court recently has restated its reluctance to “expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended,” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (quoting *Collins*, 503 U.S. at 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061), and the Does have not developed any argument that the right to “live where you want” is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” *id.* at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (quoting *Moore*, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (plurality opinion)) or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.” *Id.* (quoting *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)). We are thus not persuaded that the Constitution establishes a right to “live where you want” that requires strict scrutiny of a State’s residency restrictions.

13 Because § 692A.2A does not implicate a constitutional liberty interest that has been elevated to the status of “fundamental right,” we review the statute to determine whether it meets the standard of “rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose.” *Flores*, 507 U.S. at 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439. The Does acknowledge that the statute was designed to promote the safety of children, and they concede that this is a legitimate state interest. They also allow that perhaps “certain identifiable sex offenders should not live right across the street from a school or perhaps anywhere else where there are children.” (Appellees’ Br. at 51). The Does contend, however, that the statute is irrational because there is no scientific study that supports the legislature’s conclusion that excluding sex offenders from residing within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility is likely to enhance the safety of children.

We reject this contention because we think it understates the authority of a state legislature to make judgments about the best means to protect the health and welfare of its citizens in an area where precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily unpredictable. Although the Does introduced one report from the Minnesota Department of Corrections finding “no evidence in Minnesota that residential proximity of sex offenders to schools or parks affects reoffense,” this solitary case study—which involved only thirteen reoffenders released from prison between 1997 and 1999—does not make irrational the decision of the Iowa General Assembly and the Governor of Iowa to reach a different predictive judgment for Iowa. As the district court observed, twelve other States have enacted some form of residency restriction applicable to sex offenders.⁴ There can be *715 no doubt of a legislature’s rationality in believing that “[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation,” and that “[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” *Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety*, 538 U.S. at 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (alterations in original) (quoting *McKune v. Lile*, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) (plurality opinion)). The only question remaining is whether, in view of a rationally perceived risk, the chosen residency restriction rationally advances the State’s interest in protecting children.

14 We think the decision whether to set a limit on proximity of “across the street” (as appellees suggest), or 500 feet or 3000 feet (as the Iowa Senate considered and rejected, *see* S. Journal 79, 2d Sess., at 521 (Iowa 2002)), or 2000 feet (as the Iowa General Assembly and the Governor eventually adopted) is the sort of task for which the elected policymaking officials of a State, and not the federal courts, are properly suited. The legislature is institutionally equipped to weigh the benefits and burdens of various distances, and to reconsider its initial decision in light of experience and data accumulated over time. The State of Alabama, for example, originally adopted a residency restriction of 1000 feet, but later increased the distance to 2000 feet, *Ala.Code* § 15–20–26(a); *see also* 2000 Ala. Acts 728, § 1; 1999 Ala. Acts 572, § 3, while the Minnesota legislature apparently followed the recommendation of the State’s Department of Corrections that no blanket proximity restriction should be adopted. (Appellee’s App. at 338). Where individuals in a group, such as convicted sex offenders, have “distinguishing *716 characteristics relevant

to interests the State has authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued.” *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 441–42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

The record does not support a conclusion that the Iowa General Assembly and the Governor acted based merely on negative attitudes toward, fear of, or a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. *Cf. Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 448, 105 S.Ct. 3249; *Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). Sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and the parties presented expert testimony that reducing opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing the risk of reoffense. Even experts in the field could not predict with confidence whether a particular sex offender will reoffend, whether an offender convicted of an offense against a teenager will be among those who “cross over” to offend against a younger child, or the degree to which regular proximity to a place where children are located enhances the risk of reoffense against children. One expert in the district court opined that it is just “common sense” that limiting the frequency of contact between sex offenders and areas where children are located is likely to reduce the risk of an offense. (Appellant’s App. at 165). The policymakers of Iowa are entitled to employ such “common sense,” and we are not persuaded that the means selected to pursue the State’s legitimate interest are without rational basis.

IV.

15 The Does next argue that the residency restriction, “in combination with” the sex offender registration requirements of § 692A.2, unconstitutionally compels sex offenders to incriminate themselves in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court concluded that a sex offender who establishes residence in a prohibited area must either register his current address, thereby “explicitly admit[ting] the facts necessary to prove the criminal act,” or “refuse to register and be similarly prosecuted.” 298 F.Supp.2d at 879. The court then held that § 692A.2A “unconstitutionally requires sex offenders to provide incriminating evidence against themselves,” and enjoined enforcement of the residency restriction on this basis as well.

We disagree that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment renders the residency restriction of § 692A.2A unconstitutional. Our reason is straightforward: the residency restriction does not compel a sex offender to be a witness against himself or a witness of any kind. The statute regulates only where the sex offender may reside; it does not require him to provide any information that might be used against him in a criminal case. A *separate* section of the *Iowa Code*, § 692A.2, requires a sex offender to register his address with the county sheriff. The Does have not challenged the constitutionality of the registration requirement, or sought an injunction against its enforcement, and whatever constitutional problem may be posed by the registration provision does not justify invalidating the residency restriction.

None of the authorities cited by the Does supports invalidation of a substantive rule of law because a reporting or registration requirement allegedly compels a person in violation of that substantive rule to incriminate himself. The Supreme Court held in **717 Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and *Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968), that a gambler was privileged under the Fifth Amendment not to register his occupation as one in the business of accepting wagers, not to pay the required occupational tax, and not to pay a wagering excise tax, because these submissions would create a real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination for the gambler. The Court never suggested, however, that the Self-Incrimination Clause prevented the government from criminalizing wagering or gambling. Similarly, in *Leary v. United States*, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969), the Court’s holding that a plea of self-incrimination was a complete defense in a prosecution for non-compliance with provisions requiring payment of a tax on marijuana imported into the United States did not imply that state laws prohibiting the possession of marijuana were somehow unconstitutional. *Id.* at 29, 89 S.Ct. 1532. And in *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control*

Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965), where the Court held unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment a requirement that members of the Communist Party file a registration statement with the Attorney General, it was never intimated that the registration requirement rendered unconstitutional Section 4(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, under which Albertson might have been prosecuted as a result of the registration.

Even had the Does challenged the sex offender registration statute, moreover, we believe that a self-incrimination challenge to the registration requirements would not be ripe for decision. Unlike *Albertson*, where the petitioners had asserted the privilege against self-incrimination on multiple occasions, the Attorney General of the United States had rejected their claims, and specific orders requiring the petitioners to register had been issued, 382 U.S. at 75, 86 S.Ct. 194, the process with respect to enforcement of the Iowa sex offender registration statute in conjunction with the residency restriction is far less developed. The record does not show whether any of the plaintiffs has registered with the county sheriff an address that is prohibited by § 692A.2A, whether any of the county attorneys or the Attorney General would seek to use registration information to further a criminal prosecution for violation of the residency restriction (rather than merely as a regulatory mechanism to bring sex offenders into compliance with the statute),⁵ or whether the prosecuting authorities would recognize a refusal to register as a valid assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination (and thus decline to prosecute a sex offender for failing to register a prohibited residence).

We think that under these circumstances, a self-incrimination challenge to the registration statute would be premature. See *Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.*, 367 U.S. 1, 106–10, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961); cf. *Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group*, 468 U.S. 841, 858, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). If and when there is a prosecution for violation of the residency restriction in which the prosecution makes use of a sex offender's registration, a prosecution for failure to register a prohibited address, or some other basis such as in *Albertson* to say that the *718 dispute is ripe, then the self-incrimination issue will be joined. It would then be appropriate to consider such questions as whether the registration requirement as applied falls under the rule of cases such as *Marchetti* and *Albertson*, where the Fifth Amendment was held to prohibit incriminating registration or reporting requirements directed at persons “inherently suspect of criminal activities,” *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 79, 86 S.Ct. 194, or whether the public need for information about convicted sex offenders and the noncriminal regulatory purpose for securing the information might permit enforcement of the requirement consistent with the Fifth Amendment. Cf. *Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549, 557–59, 110 S.Ct. 900, 107 L.Ed.2d 992 (1990); *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 431–34, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971) (plurality opinion); *id.* at 457–58, 91 S.Ct. 1535 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). At this point, we conclude that the Does' self-incrimination claim is both misdirected and premature.

V.

16,17,18 A final, and narrower, challenge advanced by the Does is that § 692A.2A is an unconstitutional *ex post facto* law because it imposes retroactive punishment on those who committed a sex offense prior to July 1, 2002. The *Ex Post Facto* Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution prohibits the States from enacting laws that increase punishment for criminal acts after they have been committed. See generally *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (Chase, J., seriatim). In determining whether a state statute violates the *Ex Post Facto* Clause by imposing such punishment, we apply the framework outlined in *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), where the Supreme Court considered an *ex post facto* challenge to an Alaska statute requiring sex offenders to register. Under that framework, we must first “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” *Id.* (internal quotation omitted). If the legislature intended criminal punishment, then the legislative intent controls the inquiry and the law is necessarily punitive. *Id.* If, however, the legislature intended its law to be civil and nonpunitive, then we must determine whether the law is nonetheless “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the

State's nonpunitive intent. *Id.* (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[O]nly the clearest proof” will transform what the legislature has denominated a civil regulatory measure into a criminal penalty. *Id.*

19 The district court found that in passing the residency restriction of § 692A.2A, the Iowa General Assembly intended to create “a civil, non-punitive statutory scheme to protect the public.” 298 F.Supp.2d at 868. The Does do not dispute this conclusion on appeal, and we agree that the legislature's intent was not punitive. Although Iowa Code § 692A.2A does not contain any clear statement of purpose, the residency restriction is codified as part of Chapter 692A, together with a registration system that the Supreme Court of Iowa has declared to have a purpose of “protect[ing] society” and to be a nonpunitive, regulatory law. *In Interest of S.M.M.*, 558 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997); *State v. Pickens*, 558 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1997). “[W]here a legislative restriction is an incident of the State's power to protect the health and safety of its citizens, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 93–94, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quoting **719 Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)) (internal marks omitted). We believe the available evidence leads most naturally to the inference that the restrictions in § 692A.2A are intended, like the restrictions elsewhere in the same chapter, to protect the health and safety of Iowa citizens. Therefore, we conclude that the purpose of the Iowa General Assembly in passing this law was regulatory and non-punitive.

We must next consider whether the Does have established that the law was nonetheless so punitive in effect as to negate the legislature's intent to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme. In this inquiry, we refer to what the Supreme Court described in *Smith v. Doe* as “useful guideposts” for determining whether a law has a punitive effect. In analyzing the effect of the Alaska sex offender registration law, the Court in *Smith* pointed to five factors drawn from *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), as particularly relevant: whether the law has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment, whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. These factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” *id.* (quotation omitted), and while we consider them as an aid to our analysis, we bear in mind that the ultimate question always remains whether the punitive effects of the law are so severe as to constitute the “clearest proof” that a statute intended by the legislature to be nonpunitive and regulatory should nonetheless be deemed to impose *ex post facto* punishment.

Turning first to any historical tradition regarding residency restrictions, the Does argue that § 692A.2A is the effective equivalent of banishment, which has been regarded historically as a punishment. *See Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Banishment has been defined as “ ‘punishment inflicted on criminals by compelling them to quit a city, place, or country for a specified period of time, or for life,’ ” *United States v. Ju Toy*, 198 U.S. 253, 269–70, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting *Black's Law Dictionary*), or “expulsion from a country.” *Black's Law Dictionary* 154, 614 (8th ed.2004). The Supreme Court most recently explained that banished offenders historically could not “return to their original community,” and that the banishment of an offender “expelled him from the community.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140; *see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893) (holding that order of deportation is “not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment”).

While banishment of course involves an extreme form of residency restriction, we ultimately do not accept the analogy between the traditional means of punishment and the Iowa statute. Unlike banishment, § 692A.2A restricts only where offenders may reside. It does not “expel” the offenders from their communities or prohibit them from accessing areas near schools or child care facilities for

employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or for any purpose other than establishing a residence. With respect to many offenders, the statute does not even require a change of residence: the Iowa General Assembly included a grandfather provision that permits sex offenders to maintain a residence that was established prior to July 1, 2002, even if that residence is within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility. *720 Iowa Code § 692A.2A(4)(c). The district court, moreover, found that residency restrictions for sex offenders “are relatively new and somewhat unique,” 298 F.Supp.2d at 849 n. 4, and as with sex offender registration laws, which also were of “fairly recent origin,” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal quotation omitted), this novelty “suggests that the statute was not meant as a punitive measure, or, at least, that it did not involve a traditional means of punishing.” *Id.* We thus conclude that this law is unlike banishment in important respects, and we do not believe it is of a type that is traditionally punitive.

The second factor that we consider is whether the law promotes the traditional aims of punishment—deterrence and retribution. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The district court found that the law was both deterrent and retributive, and thus weighed this factor in favor of its finding that the law was punitive. We agree with the district court that the law could have a deterrent effect, but we do not agree that the deterrent effect provides a strong inference that the restriction is punishment. The primary purpose of the law is not to alter the offender's incentive structure by demonstrating the negative consequences that will flow from committing a sex offense. The Iowa statute is designed to reduce the likelihood of reoffense by limiting the offender's temptation and reducing the opportunity to commit a new crime. We observe, moreover, that the Supreme Court has cautioned that this factor not be over-emphasized, for it can “prove[] too much,” as “[a]ny number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.” *Id.*

The statute's “retributive” effect is similarly difficult to evaluate. For example, while the Ninth Circuit found punishment where the length of sex offender reporting requirements corresponded to the degree of wrongdoing rather than the extent of the risk imposed, *Doe I v. Otte*, 259 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir.2001), *rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Supreme Court disagreed, and instead emphasized that the reporting requirements were “reasonably related to the danger of recidivism” in a way that was “consistent with the regulatory objective.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. While any restraint or requirement imposed on those who commit crimes is at least potentially retributive in effect, we believe that § 692A.2A, like the registration requirement in *Smith v. Doe*, is consistent with the legislature's regulatory objective of protecting the health and safety of children.

The next factor we consider is whether the law “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint.” Imprisonment is the “paradigmatic” affirmative disability or restraint, *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140, but other restraints, such as probation or occupational debarment, also can impose some restriction on a person's activities. *Id.* at 100–01, 123 S.Ct. 1140. While restrictive laws are not necessarily punitive, they are more likely to be so; by contrast, “[i]f the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” *Id.* at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. For example, sex offender registration laws, requiring only periodic reporting and updating of personal information, do not have a punitive restraining effect. *Id.* at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. At the same time, civil commitment of the mentally ill, though extremely restrictive and disabling to those who are committed, does not necessarily impose punishment because it bears a reasonable relationship to a “legitimate nonpunitive objective,” namely protecting the public from mentally unstable *721 individuals. *Hendricks*, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072.

Iowa Code § 692A.2A is more disabling than the sex offender registration law at issue in *Smith v. Doe*, which had not “led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background checks by employers and

landlords.” 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Although the Does did not present much evidence about housing within restricted areas that would have been available to them absent the statute, they did show that some sex offenders would have lived with spouses or parents who owned property in the restricted zones, and some sex offenders were living in residences within restricted areas that were permitted under the statute’s “grandfather” provision. The residency restriction is certainly less disabling, however, than the civil commitment scheme at issue in *Hendricks*, which permitted complete confinement of affected persons. In both *Smith* and *Hendricks*, the Court considered the degree of the restraint involved in light of the legislature’s countervailing nonpunitive purpose, and the Court in *Hendricks* emphasized that the imposition of an affirmative restraint “does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.” 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (internal quotation omitted). Likewise here, while we agree with the Does that § 692A.2A does impose an element of affirmative disability or restraint, we believe this factor ultimately points us to the importance of the next inquiry: whether the law is rationally connected to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether it is excessive in relation to that purpose.

20 This final factor—whether the regulatory scheme has a “rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose”—is the “most significant factor” in the *ex post facto* analysis. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The requirement of a “rational connection” is not demanding: A “statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.” *Id.* at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The district court found “no doubt” that § 692A.2A has a purpose other than punishing sex offenders, 298 F.Supp.2d at 870, and we agree. In light of the high risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders, *see Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140, the legislature reasonably could conclude that § 692A.2A would protect society by minimizing the risk of repeated sex offenses against minors.

21 The district court nonetheless concluded that the statute is excessive in relation to this purpose, because the law applies “regardless of whether a particular offender is a danger to the public.” 298 F.Supp.2d at 871. The absence of a particularized risk assessment, however, does not necessarily convert a regulatory law into a punitive measure, for “[t]he *Ex Post Facto* Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Supreme Court over the years has held that restrictions on several classes of offenders are nonpunitive, despite the absence of particularized determinations, including laws prohibiting the practice of medicine by convicted felons, *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 197, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898), laws prohibiting convicted felons from serving as officers or agents of a union, *De Veau v. Braisted*, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (plurality opinion); *id.* at 160–61, 80 S.Ct. 1146 (opinion of Brennan, J.), and of course laws ^{*722} requiring the registration of sex offenders. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 106, 123 S.Ct. 1140.

In this case, we conclude that a categorical rule is consistent with the legislature’s regulatory purpose and not “excessive” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decisions. While the Does argue that the legislature must tailor restrictions to the individual circumstances of different sex offenders, we view this position as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s direction that the “excessiveness” prong of the *ex post facto* analysis does not require a “close or perfect fit” between the legislature’s nonpunitive purpose and the corresponding regulation. The evidence presented at trial suggested that convicted sex offenders as a class were more likely to commit sex offenses against minors than the general population. Dr. McEchron indicated that “there are never any guarantees that [sex offenders] won’t reoffend,” (Appellant’s App. at 162), and Mr. Allison testified that “any sex offender is always going to be of some concern forever.” (T. Tr. at 279).

More specifically, in Allison’s view, even an offender who committed a crime involving an older victim, such as statutory rape, would be of concern around a day care or elementary school, although the concern

may be reduced, (T. Tr. at 278), and Dr. Rosell testified that while he believed that a sex offender who committed an offense with a 14 or 15-year-old victim was likely to stay in that age range, there also was no way to predict whether a sex offender would “cross over” in selecting victims from adults to children or males to females. (Appellee's App. at 149, 184). Dr. Rosell was less than definitive about the degree to which sex offenders' future behavior was predictable and avoidable; while he personally did not believe residential proximity made “that big of a difference,” he agreed that “what works in criminal justice is imprecise at best,” and testified that “[t]here is always a risk” of reoffense. (Appellee's App. at 193, 195, 190). In view of the higher-than-average risk of reoffense posed by convicted sex offenders, and the imprecision involved in predicting what measures will best prevent recidivism, we do not believe the Does have established that Iowa's decision to restrict all such offenders from residing near schools and child care facilities constitutes punishment despite the legislature's regulatory purpose.

22 The Does also urge that the law is excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose because there is no scientific evidence that a 2000-foot residency restriction is effective at preventing sex offender recidivism. “The excessiveness inquiry of our *ex post facto* jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy,” but rather an inquiry into “whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. In this case, there was expert testimony that reducing the frequency of contact between sex offenders and children is likely to reduce temptation and opportunity, which in turn is important to reducing the risk of reoffense. None of the witnesses was able to articulate a precise distance that optimally balanced the benefit of reducing risk to children with the burden of the residency restrictions on sex offenders, and the Does' expert acknowledged that “[t]here is nothing in the literature that has addressed proximity.” (Appellee's App. 198; *accord id.* at 41, 47–48 (testimony of Dr. McEchron)). As even Dr. Rosell admitted, we just “don't know” that the Iowa Legislature “isn't ahead of the curve.” (*Id.* at 198).

***723** We believe the legislature's decision to select a 2000-foot restriction, as opposed to the other distances that were considered and rejected, is reasonably related to its regulatory purpose. Given the challenge in determining precisely what distance is best suited to minimize risk to children without unnecessarily restricting sex offenders, and the difficult policy judgments inherent in that choice, we conclude that the Does have not established the “clearest proof” that Iowa's choice is excessive in relation to its legitimate regulatory purpose, such that a statute designed to be nonpunitive and regulatory should be considered retroactive criminal punishment.⁶

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I join in the majority's opinion, sections I through IV. However, I dissent as to section V because I believe section 692A.2A is an unconstitutional *ex post facto* law.

The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from passing *ex post facto* laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. “‘Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed,’ ” is an *ex post facto* law. *Stogner v. California*, 539 U.S. 607, 612, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (quoting *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)).

As set out by the majority, the fundamental question the Court must decide is whether the residency requirement amounts to punishment. We do so by first asking whether the legislature intended the statute to be punitive. If the answer is in the affirmative, that ends our inquiry, and we find the legislation to be an *ex post facto* law. However, if the legislature intended the statute to be nonpunitive, “we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's

intention to deem it civil.” *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). I agree with the majority that the purpose of section 692A.2A is to protect the public. This purpose is nonpunitive, so we must determine if the statute “is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it civil.” *Id.*

I also agree with the majority that the factors outlined in *Smith* should guide our analysis. However, I part ways with the majority as to how some of the individual factors should be examined and as to the final outcome of the multi-factor analysis.

1. Have measures like the residency restriction historically been regarded as punishment?

The majority concedes that banishment has historically been regarded as punishment, *724 but points out how the residency restriction differs from banishment. The majority concludes that section 692A.2A is not the type of law that has historically been regarded as punishment. I would find that, although section 692A.2A does not amount to full banishment, it sufficiently resembles banishment to make this factor weigh towards finding the law punitive.

The district court made the following factual findings on the availability of housing:

[S]ex offenders are completely banned from living in a number of Iowa's small towns and cities. In the state's major communities, offenders are relegated to living in industrial areas, in some of the cities' most expensive developments, or on the very outskirts of town where available housing is limited. Although some areas are completely unrestricted, these are either very small towns without any services, or farmland.

* * * * *

In larger cities such as Des Moines and Iowa City, the maps show that the two thousand foot circles cover virtually the entire city area. The few areas in Des Moines, for instance, which are not restricted, include only industrial areas or some of the city's newest and most expensive neighborhoods. In smaller towns that have a school or childcare facility, the entire town is often engulfed by the excluded area. In Johnson County alone, the towns of Lone Tree, North Liberty, Oxford, Shueyville, Solon, Swisher and Tiffin are wholly restricted to sex offenders under § 692A.2A. Unincorporated areas and towns too small to have a school or childcare facility remain available, as does the country, but available housing in those areas is not necessarily readily available.

These findings are not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld. *See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)*. In its findings, the district court demonstrated how difficult it is for sex offenders to find legal housing in many communities in Iowa due to the housing restriction. It is common that offenders may not return to live in the community they lived in before incarceration, the place where their families live, and/or the place they find work. There are so few legal housing options that many offenders face the choice of living in rural areas or leaving the state. The difficulty in finding proper housing effectively prevents offenders from living in many Iowa communities. This effectively results in banishment from virtually all of Iowa's cities and larger towns.

In *Smith*, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between Alaska's sex offender registry and colonial punishments such as shaming, branding, and banishment. The Court found that the registry merely involved “dissemination of information,” whereas the colonial punishments “either held the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming or *expelled him from the community*.” *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (emphasis added). It described the aim of these colonial punishments as making

“offenders suffer permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.” *Id.* (internal quotation and citation omitted). The residency requirement is a permanent stigma as well as a law that effectively casts the person out of the community. Further, *Smith* also described as banishment situations in which individuals “could neither return to their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.” *Id.* Under this phrasing, section 692A.2A fits the description of banishment.

*725 Of course, the residency restriction does not prevent offenders from living in every community, nor from visiting communities in which they are not allowed to live. In this way, the law differs from complete banishment. However, preventing offenders from making a home in many Iowa communities after they have served their sentence does have substantial similarity to banishment. To the extent that offenders are effectively banished from their desired places of residence, I would find this factor weighs in favor of finding section 692A.2A punitive.

2. Does the residency restriction promote traditional aims of punishment?

The residency restriction serves a traditional aim of punishment: deterrence. The majority attempts to minimize the deterrent effect of the statute by arguing that the statute does not increase the negative consequences for an action, but merely reduces the opportunity for that action to occur. In my view, this distinction is not important. One major reason we use the punishments we do, such as imprisonment, is to reduce the likelihood of future crimes by depriving the offender of the opportunity to commit those crimes. There is clearly a deterrent purpose at work in section 692A.2A, thus the measure promotes a traditional aim of punishment.

3. Does the residency restriction impose an affirmative disability or restraint?

The majority acknowledges that the residency requirement imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, and I agree. It restricts offenders from living in certain areas. Offenders that live within the restricted areas face criminal penalties. In this way, the restraint differs greatly from the sex offender registry in *Smith*. The Court in that case pointed out that offenders were “free to change ... residences.” *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Court also noted that there was no evidence that the measure disadvantaged the offenders in finding housing. *Id.* I would find that the affirmative disability or restraint intrinsic in the residence requirement distinguishes it from the sex offender registry in *Smith* and weighs in favor of finding the law punitive.

4. Does the residency restriction have a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose?

I agree with the majority that section 692A.2A has a rational connection to the nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public. See *In Interest of S.M.M.*, 558 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997).

5. Is the residency restriction excessive?

Though I believe a rational connection exists between the residency restriction and a nonpunitive purpose, I would find that the restriction is excessive in relation to that purpose. The statute limits the housing choices of all offenders identically, regardless of their type of crime, type of victim, or risk of re-offending. The effect of the requirement is quite dramatic: many offenders cannot live with their families and/or cannot live in their home communities because the whole community is a restricted area. This leaves offenders to live in the country or in small, prescribed areas of towns and cities that might offer no appropriate, available housing. In addition, there is no time limit to the restrictions.

Also, the residency restriction applies to plaintiffs who are not the most serious sex offenders. There is no doubt a class of offenders that is at risk to re-offend and for whom such a restriction is reasonable. *726 However, the restriction also applies to John Doe II, who pleaded guilty to third degree sexual abuse for having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl when he was twenty years old. The restriction applies to John Doe VII, who was convicted of statutory rape under Kansas law. His actions which gave rise to this conviction would not have been criminal in Iowa. The restriction applies also to John Doe XIV, who pleaded guilty to a serious misdemeanor charge in 1995 after he exposed himself at a party at which a thirteen-year-old girl was present. John Doe XIV was nineteen at the time of his offense. The actions of these and other plaintiffs are serious, and, at least in most cases, illegal in this state. However, the severity of residency restriction, the fact that it is applied to all offenders identically, and the fact that it will be enforced for the rest of the offenders' lives, makes the residency restriction excessive.

In my view, four factors weigh in favor of finding the statute punitive, while only one weighs in favor of finding the statute nonpunitive. The analysis leads me to the conclusion that the residency restriction is punitive. Because the imposition of the residency requirement “ ‘changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed,’ ” *Stogner*, 539 U.S. at 612, 123 S.Ct. 2446 (quoting *Calder*, 3 U.S. at 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648), I would find Section 692A.2A is an unconstitutional ex post facto law that cannot be applied to persons who committed their offenses before the law was enacted.

Footnotes

* Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, Judge Murphy, Judge Bye, Judge Melloy, and Judge Smith would grant the petition for rehearing en banc.

1 The text of the statute provides as follows:

692A.2A Residency restrictions—child care facilities and schools.

1. For purposes of this section, “person” means a person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor.

2. A person shall not reside within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility.

3. A person who resides within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, or a child care facility, commits an aggravated misdemeanor.

4. A person residing within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility does not commit a violation of this section if any of the following apply:

a. The person is required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution or facility.

b. The person is subject to an order of commitment under chapter 229A.

c. The person has established a residence prior to [] July 1, 2002, or a school or child care facility is newly located on or [after] July 1, 2002.

d. The person is a minor or a ward under a guardianship.

Iowa Code § 692A.2A. The term “residence” is defined as “the place where a person sleeps, which may include more than one location, and may be mobile or transitory.” Iowa Code § 692A.1(8).

2 The parties presented substantial evidence concerning the effect of the statute on the availability of housing for sex offenders in Carroll County, Iowa. The district court found that 2077 of 9019 residential units in the county (23 percent) were not in restricted areas. The Carroll County Attorney testified that 1694 of the available units were in unincorporated areas of the county, and were “mainly farmhouses,” but he noted that the trend toward larger farms has created some vacancies in farmhouses where the party farming the land does not live in the farmhouse. Of the remaining 383 units available in the county, the

district court found that 244 were located in towns without a school or child care facility. *Doe v. Miller*, 298 F.Supp.2d at 852.

3 In its analysis of the right to interstate travel, the district court also expressed concern that a sex offender might be compelled to avoid Iowa altogether, lest he establish an unlawful residence by “unwittingly falling asleep” at a location within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility. 298 F.Supp.2d at 875. The court stated that “[l]iteral application of the Act would result in the great majority of the State’s hotels and motels being restricted to traveling sex offenders,” and that “community centers such as homeless shelters and missions will most likely be unavailable to sex offenders because of location.” *Id.* This led the court to conclude that “sex offenders would appear to be able to travel to Iowa freely only so long as they do not stop.” *Id.*

We question whether these concerns are even applicable to the plaintiffs, given that the plaintiff class was defined as those sex offenders “currently living” in Iowa or “might wish to live” in Iowa, not vacationers or cross-country travelers. *Id.* at 847. In any event, the Does do not rely on these factual assertions in defending the judgment of the district court, and we do not find evidence in the record that would support a specific finding about the proximity of hotels, motels, homeless shelters, and missions throughout Iowa to schools and child care facilities.

4 See Ala.Code § 15–20–26(a) (“Unless otherwise exempted by law, no adult criminal sex offender shall establish a residence or accept employment within 2,000 feet of the property on which any school or child care facility is located.”); Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–128(a) (“It shall be unlawful for a sex offender who is required to register ... and who has been assessed as a Level 3 or Level 4 offender to reside within two thousand feet (2000') of the property on which any public or private elementary or secondary school or daycare facility is located.”); Cal.Penal Code § 3003(g) (“[A]n inmate who is released on parole for any violation of [sections prohibiting lewd or lascivious acts, or continued sexual abuse of a child] shall not be placed or reside ... within one one-quarter mile of any public or private school.”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (“Any inmate convicted of [certain sexual crimes against minors] and ... subject to conditional release supervision ... [is prohibited from] living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, designated public school bus stop or other place where children regularly congregate.”); Ga.Code Ann. § 42–1–13(b) (“No individual required to register ... shall reside within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate.”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/11–9.3(b–5) (“It is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly reside within 500 feet of a school building ...”); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 17.495 (“No registrant ... who is placed on probation, parole, or any form of supervised release, shall reside within one thousand (1,000) feet of a high school, middle school, elementary school, preschool, or licensed day care facility.”); La.Rev.Stat. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (“Unlawful presence of a sexually violent predator is ... the physical residing of a sexually violent predator within one thousand feet of any public or private, elementary or secondary school, a day care facility, playground, public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or free standing video arcade facility.”); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2950.031(A) (“No person who has been convicted of ... either a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense shall establish a residence or occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of any school premises.”); Okl. Stat. tit. 57, § 590 (“It is unlawful for any person registered pursuant to the Oklahoma Sex Offenders Registration Act to reside within a two thousand-foot radius of any public or private school site or educational institution.”); Or.Rev.Stat. § 144.642(1)(a) (Rules for post-prison supervision or parole “shall include ... a general prohibition against allowing a sex offender to reside near locations where children are the primary occupants or users.”); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40–39–211(a) (“No sexual offender, ... or violent sexual offender, ... shall knowingly reside or work within one thousand feet (1,000') of the property on which any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, or any other child care facility is located.”).

5 There is evidence in the record that some Iowa law enforcement authorities, rather than immediately file charges against an offender found to be residing in a restricted zone, have withheld charges while the offender sought housing in an unrestricted area. (T. Tr. at 229).

⁶ In view of our conclusion that the statute is not punitive, it follows that the law is not a “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. *See Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (explaining that factors used in determining whether law is punishment for *ex post facto* purposes “have their earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments”); *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 94–99, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion). Even assuming that § 692A.2A were punitive, we would agree with the district court that the law is neither barbaric nor grossly disproportionate to the offenses committed by the Does. We therefore reject the Eighth Amendment argument urged by the appellees as an alternative ground for affirming the district court.



Criminal Careers in the Short-Term: Intra-Individual Variability in Crime and Its Relation to Local Life Circumstances

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CRIMINAL CAREERS IN THE SHORT-TERM: INTRA-INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY IN CRIME AND ITS RELATION TO LOCAL LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES*

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We analyze month-to-month variations in offending and life circumstances of convicted felons to understand change in criminal behavior. We extend previous applications of social control theory by considering whether local life circumstances that strengthen or weaken social bonds influence offending over relatively short periods of time. We seek to determine whether formal and informal mechanisms of social control affect the likelihood of committing nine major felonies. We employ a hierarchical linear model that provides a within-individual analysis as we explore factors that determine the pattern of offending. The results suggest that meaningful short-term change in involvement in crime is strongly related to variation in local life circumstances.

Issues of continuity and change have recently come to the fore in criminology. Two influential theoretical statements have focused on the continuity in criminal behavior and challenged the importance of social factors during adulthood (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Both theories assume that a basic propensity to commit crime is *established early in life and persists throughout the life course*. This propensity is the key to understanding criminal behavior. This view implies that life events after childhood are of little, if any, explanatory importance. Thus, events such as

changes in position in the social structure or assumption of new roles that increase social integration would have no bearing on adult crime.

Sampson and Laub (1993) took a very different perspective in their life-span approach to the study of crime. While they acknowledged that measures of illegal behavior are highly correlated over time, they argued that such continuity does not preclude large and systematic changes for many individuals. Their empirical research, which tracked individuals across large segments of the life-span, documented substantial changes in offending. They explain these patterns of change in terms of variation in social control.

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The purpose of the present study is to fill an important gap in our knowledge about change in criminal behavior during adulthood. Rather than examine extended time periods, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of month-to-month change in criminal behavior over three years for a sample of serious offenders. Thus, we forego the broad sweep of trajectories over the life-span in favor of a more detailed mapping of the correspondence between offending and current circumstances.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND CRIME BY ADULTS

Although the sociological tradition is compatible with the study of changes in offending during adulthood, most work on this topic stems from other traditions, such as developmental perspectives (Moffitt 1993; Patterson and Yoerger 1993) and the criminal careers perspective (Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, and Visser 1986). The limited role of sociology in this area is perhaps understandable in that prominent sociological theories primarily concern juvenile delinquency rather than adult crime. For instance, Shaw and McKay's (1942) classic theory of social disorganization portrayed delinquency as arising from adults' inability to supervise their children's activities, and there is no obvious generalization to crime by adults.

Other sociological theories are more pertinent to adult offending, either because they entail types of socialization that have long-term implications or because they specify general social processes that are not limited to a particular age. An example of the first type of theory is Cohen's (1955) strain theory, which explains delinquency as stemming from socialization that leaves lower-class adolescents unprepared to compete by middle-class standards. Differential association theory (Sutherland and Cressey 1955) and its social learning variations (Akers 1985; Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton 1985) exemplify the second type of theory—they predict that changing from a conventional peer or reference group to a deviant one leads to crime, regardless of age. It is not simply associations that create change, but rather the learning or influence that follows from such associations, which takes time. These two

types of theory imply that change in criminal behavior is nonexistent or very gradual. Thus, these theories do not predict the month-to-month correspondence between offending and social factors that we investigate in the present study.

Two other veins of sociological theory imply more immediate effects of changing life circumstances during adulthood. Social control theory, as described in Hirschi's early work, proposes that social bonds prevent crime and deviance (Hirschi 1969). Because crime results directly from the absence of bonds rather than from some mediating process, social control theory predicts relatively rapid changes in criminal behavior in response to changing life circumstances. Immediate effects also follow from rational choice or opportunity theories, such as routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979). This approach emphasizes the role of social conditions in creating situations conducive to crime. When applied to individual offending, routine activities theory predicts that adults' involvement in crime will increase or decrease as their roles and relationships change their "daily round" of activities so as to present more or fewer opportunities for offending.

LONGITUDINAL DESIGNS AND THE ANALYSIS OF CHANGE

A reliance on cross-sectional designs has limited the ability of criminologists to study change. Cross-sectional designs preclude separating the effects of extrinsic variables from the effects of enduring individual differences. For example, the finding that men in stable marriages commit fewer crimes than those not involved in such relationships can be interpreted either as evidence of the social control function of marriage or as evidence that offending and failure to develop a stable marriage are both indicators of a single underlying trait, such as self-control. Thus, Farrington (1988, 1992) and others have argued that longitudinal research designs are needed to appropriately address questions relating to change in criminal behavior.

Even when longitudinal data have been collected, analyses have rarely assessed within-individual change, such as determin-

ing whether individuals commit more crimes when unemployed than when employed. Most longitudinal data currently available for studying criminal behavior were obtained infrequently, thus making the analysis of within-individual change difficult, if not impossible. With widely spaced waves of data collection and correspondingly few alternations of conditions, there must be greater dependence on aggregation in order to have enough variability to study. Nagin and Farrington (1992a, 1992b) demonstrated how relationships detected through the cross-sectional analysis of longitudinal data can be spurious and suggested the use of statistical methods that control for "persistent unobserved heterogeneity" (i.e., stable individual differences in rates of offending).

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argued that longitudinal designs intended to study changes in offending offer no real advantage and waste resources because there is *little reason to believe that ordinary events are important determinants of offending*. In fact, they contended "that crime-relevant characteristics of people cause all of these events" (p. 237). Testing this contention requires analyses of within-individual change.

CONCEPTIONS OF CHANGE IN CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

One of the most comprehensive longitudinal data sets in criminological research was collected by Glueck and Glueck (1950). Challenging the notion that ordinary events do not matter, Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993; Laub and Sampson 1993) re-analyzed the Gluecks' data using more sophisticated techniques and evaluated the findings in light of current theory. In their "sociogenic" theoretical model, they proposed that regardless of an individual's delinquent or antisocial background, criminal behavior would still be influenced in adulthood by institutions of informal social control, such as family or work. Thus, from a social control approach, Sampson and Laub (1990) suggested that "childhood pathways to crime and deviance can be significantly modified over the life course by adult social bonds" (p. 611).

The Gluecks' data came from interviews at ages 14, 25, and 32 with delinquent and nondelinquent boys matched on a number of

social variables. Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993) constructed an overall measure of crime frequency and considered its relation to three key independent variables: job stability, commitment (a combined measure of the respondent's work, education, and economic ambitions), and attachment to spouse. They controlled for criminal "propensity" by performing separate analyses for the delinquent and nondelinquent samples and by studying relationships within a given age range while controlling for delinquency at earlier ages. Although they found clear evidence of stability of offending over time, job stability and marital attachment emerged as significant predictors of adult crime and deviance, even after childhood delinquency and crime in young adulthood were controlled. Accordingly, Sampson and Laub (1990) concluded that "both continuity and change are evident, and that trajectories of crime and deviance are systematically modified by social bonds to adult institutions of informal social control" (p. 625).

Laub and Sampson (1993) discussed the nature of change and provided illustrations of three kinds of change. What Caspi and Moffitt (1993) refer to as "systematic" or "deep" change is depicted by a high-rate offender who ceases offending completely, whereas what Laub and Sampson called "modified" change is exemplified when a high-rate offender starts offending at a lower rate. A third kind of change is illustrated by an offender switching from burglary to robbery. Although Laub and Sampson were most interested in the first two kinds of change, all fit within their conceptualization of change. Appropriate to their life-course perspective and their focus on the alteration of life trajectories, they implicitly conceptualize change as an enduring modification of behavior patterns.

Laub and Sampson's (1993) perspective also led them to look to the role of institutions, such as employment and marriage, to understand how social bonds structure the process of change. Transitions into such institutions are traditionally considered to be unidirectional (i.e., these transitions represent stages of development or permanent changes in state). A young man joins the work force or marries and starts a family, and his social investment in these institutions ac-

cumulates from that point on. Nevertheless, adult lives are not always so orderly, especially the lives of serious criminal offenders. Not only do role transitions often fail to follow an orderly progression (Rindfuss, Swicegood, and Rosenfeld 1987), but reversals of transitions may be common, as when employment is terminated or a marriage is dissolved. In their qualitative analysis of the life-history records of men from the Gluecks' study, Laub and Sampson (1993) described how some men experienced declines in job stability when the labor market changed and how others, who had married and initially got along well with their spouses, had marriages unravel ("there were separations, followed by reconciliations, followed by further separations" [p. 317]). When these scenarios were played out, "crime and deviance became more pronounced over time due to the severing of social ties to work and family" (p. 317).

Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993) have made a major contribution to criminology by showing that a focus on stability or continuity of offending is insufficient for understanding adult criminal behavior. By showing how adult social bonds can alter life trajectories, they demonstrated that change matters. The long-term view of change Sampson and Laub provided can be seen only when looking back on a relatively long segment of an individual's life course. It is also the only picture of change that can emerge when our view of the life course is constructed from infrequent measurements. We believe it may also be productive to consider a short-term view of change and ask whether levels of criminal activity shift in response to alterations in "local life circumstances." We introduce the term "local life circumstances" to emphasize conditions in an individual's life that can fluctuate relatively frequently. Because these life circumstances may be constantly shifting, any resulting changes in criminal behavior may be transient rather than enduring. The same circumstances that lead one person to an altered life trajectory because the circumstances endure (a stable marriage, for example), may produce only transient change in another individual if the circumstances are fleeting (a marriage that lasts only a few months or years).

LOCAL LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHORT-TERM VARIATION IN CRIMINAL CAREERS

Within the criminal careers paradigm (Blumstein et al. 1986), the study of change has emphasized the determinants of career initiation or termination; persistence in offending has generally been viewed simply as the converse of desistance. Research on persisting careers has focused almost exclusively on the frequency of committing crimes (incidence) and has generally assumed that offending occurs at a constant rate.

There have been few attempts to look at within-individual variability in offending over relatively short periods of time. Horney and Marshall (1991) found that incarcerated offenders described considerable month-to-month variability in levels of offending, and that activity patterns varied by type of crime. Nagin and Land (1993) found that models of offending that incorporate an intermittency parameter that allowed for periods of activity and inactivity performed better than models without such a parameter. Thus, they established that there is genuine within-individual change over time in offending. They observed, however, that "notwithstanding its contribution to the model fit, the concept of intermittency is problematic because a promising theoretical explanation for why it should occur has yet to be offered" (p. 357).

We believe one plausible explanation for intermittency is that the same kind of social control variables that Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993) found to alter trajectories of criminal offending are also responsible for short-term variation in criminal behavior. In other words, whether an individual offends at a particular time depends on whether he or she is employed, married, or going to school at that time. Although a persistent underlying trait like self-control can influence both an individual's overall level of offending and his or her overall stability of marriage and employment, that shared influence does not mean that a relationship between offending and the life circumstance is necessarily spurious. It is still possible that involvement in those social institutions influences the likelihood of offending *during the time of involvement*. The high crime rate of the most persistent offender, rather than in-

dicating a total lack of investment in social institutions, may instead reflect alternating periods of criminal activity and inactivity. A coherent causal pattern would be indicated if the relatively infrequent and brief periods of inactivity correspond to sporadic episodes of social bonding.

Some theorists have dealt with the role of more localized life circumstances in determining criminal offending. Farrington (1992), for example, asserted that

... short-term, situationally-induced motivating factors that are conducive to offending include boredom, frustration, alcohol consumption, getting fired from a job, or quarrelling with a wife or girlfriend. Slightly longer-lasting life circumstances or events may also be important, such as unemployment, drug addiction, and shortage of money. (P. 278)

Unfortunately, empirical evidence of relationships between such factors and offending is scarce.

Farrington, Gallagher, Morley, St. Ledger, and West (1986) analyzed data from the Cambridge Youth Study, which was collected in two-year waves, and found that boys in their sample had higher crime rates during periods of unemployment than they did during periods of employment. Unfortunately, their analysis was hampered by the fact that only 95 of the 399 youths had committed offenses, and only 11 had at least one offense when unemployed and one offense when employed. The authors appropriately noted a self-selection problem—that the youths who were unemployed could differ in many ways from those who were employed, and the higher crime rate during unemployment could occur because both variables were related to some other causal factor. They attempted to control for this possibility by restricting the analysis to youths who had been unemployed and had committed officially recorded crimes, but this resulted in very small numbers of youths. When, in their “most important test of the effect of unemployment” (p. 345) they also required minimum periods of unemployment, the resulting analysis was based on only 36 youths. The authors suggested that to determine whether individual offending varies with conditions like employment, larger samples and samples of persons with relatively high offending rates must be studied.

THE CURRENT STUDY

In the current study, we explore the role of local life circumstances as determinants of change in criminal behavior. Our data were obtained through a retrospective survey in which more than 600 serious offenders provided a month-by-month account of criminal offenses and local life circumstances. Our analysis extends Sampson and Laub's (1993) application of social control theory to criminal career trajectories by considering whether local life circumstances that strengthen or weaken social bonds influence offending over relatively short periods of time. We focus on informal mechanisms of social control and ask if the likelihood of offending is affected by going to school, being employed, living with a wife or girlfriend, drinking heavily, or using drugs. We also consider the impact of formal social control mechanisms by asking whether individuals are less likely to offend when they are on probation or parole. We employ hierarchical linear modeling to obtain a within-individual analysis of factors that determine the patterning of offending.

METHODOLOGY

The data presented here are based on interviews conducted with 658 newly convicted male offenders sentenced to the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services during a nine-month period in 1989–1990. A few inmates incarcerated during that time could not be interviewed for various logistical reasons; 94 percent of those invited to participate completed interviews. This sample was 57.3 percent White and had a mean age of 28.1 years. Although this sample is not representative of the general population, it is suited to addressing the impact on criminal behaviors of changes in local life circumstances. The short-term variability we wish to study is far greater in this sample than it is in most others, owing to the prison respondents' high rates of offending and the considerable instability of their lives in terms of marriage, employment, and so forth.

Because we sampled incarcerated offenders, our sample is not representative of the general population of offenders. We must assume we have oversampled men who com-

mit more crimes, those who commit crimes for which it is easier to be caught and convicted, and those who are less able to avoid detection.

Survey Instrument

We used a modified version of a survey instrument used in the RAND Corporation's Second Inmate Survey (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982). The 48-page instrument generally required a 45- to 90-minute interview. In the critical section of the interview, two calendars—an "event calendar," and a "crime calendar"—were used to establish the reference period and to record detailed information. Respondents were asked to consider a reference period based on the date of the arrest that led to the current incarceration. The reference period included the months up to and including the month of arrest for the calendar year of arrest and the two calendar years preceding the year of arrest. The measurement periods thus varied across respondents from 25 months to 36 months. All months outside the reference period as well as any months during which the respondent had been locked up were crossed out on the calendars. The remaining months were considered "street months."

The event calendar was then used to record various life circumstances. The respondent was asked to identify those street months during which he had been on probation, on parole, going to school, working, living with a wife, living with a girlfriend, drinking heavily, or using drugs (other than prescription drugs or marijuana). The interviewer placed a check beside the appropriate items for those months. The crime calendar was created in the same manner to determine the months during which the respondent committed any burglaries, personal robberies, business robberies, assaults, thefts, auto thefts, frauds, forgeries, or drug deals.

Research indicating that personal memories are organized as "autobiographical sequences" (Bradburn, Rips, and Shevell 1987) suggests that the use of life-history calendars helps to facilitate recall. Evidence of the reliability of retrospective data collected through life-history calendars is available from studies that have gathered the retrospective data within a longitudinal research

design. Freedman, Thornton, Camburn, Alwin, and Young-DeMarco (1988) found that 91 percent of respondents gave identical answers about 1980 school attendance (whether attending school in a particular month) in 1980 interviews and 1985 interviews, while 83 percent gave identical responses about employment.

In a similar study, Caspi and Amell (1994) used a life-history calendar to obtain retrospective data about monthly life events that had been concurrently reported three years earlier. They compared reports of whether the respondent was living with parents, cohabiting with a partner, the primary caregiver for a child, attending school, involved in job training, employed, and searching for employment or receiving unemployment benefits. Over 90 percent of the reports matched with regard to status for the month of the first interview.

Statistical Model

Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), a generalization of multiple regression for nested or repeated-measures data, was developed by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) and other statisticians. Raudenbush (1993) presented a binomial version of the model that is suited to a research design like ours, which includes many waves of dichotomous data for each subject. We will first describe the HLM model for continuous data. Then we will turn to the distinctive features of the binomial version.

HLM is one of several methods developed in recent years for analyzing data containing multiple observations for each individual. These methods provide a general format for analyses that allow effects to vary randomly across cases (Goldstein 1987; Mason, Wong, and Entwistle 1983), and they follow from earlier statistical developments extending random-coefficient models (Hsiao 1986, chap. 6, esp. pp. 151–53). These models can also be viewed as extensions or generalizations of analysis of variance for repeated-measures designs (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992:chap. 2) and as elaborations of models for "pooled time-series and cross-sections" found in econometrics (Sayrs 1989). We have chosen Bryk and Raudenbush's HLM because it is flexible and is described well in

available publications. Also, a computer program for implementing the version of the method for continuous data is commercially available (Bryk, Raudenbush, and Congdon 1993), and a version of HLM for dichotomous data has been developed.

Within-person model. HLM separates within-person and between-persons models, as in repeated-measures analysis of variance. These models are distinct, but closely linked, linear models. In an HLM analysis, the within-person model must be considered first because it determines the meaning of the between-persons model. Equation 1 presents the basic elements of the within-person models used in our analysis:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0,i} + \beta_{1,i}T_{ij} + \beta_{2,i}X_{ij} + r_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where i is the index for persons, j is the index for occasions, T is an interval measure of time (months in our study), and X is an explanatory variable that varies over time for at least some of the respondents. In our application the explanatory variable is a local life circumstance like employment or marriage.

Notice that the parameters, β , can take different values for different individuals because they carry the subscript i . $\beta_{0,i}$ is the individual's intercept, which will be the fitted value of the dependent variable, crime, when both T and X equal 0; $\beta_{1,i}$ is the amount this person's level of crime (Y) changes per unit of time; and r_{ij} corresponds to the unexplained variance for this specific observation on Y . Against the backdrop of the time trend for each individual, the outcome also varies as a function of the local life circumstance, and $\beta_{2,i}$ reflects the magnitude of this relationship.

Between-persons model. In most applications, including ours, the primary results of interest are the parameters of the between-persons model. In HLM, the individual-level parameters from the within-person model serve as dependent variables for the between-persons model, leading to a separate equation for each parameter:

$$\beta_{0,i} = \gamma_{0,0} + u_{0,i}; \quad (2)$$

$$\beta_{1,i} = \gamma_{1,0} + u_{1,i}; \quad (3)$$

$$\beta_{2,i} = \gamma_{2,0}. \quad (4)$$

In the general HLM model, these between-persons equations may include additional explanatory variables for characteristics that do not change over the period of study (e.g., race and sex), but this feature plays a minor role in the present study because our theoretical interests involve change in local life circumstances.¹ In the present study, the between-persons models are simple because each model involves a single parameter, γ (with one exception discussed below). In this case, the γ parameters reflect the average level of the corresponding within-person parameters, which in turn indicate individual-level intercepts, time trends, and effects of the local life circumstance.

Error terms. In equations 2 and 3, the person-specific error terms, $u_{0,i}$ and $u_{1,i}$, mean that the between-persons model treats $\beta_{0,i}$ and $\beta_{1,i}$ as random effects (i.e., as having meaningful variance across individuals). The error term in equation 2, $u_{0,i}$, allows for random variation in the form of individual differences in the average level of offending, which typically is the principal source of correlated error when applying ordinary least squares regression to panel data. This term appears in the variance-components models found in the pooled time-series literature (Sayrs 1989) and is equivalent to the persistent heterogeneity that is a central feature of Nagin and Farrington's work (1992a, 1992b).

Equation 3 shows how HLM generalizes this principle to other elements of the within-person model, making this a "random coefficients" model. In this case, the error term, $u_{1,i}$, reflects unexplained variability in linear time trends. Thus, including this error term allows the linear time trends to vary across individuals. This term helps correct for a second type of problem of independence because it allows for gradual change over time, which is a major source of serially correlated error. Equation 4 does not contain an error term because there is no a priori reason to assume that the effects of local life circumstances vary across individuals.

We can form an overview of the between-persons model by substituting equations 2, 3, and 4 into equation 1:

¹ Elaborating this aspect of the models, to assess whether the impact of local life circumstances varies across groups, would be an appropriate direction for future research.

$$Y_{ij} = \underbrace{(\gamma_{0,0} + \gamma_{1,0}T_{ij} + \gamma_{2,0}X_{ij})}_{\text{[Effects on } Y]} + \underbrace{(u_{0,i} + u_{1,i}T_{ij} + r_{ij})}_{\text{[Composite error term]}}. \quad (5)$$

This arrangement makes apparent the composite error term, which resolves the problems of independence that arise with multiple measures of Y for each respondent. Similar composite error terms are characteristic of repeated-measures analysis of variance and variance components models for pooled time-series.

Within-person change. The estimate of the impact of the local life circumstance X that is captured by $\gamma_{2,0}$ in equation 4 represents the combined effects of differences between individuals in their average circumstances and within-person change over time in this circumstance (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992: 117–23). This is inappropriate because our substantive interest is in change. An estimate that is restricted to within-person change can be obtained by two modifications to the preceding equations. First, the values for X in equation 1 are transformed to deviations from each individual's mean calculated across the entire period of observations:

$$X_{ij}^* = X_{ij} - \bar{X}_i.$$

Second, the individual means, $\bar{X}_i$, are included as an explanatory variable in the equation for overall individual differences (equation 2):

$$\beta_{0,i} = \gamma_{0,0} + \gamma_{0,1}\bar{X}_i + u_{0,i}.$$

Under this formulation, $\gamma_{0,1}$ reflects the effects of between-persons differences in average local life circumstances, while $\gamma_{2,0}$ (from equation 4) satisfies our need for an estimator that reflects the effects of within-person change.²

² Fixed-effects estimators for panel data also restrict the analysis to within-individual change. Both the fixed-effects approach and our approach limit the analysis to deviations from individual means on X . In fixed-effect models the same transformation is applied to Y , whereas we accomplish the same result with random effects by including the individual mean of X as a predictor. The fixed-effects approach is difficult to apply to discrete outcomes when there are more than a few waves of data (Greene 1990:686–88), but our model gives us one of its principal advantages.

Model estimates. An HLM analysis yields estimates of the between-persons parameters, their standard errors, and their statistical significance. The results also include estimates of the magnitude and reliability of the variance components of random effects. HLM uses the covariances among the errors of the β s to derive generalized least squares estimates of the γ s. In this fashion, HLM capitalizes on any interdependence among the within-person components to increase the efficiency of the estimates and to gauge their standard errors. Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) presented the statistical theory underlying HLM in an extended treatment that is not highly technical. The method relies on iterative estimates of the true variance and the error variance of the $\beta_{k,i}$, which are derived through a Bayesian weighting of information from the within-person and between-persons portions of the analysis. HLM also capitalizes on the EM algorithm, developed by Dempster et al. (1977), to make use of data from all respondents, including respondents with insufficient data for separate estimation of the within-person parameters. As with most methods for analyzing continuous dependent variables, HLM assumes that errors for particular observations, r_{ij} , are normally distributed. Furthermore, treatment of the within-person parameters as random effects requires specification of their error distributions, and these error terms, $u_{1,i}$, are also assumed to be normally distributed.

The HLM model does not require that each person provide data on any particular set of occasions, which means that the method is suitable for irregular data sets, unlike many other approaches to analyzing panel data. This flexibility arises because the parameters of interest, the between-persons parameters, γ , are defined in relation to the within-person parameters, β . Thus, the analysis does not hinge on having a particular set of observation times for Y , but rather on the available observations of Y providing enough information to estimate the individual-level β s. HLM gauges the precision of these person-specific estimates from information such as the number of data points and the variances of Y , T , and X for the respondent.

Binomial HLM. The statistical model for the binomial version of HLM closely follows the format of the basic HLM model (Rau-

denbush 1993). The within-person model becomes a logistic regression:

$$\log_n[\text{odds}(Y_{ij} = 1)] = \beta_{0,i} + \beta_{1,i}T_{ij} + \beta_{2,i}X_{ij}. \quad (6)$$

Thus, the fitted values from the within-person model no longer refer directly to levels of Y . Instead this is a linear model of the logit, which is the natural logarithm of the odds that the dichotomous Y variable will take on the value 1, (i.e., an offense occurred this month) rather than the alternative value of 0 (i.e., no offense this month). Also, the within-person model no longer includes an error term because the logistic model is inherently probabilistic. This use of the logistic regression model brings to HLM a standard approach for correcting the problems that would result from applying ordinary least squares regression to a dichotomy.

Equations 2, 3, and 4 still define an appropriate between-persons model, despite the change to the logistic within-person model.³ Of course, these equations now reflect average values of β s that are logistic coefficients rather than ordinary regression coefficients. No change in the between-persons model is necessary, however, because the within-person coefficients (which serve as the dependent variables) are continuous and have meaningful intervals. The generalized least squares derivation of the estimates of the between-persons parameters remains applicable, although the weighting of the variance components changes according to the precision of logistic regression estimates. Because the logistic regression model is nonlinear in relation to the observed values of Y , the estimation requires an iterative reweighting of the within-person data.

Our full model. Our analysis extends the simple model presented above in two re-

spects. First, the analyses included seven local life circumstances rather than the single X in the example. All life circumstances are dichotomies (coded 1 if the feature is present and 0 if not) extracted from the event calendars in the same fashion as the measures of offending. The specific life circumstances are supervision by the justice system (probation or parole), attending school, working, living with a wife, living with a girlfriend, heavy alcohol use, and use of illicit drugs other than marijuana.

We also extended the simple model by including a more elaborate control for individual time trends. Because the analysis includes up to 36 waves of data for each respondent, it would be unreasonable to assume that individual time trends are so consistent as to be linear. Instead, the basic model allows greater flexibility in the time trend through a third-order polynomial function of time. The within-person intercept and all three powers of time were specified as random effects. As a result, changes over time in offending are attributed to substantive variables only if offending closely tracks that variable over time. More gradual or diffuse changes are instead attributed to the individual time trend.

The final element of the model is a dummy variable indicating the month of the arrest leading to the current incarceration.⁴ This variable corrects the offense rate for this specific month, which is artificially high due to our sample selection criteria.

³ The coefficients for the between-persons model represent conditional relationships in that the analysis controls for individual differences in overall rates of offending. Because the binomial model is nonlinear in relation to probabilities, these conditional within-individual relationships tend to be stronger than the marginal relationship of the explanatory variables to the average rates of offending for the entire population (Zeger, Liang, and Albert 1988). We report only conditional relationships because our focus is on change within individuals over time.

⁴ The time variables were transformed to reduce the correlations among the components and improve the efficiency of the estimation of the model. These transformations have no impact on the substantive results of the model, but they must be taken into account in order to reproduce the average time curves. The last wave of data collection was given a value of 0 on the components of the polynomial of time, making the dummy code for the last month orthogonal to the other time components. To give the linear component a mean of 0 across persons, a value of 0 was assigned to 15.4 months before the final month. The squared term for month was this value multiplied by itself and divided by 10 (to reduce its range and place its coefficient in a more useful range). We subtracted 8 from the result, to give it a mean of 0. Finally, the cubed power of time was formed as the product of the linear and squared terms, divided by 10.

Fifty-three percent of the sample reported one or more offenses for this month versus 32 percent for all other months.⁵ Because this variable refers to a single month, it was defined as a fixed effect.

RESULTS

The analysis was limited to respondents who contributed information on the full set of variables for at least 10 “street months.” Though HLM does not require any minimum number, respondents with fewer months of data would contribute little to the analysis. Only 41 of the 658 respondents failed to meet this criterion; the remaining 617 respondents provided data for an average of 28.36 months.

The analysis was conducted separately for each of four measures of offending. The first measure, “any crime,” was coded 1 for months in which a respondent reported committing at least one of the nine felonies. The other measures of offending referred to specific crimes: property crime (burglary, personal robbery, business robbery, theft, auto theft, forgery, and fraud), assault, and drug crime (dealing). Table 1 reports descriptive information on the measures used in the analysis.

Because our analysis focuses on within-person change, our ability to detect the impact of local life circumstances is largely dependent on the number of respondents who experience change on those variables. Column 2 of Table 1 reports the proportion of respondents who had at least one transition during the period of study for each of the local life circumstances (e.g., from student to nonstudent or nonstudent to student, as opposed to always a student or never a student). Fully 85 percent of the sample experienced at least one transition over this interval of no more than three years, and over one-half experienced two or more transitions.

⁵ The rate still falls well below 100 percent because: (1) arrest could occur more than a month after the actual offense; (2) a small proportion of respondents were incarcerated for offenses not included in the measure (e.g., drunk driving); and (3) some respondents claimed not to have committed the offense for which they were incarcerated, although they admitted to other offenses.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analyses: Male Offenders in Nebraska, 1989–1990

Variable	Proportion of Months	Proportion of Sample with Change in Status
<i>Measures of Offending</i>		
Any crime	.33	
Property crime	.11	
Assault	.06	
Drug crime	.23	
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>		
Probation or parole	.11	.25
School	.11	.25
Work	.65	.58
Live with wife	.19	.12
Live with girlfriend	.29	.30
Heavy drinking	.28	.19
Illegal drug use	.24	.22

Note: N = 617 individuals; 17,500 street months.

Summary Statistics for Change in Offending

Table 2 presents some simple summary statistics about the changes in offending following changes in local life circumstances. These statistics reflect periods that begin with a change in a local life circumstance (e.g., starting school) and end with either a change in offending (for our “any crime” measure), a subsequent change in that local life circumstance (e.g., stopping school), or the end of the period of observation. The odds of starting crime is computed for periods preceded by a month for which no crime was reported; it is the ratio of the number of instances in which a subsequent crime was reported divided by the number of instances in which no offense was reported throughout the period. The odds of stopping crime is the comparable ratio for periods preceded by a month in which an offense occurred. The odds ratios and log odds in Table 2 indicate that changes in offending depend on changes in local life circumstances. Thus, for men on probation or on parole, the odds ratio of .42 for starting crime (.69 divided by 1.63) indicates that the odds of starting to offend are

over twice as high after probation or parole stops as after the supervision starts. The odds ratio of .74 for stopping crime (.49 divided by .66) indicates that the odds of stopping crime are greater after probation or parole stops than after the supervision starts.

The results presented in Table 2 suggest that changes in offending systematically follow changes in local life circumstances. Typically, the odds of a change in offending roughly double (or are halved) following a change in a local life circumstance, such as marriage, employment, or drug use. Furthermore, the two directions of change in the explanatory variables typically have comparable relationships with criminal behavior, as is assumed in the HLM analysis. For instance, moving in with one's wife doubles the odds of stopping offending (compared to moving away), and moving away from one's wife doubles the odds of starting to offend (compared to moving in). The largest discrepancy is for living with a girlfriend. The odds of stopping offending were considerably lower after moving away from a girlfriend, but starting to offend was unrelated to this variable. The presence of a single discrepancy of this limited magnitude is not surprising from such a simple and ad hoc summary of the data.

Variance Components

The HLM analyses provide greater statistical control and allow us to gauge the precision of our results. Table 3 shows results for the variance components of the model. Estimates of variance components are provided for unconditional models, which include the time trends but not the explanatory variables, and conditional models, which include all variables. Preliminary analyses indicated that the higher-order elements of the polynomial time trend were not justified for some of the measures of offending. For all measures, there was substantial variation in average level of offending, as reflected by the size and reliability of the variance components for the within-person intercepts. This replicates Nagin and Farrington's (1992a, 1992b) finding that there are substantial individual differences in propensities to offend, and extends that finding to a prison population with a much higher overall rate of offending.

Table 2. Odds of Changes in Offending Following Changes in Local Life Circumstances: Male Offenders in Nebraska, 1989-1990

Life Circumstance	Odds of Crime Starting	Odds of Crime Stopping
<i>Probation or Parole</i>		
Starts	.69	.66
Stops	1.63	.49
Odds ratio	.42	.74
Log odds	-.86	-.30
<i>School</i>		
Starts	.33	.36
Stops	.76	.25
Odds ratio	.43	.70
Log odds	-.84	-.35
<i>Work</i>		
Starts	.33	.36
Stops	.76	.25
Odds ratio	.43	.70
Log odds	-.84	-.35
<i>Live with Wife</i>		
Starts	.62	.75
Stops	1.20	.42
Odds ratio	.52	.56
Log odds	-.66	-.59
<i>Live with Girlfriend</i>		
Starts	1.02	.25
Stops	1.11	.66
Odds ratio	.92	2.64
Log odds	-.09	.97
<i>Heavy Drinking</i>		
Starts	.51	.42
Stops	.25	1.12
Odds ratio	2.09	2.67
Log odds	.74	.98
<i>Illegal Drug Use</i>		
Starts	.59	.20
Stops	.27	.37
Odds ratio	2.16	1.86
Log odds	.77	.62

Note: Odds ratios greater than 1 and positive log odds indicate greater odds of starting crime after the local life circumstance starts and greater odds of stopping crime after the local life circumstance stops.

Table 3. Variance Components for Random Effects in Binomial Hierarchical Linear Models: Male Offenders in Nebraska, 1989–1990

Type of Crime and Model Term	Unconditional Model			Conditional Model		
	Reliability	Variance	χ^2	Reliability	Variance	χ^2
<i>Any Crime</i>						
Intercept	.81	11.298	4,398.2*	.76	8.750	4,498.3*
Month	.42	.026	1,202.9*	.40	.025	1,157.0*
(Month) ²	.26	.011	763.0*	.24	.011	715.0*
(Month) ³	.16	.007	465.3	.14	.006	432.1
<i>Property Crime</i>						
Intercept	.66	7.061	4,781.6*	.62	6.161	3,957.4*
Month	.22	.008	628.9	.21	.008	623.2
(Month) ²	.16	.007	513.3	.16	.007	507.8
<i>Assault</i>						
Intercept	.56	4.799	3,922.4*	.53	4.617	3,509.6*
Month	.17	.007	429.6	.17	.007	427.3
<i>Drug Crime</i>						
Intercept	.72	14.324	5,445.0*	.66	12.701	5,015.8*
Month	.32	.020	1,035.8*	.30	.022	932.2*
(Month) ²	.21	.013	624.7	.18	.012	523.7

**p* < .05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: All terms had 616 degrees of freedom, except the intercepts in the conditional models, which had 609.

Effects of Local Life Circumstances

Table 4 reports the estimates of the within-person effects of local life circumstances from the binomial HLM analyses. The table includes the logistic coefficients, γ (as in $\gamma_{2,0}$ in equation 4), their standard errors, and the odds ratios corresponding to the coefficients. (Coefficients for the time trends and between-persons differences in the local life circumstances, which are not of substantive interest for this analysis, are available on request from the authors.)

Use of illegal drugs was related to all four measures of offending. Use of drugs had an especially strong association with involvement in drug dealing—the logistic coefficient of 2.75 corresponds to a 15-fold increase in the odds of drug crime during months of drug use. Although the relationship of illegal drug use to property crimes and assaults is less extreme, it is still substantial. During months of drug use, the odds of committing a property crime increased by

54 percent, and odds of committing an assault increased by over 100 percent. Combining these for the summary index, illegal drug use increased the odds of committing any crime by sixfold.

Our findings on the impact of drug use are consistent with studies of heroin addicts that have compared periods of addiction with periods of nonaddiction. Ball, Shaffer, and Nurco (1983) and Anglin and Speckart (1986) found substantially higher self-reported crime-commission rates during periods of addiction. Our results indicate that drug use apparently has the same kind of deleterious effects, even when a criterion less stringent than addiction is used (i.e., monthly use) and when drugs other than heroin are considered (i.e., illegal drugs other than marijuana; very few of our respondents used heroin).

Heavy drinking was positively related to the four measures of offending, significantly so for property offenses. Indeed, heavy drinking was more strongly related to commission of property crimes than was illicit

Table 4. Logistic Coefficients (γ) and Odds Ratios from Binomial Heirarchical Linear Models of Monthly Offending in Relation to Change in Life Circumstances: Male Offenders in Nebraska, 1989–1990

Life Circumstance	Any Crime		Property Crime		Assault		Drug Crime	
	γ	Odds Ratio	γ	Odds Ratio	γ	Odds Ratio	γ	Odds Ratio
Probation or parole	-.21 (.20)	.81	-.27 (.20)	.76	.06 (.22)	1.06	.08 (.28)	1.08
School	-.73* (.18)	.48	-.25 (.20)	.78	-.17 (.23)	.84	-.94* (.24)	.39
Work	.13 (.11)	1.14	.25* (.12)	1.28	-.28 (.16)	.76	.11 (.15)	1.11
Live with wife	-.52 (.29)	.59	-.19 (.31)	.82	-.84* (.38)	.43	-.48 (.39)	.62
Live with girlfriend	.50* (.17)	1.64	.25 (.18)	1.28	-.06 (.23)	.94	.49* (.21)	1.63
Heavy drinking	.39 (.21)	1.48	.63* (.23)	1.88	.31 (.29)	1.36	.53 (.29)	1.71
Illegal drug use	1.81* (.19)	6.10	.43* (.20)	1.54	.73* (.27)	2.07	2.75* (.25)	15.70

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

drug use. Although not statistically significant, coefficients relating heavy drinking to commission of any crime and to commission of a drug crime are sizable as well. Their relatively large standard errors result from the limited number of individuals who had changes in their heavy drinking status (see Table 1).

Table 4 shows that living with a wife is associated with lower levels of offending, but living with a girlfriend is associated with higher levels. Living with a girlfriend significantly raised the odds of offending by over 64 percent for commission of any crime and for commission of a drug crime. The relationship of living with a wife to these measures of offending was of equal magnitude, but was not statistically significant (again because of the small number of individuals with change on this variable). There was a statistically significant decrease of 57 percent in the odds of committing an assault when living with a wife.

These results are in accord with Sampson and Laub's (1993) finding that marital attachment was one of the strongest predictors of adult criminality, even after childhood delinquency and early adult criminality were controlled. Their composite measure of marital attachment was based on interview data

and included the respondent's assessment of the general marital relationship, his attitude toward marital responsibility, and, for the final wave of data, a measure of family cohesiveness. Although we do not have measures of marital attachment, we do have the comparison of living with a wife and living with a girlfriend. If we assume that formalizing a relationship through marriage indicates attachment, then the lesser attachment may explain why living with a girlfriend does not lower the odds of offending. We have no explanation for the unexpected increase in the odds of offending associated with living with a girlfriend.

Changing life circumstances in the domains of work and school also contributed to the odds of offending in any given month. Attending school had uniformly beneficial consequences, significantly reducing the odds of involvement in any crime by 52 percent and the odds of involvement in drug crimes by 61 percent. Working was only weakly related to all of the measures of offending. Surprisingly, the odds of committing a property crime increased by 28 percent in the months when men worked. Though this was statistically significant, it is exceeded by an opposite, but not significant, coefficient for commission of assault. Because changes

in work status were common, these coefficients have the smallest standard errors.

We viewed employment as an important aspect of social bonding that should reduce the likelihood of offending. Our crude measure (respondents simply reported whether they worked during a given month) may be responsible for the weak results on lowered odds of offending. We measured none of the aspects of attachment to a job that Sampson and Laub (1993) considered; our measure did not even distinguish part-time from full-time employment, or temporary from permanent work. The surprising increase in the odds for commission of a property crime may reflect the increased opportunities for theft and perhaps also for forgery or fraud that are available in the workplace. The only aspect of local life circumstances that was not related to any of the indices of offending was justice supervision in the form of probation or parole.

Reduced models. We also estimated two reduced models using subsets of the seven local life circumstances. One model excludes the substance use variables of heavy drinking and illegal drug use. This reduced model is useful for two purposes. First, it is informative about potential indirect effects that might be mediated by the impact of substance use. Attending school, being employed, and living with a wife could reduce crime indirectly by reducing substance use. Comparing this reduced model to the full model gives little evidence of this. Relationships that were significant in the full model typically changed little when we did not control for substance use. There was one notable change, however: Living with a wife became significantly and negatively related to the general measure of crime ($\gamma = -.61$, $s.e. = .29$), which adds consistency to the previous pattern of results. Nevertheless, it does not appear that controlling for substance use obscured important effects.

This reduced model is also of interest because the causal role of the substance use variables is subject to an alternative interpretation. Heavy alcohol use and illegal drug use are deviant or conventionally disapproved behaviors, as are our measures of crime. Thus, rather than influencing crime, these behaviors may be alternative manifestations of the same factors that lead to crime

(Osgood, Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman 1988:81–83). That would imply that their relationship is spurious rather than causal, an issue that the present analysis cannot resolve. The reduced model is useful in this regard because it provides estimates of the effects of the other local life circumstances, unbiased by any potential spurious relationship between crime and substance use.

The second reduced model concerns probation or parole, the only local life circumstance that was not related to any of the indices of offending in the full models. These results may arise because the impact of probation or parole is indirect, being mediated by intermediate effects of supervision, such as reducing illegal drug use and promoting employment. The second reduced model addresses this possibility by excluding all measures of local life circumstances other than justice supervision, thereby ruling out any indirect effects. Even in this model, there are no significant effects of justice supervision on offending. Though three of the four coefficients indicate lower rates of offending during justice supervision, the relationships are weak, reflecting a 26 percent reduction in odds of offending at most. Clearly, justice supervision did not produce substantial reductions in crime among these serious offenders. These results are consistent with previous findings in the perceptual deterrence literature that the threat of formal sanctions is much less effective in altering behavior than are informal processes of social control (Paternoster and Iovanni 1986; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, and Chiricos 1983).

DISCUSSION

Our results provide clear evidence of meaningful short-term change in involvement in crime, and this change is strongly related to variation in local life circumstances. Our use of a hierarchical linear model allowed us to rule out criminal propensity as a confounding variable by controlling for individual differences in the overall probability of offending. Thus, our results cannot be explained by the possibility that drug use, unstable marriage, and criminal offending are all indicators of an underlying stable trait—a lack of self-control, for example. Rather, we found that, regardless of overall level of offending,




Figure 1. The Effect of Changing Life Circumstances on the Probability of Committing a Crime: Three Hypothetical Individuals

these men were more likely to commit crimes when using illegal drugs and conversely were less likely to commit crimes when living with a wife.

Figure 1 illustrates the implications of the estimates in Table 4. This figure shows that, even in the presence of substantial individual differences in the propensity to offend, varying local life circumstances produce dramatic changes in rates of offending. Probabilities of committing a crime by three hypothetical individuals who offend at average, low, and high rates (corresponding to monthly probabilities of .33, .06, and .80 when all *X* variables are at their means) are portrayed. They begin this period living with wives and not using drugs or using alcohol heavily. The horizontal axis indicates changes that occur from one month to the next, and the lines plot the corresponding changes in rates of offending. For comparison, a fourth line indicates the overall time trend when local life circumstances are held constant. Although changes in life circumstances have greater effects for the average- and high-rate offenders, offense rates for all three hypothetical individuals vary markedly with changes in living arrangements, school attendance, and substance use.

We believe that measuring offending activity in fairly short units of time is important for understanding the relationship between life events and criminal behavior. As Freedman et al. (1988) noted, “the traditional panel study provides only multiple snapshots of individual lives” (p. 39). When one- or two-year intervals are used, the correspondence between events in time may be missed, especially in the unstable lives of serious offenders. To detect change over brief time spans, it is also important to use self-reports of criminal activity. Although official records may be good indicators of the overall level of criminal activity, measures of arrests or convictions have base rates that are too low to allow meaningful estimation of the relationship of offending to local life circumstances.

We used life-event calendars to collect retrospective data in one-month units. Although studies on the reliability of such techniques (Freedman et al. 1988; Caspi and Amell 1994) have been encouraging, Freedman et al. (1988) reported that “one important issue in obtaining retrospective data appears to be the degree of volatility of the activity patterns, since respondents find it more difficult to recall widely fluctuating event

patterns" (p. 66). Because we studied a population with considerable volatility in their activity patterns, it would be extremely beneficial to replicate this study with a longitudinal design that allows the prospective collection of data at short intervals.

The measurement of offending and life circumstances at frequent intervals over a relatively short period of time provides a different perspective on change than that provided by Sampson and Laub (1990, 1993; Laub and Sampson 1993). Whereas their long-term perspective showed that life events could modify criminal career trajectories, our short-term perspective has shown that local life circumstances can change criminal careers by modifying the likelihood of offending *at particular times*.

Because we looked at only a tiny portion of the life course, we cannot say whether the changes we observed represent alterations in life trajectories for some individuals, nor can we assess the degree of continuity in these respondents' criminal careers. We are encouraged, however, that the underlying processes involved in producing short-term change may be the same processes that produce "deep" change, or the alteration in a life trajectory. Living with a wife reduces the short-term likelihood of committing crime; a stable marriage and attachment to a spouse may lead to the long-term cessation of offending.

We have made no attempt to explain the processes underlying change. As we noted in our introduction, social control and rational choice (or opportunity) theories provide the most relevant sociological perspectives. Sampson and Laub (1993) emphasized the role of "informal social controls that emerge from the role reciprocities and structure of interpersonal bonds linking members of society to one another and to wider social institutions such as work, family, and school" (p. 18) and contended that "adult social ties are important insofar as they create interdependent systems of obligation and restraint that impose significant costs for translating criminal propensities into action" (p. 141). Their focus on the quality or strength of these social ties goes beyond what we could assess with our simple indicators. Their results suggest that we might have found stronger relationships between offending and lo-

cal life circumstances if we had been able to appreciate more fully the level of investment those circumstances represented for individuals.

Rational choice or routine activity perspectives may also provide useful frameworks for thinking about the role of local life circumstances. When individuals are married and living with their spouses, their perceptions of the consequences of crime may change, either because they view themselves as having more to lose, or because a sense of shame is enhanced when the reactions of a significant other person are considered. When individuals are using drugs, on the other hand, they may become even more present-oriented, judge the utility of committing a crime to be greater, and give lesser consideration to sanctions and shame. Involvement in marriage and family, school, and work may also be important because of the role these institutions play in structuring daily activities. Time devoted to activities related to those institutions is time unavailable for "hanging out" on the streets or in bars and may therefore reduce an individual's exposure to situations conducive to involvement in criminal behavior.

Reconciling Continuity and Change

We cannot assume that the local life circumstances we studied were randomly distributed among offenders. Probably, they were to some extent determined by time-stable characteristics of the individuals. Our results in no way negate findings of long-term continuity—individuals do differ in their long-term criminal propensities and in their abilities to maintain stable schooling, employment, and marriages.

We believe that these tendencies interact with each other in complex ways and that contrasting continuity with change is a false dichotomy. As Rowe and Osgood (1984) noted, long-term correlates of offending, even genetic factors, do not rule out important social influences on crime because social processes may be essential links in the chain of causes that produce those relationships. For example, Booth and Osgood (1993) found that the positive relationship of testosterone levels to adult offending was mediated by current social integration. Thus,

although continuity over the life course supports the importance of early influences, it has no direct bearing on the contribution of social factors during adulthood.

One view of the interplay between continuity and change can be found in the recent work of Nagin and Paternoster (1993), who showed how theories of criminal opportunity and rational choice can be linked to theories that focus on enduring individual differences in propensities. Using scenarios presented to college undergraduates, they found that a measure of self-control was directly related to decisions to commit offenses and indirectly related to intentions to offend through self-control's influence on judgments about total sanctions, the perceived utility of committing the offense, and shame. Yet even after differences in self-control were accounted for, decisions to offend were still influenced by the attractiveness of the target, the ease of committing the crime, and perceptions of the costs and benefits of committing the crime. As Nagin and Paternoster (1993) noted, "a belief that variation in offending is reflective of variations in criminal propensity or poor self-control does not preclude the possibility that would-be offenders are sensitive to the attractions and deterrents of crime" (p. 490).

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), while arguing for the central role of a time-stable criminal propensity, acknowledged a role for immediate circumstances in determining when and where crimes are committed. They have reconciled the seeming contradiction by distinguishing between self-control—"relatively stable differences across individuals in the propensity to commit criminal (or equivalent) acts" (p. 137)—and the criminal acts themselves—"short-term, circumscribed events that presuppose a peculiar set of necessary conditions (e.g., activity, opportunity, adversaries, victims, goods)" (p. 137). Yet Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) denied a role for life circumstances beyond the immediate situation, such as those we have studied, by arguing that these ordinary events are caused by the individual's crime-relevant characteristics and thus are only spuriously connected to crime.

We have shown that less immediate local life circumstances are also important. These circumstances may provide an essential intermediate level of analysis that can be

linked both to enduring individual differences rooted in early childhood experience and to the immediate circumstances in which criminal acts occur. Our results closely parallel those of Nagin and Paternoster (1993). They showed that, although individuals with low self-control discounted the costs of crime relative to individuals with high self-control, they were not insensitive to costs. We have shown that, although individuals with a high propensity to offend maintain few social bonds to society relative to individuals with a low propensity, they are not insensitive to those bonds. Persons with a high propensity for crime may be unlikely to graduate from school, unlikely to maintain meaningful employment, and unlikely to stay in stable, committed marriages. Even so, they may *sometimes* go to school, *sometimes* work, and *sometimes* live with a wife, and *at those times* they are less likely to commit crimes. Likewise the high-propensity individuals may be more likely than others to be involved with drugs and heavy alcohol use, but *sometimes* they do not use these substances, and *when they do not*, they are less likely to commit crimes.

We believe our findings also provide a link to the long-term change described by Sampson and Laub (1993). The combined effects of several crime-inhibiting local life circumstances may lead to the accumulation of enough social capital to motivate an individual to work at maintaining the social bonds. The maintenance of the bonds may, in turn, provide additional social capital and further reduce offending. If such a process continues to spiral, it could produce the kind of incremental change that results in a major alteration of a life trajectory. Just as lives are built one day at a time, over-arching life-span trajectories can only evolve from responses to daily social realities. Inevitably, short-term and long-term analyses of change must converge. Achieving this convergence would lend considerable support to our theories, and the effort will provide a richer appreciation of the task of explaining how individual lives evolve.

In sum, our findings strongly support the conclusion that continuity and change are not opposites, but rather are two faces of intertwined causal processes. Our results forcefully demonstrate that social events during

adulthood are related to crime. Contrary to the image presented by some theorists of crime, life after puberty does matter. Yet changes in offending during adulthood do not negate the importance of enduring individual differences in criminal propensity or of related constructs like self-control. Instead, our results suggest that differences among individuals combine with their shifting social environments to produce current levels of criminal activity.

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Ineke Haen Marshall is Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. She is currently collaborating in an international study of self-reported juvenile delinquency. Her other recent research interests are ethnicity and crime and drug policy. She is co-editor (with Ed Leuw) of *Between Prohibition and Legalization: The Dutch Experiment in Drug Policy* (Amsterdam: Kugler, 1994).

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306 F.Supp.3d 1086
United States District Court, D. Minnesota.
Thomas Wayne EVENSTAD, Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF WEST ST. PAUL, Jenny Halvorson, John Does 1–10, and Jane Does
1–5, Defendants.

Civil No. 17–4067 (JRT/DTS)

Signed 01/25/2018

Synopsis

Background: Sex offender brought action against city, alleging that its ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes violated Ex Post Facto Clause. Sex offender moved for preliminary injunction.

Holdings: The District Court, John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, held that:

- 1 sex offender was likely to prevail on the merits;
- 2 sex offender could suffer irreparable harm absent injunction;
- 3 balance of harms favored sex offender;
- 4 public interest disfavored injunction; but
- 5 District Court would waive injunction's bond requirement.

Motion granted.

West Headnotes (26)

1 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

District Court would grant preliminary injunction against city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes, in sex offender's action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause, even though public interest disfavored grant of the injunction; sex offender was likely to prevail on merits and could suffer irreparable harm absent injunction, and balance of harms favored sex offender. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

2 Injunction Preservation of status quo

Injunction Equitable considerations in general

At base, the question in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction is whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.

3 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

Sex offender was likely to prevail on merits of action alleging that city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes was criminal law in violation of Ex Post Facto Clause, as factor favoring grant of preliminary injunction against ordinance, although nature of ordinance had not been regarded in history and traditions as punishment and ordinance did not promote traditional aims of punishment, where ordinance lacked rational connection to nonpunitive purpose, was excessive in relation to its stated purpose, and imposed affirmative disability or restraint. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

4 Injunction Equitable considerations in general

In balancing the equities in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, no single factor is determinative.

5 Injunction Likelihood of success on merits

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, likelihood of success must be examined in the context of the relative injuries to the parties and the public.

6 Injunction Likelihood of success on merits

Likelihood of success on the merits is the most significant factor in considering a preliminary injunction.

7 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

City ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes had been enacted pursuant to presumptively reasoned democratic processes, and thus sex offender seeking preliminary injunction against ordinance in action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause bore burden of showing he was likely to prevail on merits; members of city government had assisted in developing ordinance, and ordinance had been read twice at city council meetings with documents circulated before first reading, passed by unanimous vote of council, signed by prior mayor, and enforced by current mayor. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

8 Injunction Likelihood of success on merits

The likelihood of success factor for a preliminary injunction ordinarily requires the moving party to prove only a fair chance of prevailing, which may mean something less than fifty percent.

9 Injunction Injunctions Against Enforcement of Laws and Regulations

When the matter at issue is a law that was the product of government action based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes, the likelihood of success factor for a preliminary injunction requires the moving party to show that they are likely to prevail on the merits.

10 Injunction Injunctions Against Enforcement of Laws and Regulations

With a city ordinance against which a preliminary injunction is sought, the question in determining the applicable likelihood of success standard is to what extent the challenged action represents the full play of the democratic process.

11 Constitutional Law Registration

Sex offender registration laws do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if they establish civil proceedings rather than criminal punishment. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

12 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Constitutional Law Punishment in general

In determining whether a law is civil or criminal under the Ex Post Facto Clause, five factors, though neither exhaustive nor dispositive, are relevant to analysis of whether a law is punitive in effect: courts must ask whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme (1) has been regarded in history and traditions as a punishment, (2) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promotes the traditional aims of punishment, (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, or (5) is excessive with respect to this purpose. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

13 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

City did not intend ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes to impose punishment, as factor disfavoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause; although legislative record did not show consideration of specific risks posed by offenders who victimized adults or dangers posed to vulnerable adults, it showed generalized discussion of safety risks posed by offenders, and although ordinance was triggered solely by underlying criminal offenses and could result in criminal misdemeanor, it was situated in city code's general regulations and stated its purpose was to serve city's "compelling interest" to promote, protect, and improve health, safety, and welfare of citizens, with particular focus on children and vulnerable individuals. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

14 Statutes Language and intent, will, purpose, or policy

Statutes Design, structure, or scheme

To discern legislative intent, courts consider a statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.

15 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Constitutional Law Punishment in general

In determining whether a law is civil or criminal under the Ex Post Facto Clause, when asking whether the legislature intended to impose punishment, considerable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

16 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Nature of city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes had not been regarded in history and traditions as punishment, as factor disfavoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause, where ordinance did not prohibit sex offenders from being present in restricted areas, only from living in them. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

17 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

City ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing, but not being present, within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes did not promote traditional aims of punishment, as factor disfavoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause, even if restrictions had deterrent or retributive effect, to the extent that they were intended to protect the public rather than to reduce sex offenders' incentives to reoffend through imposition of negative consequences. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

18 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

City ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes lacked rational connection to nonpunitive purpose, as factor favoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause, where ordinance's stated purpose was to serve city's "compelling" interest to promote, protect, and improve health, safety, and welfare of citizens, particularly children and vulnerable adults, and ordinance restricted sex offenders of all types, including sex offenders who victimized adults, without individualized case-by-case assessment. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

19 Criminal Law Prevention and Investigation of Crime

States may make reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences, including registration and notification.

20 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

City ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes was excessive in relation to its stated purpose of promoting, protecting, and improving health, safety, and welfare of citizens, as factor favoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause, where ordinance included sex offenders who victimized adults and applied to all sex offenders convicted of enumerated offenses without individualized assessment, and entire swaths of were restricted only due to group homes, not schools or day care facilities. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

21 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

City ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes imposed affirmative disability or restraint, as factor favoring ordinance being a criminal law under Ex Post Facto Clause, where entire swaths of city were restricted only due to group homes, not schools or day care facilities. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

22 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

Injunction Sexual predators and offenders

Sex offender could suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunction against city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes, as factor favoring grant of such injunction in action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause, where there were 69 unrestricted rental properties available, and 60 of them were in building that did not allow

convicted felons like sex offender to rent; sex offender could be forced into homelessness. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

23 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

Balance of harms favored sex offender, as factor favoring grant of preliminary injunction against city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes in action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause, even if barring city from enforcing ordinance against sex offender would undermine its health and safety goals, where sex offender could be forced into homelessness and was likely to prevail on the merits. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

24 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

Public interest was factor disfavoring grant of preliminary injunction against city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes, in sex offender's action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause; even if public had interest in overturning unconstitutional laws, public also had interests in enforcing constitutional laws and protecting children from predatory offenders. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

25 Civil Rights Property and housing

Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement; prisons

District Court would waive bond required for preliminary injunction against city ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes in sex offender's action alleging that ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause; city had not objected to waiver of requirement nor demonstrated any costs or monetary damages that could result from injunction's issuance, and sex offender sought to vindicate important constitutional right. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

26 Injunction Amount

The amount of the bond required for a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

Attorneys and Law Firms

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Monte A. Mills and Clifford M. Greene, GREENE ESPEL PLLP, 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for defendants.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Thomas Wayne Evenstad filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in this constitutional challenge against the City of West St. Paul, its mayor, and several Doe defendants (collectively, “the City”). Evenstad argues that a West St. Paul ordinance restricting sex offenders from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group homes (the “Ordinance”) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.¹ The City's response that Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses Evenstad's argument is unavailing, because the Ordinance is significantly more restrictive than those upheld by the Eighth Circuit. Because Evenstad shows that the equities are strongly in his favor and that he is likely to succeed on the merits, the Court will grant his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

BACKGROUND

The West St. Paul City Council passed the Ordinance in December 2016 by a unanimous vote. (Decl. of Peter J. Nickitas (“Nickitas Decl.”) ¶ 3, Ex. 1, Sept. 29, 2017, ***1091** Docket No. 17.) The findings and intent section of the Ordinance states:

Repeat predatory offenders, predatory offenders who use physical violence and predatory offenders who prey on children and vulnerable individuals are predators who present a threat to the public safety.... It is the intent of this chapter to serve the city's compelling interest to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city by creating areas around locations where children and vulnerable individuals regularly congregate wherein certain predatory offenders are prohibited from establishing a primary or secondary address.

IX West St. Paul City Code (“City Code”)) § 97.01.

The public record surrounding enactment of the Ordinance, as made available by the City, is largely consistent with its stated intent. A memo prepared by the City's police chief in advance of the first reading of the Ordinance contrasted “the Council's desire to establish a business and residential growth direction” with forces that “tend to change neighborhood character overnight,” including group residential housing and predatory offenders. (Decl. of Ben Boike (“Boike Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. 2 at 22, Oct. 27, 2017, Docket No. 39.) The memo focused on the safety threat posed by “a rapid influx of predatory offenders,” and noted the chief's concern “about what is on the horizon when the state begins to deinstitutionalize those offenders currently being held in [civil] confinement.” (*Id.*) The chief proposed “a safe-zone around those institutions where potential victims are likely to congregate,” and explained that he had “considered varying differences including 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 feet and found 1,200 feet to be a good balance in protecting the public's interest while still allowing areas where predatory offenders may reside.” (*Id.* at 23.)

At the first reading of the Ordinance, the police chief's presentation included a “detailed account of predatory offenders and the risks and danger to our community.” (Boike Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 1 at 13.) Three council members spoke—one supporting of the Ordinance, and two wondering if it could be stricter—and a fourth voted to second the motion to approve the reading. (*Id.*) There was an opportunity for public comment at the second reading, but no one spoke. (Boike Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 3 at 29.) The Ordinance was approved without further deliberation. (*Id.*) Neither the memo nor the meeting minutes reflect the City's reasoning for including group homes in the Ordinance or discussion of including offenders who victimized adults without individualized risk assessment.

As enacted, the Ordinance prohibits any designated offender from living within 1200 feet of schools, licensed day care centers, and state licensed residential care or housing with services establishments. (City Code § 97.03(A).) It also prohibits renting to such an offender. (*Id.* § 97.04.) Violations of the Ordinance may result in “a misdemeanor or administrative citation.” (*Id.* § 97.03(D).) It excepts certain offenders—minors, those who offended and were convicted as minors, those living with family, those domiciled in a restricted area prior to the Ordinance's enactment, and those domiciled in an area that becomes restricted due to a new facility. (*Id.* § 97.03(E).) Based on a map provided by the City, Evenstad estimates that the restrictions cover approximately 90% of the total area and as much as 95% of the residential area of the city. (*See* Nickitas Decl., Ex. 1 at 5.) The City submits that there are 69 rental units in unrestricted areas. (Second Decl. of Ben Boike (“2d Boike Decl.”) ¶ 5.) The City does not dispute ***1092** Evenstad's claim that 60 of those units are in a building that, as a matter of policy, does not rent to felons.

The Ordinance does not define “designated offender,” but it defines “predatory offender”² by reference to two other sources:

Any person who [1] is required to register as a predatory offender under [Minnesota Statute] § 243.166, or [2] has been convicted of a designated sexual offense, regardless of whether the adjudication has been withheld, in which the victim of the offense was less than 16 years of age.

(City Code § 97.02.) Thus, the first category includes anyone who is required by the state of Minnesota to register as a sex offender. Notably, the Minnesota registration requirement applies to offenders who victimized adults. *See* Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b. The Minnesota registration requirement generally persists for ten years after an offender's release from confinement; as such, the Ordinance's residency restrictions apply to individuals in this category for ten years after their release. *See* Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6. The second category includes anyone convicted of a “designated sexual offense” against a victim less than 16 years of age. The Ordinance defines “designated sexual offense” to include several state crimes, including first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct, solicitation of children, incest, indecent exposure, or any of three child pornography crimes. (City Code § 97.02.) There is no time limitation for individuals in this category; as such, the Ordinance's residency restrictions for offenders who victimize children under 16 apply for life. *See id.*

Evenstad, 52, falls into the first category: he was convicted in 1999 of First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct using force or coercion and causing personal injury to an 18-year-old victim. (Nickitas Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (Decl. of Thomas Evenstad (“Evenstad Decl.”)) ¶ 2, Sept. 29, 2017, Docket No. 17.) On August 21, Evenstad was released from jail and moved into an apartment in a West St. Paul residence. (*See id.* ¶ 3.) Three days later, City police informed Evenstad's landlord that Evenstad was prohibited from living there and warned both that they would be subject to criminal charges if Evenstad did not vacate by September 5. (*Id.* ¶¶ 5–6.) The building is within 1200 feet of at least one day care center and two group homes. (*See* Nickitas Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 3 at 1.)

On August 31, Evenstad filed a pro se complaint and motion for preliminary injunction. (Compl., Aug. 31, 2017, Docket No. 1; Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Aug. 31, 2017, Docket No. 3.) The next day, police agreed to give Evenstad until September 30 to vacate the duplex. (Evenstad Decl. ¶ 11.) After obtaining counsel, Evenstad filed the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction that is now before the Court. (Ex Parte Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Sept. 29, 2017, Docket No. 13.)

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1,2 The Court considers four factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits, **1093* (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party, (3) the balance of harms as between the parties, and (4) the public interest. *See Grasso Enters., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc.*, 809 F.3d 1033, 1036 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing *Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.*, 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). “At base, the question is whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” *Dataphase*, 640 F.2d at 113.

II. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

3,4,5,6 “In balancing the equities no single factor is determinative.” *Dataphase*, 640 F.2d at 113. As such, likelihood of success “must be examined in the context of the relative injuries to the parties and the public.” *Id.* However, likelihood of success on the merits is the most significant factor in considering a preliminary injunction. *S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist.*, 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2012).

A. Required Showing

7,8,9,10 The likelihood of success factor ordinarily requires the moving party to prove only a “fair chance of prevailing,” which may mean “something less than fifty percent.” *Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds*, 530 F.3d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). When the matter at issue is a law that was the product of “government action based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes,” however, the moving party must show that they are “likely to prevail on the merits.” *Id.* at 732–33. With a city ordinance, the question is “to what extent the challenged action represents ‘the full play of the democratic process.’ ” *Id.* at 732 n.6 (quoting *Able v. United States*, 44 F.3d 128, 131–32 (2d Cir. 1995)); *see also Johnson v. Minneapolis Park & Rec. Bd.*, 729 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying the “likely to prevail” standard to a park board’s speech restriction).

Evenstad alleges that the Ordinance was passed by a unanimous vote of the City Council, signed by the previous mayor, and enforced under the current mayor, and that others in the City’s government assisted in developing it. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–14.) The City submits evidence of the first and second readings of the Ordinance at council meetings and documents circulated prior to the first reading. (Boike Decl. ¶¶ 1–3, Ex. 1–3.) The Court finds that the Ordinance was enacted pursuant to a “presumptively reasoned democratic processes,” if not a terribly deliberative one. As such, Evenstad bears the burden of showing that he is “likely” to prevail on the merits.

B. The Ex Post Facto Clause

In support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Evenstad argues that the Ordinance’s restrictions on all “designated offenders,” regardless of date of offense, are retroactive punishment prohibited by the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

11,12 Sex offender registration laws do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if they establish civil proceedings rather than criminal punishment. *Smith v. United States*, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). To determine whether a law is civil or criminal, the court must ask: (1) Did the City intend to impose punishment? (2) If not, is the law “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate the City’s intention that it be civil? *Id.* (quoting *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Five factors, though neither exhaustive nor dispositive, are relevant to analysis of **1094* whether a law is punitive in effect. *Id.* at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citing *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)). Courts must ask “whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” *Id.*

1. The Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit has twice applied *Smith* to resolve Ex Post Facto challenges to sex offender residency restrictions, in both instances upholding the challenged laws.

First, in *Doe v. Miller*, the Eighth Circuit upheld an Iowa statute prohibiting sex offenders who had victimized minors from residing within 2000 feet of a school or day care. 405 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2005). It concluded that the statute was not punitive because the legislature’s intent was to protect the health and safety of Iowa citizens. *Id.* at 718–19. It then applied the five *Smith* factors to conclude that the law was not so punitive in effect as to negate the legislature’s intent. *Id.* at 719–23. First, it rejected the argument that the residency restrictions amounted to the historical punishment of “banishment” because they did not “expel” offenders from the restricted areas altogether. *Id.* at 719–20. It did so despite the fact that the record showed that “the restricted areas in many cities encompass the majority of the available housing,” and in smaller towns even a single facility “can cause all of the incorporated areas of the town to be off limits” to offenders. *Id.* at 706 & n.2. Second, it found that the statute’s goal of “protecting the health and safety of children” outweighed its deterrent or retributive effects. *Id.* at 720. Third, it noted that

the restrictions imposed less disability or restraint than a civil commitment scheme the Supreme Court had approved. *Id.* at 721. Fourth, it found that the restrictions had a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose. *Id.* Lastly, it found that the restrictions were not excessive. Crediting trial testimony that “convicted sex offenders as a class were more likely to commit sex offenses against minors than the general population,” the court stated that “[t]he absence of a particularized risk assessment [] does not necessarily convert a regulatory law into a punitive measure.” *Id.* at 721.

Second, in *Weems v. Little Rock Police Department*, the Eighth Circuit upheld an Arkansas statute prohibiting certain sex offenders from residing within 2000 feet of a school or day care. 453 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2006). The court began by looking to *Miller*, finding that:

The Iowa statute differed from the Arkansas law in two principal ways. The Iowa statute was narrower in that it applied only to offenders convicted of sex offenses against minors, while the Arkansas law applies to some sex offenses in which adults were victimized. The restrictions of the Iowa statute affected offenders more broadly, however, because they applied to every sex offender convicted of an enumerated offense, without any individualized assessment.

Id. at 1015. Specifically, the Arkansas law applied to offenders who received an individually-assigned risk level of three (“high risk”) or four (“sexually violent predators”). *Id.* at 1012–13. Risk levels are assigned by expert examiners, and, for level four offenders, by a sentencing court. *Id.* An offender has a right to request an administrative review and, if unsuccessful, to challenge an assigned risk level in court. *Id.* at 1013. The Court concluded that the *1095 legislature’s intent was not punitive, in part because the restriction was passed as part of the state’s overall registration scheme. *Id.* at 1017. And it concluded that the case-by-case risk assessment process put the Arkansas law “on even stronger constitutional footing than the Iowa statute.” *Id.* at 1017. The court specifically noted that this “fine-tuning of the restriction addresses the principle concern of the dissenting judges who believed the Iowa statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.” *Id.*

2. Persuasive Authority

Lacking direct support in the Eighth Circuit, Evenstad turns to analogous cases decided elsewhere in the intervening decade since *Miller* and *Weems* to argue that he is likely to prevail here. While none of these cases are controlling, they offer persuasive authority in support of the proposition that courts are skeptical of schemes that are stricter than those upheld in *Miller* and *Weems*.

First, Evenstad cites a Sixth Circuit case holding that Michigan’s sex offender statutory regime (which, as relevant here, prohibited registered sex offenders from living, working, or loitering within 1000 feet of a school) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. *Does # 1–5 v. Snyder*, 834 F.3d 696, 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2016), *reh’g denied* (Sept. 15, 2016), *cert. denied sub nom. Snyder v. John Does # 1–5*, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 55, 199 L.Ed.2d 18 (2017). Like the Arkansas statute in *Weems*, the Michigan law applied to offenders who victimized adults—but the court was concerned that the restrictions were based entirely on the crime of conviction rather than individualized assessment. *Id.* The court expressed particular concern that the classifications were not appealable. *Id.* at 702–03. It was also concerned about the restrictions on working and loitering, *id.* at 703, and the lack of evidence as to the efficacy of such restrictions, *id.* at 704–05.

Second, Evenstad discusses a Wisconsin district court case considering an ordinance that restricted offenders who had victimized children from living within 3000 feet of a prohibited location (including schools, day cares, parks, trails, playgrounds, places of worship, and athletic fields used by minors) and 500 feet of each other. *Hoffman v. Vill. of Pleasant Prairie*, 249 F.Supp.3d 951, 954 (E.D. Wis. 2017). Those not already living in the Village were banned altogether. *Id.* The court called the ordinance “high unprecedented in its punitive effect,” *id.* at 958, comparing it unfavorably to the Iowa and Arkansas

statutes. *Id.* at 959–60 (noting in particular the lack of individualized assessment, lack of exemptions, and lifetime ban on residency).

Third, Evenstad turns to the Eleventh Circuit that considered a law prohibiting offenders who had victimized someone under sixteen from living within 2500 feet of a school. *Doe v. Miami-Dade Cty., Fla.*, 846 F.3d 1180, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2017). The court affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss an Ex Post Facto challenge because the complaint sufficiently alleged that the county law created an affirmative disability (plaintiffs alleged that their homelessness resulted from the residency restriction) and because the law was excessive in relation to its stated purpose (it contained no individualized assessment and applied for life). *Id.* at 1185–86. The court distinguished the ordinance from a less-severe, time-limited state residency restriction. *Id.* at 1186.

Finally, Evenstad cites two state supreme court cases. In *Commonwealth v. Baker*, the Kentucky Supreme Court overturned a state law barring all registered offenders from residing within 1000 feet of a school, playground, or day care. *1096 295 S.W.3d 437, 439–441, 447 (Ky. 2009). The *Baker* court was similarly troubled that the statute covered all offenders, regardless of their victim's age, and that it did not contain any sort of individualized risk assessment. *Id.* at 444, 446. And in *Starkey v. Oklahoma Dep't of Corr.*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that retroactive application of a state-law restriction on residency within 2000 feet of locations including schools, playgrounds, parks, and day cares violated the state constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, in part because the extension took place without any individualized risk assessments. 305 P.3d 1004, 1026, 1028–30 (Okla. 2013). That said, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on the federal Constitution. *See Shaw v. Patton*, 823 F.3d 556, 576–77 (10th Cir. 2016). That court was not troubled by the lack of individualized assessment, in part because the plaintiff “has not shown that his own risk of recidivism is particularly low.” *Id.*

C. Analysis

1. Intent

13,14,15 To discern intent, courts “consider the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.” *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140. “[C]onsiderable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.” *Id.* at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Here, the Ordinance states that its purpose is “to serve the city's compelling interest to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city,” with a particular focus on “children and vulnerable individuals.” City Code § 97.01. Moreover, while the legislative record shows generalized discussion of the safety risks posed by offenders, it does not show consideration of the specific risks posed by offenders who victimized adults or specific dangers posed to vulnerable adults.³ (Boike Decl. ¶¶ 1–2, Ex. 1 at 13, Ex. 2 at 22–23.) The Ordinance is triggered solely by underlying criminal offenses and may result in a criminal misdemeanor, but it is situated in the “General Regulations” title of the City Code. On the record before the Court, it appears that the intent of the City Council was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime.

2. Effects

The Court therefore turns to the Ordinance's effects to determine whether they are so punitive in nature as to negate the City's stated intent. Although the City argues that the 1200-foot restriction in the Ordinance makes it “less onerous” than the 2000-foot restrictions upheld in *Miller* and *Weems*, the Eighth Circuit's comparison of the Iowa and Arkansas statutes shows that the Court's analysis must go beyond the distance covered by the restriction. *See Weems*, 453 F.3d at 1015. The City's Ordinance is in actuality stricter than either of the two statutes the Eighth Circuit upheld because it consolidates multiple categories of offenders into one and applies an across-the-board restriction on residency near schools, day care centers, and group homes to each. As such, new analysis is required.

a. Historically Regarded as Punishment

16 Under *Smith*, the first factor is whether the nature of the Ordinance has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment. *Miller* forecloses Evenstad's argument that the residency restriction *1097 is banishment. The Eighth Circuit focused on the fact that the residency restriction in *Miller* did not prohibit offenders from being present during the day to hold that it was unlike banishment. 405 F.3d at 719–20. Evenstad acknowledges that the Ordinance does not prohibit him from being present in the restricted areas, only from living in them.

b. Traditional Aims of Punishment

17 A related factor is whether the Ordinance promotes traditional aims of punishment. Evenstad says that it advances all three traditional aims of punishment: incapacitation (because it keeps offenders away from certain locations), retribution (because its application is based on prior acts, not current assessments of danger), and deterrence (because the goal is to avoid recidivism). His arguments as to deterrence and retribution are foreclosed by *Miller*, which acknowledged that residency restrictions could have a deterrent or retributive effect, but are nonpunitive to the extent that they are intended to protect the public rather than to reduce the offender's incentive to reoffend through imposition of negative consequences. *See* 405 F.3d at 720; *see also Smith*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Evenstad's incapacitation argument is unique, but fails in part for the same reason and in part because offenders are not restricted from mere presence.

c. Affirmative Disability or Restraint

The next factor is whether the Ordinance imposes an affirmative disability or restraint. The court in *Miller* explained that the degree of any disability or restraint must be considered in light of the law's “countervailing nonpunitive purpose”—the greater the legitimate objective, the more restraint is allowed. 405 F.3d at 720–21. The court acknowledged that the Iowa statute “does impose an element of affirmative disability or restraint,” but linked this factor together with the fourth and fifth factors to determine whether its degree was permissible. *Id.* Although the Ordinance includes group homes on the list of restricted facilities, its overall coverage (and therefore restraint) is not necessarily greater than what was at issue in at least some cities and towns in *Miller*. The Court will therefore consider this factor together with the next two factors.

d. Rational Connection to Nonpunitive Purpose

18 The final two factors, which are closely related, are whether the Ordinance has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether its restrictions are excessive with respect to this purpose. Evenstad argues that the Ordinance lacks a rational connection to its stated purpose (because it does not target offenders who victimized minors and is not supported by evidence) and is excessive with respect to the stated purpose (because the restrictions do not allow for individualized assessment). To the extent that the Ordinance is coextensive with those upheld by the Eighth Circuit in *Miller* and *Weems*, his argument must fail. But the Ordinance at issue here is broader in important ways: it is intended to protect more than just minors, it restricts offenders who victimized adults without an individualized case-by-case assessment, and it restricts residency near group homes. As such, though *Miller* and *Weems* certainly guide the Court's analysis of these factors, they do not command an outcome.

The stated purpose of the Ordinance is “to serve the city's compelling interest to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city,” particularly “children and vulnerable *1098 individuals.” City Code § 97.01. The record shows that the Ordinance was designed to address the City's concerns that predatory offenders “tend to change neighborhood character overnight,” and that a “rapid influx” of such offenders “can quickly degrade a community's sense of safety.” (Boike Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 2 at 22.) This focus on “character” and “sense of safety” rather than actual safety is questionable, and even the reasonable goal of protecting vulnerable adults and the community writ large is significantly broader than the nonpunitive purpose of the statutes affirmed by the Eighth Circuit

in *Miller* and *Weems*. See *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 721 (“minimizing the risk of repeated sex offenses against minors”); *Weems*, 453 F.3d at 1017 (“minimizing the risk of sex crimes against minors”).⁴

19 Admittedly, however, it is similar to a purpose affirmed as legitimate in *Smith*: “public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their communit[y].” 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. And states may make “reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences,” including registration and notification. *Id.* But the City has pointed to no case—in the Eighth Circuit or anywhere else—where a court held that residency restrictions were rationally connected to so broad a purpose as “promot[ing], protect[ing] and improv[ing] the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city.”

Perhaps it is possible to read a more limited purpose to the Ordinance: protecting the safety of “children and vulnerable individuals.”⁵ But even this more limited purpose is broader than that of the statutes in *Miller* and *Weems*—and the City has not cited any cases where a court upheld a law restricting offenders from residing near group homes. Nor did the City consider any evidence that the same sort of “temptation and opportunity” posed by contact between children and sex offenders who victimized children, See *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 720, is posed by contact between vulnerable adults and sex offenders of all types.

But with all that said, the Supreme Court has noted that a law “is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.” *Id.* (distinguishing cases where the nonpunitive purpose is a “sham or mere pretext”). Evenstad does make a colorable argument that there is no rational connection between the stated nonpunitive purpose of protecting children and vulnerable individuals and the Ordinance's across-the-board residency restrictions, *1099 particularly in light of the City's consideration of “neighborhood character.” But he has not demonstrated that he is likely to prevail in making the case that the City's stated purpose is a sham or pretext.

e. Excessive in Relation to a Nonpunitive Purpose

20 Evenstad's case that the Ordinance is excessive in relation to its stated purpose, however, is strong. First, like the Arkansas statute in *Weems*, the City's Ordinance is harsher than the Iowa law because it includes offenders who victimized adults. Second, like the Iowa statute in *Miller*, the City's Ordinance is broader than the Arkansas law because it applies to every sex offender convicted of an enumerated offense without any individualized assessment. Third, unique among the laws considered in the cases cited by the parties, the Ordinance includes group homes among the restricted facilities.

With regard to the first two points, it is true that *Weems* forecloses Evenstad's suggestion that the Ordinance is excessive merely because it restricts offenders who victimized adults. See 453 F.3d at 1015. But it is also true that a crucial aspect of holding such a restriction constitutional is that an individualized assessment is required. *Id.* This is particularly relevant in an Ex Post Facto challenge, because an across-the-board restriction is directly tied to an offender's prior conviction, not to any present threat to community safety. That is why the Arkansas law's appealable individualized assessment, and the resulting application of restrictions to only the most dangerous offenders, put it “on even stronger constitutional footing” than the Iowa statute. *Id.* at 1017. Like the Eighth Circuit, other circuit courts have stressed the importance of individualized assessment, treating laws containing across-the-board restrictions with skepticism. See *Miami–Dade Cty.*, 846 F.3d at 1185; *Snyder*, 834 F.3d at 702, 705. Indeed, of the four persuasive cases the City cites for support, only two (both from New York) discuss laws restricting offenders who victimized adults—and those laws included individualized assessments. *Wallace v. New York*, 40 F.Supp.3d 278, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2014);⁶ *Matter of Devine v. Annucchi*, 150 A.D. 3d 1104, 56 N.Y.S.3d 149 (2017).⁷

The Minnesota sex offender regime already requires an end-of-confinement risk assessment to determine whether an offender has a low, moderate, or high risk of reoffense. Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3. Offenders have a limited right to request review of the assessment, though not to appeal it to a court. *See id.* at § 244.052, subd.3(i). It is undisputed that the Ordinance does not take that assessment into account. The City argued at the hearing on this motion that even offenders assigned the lowest risk level pose at least some safety risk, but under Minnesota law all released offenders must be assigned to one of these three risk levels. *See id.* As such, the fact that an offender is not adjudicated zero-risk is a direct result of the crime of *1100 conviction. Even though the Ordinance does except certain offenders from its restrictions, neither the Ordinance nor the record of its enactment reflect any consideration of whether or how the City should take into account the state's risk assessment. The fact that the Ordinance does not do so—let alone the fact that the City did not even consider whether it should—cuts strongly in Evenstad's favor.

21 With regard to the third point, including group homes among the restricted facilities significantly increases the degree of restraint. The City's map of restricted areas reveals that there are 36 such facilities in the City and six more within 1200 feet of its boundaries. Entire swaths of the City are restricted only due to group homes, not schools or day care facilities. As such, this factor expands the restraint on offenders in a manner, if not a degree, that has not been considered by the Eighth Circuit. Although the *Miller* court acknowledged that the Iowa statute severely restricted living options for offenders, it did so as a side effect of its necessary operation. Here, by contrast, the Ordinance's restrictions on residency near group homes are outside the traditional operation of these sorts of statutes—and the resulting expansion in coverage is more reminiscent of the complete ban in *Pleasant Prairie* than the incidental effect in *Miller* or *Weems*. Again, neither the Ordinance nor the record of its enactment reflect any consideration of whether or how the City should take into account the unique nature of group homes. This fact, too, cuts in Evenstad's favor.

Relatedly, the fact that *Smith*, *Miller*, and *Weems* all deal with state statutes and not city ordinances is worthy of mention. Again, in each instance the restrictions were part and parcel of the state's broader regularly regime—not a piecemeal addition layered on top. The *Weems* court specifically cited the fact that the residency restriction was enacted as part of a bill relating to registration as evidence of its nonpunitive nature. 453 F.3d at 1017. And the persuasive authority reviewed above reveals that courts are generally more skeptical of local restrictions than statewide restrictions. *See, e.g., Miami-Dade Cty.*, 846 F.3d at 1185–86 (distinguishing a more-restrictive county ordinance from the state regime and overturning it); *cf. Wallace*, 40 F.Supp.3d at 324–25 (distinguishing more-restrictive county and town restrictions from the state regime and upholding them). This fact also cuts narrowly in Evenstad's favor.

Finally, the Court notes that Evenstad has submitted some recent evidence that sex offender residency restrictions are ineffective at preventing recidivism. The City is of course correct that such research is insufficient to justify a holding that Evenstad is likely to prevail in an effort to overturn the state regimes upheld by the Eighth Circuit. But the evidence does lend support to Evenstad's case that the City's more restrictive Ordinance is excessive in relation to its stated purpose.

* * *

In sum, although the two factors related to whether the Ordinance takes the form of traditional punishment cut in favor of the City, the three factors related to whether the Ordinance's restrictiveness is rationally related to its purpose cut in favor of Evenstad. Although it is a close call], the Court finds that Evenstad is likely to prevail on the merits.

III. OTHER FACTORS

The other three factors the Court considers in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction are: (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party, *1101 (3) the balance of harms, and (4) the public interest. *Dataphase*, 640 F.2d at 114.

22 Evenstad argues that he will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction because he will likely be forced into homelessness, may lose his job, and could even go back to prison for a probation violation. The City concedes that eviction can be an irreparable injury when a party faces “the real threat of homelessness,” *Greer v. Mehiel*, No. 15-CV-6119, 2016 WL 828128, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016), but disputes that such a threat exists here. In support, it submits evidence that there are 69 rental properties in the City available to designated offenders. (2d Boike Decl. at ¶ 5.) That fact nicely makes Evenstad's case that there are few places for him to live. Evenstad takes it further by noting that he contacted the 60-unit building the City lists as available and found that, in addition to being cost-prohibitive, it does not allow convicted felons to rent. The Court finds that Evenstad has shown he would suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction.

23 Next, Evenstad argues that the balance of harms is in his favor because the City would not suffer any harm from an injunction because his homelessness would be worse for the City than his residency there. The City responds that barring it from enforcing the Ordinance against Evenstad would undermine not only its health and safety goals, but its very authority to govern.⁸ Because the Court believes Evenstad has shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits, it finds that the balance of harms cuts narrowly in Evenstad's favor.

24 Similarly, the public interest factor turns almost entirely on resolution of the merits—Evenstad says that all citizens have an interest in overturning unconstitutional laws, while the City says that the public has an interest in enforcing those that are constitutional. The City additionally quotes *Weems* for the straightforward proposition that the public has an interest in protecting children from predatory offenders. Even though that case says nothing about vulnerable adults, this point is sufficient for the Court to find that the public interest factor cuts narrowly in favor of the City.

Due to the risk of irreparable harm absent an injunction, however, the Court finds that these equities are strongly in Evenstad's favor. Because Evenstad is likely to succeed on the merits and the equities are strongly in his favor, the Court will grant his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

IV. SECURITY

25,26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) states that the Court “may issue a preliminary injunction ... only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” The “amount of the bond rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.” *Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp.*, 528 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1976). “Courts in this circuit have almost always required a bond before issuing a preliminary injunction, but exceptions have been made where the defendant has not objected *1102 to the failure to require a bond or where the damages resulting from a wrongful issuance of an injunction have not been shown.” *Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr's*, 826 F.3d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). The City has not objected to waiver of the bond requirement nor demonstrated any costs or monetary damages that may result from issuance of the injunction. Moreover, Evenstad seeks to vindicate an important constitutional right. Under the circumstances, the Court will exercise its discretion to waive Rule 65(c)'s bond requirement. If the City wishes to object, the Court will consider its motion and argument.

V. CONCLUSION

This case presents a close call, primarily because of the Eighth Circuit precedents that guide the Court in this case. But the Court finds simply that West St. Paul has gone too far in the sweep of its Ordinance. No one disputes that a city has a strong interest in protecting its citizens. Indeed, a more narrowly drawn ordinance would likely pass constitutional muster. The addition of group homes to the restricted areas and the lack of individualized assessments as to risk, in the Court's view, severely impact the rights of Evenstad and others affected by the Ordinance and doom this set of restrictions.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 13] is **GRANTED**.
2. The security requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived.

Footnotes

1 Evenstad's initial pro se Complaint also alleged that the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause and his procedural and substantive due process rights. Because Evenstad did not advance these arguments in support of this motion, the Court declines to consider them at this time, but does not consider them waived.

2 The prohibition on residency applies to “any designated offender.” (City Code § 97.03(A).) So does the provision that applies to landlords. (*Id.* § 97.04(C).) But the exceptions section exempts certain “predatory offender[s].” (*Id.* § 97.03(E).) And the City Council's summary of the Ordinance says it applies to “new predatory offenders.” (Nickitas Decl., Ex. 1 at 4.) The City stated at the hearing on this motion that the difference is of no legal significance.

3 Curiously, before turning to public safety, the police chief described predatory offenders and Group Residential Housing facilities together as “forces which ... tend to change neighborhood character overnight,” and noted the “adverse impact” of the “growing number” of such facilities. (Boike Decl. ¶¶ 1–2, Ex. 1 at 13, Ex. 2 at 22–23.)

4 Cf. *Vasquez v. Foxx*, No. 16-CV-8854, 2016 WL 7178465, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2016) (“protecting children from convicted sex offenders”); *Duarte v. City of Lewisville*, 136 F.Supp.3d 752, 775 (E.D. Tex. 2015), *aff'd sub nom. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, Texas*, 858 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2017), *cert. denied sub nom. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, Tex.*, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 391, 199 L.Ed.2d 281 (2017) (advancing “public safety and protection of the City's most vulnerable citizens, its children”).

5 The City advanced this more limited purpose at the hearing on this motion, noting that an individual may be convicted of first degree criminal sexual assault under one of twelve subcomponents if he or she causes personal injury to a victim and knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.342(e)(ii). But the Ordinance does not distinguish the subcomponents of Section 609.342, or of any other predicate crime. As such, it is hard to see how the subcomponents of any particular crime of conviction play any role in determining whether the Ordinance's across-the-board restrictions on all offenders are rationally connected to the purpose of protecting vulnerable adults.

6 “Because the State registration requirements, and, by extension, the County and Town residency restrictions, rely on a ‘particularized risk assessment’ to ensure that the ‘length and extent of’ such regulations are tailored to this end, they are ‘not excessive.’ ” *Id.* (quoting *Weems*, 453 F.3d at 1017).

7 At the hearing on this motion, the City cited *Devine* as an example of a court upholding the application of a residency restriction to a level-one offender against an Ex Post Facto challenge, but the offender at issue there victimized a minor and the state law that applied to him restricted only offenders who victimized minors and level-three offenders who victimized adults. 150 A.D. 3d at 1105; N.Y. Exec. Law § 259–c(14).

8 The City also argued that Evenstad would not suffer harm absent an injunction because the unit he was living in was an illegal rental unit. Evenstad does not dispute that this was the case at the time of the City's filing, and the City does not dispute that it is no longer true. Because Evenstad is legally in the unit now, the Court considers this fact of no moment.



Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from State Prison: A 9-Year Follow-Up (2005-14)

Mariel Alper, Ph.D., and Matthew R. Durose, *BJS Statisticians*

Among persons released from state prisons in 2005 across 30 states after serving a sentence for rape or sexual assault, 8% were arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years after their release. Overall, 67% of sex offenders released in 2005 were arrested at least once for any type of crime during the 9-year follow-up period.¹


About 3 in 10 (29%) sex offenders released in 2005 were arrested during their first year after release (**figure 1**). About 1 in 5 (20%) were arrested during their fifth year after release, and nearly 1 in 6 (16%) were arrested during their ninth year.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) used criminal-history data and prisoner records to analyze the post-release offending patterns of former prisoners both within and outside of the state where they were imprisoned. This is BJS's first recidivism study on sex offenders with a 9-year follow-up period.

¹For this report, "sex offenders" refers to released prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was rape or sexual assault.

FIGURE 1

Annual arrest percentage of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault



Note: The denominator is the 20,195 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault. See table 7 for estimates and appendix table 9 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

HIGHLIGHTS

Within 9 years of their release from prison in 2005—

- Rape and sexual assault offenders were less likely than other released prisoners to be arrested, but they were more likely than other released prisoners to be arrested for rape or sexual assault.
- Released sex offenders were more than three times as likely as other released prisoners to be arrested for rape or sexual assault (7.7% versus 2.3%).
- About two-thirds (67%) of released sex offenders were arrested for any crime, compared to about five-sixths (84%) of other released prisoners.
- Half of released sex offenders had a subsequent arrest that led to a conviction.
- Released sex offenders accounted for 5% of releases in 2005 and 16% of arrests for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period.
- Less than half of released sex offenders were arrested for any crime within the first 3 years, while more than two-thirds were arrested within 9 years.
- Eleven percent of released sex offenders were arrested at least once for any crime outside the state of release.
- Among released prisoners who had a prior arrest for a sex offense but were serving time for an offense other than a sex offense, 6.7% were subsequently arrested for rape or sexual assault.

This study compares released prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was rape or sexual assault to all other released prisoners, in terms of their characteristics and recidivism patterns. It also compares the characteristics and recidivism patterns of released sex offenders to those of released prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was assault.

Prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was a violent crime of rape, sexual assault, or assault (whether aggravated or simple) were involved in a generally nonfatal attack upon a person, whereas homicide involves a fatality, and robbery involves an attack with the aim of taking property. So, in addition to comparisons with other released prisoners as a whole, this report examines how the recidivism patterns of sex offenders compare to the recidivism patterns of prisoners released after serving time for a non-sexual assault. (See Methodology for offense definitions.)

Separate recidivism rates for prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault against a child were unavailable because a large number of prison records did not distinguish between crimes against children and crimes against adults. Prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault against a child are included with all other rape and sexual assault offenders. Released prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was a non-violent sex offense, such as prostitution or pornography, are included with public-order offenders.

This study was based on a sample of 67,966 released prisoners who were randomly sampled to represent the 401,288 state prisoners released in 30 states in 2005. These 30 states were responsible for 77% of all persons released from state prisons nationwide. (See map on page 15.) A total of 358,398 male prisoners and 42,890 female prisoners were released in the study's 30 states in 2005. These persons may have been serving time for more than one offense and were categorized by the offense with the longest maximum sentence. For instance, prisoners released after serving time for homicide and rape or sexual assault were categorized as homicide offenders if the sentence length for the homicide was longer.

Males accounted for 19,871 (98%) of the 20,195 prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault in 2005 in the study's 30 states (table 1). This report examines the recidivism rates of male and female sex offenders separately in tables 10 to 13.

TABLE 1

Characteristics of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense		
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault	Offense other than rape/sexual assault
Sex				
Male	89.3%	98.4%	93.0%	88.8%
Female	10.7	1.6	7.0	11.2
Race/Hispanic origin				
White ^a	39.7%	52.1%	36.1%	39.1%
Black/African American ^a	40.1	27.2	38.0	40.8
Hispanic/Latino	17.7	17.2	22.5	17.7
Other ^{a,b}	2.4	3.5	3.4	2.4
Age at release				
24 or younger	17.7%	12.3%	19.4%	18.0%
25–29	19.4	15.9	21.3	19.6
30–34	16.0	14.1	17.1	16.1
35–39	15.7	14.0	14.9	15.8
40 or older	31.2	43.8	27.3	30.6
Median	34 yrs.	38 yrs.	32 yrs.	34 yrs.
Mean	35.0	38.8	34.0	34.8
Type of prison release				
Conditional	74.1%	67.9%	75.3%	74.4%
Unconditional	25.9	32.1	24.7	25.6
Maximum sentence length ^c				
1–<2 years	19.2%	10.5%	12.9%	19.6%
2–<5 years	44.7	34.2	56.3	45.3
5–<10 years	22.1	28.0	20.4	21.8
10 years or more	14.0	27.3	10.4	13.3
Median	36 mos.	60 mos.	36 mos.	36 mos.
Number of prior arrests per released prisoner ^d				
4 or fewer	24.8%	52.4%	25.0%	23.4%
5–9	30.3	26.6	30.2	30.5
10 or more	44.9	21.0	44.8	46.2
Median	9 arsts.	4 arsts.	9 arsts.	9 arsts.
Mean	11.0	6.3	10.8	11.3
At least one prior arrest for—				
Drug offense	70.7%	30.5%	57.9%	72.8%
Property offense	81.3	55.8	78.0	82.6
Number of released prisoners				
	401,288	20,195	38,468	381,093

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Percentages exclude missing data. Data on prisoners' age at release were reported for 100% of cases; race/Hispanic origin, for 99.86%; type of prison release, for 98.19%; and maximum sentence length, for 99.72%. See appendix table 3 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

^cBased on the released prisoners' total maximum sentence length for all commitment offenses. Study excludes prisoners sentenced to less than one year.

^dIncludes arrests for any type of crime prior to the prisoners' date of release in 2005.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Sex offenders were more likely than other released prisoners to receive longer sentences and to be granted unconditional releases

Rape or sexual assault was the most serious commitment offense for 5% of the 401,288 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005. (See appendix table 1.) In comparison, assault was the most serious commitment offense of 10% (38,468) of released prisoners.

The median sentence length among prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving time for rape or sexual assault (60 months) was longer than the median sentence length among all prisoners (36 months) or prisoners released after serving time for assault (36 months). Twenty-seven percent of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were serving a maximum sentence length of 10 years or more, compared to 10% of prisoners released after serving time for assault.

Sex offenders were more likely to be given unconditional releases than other offenders. About 1 in 3 (32%) sex offenders were granted an unconditional release and not placed on parole, probation, or some other form of community supervision, compared to about 1 in 4 (26%) offenders overall and 1 in 4 (25%) assault offenders. Among prisoners who were granted an unconditional release, 96% were released for an expiration of sentence, and the remaining 4% were commutations or other types of unconditional releases (not shown in tables).

The median age at release for sex offenders was 38

The demographic composition of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault differed from those released after serving time for other offenses. About half (52%) of sex offenders were white, compared to 36% of assault offenders and 40% of all offenders.

Criminal-history data were used to measure recidivism outcomes of former prisoners

This study uses several measures to examine the post-release offending patterns of former state prisoners, including new arrests and returns to prison. The recidivism patterns were examined in terms of post-release arrests for any type of offense and for the same type of offense for which the former prisoner had been serving time. These estimates do not include crimes that were not reported to the police or that did not result in an arrest.

Prisoners released in 2005 may not have been able to commit certain types of crimes for a portion of the 9-year period following their release because they were re-incarcerated. Data on the amount of time that the prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 spent in prison or jail during the 9-year follow-up period were not available for this study. The recidivism estimates include offenses that the released prisoners were charged with while incarcerated during the follow-up period.

The **cumulative arrest percentage** is the percentage of former prisoners who were arrested at least once during the follow-up period. For example, the cumulative arrest percentage for year-3 is the percentage of prisoners who had at least one arrest during the first, second, or third years following their release. This report also examines the cumulative percentage of prisoners who had a subsequent arrest that led to a court conviction and the cumulative percentage who returned to prison following release. Because not all arrests result in a conviction or reimprisonment, recidivism rates based on these measures are lower than those based on an arrest.

The **annual arrest percentage** is the percentage of released prisoners who were arrested at least once during a particular year within the follow-up period. The denominator for each percentage from years 1 through 9 is the total number of prisoners released in the 30 states during 2005. The numerator is the number of former prisoners arrested during the particular year, regardless of whether they had been arrested during a prior year.

The **annual percentage of first arrests** is the percentage of prisoners who had their first arrest following release during a specific year during the follow-up period. The denominator for each annual first-arrest percentage from years 1 through 9 is the total number of prisoners released in the 30 states in 2005. The numerator is the number of former prisoners arrested for the first time during each of those years (i.e., they had not been arrested during a prior year during the follow-up period). The sum of the annual first-arrest percentages during a follow-up period equals the cumulative arrest percentage for the same period.

The **volume of arrest offenses** is the total number of arrest offenses among the released prisoners during the follow-up period. A former prisoner may have had multiple arrests during the follow-up period, and a single arrest may have involved charges for more than one crime.

The median age at the time of release was older for sex offenders (age 38) than for all released prisoners (age 34) and for assault offenders (age 34). Forty-four percent of sex offenders were age 40 or older at release, compared to 27% of assault offenders and 31% of all offenders.

About half of sex offenders had 5 or more prior arrests and about a third had at least 1 prior drug arrest

About half (52%) of prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape or sexual assault had four or fewer arrests for any type of crime in their criminal history prior to their release in 2005, and about half (48%) had five or more prior arrests. On average, sex offenders had fewer prior arrests in their criminal history than assault offenders. The median number of prior arrests among sex offenders was four, compared to nine for assault offenders. Prior to their release, 31% of sex offenders had been arrested at least once for a drug offense and 56% for a property offense.

Sex offenders were less likely than other released prisoners to be arrested during the 9 years following release

An estimated 83% of the 401,288 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 were arrested for a new crime within 9 years of release (table 2). The percentage of released prisoners arrested within 9 years for any type of crime after serving time for rape or sexual assault was 67%. That was higher than for prisoners released after serving time for homicide (60%) and lower than for prisoners released after serving time for robbery (84%) or assault (83%). Sex offenders (67%) were also less likely to be arrested following release than prisoners released after serving time for property (88%), drug (84%), or public-order (82%) offenses. Among released prisoners who were arrested during the 9-year follow-up period, 96% of sex offenders and 99% of all offenders were arrested for an offense other than a probation or parole violation (not shown in tables).

Among all 401,288 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, 381,093 (95%) were serving time for offenses other than rape or sexual assault (i.e., their most serious commitment offense was not a violent sex offense). An estimated 84% of prisoners released after serving time for an offense other than rape or sexual assault were arrested for any type of offense during the 9-year follow-up period.

TABLE 2

Percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested within 9 years following release, by most serious commitment offense and types of post-release arrest charges

Most serious commitment offense	Post-release arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
		Total violent ^a	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault			
All prisoners	83.3%	39.1%	1.2%	2.6%	7.8%	31.3%	48.0%	48.0%	68.4%
Violent ^a	78.1%	43.4%	1.4%	4.0%	9.2%	34.1%	39.6%	36.7%	65.0%
Homicide	60.0	29.5	2.7	1.9	4.3	23.1	24.4	26.1	45.8
Rape/sexual assault	66.9	28.1	0.2	7.7	3.8	18.7	24.2	18.5	58.9
Robbery	84.1	47.2	1.5	3.4	16.8	34.3	47.7	45.3	67.1
Assault	82.9	50.7	1.4	2.8	7.7	44.2	44.3	43.2	69.6
Property	87.8%	40.3%	1.0%	2.5%	9.1%	31.9%	63.5%	48.4%	72.4%
Drug	83.7%	34.0%	1.1%	1.6%	5.8%	28.0%	42.4%	60.4%	66.9%
Public order	81.8%	39.8%	1.3%	2.4%	6.7%	32.5%	42.5%	38.8%	70.1%
Rape/sexual assault*	66.9%	28.1%	0.2%	7.7%	3.8%	18.7%	24.2%	18.5%	58.9%
Offense other than rape/sexual assault ^b	84.1% †	39.6% †	1.2% †	2.3% †	8.0% †	31.9% †	49.2% †	49.6% †	68.9% †

Note: The numerator for each percentage is the number of persons arrested for that offense during the 9-year follow-up period, and the denominator is the number released after serving time for each type of commitment offense. Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Details may not sum to totals because a person may be arrested more than once for different types of offenses and each arrest may involve more than one offense. See appendix table 4 for standard errors.

*Comparison group.

†Difference with comparison group (rape/sexual assault) is significant at the 95% confidence level.

^aIncludes other miscellaneous violent offenses that are not shown separately.

^bIncludes the 381,093 prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was an offense other than rape or sexual assault.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Sex offenders were three times as likely as other offenders to be arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release

Among all prisoners released across 30 states in 2005, 2.6% were arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period. Among prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault, 7.7% were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 9 years of release. Prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault (7.7%) were more than twice as likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period than prisoners released after serving time for robbery (3.4%), assault (2.8%), or homicide (1.9%). Overall, prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault (7.7%) were more than three times as likely as other released prisoners (2.3%) to be arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release.

Sex offenders were more likely to be arrested for an assault or a drug, property, or public-order offense than for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years after release. During the 9-year follow-up period, approximately 1 in 5 (19%) sex offenders were arrested at least once for assault, 1 in 4 (24%) were arrested for a property offense, and 1 in 5 (18%) were arrested for a drug offense, while 1 in 13 (7.7%) were arrested for a rape or sexual assault. The majority (59%) of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested for a public-order offense within 9 years.

In addition to the 20,195 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving time for rape or sexual assault, other prisoners released that year had prior arrests for rape or sexual assault in their criminal-history records.

Of the 381,093 prisoners released in 2005 after serving time for offenses other than rape or sexual assault, 25,948 (6.5%) had been arrested at least once for rape or sexual assault in their criminal history prior to being released in 2005 (not shown in tables).

Among the 25,948 prisoners released in 2005 whose most serious commitment offense was not rape or sexual assault but who had at least one prior arrest for rape or sexual assault, 6.7% were arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release (not shown in tables). Of those prisoners released after serving time for offenses other than rape or sexual assault who had no prior arrests for rape or sexual assault, 2.0% were arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period.

Overall, a combined total of 46,144 prisoners released in 2005 either had been serving time for rape or sexual assault (20,195) or had been serving time for another type offense but had previously been arrested for rape or sexual assault (25,948). Of these 46,144 released prisoners, 7.2% were arrested for rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release.

18% of sex offenders were arrested for the first time during years 4 through 9 after release

The cumulative arrest percentage among released sex offenders increased 18 percentage points when the follow-up period was extended from 3 to 9 years. About half (49%) of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested within 3 years, while 62% were arrested within 6 years (table 3). By the end of the 9-year follow-up period, the percentage

TABLE 3

Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested following release, by year following release and most serious commitment offense

Year after release	Most serious commitment offense							
	All prisoners		Rape/sexual assault		Assault		Offense other than rape/sexual assault	
	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage
1	43.8%	43.8%	29.0%	29.0%	43.2%	43.2%	44.5%	44.5%
2	16.2	60.0	12.9	41.9	16.2	59.4	16.4	60.9
3	8.3	68.3	7.0	48.9	8.5	67.9	8.4	69.3
4	5.1	73.4	4.9	53.8	5.6	73.5	5.2	74.4
5	3.5	76.9	4.4	58.2	4.1	77.5	3.5	77.9
6	2.3	79.3	3.6	61.8	2.1	79.6	2.3	80.2
7	1.7	80.9	2.0	63.8	1.5	81.2	1.7	81.8
8	1.3	82.3	1.9	65.7	1.1	82.3	1.3	83.1
9	1.0	83.3	1.2	66.9	0.7	82.9	1.0	84.1

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 5 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

of sex offenders arrested after release had increased to 67%. Released sex offenders were less likely (49%) than other released prisoners (69%) to be arrested within 3 years but more likely to be arrested for the first time in years 4 through 9 (18% versus 15%).

Among prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault who were arrested during the 9-year follow-up period, 63% were arrested for the first time during the first 2 years. Among prisoners released after serving time for an offense other than rape or sexual assault who were arrested during the 9-year follow-up period, 72% were arrested for the first time during the first 2 years (not shown in tables).

Sex offenders had a lower cumulative arrest percentage than assault offenders. During year-1, 29% of sex offenders were arrested, compared to 43% of assault offenders. By the end of year-9, 67% of sex offenders had been arrested, compared to 83% of assault offenders.

As with released prisoners as a whole, the longer sex offenders went without being arrested after release, the less likely they were to be arrested during the 9-year follow-up period. While 13% of sex offenders were arrested following release for the first time in year-2, that constituted 18% of the 71% who were not arrested in year-1 (not shown in tables). For those not arrested by the end of year-2, 12% were arrested by the end of year-3. Nine percent of those not arrested in years 1 through 5 were arrested in year-6. In year-9, 4% of the released sex offenders who went 8 years without an arrest were arrested.

Half of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault had an arrest within 9 years that led to a conviction

This study also examines the percentage of prisoners who had an arrest during the 9 years following release that resulted in a conviction. This measure was based on prisoners released from the 29 states in the study (all but Louisiana) that had the necessary data. (See *Methodology*.)

Sex offenders were less likely than all prisoners released in 2005 to have had a new arrest that resulted in a conviction after release. During the first 3 years after release, 28% of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault had a new arrest that led to a conviction, compared to 49% of all prisoners (table 4). At the end of the 9-year follow-up period, 50% of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault had a new arrest that led to a conviction, compared to 69% of all prisoners.

The percentage of sex offenders who had an arrest that led to a conviction within 9 years of release (50%) was about three-quarters of the percentage of sex offenders who were arrested within 9 years of release (67%).

TABLE 4
Cumulative arrest percentage of prisoners released in 29 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who had an arrest that led to a conviction after release

Year after release	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	25.4%	12.8%	22.4%
2	39.6	22.3	37.7
3	49.0	28.4	46.4
4	55.3	34.2	53.5
5	59.8	38.5	58.3
6	63.1	42.2	62.1
7	65.7	45.2	65.1
8	67.8	48.1	67.7
9	69.2	49.6	68.8

Note: Estimates based on time from release to first arrest that led to a conviction among prisoners released in 29 of the study's 30 states (all but Louisiana). Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 6 for standard errors.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.


Younger sex offenders were more likely than older sex offenders to be arrested for another sex offense post-release

Overall, 4.4% of sex offenders were arrested for another sex offense within 3 years following release (table 5). After 9 years following release, the percentage rose to 7.7%. Younger sex offenders (those age 24 or younger at the time of release) were more likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault following release than older sex offenders (age 40 or older at the time of release).

Nearly 10% (9.4%) of sex offenders age 24 or younger at the time of their release were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 3 years of release, compared to 3.0% of those age 40 or older (figure 2). About half of those age 24 or younger who were arrested within 3 years of release for rape or sexual assault were arrested in year-2 alone (4.6%). Overall, within 9 years of release, sex offenders age 24 or younger were twice as likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault (11.8%) as sex offenders age 40 or older (5.9%).

FIGURE 2

Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault who were arrested for rape/sexual assault after release, by age and year after release



Note: Age groups are based on prisoners' age at time of release after serving a sentence for rape or sexual assault. See table 5 for estimates and appendix table 7 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

TABLE 5

Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault who were arrested for rape/sexual assault after release, by age and year after release

Most serious commitment offense	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All prisoners	0.5%	0.9%	1.2%	1.5%	1.8%	2.0%	2.2%	2.4%	2.6%
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	1.9	3.5	4.4	5.1	5.9	6.3	6.9	7.6	7.7%
Age at release									
24 or younger	2.5	7.1	9.4	9.7	10.3	10.5	11.2	11.7	11.8
25–39	2.8	3.8	4.3	4.9	6.3	6.8	7.5	8.2	8.4
40 or older	0.8	2.2	3.0	3.9	4.2	4.5	5.0	5.8	5.9
Race/Hispanic origin									
White ^a	1.6	2.6	3.2	3.9	4.6	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.2
Black/African American ^a	1.7	4.4	4.6	6.0	6.5	6.8	7.7	9.7	9.7
Hispanic/Latino	3.3	4.9	7.5	7.5	8.1	8.1	8.6	8.6	8.6
Other ^{a,b}	1.0	2.6	3.8	4.1	4.5	4.7	6.7	6.7	6.9

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Data on prisoners' sex and age at release were known for 100% of cases, and race/Hispanic origin was known for 99.86%. See appendix table 7 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Measuring recidivism as a return to prison

In addition to arrests, returns to prison are another measure that can be used when studying prisoner recidivism. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) relies on a combination of criminal-history records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and state repositories, along with prisoner records obtained from state departments of corrections through the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), to estimate the percentage of released state prisoners who returned to prison.

BJS published a report in 2014 on state prisoners released in 2005 that used a 5-year follow-up period to examine offending patterns based on other recidivating events, including a conviction and return to prison.² The return-to-prison analysis for that report was based on prisoners released from the 23 states that could provide the necessary data. (See *Methodology*.) BJS used the annual 2005-10 NCRP files to supplement the criminal-history records with information on released prisoners who returned to prison for a probation or parole violation or a sentence for a new crime.

When BJS extended the follow-up period from 5 to 9 years, only 17 states could provide the

prison-admission data needed to identify returns to prison for the entire time frame. As a result, this report provides return-to-prison rates for only the first 5 years following release for the prisoners released in the 23 states with the necessary data. The 5-year return-to-prison rates of released sex offenders were not included in prior reports on prisoners released in 2005.

Prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault had a lower 5-year return-to-prison rate than released prisoners overall. Among prisoners serving time for rape or sexual assault who were released in 2005 in the 23 states with available data on returns to prison, 35% had a parole or probation violation or an arrest for a new offense that led to imprisonment within 3 years, while 40% had one within 5 years. In comparison, 55% of all prisoners released in 2005 had a parole or probation violation or an arrest for a new offense that led to imprisonment within 5 years.

Due to limitations with the prison-admission data used for this study, it is not possible to distinguish between returns to prison for parole or probation violations and returns to prison for sentences for new crimes. It is also not possible to determine how many of the returns to prison were for rape or sexual assault (or other types of crimes).

²*Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010*, NCJ 244205, BJS web, April 2014.

Within 3 years of release, sex offenders with 10 or more prior arrests for any crime (5.7%) were not statistically significantly more likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault than those with 5 to 9 prior arrests (4.5%) and those with 4 or fewer prior arrests (3.7%) (not shown in tables). Within 9 years of release, sex offenders with 10 or more prior arrests for any crime (10.4%) were not statistically significantly more likely to be arrested for rape or sexual assault than those with 5 to 9 prior arrests (8.3%) and those with 4 or fewer prior arrests (6.4%) (not shown in tables).

11% of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested at least once outside the state that released them

Five percent of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested outside of the state that released them, for any type of crime, during the first 3 years after release (table 6). During years 4 through 9, the out-of-state cumulative arrest rate increased to 11%. Among prisoners released after serving time for assault, 8% were arrested in another state within 3 years and 17% were arrested within 9 years. Fewer than 1% of sex offenders were arrested in another state for rape or sexual assault during the

9 years following release (not shown in tables). Of the released sex offenders arrested for a new crime during the 9-year follow-up period, 17% had been arrested out-of-state and 83% had been arrested only within the state that released them (not shown in tables).

TABLE 6
Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested outside the state of release, by year after release

Year after release	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	3.3%	2.1%	3.6%
2	5.7	3.4	6.4
3	7.7	5.2	8.4
4	9.3	6.7	10.2
5	10.8	8.2	11.9
6	12.1	9.4	13.1
7	13.3	10.1	14.4
8	14.4	10.6	15.6
9	15.4	11.4	16.7

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 8 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Annual arrest percentages among sex offenders declined during the 9 years following their release

Overall, 84% of sex offenders who were age 24 or younger at release were arrested for any type of crime within 9 years after release, compared to 72% of those ages 25 to 39 and 57% of those age 40 or older (table 7). Twenty-nine percent of all sex offenders were arrested during their first year after release, compared to 16% during their ninth year. Among sex offenders who were age 24 or younger at release, the annual arrest percentage declined from 43% in year-1 to 19%

in year-9. Roughly a third (33%) of sex offenders ages 25 to 39 were arrested during their first year after release, compared to about a sixth (17.5%) during their ninth year.

Thirty-five percent of sex offenders who were Hispanic were arrested in year-1, while the annual arrest rate declined by more than two-thirds to 11% in year-9. This decrease was larger than the decrease between years 1 and 9 for sex offenders who were white (from 24% to 13%) or who were black (from 35% to 26%).

TABLE 7

Annual arrest percentage of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by prisoner characteristics

Characteristic	Number of released prisoners	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All prisoners	401,288	83.3%	43.8%	37.6%	34.2%	31.9%	30.0%	27.9%	27.2%	25.9%	24.0%
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	20,195	66.9%	29.0%	26.6%	24.2%	19.3%	20.2%	19.5%	17.6%	17.3%	16.1%
Age at release											
24 or younger	2,486	83.8	42.9	37.5	29.7	21.2	26.9	21.9	25.5	27.5	18.7
25–39	8,867	72.0	32.7	30.4	27.5	21.7	23.1	22.5	19.3	17.5	17.5
40 or older	8,842	57.1	21.3	19.7	19.2	16.3	15.3	15.7	13.7	14.3	14.0
Race/Hispanic origin											
White ^a	10,499	61.3	23.8	22.0	20.1	16.7	16.4	17.2	14.0	15.9	12.8
Black/African American ^a	5,482	78.6	35.0	34.1	30.1	24.8	27.4	21.6	26.0	25.3	25.7
Hispanic/Latino	3,459	64.9	34.9	26.6	27.1	16.4	20.9	22.4	15.1	9.2	11.2
Other ^{a,b}	713	66.9	25.4	31.7	19.7	24.3	11.6	17.2	13.6	11.5	9.8
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault	38,468	82.9%	43.2%	38.1%	34.0%	32.4%	31.3%	29.0%	29.0%	28.4%	24.8%
Age at release											
24 or younger	7,468	87.3	50.9	43.5	35.4	31.0	35.5	29.1	25.8	29.1	27.4
25–39	20,511	85.2	44.1	39.1	36.1	33.8	32.2	30.0	32.1	30.8	26.7
40 or older	10,489	75.4	35.9	32.4	28.9	30.7	26.5	27.1	25.3	23.4	19.2
Race/Hispanic origin											
White ^a	13,841	80.3	38.8	34.5	32.5	29.7	30.9	29.7	27.5	26.6	23.1
Black/African American ^a	14,562	86.4	45.2	41.4	35.7	35.0	31.2	30.3	29.9	28.9	25.6
Hispanic/Latino	8,629	80.6	46.0	37.5	32.8	33.0	31.7	24.9	28.8	28.7	25.4
Other ^{a,b}	1,312	85.0	47.0	44.6	34.6	29.5	34.0	32.6	33.1	37.6	24.8

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Percentages exclude missing data. Data on prisoners' age at release were reported for 100% of cases, and race/Hispanic origin was known for 99.86%. See appendix table 9 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

During the first year following release, 7% of sex offenders were arrested for a violent offense, 6% for a property offense, 4% for a drug offense, and 23% for a public-order offense (**table 8**). During the ninth year, these percentages fell to 3% each for a violent, property, or drug offense, and 13% for a public-order offense. During the 9 years after release, 28% of prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual

assault were arrested for a violent crime at least once, compared to 59% arrested for a public-order crime, 24% for a property crime, and 18% for a drug crime. Sex offenders were arrested for a violent offense less often than assault offenders during each year after release. This pattern was also observed for arrests for property, drug, and public-order offenses.

TABLE 8

Annual arrest percentage of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense and type of post-release arrest offense	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
Commitment offense: Rape or sexual assault										
Post-release arrest offense										
Violent	28.1%	6.6%	6.4%	5.3%	5.4%	5.3%	3.7%	4.1%	3.0%	2.6%
Property	24.2	5.7	5.7	4.7	4.0	4.7	3.8	4.2	4.5	3.1
Drug	18.5	4.2	4.5	3.8	1.9	3.3	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.3
Public order	58.9	23.4	20.9	19.5	15.3	14.7	14.7	13.9	13.4	13.0
Commitment offense: Assault										
Post-release arrest offense										
Violent	50.7%	12.9%	13.1%	10.4%	11.1%	11.6%	8.1%	8.6%	8.6%	7.5%
Property	44.3	12.5	10.7	11.1	8.8	7.9	8.0	8.7	8.9	8.3
Drug	43.2	11.5	12.1	7.8	9.2	8.7	8.1	8.7	9.0	8.0
Public order	69.6	30.9	25.1	23.2	22.4	20.0	19.3	19.2	19.6	16.3

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 10 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault accounted for 16% of arrests for rape or sexual assault during the follow-up period

Prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 were arrested an estimated 2 million times during the 9 years after release. An arrest may involve charges for more than one offense. For instance, one arrest could include charges for a violent crime and a drug crime. These arrests included an estimated 2.9 million different types of offenses (table 9).

The majority of arrests for a specific type of crime did not involve those who had been in prison for the same type of offense. During the 9-year follow-up period, prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault made up 16% of the approximately 12,000

arrests for rape or sexual assault that occurred among all prisoners released in 2005 in the study's 30 states. Prisoners released after serving time for other offenses accounted for the remaining 84% of the arrests for rape or sexual assault during the 9-year follow-up period. Although sex offenders accounted for 16% of the post-release arrests for rape or sexual assault, they represented 5% of all those released from prison in 30 states in 2005. (See appendix table 1.)

During the 9 years after release, prisoners released after serving time for assault made up 15% of the 232,000 arrests for assault, and prisoners released after serving time for other offenses accounted for the remaining 85% of the assault arrests. Prisoners released after serving time for assault accounted for 10% of all released prisoners.

TABLE 9

Types of offenses for which prisoners were arrested within 9 years following release in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Post-release arrest offense	Number of post-release arrest offenses	Most serious commitment offense								
		Total	Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
			Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault	Other violent			
Any offense	2,900,000	100%	0.9%	2.8%	6.6%	9.8%	1.9%	35.1%	31.8%	11.2%
Violent										
Total*	347,000	100%	1.3%	3.3%	8.8%	14.2%	2.8%	30.0%	26.5%	13.2%
Homicide	5,000	100%	4.5	1.2	8.2	10.6	5.4	27.6	28.1	14.5
Rape/sexual assault	12,000	100%	1.4	15.6	10.4	10.1	3.0	27.7	19.9	11.9
Robbery	40,000	100%	1.0	2.2	16.3	9.4	1.8	35.1	23.8	10.4
Assault	232,000	100%	1.3	2.7	7.5	15.5	2.6	29.9	27.1	13.6
Property	688,000	100%	0.7%	1.8%	7.0%	7.4%	1.5%	47.0%	24.6%	10.0%
Drug	673,000	100%	0.8%	1.5%	5.7%	7.7%	1.1%	29.4%	44.6%	9.2%
Public order	1,193,000	100%	1.0%	3.9%	6.1%	11.1%	2.3%	33.0%	30.3%	12.3%
Percent of all released prisoners		100%	1.9%	5.0%	7.2%	9.6%	2.1%	29.7%	31.9%	12.7%

Note: An arrest may involve charges for more than one type of offense. Each unique offense category included in an arrest is counted once. There were an estimated 1,990,000 post-release arrests of the 401,288 prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, and these included approximately 2,900,000 different offenses. Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Number of post-release arrest offenses for each sub-category was rounded to the nearest 1,000. See appendix table 11 for standard errors.

*Includes other miscellaneous violent offenses, not shown separately.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Almost 6% of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 were serving time for rape or sexual assault

Rape or sexual assault was the most serious commitment offense for 5.5% (19,871) of the 358,398 male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 (**table 10**). The median age at the time of release in 2005 was older for male sex offenders (age 38) than for all male prisoners released in the 30 states (age 34) and male assault offenders (age 32). Forty-four percent of male sex offenders were age 40 or older at release, compared to 27% of male assault offenders and 31% of all male offenders.

TABLE 10

Characteristics of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense		Offense other than rape/sexual assault
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Race/Hispanic origin				
White ^a	38.4%	51.7%	36.1%	37.6%
Black/African American ^a	40.9	27.4	37.2	41.7
Hispanic/Latino	18.4	17.3	23.2	18.4
Other ^{a,b}	2.4	3.6	3.4	2.3
Age at release				
24 or younger	18.3%	12.3%	19.6%	18.7%
25–29	19.7	15.9	21.7	20.0
30–34	15.9	14.0	17.1	16.0
35–39	15.2	13.9	14.7	15.3
40 or older	30.8	44.0	26.9	30.1
Median	34 yrs.	38 yrs.	32 yrs.	34 yrs.
Mean	34.9	38.9	34.0	34.6
Type of prison release				
Conditional	74.3%	68.0%	76.0%	74.7%
Unconditional	25.7	32.0	24.0	25.3
Maximum sentence length^c				
1–<2 years	18.1%	10.4%	12.4%	18.6%
2–<5 years	44.6	34.4	56.4	45.2
5–<10 years	22.5	27.8	20.5	22.2
10 years or more	14.7	27.4	10.7	14.0
Median	39 mos.	60 mos.	36 mos.	36 mos.
Number of prior arrests per released prisoner^d				
4 or fewer	24.5%	52.0%	24.2%	22.8%
5–9	30.4	26.8	30.2	30.6
10 or more	45.2	21.2	45.6	46.6
Median	9 arsts.	4 arsts.	9 arsts.	9 arsts.
Mean	11.0	6.4	10.9	11.3
At least one prior arrest for—				
Drug offense	70.5%	30.6%	58.5%	72.9%
Property offense	81.2	56.1	78.6	82.7
Number of released prisoners	358,398	19,871	35,771	338,527

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Percentages exclude missing data. Data on male prisoners' age at release were reported for 100% of cases; race/Hispanic origin, for 99.85%; type of prison release, for 98.21%; and maximum sentence length, for 99.72%. See appendix table 12 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

^cBased on the released prisoners' total maximum sentence length for all commitment offenses. Study excludes prisoners sentenced to less than one year.

^dIncludes arrests for any type of crime prior to the prisoners' date of release in 2005.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Fewer than 1% of female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 were serving time for rape or sexual assault

Fewer than 1% (324) of the 42,890 female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 were serving time for rape or sexual assault (**table 11**). The median age at release for female sex offenders was 34, four years younger than the median age for male sex offenders. The median maximum sentence length for female sex offenders was 5 years, the same as for male sex offenders. Seventy-six percent of female sex offenders were white, compared to 52% of male sex offenders.

On average, female sex offenders had fewer prior arrests in their criminal history than male sex offenders. The median number of prior arrests among male sex offenders was four, compared to two for female sex offenders.

Nearly 8 in 10 (79%) female sex offenders had fewer than five arrests for any type of crime prior to their release in 2005, compared to about half (52%) of male sex offenders.

TABLE 11

Characteristics of female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All female prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
Total	100%	100%	100%
Race/Hispanic origin			
White ^a	51.0%	75.9%	35.5%
Black/African American ^a	33.9	14.3	47.9
Hispanic/Latino	12.3	8.6	13.0
Other ^{a,b}	2.9	1.2	3.6
Age at release			
24 or younger	12.0%	15.0%	17.2%
25–29	16.6	15.9	16.0
30–34	17.1	20.1	17.4
35–39	19.7	16.1	17.6
40 or older	34.6	32.8	31.8
Median	36 yrs.	34 yrs.	35 yrs.
Mean	36.0	35.7	34.8
Type of prison release			
Conditional	71.9%	62.7%	66.8%
Unconditional	28.1	37.3	33.2
Maximum sentence length^c			
1–<2 years	27.8%	17.8%	19.8%
2–<5 years	45.8	21.6	55.2
5–<10 years	18.3	36.6	18.3
10 years or more	8.1	24.0	6.7
Median	36 mos.	60 mos.	36 mos.
Number of prior arrests per released prisoner^d			
4 or fewer	28.0%	78.9%	35.5%
5–9	29.3	12.6	30.7
10 or more	42.7	8.5	33.8
Median	8 arsts.	2 arsts.	6 arsts.
Mean	10.8	3.8	9.0
At least one prior arrest for—			
Drug offense	72.0%	27.4%	49.8%
Property offense	81.8	36.4	69.8
Number of released prisoners	42,890	324	2,697

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Percentages exclude missing data. Data on female prisoners' age at release were reported for 100% of cases; race/Hispanic origin, for 99.97%; and maximum sentence length, for 99.68%. See appendix table 13 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

^cBased on the released prisoners' total maximum sentence length for all commitment offenses. Study excludes prisoners sentenced to less than one year.

^dIncludes arrests for any type of crime prior to the prisoners' date of release in 2005.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

67% of male prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested within 9 years

About half (49%) of male prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested for any type of crime within 3 years, while 62% were arrested within 6 years (**table 12**). By the end of the 9-year follow-up period, the percentage of male sex offenders arrested after release had increased to 67%. At the end of the 9-year follow-up period, male sex offenders had a lower cumulative arrest percentage than all male prisoners (84%).

Four percent of male prisoners released after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 3 years, while 8% were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 9 years (appendix table 18). Additional recidivism statistics on male sex offenders are available in appendix tables 16 to 22.

Among the 324 females released from state prisons after serving time for rape or sexual assault in 30 states in 2005, an estimated 29% were arrested for any type of crime at least once during the first year after release (**table 13**). Forty percent were arrested within 3 years of their release, while 50% were arrested within 6 years. By the end of the 9-year follow-up period, 54% of female sex offenders had been arrested after release. Female sex offenders had a lower 9-year cumulative arrest percentage than all female prisoners (77%). The sample of female sex offenders in this study included too few cases to provide reliable estimates on the percentage arrested for rape or sexual assault following release.

TABLE 12

Cumulative arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested after release, by year after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	44.8%	29.0%	44.1%
2	61.1	42.0	60.3
3	69.4	49.1	68.9
4	74.4	53.9	74.5
5	77.9	58.4	78.5
6	80.2	62.0	80.6
7	81.8	64.0	82.1
8	83.1	65.9	83.1
9	84.0	67.1	83.8

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 14 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

TABLE 13

Cumulative arrest percentage of female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested after release, by year after release

Year after release	All female prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	35.1%	28.8%	31.5%
2	50.8	38.1	47.0
3	59.2	40.2	54.9
4	64.7	44.6	60.3
5	68.9	47.0	64.4
6	71.4	50.0	67.1
7	73.6	53.8	69.0
8	75.3	53.8	70.9
9	76.7	54.4	71.7

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 15 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

Methodology

Sampling

This study estimates the recidivism patterns of persons released in 2005 from state prisons in 30 states. States were included in this study if the state departments of corrections (DOCs) could provide the prisoner records and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or state identification numbers on persons released from prison during 2005, through the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), which is administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS).


The fingerprint-based identification numbers were required to obtain the criminal-history records on released prisoners. Prisoner records also included each prisoner's sex, race, Hispanic origin, date of birth, confinement offenses, sentence length, type of prison release, and date of release. The 30 states with DOCs that submitted the NCRP data on prisoners released in 2005 were Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia (map 1).

Across the 30 states in 2005, a total of 412,731 prisoners were released and were eligible for this study. That number excludes 131,997 prisoners (for a total of 544,728) who were sentenced to less than one year, were transferred to the custody of another authority, died in prison, were released on bond, were released to seek or participate in an appeal of a case, or escaped from prison or were absent without official leave. When a prisoner was released multiple times during the year, the first release during 2005 was used.

From the universe of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 in this study, all males and females who were in prison for homicide were selected with certainty into the study. Analyses were completed to determine the number of prisoners released after serving time for non-homicide offenses that would be needed from each state's universe of released prisoners to yield a statistically sound estimate of that state's recidivism rates.

MAP 1

States included in the BJS recidivism study of prisoners released in 2005



Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

As a result, states contributed different numbers of records to the final sample. To achieve the desired state-level samples, lists of all males and females imprisoned for a non-homicide offense were sorted separately by race, Hispanic origin, age, most serious commitment offense, and the country in which the sentence was imposed. The within-state sampling rate for female prisoners was double that of males to improve the precision of female recidivism estimates. The combined number of persons in the 30 state samples totaled 70,878 individuals. (This number dropped to 67,966 after accounting for those who died during the subsequent 9 years, lacked criminal-history records, or had invalid release records.) Each prisoner in the sample was assigned a weight based on the probability of selection within the state.

Collecting and processing criminal-history data for recidivism research

BJS used the state and FBI identification numbers to collect the criminal-history records on the released prisoners through the FBI's Interstate Identification Index (III) via the International Justice and Public Safety Network (Nlets). These records contained arrests, from state and federal criminal-justice agencies across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, prior to and following prison releases in 2005. Nlets parsed

fields from individual criminal-history records into a relational database with a uniform record layout consisting of state- and federal-specific numeric codes and text descriptions (e.g., criminal statutes and case-outcome information).

NORC at the University of Chicago helped BJS standardize the content of the relational database into a uniform coding structure to support the national-level recidivism research. With the exception of vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence or driving while intoxicated (DUI/DWI), and hit-and-run offenses, BJS excluded traffic violations from the study due to the variation in coverage of these events in state criminal-history records.

This study used the death information from the FBI's III and the Social Security Administration's public Death Master File to identify individuals who died during the 9-year follow-up period. BJS documented that 2,173 of the 70,878 sampled prisoners died during the 9-year follow-up period and removed these cases from the recidivism analysis along with four additional cases that were determined to be invalid release records.

Missing criminal-history records

Among the 68,701 sampled prisoners not identified as deceased during the follow-up period, BJS did not receive criminal-history records on a total of 735 prisoners (involving 27 of the study's 30 states) because either the state DOCs were unable to provide the prisoners' FBI or state identification number or the prisoner had an identification number that did not link to a criminal-history record either in the FBI or a state record repository. To account for the missing criminal-history records and to ensure the recidivism statistics were representative of all 68,701 prisoners in the analysis, BJS developed weighting-class adjustments to account for those prisoners without criminal-history information to reduce non-response bias.

To create the statistical adjustments, the 68,701 sampled prisoners were stratified into groups by crossing two categories of sex (male or female), five categories of age at release (24 or younger, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, or 40 or older), four categories of race and Hispanic origin (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, or other race), and four categories of the most serious commitment offense (violent, property,

drug, or public order). Within each subgroup, statistical weights were applied to the data of the 67,966 prisoners with criminal-history information to allow their data to represent the 735 prisoners without criminal-history information.

Conducting tests of statistical significance

This study was based on a sample, not a complete enumeration, so the estimates are subject to sampling error. One measure of the sampling error associated with an estimate is the standard error. The standard error can vary from one estimate to the next. In general, an estimate with a smaller standard error provides a more accurate approximation of the true value than an estimate with a larger standard error. Estimates with relatively large standard errors should be interpreted with caution. BJS conducted tests to determine whether differences in the estimates were statistically significant once the sampling error was taken into account.

All differences discussed in this report are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwise stated. Standard errors were generated using Stata, a statistical software package that calculates sampling errors for data from complex sample surveys.

Other measures of recidivism

In addition to new arrests, this study examined the recidivism patterns of former prisoners based on arrests within 9 years of exiting prison in 2005 that resulted in a subsequent court conviction. This measure is based on the time from release to the first date of arrest that led to a conviction, not the date of the conviction. The arrests that occurred within the follow-up period were tracked for 6 more months after year-9 to determine whether the case outcomes led to a subsequent conviction. This measure included prisoners released in 29 of the study's 30 states. Prisoners released in Louisiana were excluded because the disposition information from that state was generally not linked to the associated arrest.

The return-to-prison rates were based on prisoners released from 23 of the 30 states. The criminal-history data provided information on arrests that resulted in imprisonment during the follow-up period either within or outside of the state that released the prisoner, while the NCRP data provided

information on returns to prison for probation or parole violations or sentences for new crimes within the state that released them. Prisoners released in Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were excluded from the return-to-prison analysis because the complete prison-admission data needed to locate returns to prison during the first 5 years following release were unavailable. Prisoners released in Louisiana were also excluded from the return-to-prison analysis because the sentencing information in the criminal-history records was generally not linked to the associated arrest.

Comparing recidivism rates in this report to those from prior BJS studies

Given the increases in the number of states in the study and the length of the follow-up period, as well as improvements to the nation's criminal-history records over time, direct comparisons of the recidivism estimates from this study should not be made to those from BJS recidivism studies of previously released cohorts of prisoners.

Direct comparisons of the 9-year recidivism rates from this study on prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 to the 3-year rates from the previous BJS recidivism study on prisoners released in 15 states in 1994 should not be made due to differences in the two samples of prisoners. To control for the differences in the number of states in the studies and follow-up period lengths, BJS conducted analyses that limited the comparison to the 3-year cumulative arrest percentages among the prisoners released in the 11 states that provided the data for both studies (California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia).

Among the prisoners released in these 11 states in 1994 after serving time for rape or sexual assault, 5% of the prisoners were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 3 years. Of those released in these 11 states in 2005 after serving time for rape or sexual assault, 4% of the prisoners were arrested for rape or sexual assault within 3 years. The difference between these percentages was not statistically significant.

Due to efforts by the FBI and individual states to improve their criminal-history record systems, national criminal-history data may now capture more information on offenders' criminal activities than in the past. However, the potential effects of these improvements of the nation's criminal-history records on the observed recidivism rates are difficult to quantify.

For the 2005 study, BJS first used the prisoner records and criminal-history data to analyze the 5-year recidivism patterns. BJS extended the original 5-year follow-up period to 9 years to assess how recidivism patterns change with longer follow-up periods. Findings from this study were published in *2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014)* (NCJ 250975, BJS web, May 2018). Recidivism estimates in this report may differ slightly from previously published estimates on prisoners released in 2005 based on updates to the data used for the study.

Offense definitions

Violent offenses include homicide, rape or sexual assault, robbery, assault, and other miscellaneous or unspecified violent offenses.

Homicide includes murder, non-negligent and negligent manslaughter, and unspecified homicide offenses.

Rape or sexual assault includes (1) forcible intercourse (vaginal, anal, or oral) with a female or male; (2) forcible sodomy or penetration with a foreign object (sometimes called "deviate sexual assault"); (3) forcible or violent sexual acts not involving intercourse; (4) non-forcible sexual acts with a minor (such as statutory rape or incest with a minor); and (5) non-forcible sexual acts with someone unable to give legal or factual consent due to mental or physical defect or intoxication.

Robbery is the unlawful taking of property that is in the immediate possession of another, by force or the threat of force. Includes forcible purse-snatching but excludes non-forcible purse-snatching.

Assault includes aggravated, simple, and unspecified assault. Aggravated assault includes (1) intentionally and without legal justification causing serious bodily injury, with or without a deadly weapon; or (2) using a deadly or dangerous weapon to threaten, attempt, or cause bodily injury, regardless of the degree of injury, if any. It also includes attempted murder, aggravated battery, felonious assault, and assault with a deadly weapon. Simple assault includes intentionally and without legal justification causing less-than-serious bodily injury without a deadly or dangerous weapon, or attempting or threatening bodily injury without a dangerous or deadly weapon.

Property offenses include burglary, fraud or forgery, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and other miscellaneous or unspecified property offenses.

Drug offenses include possession, trafficking, and other miscellaneous or unspecified drug offenses.

Public-order offenses include violations of the peace or order of the community or threats to the public health or safety through unacceptable conduct, interference with a governmental authority, or the violation of civil rights or liberties. This category includes weapons offenses, DUI/DWI, probation and parole violations, obstruction of justice, commercialized vice, disorderly conduct, and other miscellaneous or unspecified offenses.

Arrests for probation and parole violations

In this report, arrests for probation and parole violations were included as public-order offenses. Excluding arrests for probation and parole violations from the analysis would have had only a small impact on the recidivism rates. Excluding arrests for probation and parole violations, 64.2% of state prisoners released in 2005 in 30 states after serving time for rape or sexual assault were arrested at least once within 9 years. By comparison, 66.9% of such released offenders were arrested within 9 years when including these arrests. In other words, 96% of the released sex offenders who were arrested during the 9-year follow-up period were arrested for an offense other than a probation or parole violation.

APPENDIX TABLE 1**Most serious commitment offense of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by sex of offender**

Most serious commitment offense	All prisoners		Male		Female	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	401,288	100%	358,398	100%	42,890	100%
Violent	103,197	25.7%	96,879	27.0%	6,317	14.7%
Homicide	7,569	1.9	6,869	1.9	700	1.6
Rape/sexual assault	20,195	5.0	19,871	5.5	324	0.8
Robbery	28,717	7.2	27,046	7.5	1,671	3.9
Assault	38,468	9.6	35,771	10.0	2,697	6.3
Other violent	8,247	2.1	7,323	2.0	924	2.2
Property	119,323	29.7%	103,013	28.7%	16,310	38.0%
Drug	127,890	31.9%	111,565	31.1%	16,325	38.1%
Public order	50,879	12.7%	46,940	13.1%	3,939	9.2%

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 2 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 2**Standard errors for appendix table 1: Most serious commitment offense of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by sex of offender**

Most serious commitment offense	All prisoners		Male		Female	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	44	~	42	~	13	~
Violent	1,053	0.26%	1,043	0.29%	149	0.35%
Homicide	1	--	3	--	3	0.01
Rape/sexual assault	535	0.13	534	0.15	36	0.08
Robbery	592	0.15	587	0.16	81	0.19
Assault	781	0.19	773	0.22	109	0.25
Other violent	361	0.09	354	0.10	68	0.16
Property	1,108	0.28%	1,086	0.30%	215	0.50%
Drug	1,116	0.28%	1,096	0.31%	214	0.50%
Public order	740	0.18%	732	0.20%	107	0.25%

--Less than 0.005%.

~Not applicable.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 3

Standard errors for table 1: Characteristics of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense		
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault	Offense other than rape/sexual assault
Sex				
Male	0.003%	0.18%	0.30%	0.02%
Female	0.003	0.18	0.30	0.02
Race/Hispanic origin				
White	0.28%	1.37%	1.02%	0.29%
Black/African American	0.27	1.17	0.99	0.28
Hispanic/Latino	0.27	1.28	1.07	0.27
Other	0.09	0.52	0.41	0.09
Age at release				
24 or younger	0.22%	0.83%	0.84%	0.23%
25–29	0.24	0.98	0.90	0.24
30–34	0.22	0.93	0.83	0.23
35–39	0.22	0.95	0.78	0.23
40 or older	0.28	1.37	0.96	0.28
Mean	0.06 yrs.	0.32 yrs.	0.20 yrs.	0.06 yrs.
Type of prison release				
Conditional	0.17%	1.11%	0.74%	0.17%
Unconditional	0.17	1.11	0.74	0.17
Maximum sentence length				
1–<2 years	0.23%	0.86%	0.61%	0.24%
2–<5 years	0.29	1.38	1.02	0.29
5–<10 years	0.22	1.21	0.80	0.23
10 years or more	0.14	1.06	0.45	0.13
Number of prior arrests per released prisoner				
4 or fewer	0.20%	1.37%	0.80%	0.20%
5–9	0.26	1.23	0.97	0.27
10 or more	0.28	1.31	1.10	0.28
Mean	0.06 arsts.	0.22 arsts.	0.21 arsts.	0.06 arsts.
At least one prior arrest for—				
Drug offense	0.25%	1.36%	1.04%	0.25%
Property offense	0.20	1.34	0.80	0.20
Number of released prisoners	44	535	781	537

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 4

Standard errors for table 2: Percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested within 9 years following release, by most serious commitment offense and types of post-release arrest charges

Most serious commitment offense	Post-release arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
		Total violent	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault			
All prisoners	0.20%	0.29%	0.07%	0.10%	0.18%	0.28%	0.30%	0.30%	0.24%
Violent	0.45%	0.59%	0.13%	0.24%	0.36%	0.57%	0.59%	0.59%	0.52%
Homicide	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
Rape/sexual assault	1.24	1.25	0.06	0.72	0.61	1.07	1.21	1.12	1.30
Robbery	0.74	1.07	0.18	0.44	0.80	1.01	1.07	1.08	0.93
Assault	0.76	1.09	0.25	0.36	0.62	1.08	1.09	1.09	0.91
Property	0.33%	0.56%	0.12%	0.18%	0.36%	0.53%	0.54%	0.56%	0.45%
Drug	0.35%	0.51%	0.12%	0.14%	0.28%	0.48%	0.53%	0.51%	0.45%
Public order	0.56%	0.76%	0.20%	0.19%	0.46%	0.72%	0.77%	0.77%	0.66%
Rape/sexual assault	1.24%	1.25%	0.06%	0.72%	0.61%	1.07%	1.21%	1.12%	1.30%
Offense other than rape/sexual assault	0.20%	0.30%	0.07%	0.09%	0.18%	0.29%	0.31%	0.30%	0.24%

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 5

Standard errors for table 3: Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested following release, by year following release and most serious commitment offense

Year after release	Most serious commitment offense							
	All prisoners		Rape/sexual assault		Assault		Offense other than rape/sexual assault	
	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage	Year of first arrest	Cumulative arrest percentage
1	0.29%	0.29%	1.36%	1.36%	1.10%	1.10%	0.29%	0.29%
2	0.21	0.27	0.90	1.38	0.78	1.02	0.22	0.27
3	0.15	0.25	0.64	1.37	0.57	0.95	0.15	0.25
4	0.11	0.23	0.47	1.35	0.45	0.88	0.12	0.23
5	0.09	0.22	0.57	1.31	0.38	0.82	0.09	0.22
6	0.07	0.21	0.49	1.28	0.24	0.80	0.07	0.21
7	0.06	0.21	0.32	1.26	0.17	0.78	0.06	0.21
8	0.05	0.20	0.26	1.25	0.17	0.77	0.06	0.20
9	0.05	0.20	0.28	1.24	0.12	0.76	0.05	0.20

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 6

Standard errors for table 4: Cumulative arrest percentage of prisoners released in 29 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who had an arrest that led to a conviction after release

Year after release	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.28%	1.00%	0.94%
2	0.30	1.18	1.08
3	0.31	1.25	1.09
4	0.30	1.32	1.08
5	0.29	1.34	1.05
6	0.29	1.36	1.03
7	0.28	1.36	1.00
8	0.28	1.36	0.97
9	0.27	1.36	0.96

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 8

Standard errors for table 6: Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested outside the state of release, by year after release

Year after release	All prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.09%	0.27%	0.38%
2	0.11	0.37	0.49
3	0.13	0.54	0.56
4	0.15	0.62	0.62
5	0.16	0.69	0.67
6	0.17	0.74	0.70
7	0.18	0.75	0.73
8	0.19	0.76	0.76
9	0.19	0.79	0.79

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 7

Standard errors for table 5 and figure 2: Cumulative percent of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault who were arrested for rape/sexual assault after release, by age and year after release

Most serious commitment offense	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All prisoners	0.04%	0.06%	0.07%	0.07%	0.08%	0.09%	0.09%	0.09%	0.10%
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	0.37%	0.47%	0.56%	0.63%	0.67%	0.67%	0.69%	0.72%	0.72%
Age at release									
24 or younger	0.75	1.92	2.44	2.45	2.46	2.46	2.46	2.50	2.50
25–39	0.77	0.82	0.85	0.87	1.01	1.02	1.04	1.06	1.07
40 or older	0.27	0.43	0.64	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.93	1.04	1.04
Race/Hispanic origin									
White	0.46	0.52	0.56	0.68	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.75	0.76
Black/African American	0.48	0.78	0.80	1.11	1.13	1.14	1.19	1.41	1.41
Hispanic/Latino	1.47	1.87	2.44	2.44	2.46	2.46	2.48	2.48	2.48
Other	0.39	0.95	1.16	1.19	1.25	1.28	1.67	1.67	1.69

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 9

Standard errors for table 7: Annual arrest percentage of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by prisoner characteristics

Characteristic	Number of released prisoners	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All prisoners	44	0.20%	0.29%	0.29%	0.29%	0.29%	0.28%	0.28%	0.28%	0.27%	0.27%
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	535	1.24%	1.36%	1.31%	1.30%	1.12%	1.14%	1.17%	1.12%	1.09%	1.10%
Age at release											
24 or younger	176	2.25	3.61	3.55	3.34	2.71	3.41	2.92	3.41	3.31	2.67
25–39	355	1.75	2.08	2.05	1.99	1.70	1.78	1.78	1.71	1.62	1.71
40 or older	374	2.07	2.01	1.88	1.98	1.77	1.59	1.80	1.62	1.62	1.67
Race/Hispanic origin											
White	356	1.63	1.68	1.56	1.57	1.38	1.32	1.45	1.30	1.35	1.26
Black/African American	267	1.79	2.48	2.46	2.46	2.16	2.31	2.05	2.34	2.37	2.45
Hispanic/Latino	295	4.01	4.24	4.13	4.08	3.26	3.55	3.78	3.35	2.63	2.85
Other	106	7.03	6.97	7.81	5.53	7.05	2.67	5.46	2.70	2.32	1.85
Prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault	781	0.76%	1.10%	1.09%	1.06%	1.05%	1.05%	1.03%	1.04%	1.04%	1.01%
Age at release											
24 or younger	351	1.49	2.37	2.40	2.31	2.20	2.35	2.18	2.06	2.22	2.23
25–39	599	1.01	1.53	1.51	1.50	1.48	1.46	1.45	1.49	1.49	1.43
40 or older	425	1.66	2.10	2.04	1.95	2.02	1.96	1.98	1.94	1.90	1.78
Race/Hispanic origin											
White	465	1.27	1.75	1.69	1.67	1.67	1.67	1.69	1.63	1.64	1.56
Black/African American	435	0.89	1.55	1.55	1.52	1.51	1.49	1.47	1.51	1.50	1.45
Hispanic/Latino	483	2.16	2.89	2.85	2.76	2.75	2.73	2.58	2.67	2.72	2.66
Other	159	4.28	6.07	6.17	5.80	5.15	5.80	5.79	5.79	6.01	5.01

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 10

Standard errors for table 8: Annual arrest percentage of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense and type of post-release arrest offense	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
Commitment offense: Rape or sexual assault										
Post-release arrest offense										
Violent	1.25%	0.76%	0.69%	0.67%	0.71%	0.65%	0.46%	0.53%	0.42%	0.41%
Property	1.21	0.72	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.66	0.56	0.62	0.65	0.47
Drug	1.12	0.67	0.66	0.59	0.30	0.49	0.53	0.56	0.54	0.55
Public order	1.30	1.31	1.26	1.25	1.06	1.02	1.08	1.08	1.00	1.06
Commitment offense: Assault										
Post-release arrest offense										
Violent	1.09%	0.74%	0.76%	0.66%	0.70%	0.73%	0.57%	0.61%	0.64%	0.60%
Property	1.09	0.75	0.69	0.71	0.62	0.57	0.61	0.66	0.68	0.66
Drug	1.09	0.77	0.78	0.58	0.68	0.68	0.65	0.71	0.72	0.71
Public order	0.91	1.09	1.03	1.00	0.99	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.97	0.90

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 11

Standard errors for table 9: Types of offenses for which prisoners were arrested within 9 years following release in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Post-release arrest offense	Number of post-release arrest offenses	Most serious commitment offense							
		Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
		Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault	Other violent			
Any offense	24,074	0.01%	0.17%	0.25%	0.39%	0.16%	0.57%	0.55%	0.34%
Violent									
Total	4,212	0.02%	0.24%	0.34%	0.57%	0.28%	0.65%	0.60%	0.44%
Homicide	335	0.29	0.32	1.08	1.87	2.04	3.25	2.75	2.28
Rape/sexual assault	504	0.06	1.53	1.38	1.20	0.66	1.86	1.80	1.25
Robbery	1,086	0.03	0.37	0.91	0.86	0.30	1.38	1.27	0.81
Assault	3,082	0.02	0.21	0.32	0.64	0.34	0.68	0.63	0.47
Property	7,651	0.01%	0.18%	0.30%	0.34%	0.15%	0.65%	0.55%	0.33%
Drug	8,728	0.01%	0.16%	0.30%	0.42%	0.13%	0.73%	0.77%	0.45%
Public order	12,873	0.01%	0.26%	0.30%	0.54%	0.22%	0.68%	0.68%	0.44%
Percent of all released prisoners		--	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.09	0.28	0.28	0.18

--Less than 0.005%.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 12

Standard errors for table 10: Characteristics of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense		Offense other than rape/sexual assault
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault	
Race/Hispanic origin				
White	0.31%	1.39%	1.09%	0.32%
Black/African American	0.30	1.18	1.06	0.31
Hispanic/Latino	0.29	1.30	1.14	0.30
Other	0.10	0.52	0.43	0.10
Age at release				
24 or younger	0.25%	0.84%	0.89%	0.26%
25–29	0.26	1.00	0.96	0.27
30–34	0.24	0.94	0.89	0.25
35–39	0.24	0.96	0.83	0.25
40 or older	0.31	1.38	1.02	0.31
Mean	0.07 yrs.	0.33 yrs.	0.21 yrs.	0.07 yrs.
Type of prison release				
Conditional	0.18%	1.12%	0.78%	0.19%
Unconditional	0.18	1.12	0.78	0.19
Maximum sentence length				
1–<2 years	0.25%	0.88%	0.64%	0.26%
2–<5 years	0.32	1.40	1.09	0.32
5–<10 years	0.25	1.23	0.86	0.25
10 years or more	0.15	1.07	0.48	0.15
Number of prior arrests per prisoner				
4 or fewer	0.23%	1.39%	0.84%	0.22%
5–9	0.29	1.25	1.03	0.30
10 or more	0.31	1.33	1.17	0.31
Mean	0.07 arsts.	0.23 arsts.	0.23 arsts.	0.07 arsts.
At least one prior arrest for—				
Drug offense	0.28%	1.38%	1.11%	0.28%
Property offense	0.23	1.35	0.85	0.22
Number of released prisoners	42	534	773	536

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 13

Standard errors for table 11: Characteristics of female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Characteristic	All female prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
Race/Hispanic origin			
White	0.50%	4.64%	1.95%
Black/African American	0.47	3.29	2.07
Hispanic/Latino	0.41	3.77	1.78
Other	0.15	0.36	0.69
Age at release			
24 or younger	0.32%	4.17%	1.46%
25–29	0.38	3.25	1.56
30–34	0.38	4.28	1.62
35–39	0.41	4.24	1.61
40 or older	0.49	5.40	1.95
Mean	0.09 yrs.	1.04 yrs.	0.36 yrs.
Type of prison release			
Conditional	0.30%	5.29%	1.79%
Unconditional	0.30	5.29	1.79
Maximum sentence length			
1–<2 years	0.46%	4.14%	1.44%
2–<5 years	0.50	3.80	2.00
5–<10 years	0.34	5.70	1.48
10 years or more	0.17	4.56	0.73
Number of prior arrests per released prisoner			
4 or fewer	0.35%	4.96%	1.85%
5–9	0.45	3.87	1.94
10 or more	0.47	3.73	2.09
Mean	0.11 arsts.	0.50 arsts.	0.38 arsts.
At least one prior arrest for—			
Drug offense	0.40%	5.96%	2.08%
Property offense	0.34	5.19	1.78
Number of released prisoners	13	36	109

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 14

Standard errors for table 12: Cumulative arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested after release, by year after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.32%	1.37%	1.17%
2	0.29	1.40	1.09
3	0.27	1.38	1.00
4	0.26	1.36	0.93
5	0.24	1.33	0.87
6	0.23	1.30	0.84
7	0.23	1.28	0.83
8	0.22	1.27	0.81
9	0.22	1.25	0.81

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 15

Standard errors for table 13: Cumulative arrest percentage of female prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested after release, by year after release

Year after release	All female prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.49%	5.64%	2.04%
2	0.49	5.68	2.09
3	0.47	5.66	2.04
4	0.45	5.62	1.98
5	0.43	5.58	1.92
6	0.42	5.53	1.87
7	0.41	5.49	1.83
8	0.40	5.49	1.79
9	0.39	5.48	1.78

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 16

Percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested within 9 years following release, by most serious commitment offense and types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense	Post-release arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent							
		Total violent ^a	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault	Property	Drug	Public order
All male prisoners	84.0%	40.9%	1.3%	2.9%	8.3%	32.8%	48.0%	48.6%	69.6%
Violent ^a	78.8%	44.2%	1.4%	4.3%	9.5%	34.7%	39.6%	37.2%	65.8%
Homicide	61.9	30.7	2.9	2.1	4.5	23.9	25.2	27.3	47.6
Rape/sexual assault	67.1	28.4	0.2	7.9	3.9	18.8	24.4	18.7	59.0
Robbery	84.5	48.1	1.5	3.6	17.1	34.8	47.4	45.6	67.6
Assault	83.8	51.9	1.4	3.0	8.1	45.1	44.4	44.2	70.8
Property	88.8%	43.1%	1.1%	2.9%	9.8%	34.2%	64.1%	49.5%	74.0%
Drug	84.9%	36.1%	1.2%	1.8%	6.3%	29.8%	42.6%	61.5%	68.4%
Public order	82.3%	41.0%	1.4%	2.6%	7.0%	33.3%	42.5%	39.1%	71.0%
Rape/sexual assault*	67.1%	28.4%	0.2%	7.9%	3.9%	18.8%	24.4%	18.7%	59.0%
Offense other than rape/ sexual assault ^b	85.0% †	41.7% †	1.3% †	2.6% †	8.5% †	33.6% †	49.3% †	50.3% †	70.2% †

Note: The numerator for each percentage is the number of persons arrested for that offense during the 9-year follow-up period, and the denominator is the number released after serving time for each type of commitment offense. Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Details may not sum to totals because a person may be arrested more than once for different types of offenses and each arrest may involve more than one offense. See appendix table 1 for the number of released male prisoners by most serious commitment offense. See appendix table 23 for standard errors.

*Comparison group.

†Difference with comparison group (rape/sexual assault) is significant at the 95% confidence level.

^aIncludes other miscellaneous violent offenses, not shown separately.

^bIncludes the 338,527 male prisoners whose most serious commitment offense was an offense other than rape or sexual assault.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 17

Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 29 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who had an arrest that led to a conviction after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	26.0%	12.9%	23.1%
2	40.3	22.4	38.7
3	49.9	28.7	47.5
4	56.2	34.5	54.7
5	60.8	38.9	59.4
6	64.1	42.5	63.4
7	66.7	45.3	66.4
8	68.7	48.3	69.1
9	70.1	49.7	70.0

Note: Estimates based on time from release to first arrest that led to a conviction among prisoners released in 29 of the study's 30 states (all but Louisiana). Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 24 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 18

Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault who were arrested for rape/sexual assault after release, by age and year after release

Most serious commitment offense	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All male prisoners	0.6%	1.0%	1.4%	1.7%	1.9%	2.2%	2.5%	2.7%	2.9%
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	1.9%	3.5%	4.4%	5.1%	6.0%	6.4%	7.0%	7.7%	7.9%
Age at release									
24 or younger	2.5	7.2	9.5	9.9	10.4	10.6	11.4	11.9	12.0
25–39	2.9	3.9	4.4	5.0	6.4	7.0	7.6	8.3	8.6
40 or older	0.8	2.2	3.0	4.0	4.3	4.6	5.0	5.9	6.0
Race/Hispanic origin									
White ^a	1.6	2.7	3.3	4.0	4.7	5.2	5.6	6.0	6.3
Black/African American ^a	1.7	4.4	4.6	6.0	6.6	6.9	7.8	9.7	9.7
Hispanic/Latino	3.4	5.0	7.6	7.6	8.2	8.2	8.6	8.7	8.7
Other ^{a,b}	0.8	2.4	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.6	6.5	6.5	6.8

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Data on prisoners' sex and age at release were known for 100% of cases; and race/Hispanic origin, for 99.96%. See appendix table 25 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 19

Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested outside the state of release, by year after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	3.4%	2.1%	3.8%
2	5.9	3.5	6.5
3	7.9	5.3	8.6
4	9.6	6.8	10.4
5	11.1	8.3	12.2
6	12.5	9.5	13.4
7	13.7	10.2	14.7
8	14.8	10.8	15.9
9	15.8	11.5	17.1

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 26 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 20

Annual arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by prisoner characteristics

Characteristic	Number of released prisoners	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All male prisoners	358,398	84.0%	44.8%	38.2%	34.7%	32.3%	30.4%	28.3%	27.6%	26.3%	24.3%
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	19,871	67.1%	29.0%	26.6%	24.3%	19.4%	20.4%	19.6%	17.7%	17.5%	16.3%
Age at release											
24 or younger	2,437	83.7	42.4	37.4	29.7	21.2	27.1	22.1	25.8	27.8	18.9
25–39	8,698	72.3	32.8	30.5	27.8	21.9	23.4	22.6	19.4	17.7	17.7
40 or older	8,736	57.3	21.5	19.7	19.3	16.4	15.4	15.9	13.8	14.4	14.1
Race/Hispanic origin											
White ^a	10,253	61.5	23.7	21.9	20.2	16.9	16.6	17.5	14.2	16.1	13.0
Black/African American ^a	5,435	78.9	35.2	34.1	30.3	24.9	27.6	21.6	26.0	25.5	25.8
Hispanic/Latino	3,431	65.1	34.8	26.7	27.3	16.2	21.0	22.4	15.1	9.2	11.3
Other ^{a,b}	709	66.7	25.2	31.7	19.7	24.1	11.3	17.1	13.5	11.4	9.7
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault	35,771	83.8%	44.1%	38.7%	34.4%	32.8%	31.9%	29.7%	29.7%	29.0%	25.2%
Age at release											
24 or younger	7,005	88.2	52.2	45.2	36.3	31.0	36.1	29.8	25.9	29.9	28.0
25–39	19,134	85.9	44.7	39.3	36.3	34.3	32.8	30.5	32.8	31.1	27.1
40 or older	9,631	76.3	36.9	32.6	29.5	31.3	27.2	28.0	26.3	24.1	19.5
Race/Hispanic origin											
White ^a	12,884	81.1	39.5	34.7	32.9	29.8	31.5	30.3	27.9	26.9	23.3
Black/African American ^a	13,270	87.6	46.4	42.5	36.4	36.0	32.0	31.1	30.9	29.6	26.3
Hispanic/Latino	8,278	81.2	46.5	37.8	33.0	33.1	32.0	25.4	29.5	29.1	25.9
Other ^{a,b}	1,215	86.1	48.6	45.6	35.7	29.7	35.3	33.9	34.4	39.4	25.0

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Percentages exclude missing data. Data on male prisoners' age at release were reported for 100% of cases; and race/Hispanic origin, for 99.85%. See appendix table 27 for standard errors.

^aExcludes persons of Hispanic/Latino origin (e.g., "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and "black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks).

^bIncludes Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Other Pacific Islanders; American Indians and Alaska Natives; and persons of two or more races.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 21

Annual arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense and type of post-release arrest offense	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault										
Violent	28.4%	6.7%	6.4%	5.4%	5.4%	5.3%	3.8%	4.1%	3.0%	2.6%
Property	24.4	5.7	5.7	4.7	4.0	4.7	3.9	4.3	4.5	3.1
Drug	18.7	4.3	4.6	3.9	1.9	3.3	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3
Public order	59.0	23.4	20.9	19.6	15.3	14.8	14.8	14.0	13.5	13.1
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault										
Violent	51.9%	13.3%	13.6%	10.7%	11.5%	12.1%	8.3%	8.9%	8.9%	7.5%
Property	44.4	12.6	10.7	11.1	8.9	7.8	7.9	8.7	8.8	8.5
Drug	44.2	11.9	12.3	7.9	9.4	9.0	8.3	8.9	9.2	8.2
Public order	70.8	31.6	25.6	23.6	22.7	20.4	19.9	19.8	20.2	16.7

Note: Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. See appendix table 28 for standard errors.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 22

Types of offenses for which male prisoners were arrested within 9 years following release in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Most serious commitment offense	Arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent							Public order
		Total*	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault	Property	Drug	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Violent	22.9%	30.9%	29.9%	40.7%	31.4%	29.9%	19.3%	17.7%	25.3%
Homicide	0.9	1.3	4.4	1.4	1.1	1.3	0.7	0.8	1.0
Rape/sexual assault	3.0	3.4	1.2	15.8	2.3	2.8	2.0	1.6	4.2
Robbery	6.8	8.9	8.2	10.4	16.5	7.6	7.4	6.0	6.3
Assault	10.2	14.4	10.6	10.1	9.7	15.6	7.7	8.2	11.5
Other violent	1.9	2.8	5.5	3.0	1.8	2.6	1.5	1.1	2.3
Property	34.5%	29.6%	27.5%	27.5%	34.5%	29.6%	46.2%	28.8%	32.5%
Drug	31.2%	26.2%	28.0%	19.8%	23.5%	26.9%	24.1%	43.9%	29.6%
Public order	11.5%	13.4%	14.7%	12.0%	10.6%	13.6%	10.4%	9.6%	12.6%
Number of arrest offenses during the 9 years following release	2,644,000	329,000	5,000	12,000	38,000	219,000	613,000	606,000	1,096,000

Note: An arrest may involve charges for more than one type of offense. Each unique offense category included in an arrest is counted once. There were an estimated 1,809,000 post-release arrests of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005, and these included approximately 2,644,000 different offenses. Persons could have been in prison for more than one offense, the most serious of which is reported. Number of post-release arrest offenses was rounded to the nearest 1,000. See appendix table 29 for standard errors.

*Includes other miscellaneous violent offenses, not shown separately.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 23

Standard errors for appendix table 16: Percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 who were arrested within 9 years following release, by most serious commitment offense and types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense	Post-release arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
		Total violent	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault			
All male prisoners	0.22%	0.32%	0.08%	0.11%	0.20%	0.31%	0.33%	0.33%	0.26%
Violent	0.47%	0.63%	0.14%	0.26%	0.38%	0.60%	0.62%	0.62%	0.55%
Homicide	0.19	0.18	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19
Rape/sexual assault	1.25	1.27	0.06	0.74	0.62	1.09	1.22	1.14	1.32
Robbery	0.78	1.12	0.19	0.47	0.84	1.06	1.12	1.13	0.98
Assault	0.81	1.16	0.26	0.39	0.66	1.15	1.16	1.16	0.97
Property	0.37%	0.63%	0.14%	0.21%	0.41%	0.60%	0.61%	0.63%	0.50%
Drug	0.39%	0.57%	0.14%	0.16%	0.32%	0.54%	0.60%	0.57%	0.50%
Public order	0.59%	0.82%	0.22%	0.20%	0.50%	0.78%	0.83%	0.82%	0.70%
Rape/sexual assault	1.25%	1.27%	0.06%	0.74%	0.62%	1.09%	1.22%	1.14%	1.32%
Offense other than rape/sexual assault	0.22%	0.33%	0.08%	0.11%	0.20%	0.32%	0.34%	0.33%	0.27%

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 24

Standard errors for appendix table 17: Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 29 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who had an arrest that led to a conviction after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.31%	1.03%	1.01%
2	0.33	1.21	1.16
3	0.34	1.29	1.17
4	0.33	1.36	1.15
5	0.32	1.38	1.13
6	0.32	1.40	1.10
7	0.31	1.40	1.07
8	0.30	1.41	1.04
9	0.30	1.40	1.03

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 26

Standard errors for appendix table 19: Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault who were arrested outside the state of release, by year after release

Year after release	All male prisoners	Most serious commitment offense	
		Rape/sexual assault	Assault
1	0.10%	0.27%	0.41%
2	0.13	0.38	0.52
3	0.15	0.55	0.60
4	0.16	0.63	0.66
5	0.18	0.70	0.71
6	0.19	0.75	0.75
7	0.20	0.76	0.78
8	0.20	0.77	0.81
9	0.21	0.80	0.85

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 25

Standard errors for appendix table 18: Cumulative percent of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault who were arrested for rape/sexual assault after release, by age and year after release

Most serious commitment offense	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All male prisoners	0.05%	0.06%	0.07%	0.08%	0.09%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.11%
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	0.38%	0.48%	0.57%	0.64%	0.68%	0.68%	0.70%	0.73%	0.74%
Age at release									
24 or younger	0.76	1.95	2.49	2.50	2.50	2.51	2.51	2.55	2.55
25–39	0.78	0.83	0.86	0.89	1.03	1.04	1.06	1.08	1.09
40 or older	0.28	0.44	0.64	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.94	1.05	1.05
Race/Hispanic origin									
White	0.47	0.54	0.57	0.70	0.72	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.78
Black/African American	0.49	0.79	0.80	1.12	1.14	1.15	1.20	1.42	1.42
Hispanic/Latino	1.48	1.88	2.46	2.46	2.48	2.48	2.50	2.50	2.50
Other	0.37	0.94	1.16	1.18	1.24	1.27	1.66	1.66	1.69

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 27

Standard errors for appendix table 20: Annual arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by prisoner characteristics

Characteristic	Number of released prisoners	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
All male prisoners	42	0.22%	0.32%	0.32%	0.32%	0.32%	0.31%	0.31%	0.31%	0.30%	0.30%
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault	534	1.25%	1.37%	1.33%	1.32%	1.14%	1.16%	1.18%	1.14%	1.11%	1.11%
Age at release											
24 or younger	176	2.29	3.68	3.61	3.40	2.76	3.48	2.97	3.47	3.37	2.72
25–39	354	1.78	2.11	2.09	2.02	1.73	1.82	1.82	1.74	1.65	1.74
40 or older	373	2.09	2.03	1.90	2.00	1.79	1.61	1.82	1.64	1.64	1.69
Race/Hispanic origin											
White	354	1.66	1.71	1.59	1.60	1.41	1.35	1.48	1.33	1.38	1.29
Black/African American	267	1.80	2.50	2.48	2.48	2.17	2.33	2.07	2.36	2.38	2.47
Hispanic/Latino	295	4.04	4.27	4.16	4.11	3.29	3.58	3.81	3.37	2.66	2.87
Other	106	7.07	7.01	7.85	5.56	7.10	2.66	5.49	2.70	2.32	1.85
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault	773	0.81%	1.17%	1.16%	1.13%	1.12%	1.12%	1.10%	1.11%	1.11%	1.07%
Age at release											
24 or younger	348	1.57	2.50	2.53	2.45	2.33	2.48	2.32	2.18	2.35	2.37
25–39	593	1.07	1.62	1.61	1.59	1.57	1.55	1.54	1.58	1.59	1.52
40 or older	420	1.78	2.26	2.19	2.10	2.18	2.11	2.13	2.09	2.05	1.92
Race/Hispanic origin											
White	461	1.34	1.85	1.79	1.77	1.78	1.78	1.80	1.73	1.75	1.66
Black/African American	429	0.95	1.66	1.68	1.64	1.63	1.61	1.59	1.64	1.62	1.57
Hispanic/Latino	480	2.24	2.99	2.95	2.86	2.85	2.83	2.68	2.77	2.82	2.76
Other	157	4.54	6.50	6.59	6.23	5.51	6.23	6.22	6.22	6.44	5.38

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 28

Standard errors for appendix table 21: Annual arrest percentage of male prisoners released in 30 states in 2005 after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault or assault, by types of post-release arrest offenses

Most serious commitment offense and type of post-release arrest offense	Total arrested within 9 years	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for rape/sexual assault										
Violent	1.27%	0.78%	0.70%	0.68%	0.72%	0.66%	0.47%	0.54%	0.43%	0.42%
Property	1.22	0.73	0.66	0.66	0.60	0.67	0.57	0.63	0.66	0.48
Drug	1.14	0.68	0.67	0.60	0.30	0.50	0.54	0.57	0.55	0.55
Public order	1.32	1.33	1.28	1.27	1.08	1.03	1.10	1.09	1.01	1.08
Male prisoners released after serving a sentence for assault										
Violent	1.16%	0.79%	0.81%	0.71%	0.75%	0.79%	0.61%	0.66%	0.69%	0.64%
Property	1.16	0.80	0.74	0.75	0.66	0.61	0.64	0.70	0.72	0.71
Drug	1.16	0.83	0.83	0.62	0.73	0.73	0.70	0.76	0.76	0.75
Public order	0.97	1.16	1.10	1.07	1.05	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.04	0.96

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.

APPENDIX TABLE 29

Standard errors for appendix table 22: Types of offenses for which male prisoners were arrested within 9 years following release in 30 states in 2005, by most serious commitment offense

Most serious commitment offense	Arrest offense								
	Any offense	Violent					Property	Drug	Public order
		Total	Homicide	Rape/sexual assault	Robbery	Assault			
Violent	0.52%	0.70%	2.82%	2.07%	1.29%	0.75%	0.53%	0.59%	0.69%
Homicide	0.01	0.02	0.31	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Rape/sexual assault	0.19	0.25	0.33	1.55	0.39	0.23	0.21	0.18	0.28
Robbery	0.27	0.35	1.10	1.39	0.95	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.33
Assault	0.42	0.60	1.91	1.21	0.90	0.67	0.37	0.46	0.58
Other violent	0.17	0.30	2.09	0.67	0.31	0.35	0.17	0.14	0.23
Property	0.61%	0.68%	3.34%	1.88%	1.44%	0.72%	0.72%	0.79%	0.73%
Drug	0.60%	0.63%	2.82%	1.82%	1.32%	0.66%	0.60%	0.84%	0.74%
Public order	0.38%	0.46%	2.34%	1.26%	0.85%	0.50%	0.37%	0.49%	0.47%
Number of arrest offenses during the 9 years following release	23,699	4,181	334	504	1,075	3,053	7,501	8,551	12,707

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of State Prisoners Released in 2005 data collection, 2005–2014.



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An Exploration of Protective Factors Supporting Desistance From Sexual Offending

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Abstract

This article considers factors that support or assist desistance from sexual offending in those who have previously offended. Current risk assessment tools for sexual offending focus almost exclusively on assessing factors that raise the risk for offending. The aim of this study was to review the available literature on protective factors supporting desistance from sexual offending. This article discusses the potential value of incorporating protective factors into the assessment process, and examines the literature on this topic to propose a list of eight potential protective domains for sexual offending. The inclusion of notions of desistance and strengths may provide additional guidance to the assessment and treatment of those who sexually offend. Further research investigations are recommended to consolidate the preliminary conclusions from this study regarding the nature and influence of protective factors in enabling individuals to desist from further offending.

Keywords

risk assessment, sexual offender, recidivism, desistance, protective factors

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Introduction

Modern-day risk assessment schemes tend to predict recidivism better than chance, but there is room for improvement. The major “third generation” assessment frameworks for assessing convicted sexual offenders focus almost exclusively on factors that raise risk for recidivism, for example, the *STABLE-2007* (Fernandez, Harris, Hanson, & Sparks, 2012), the *Structure Risk Assessment* (Thornton, 2002), the *Violence Risk Scale–Sexual Offender version* (VRS:SO; Wong, Olver, Nicholaichuk, & Gordon, 2003), the *Sexual Violence Risk–20* (SVR-20; Boer, Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997), and the *Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol* (RSVP; Hart et al., 2003). Consequently, Maruna and LeBel (2003) described the assessment of risks and needs as “deficit focused” and urged those in the criminal justice field to consider balancing such measurement with an assessment of individual strengths.

There are three reasons in particular why it may be important to consider strengths as well as risks in the assessment process. First, to do so could improve the predictive validity of our risk assessment tools. For instance, the combined use of risk factors and protective factors has demonstrated incremental predictive validity over assessments with risk factors alone. A study on a combined violent and sexual offender sample that had been discharged from inpatient forensic psychiatric treatment, showed a significant increase in predictive validity for violent recidivism after treatment when protective factors were added to the risk factors in the assessment (de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, & Douglas, 2013). Second, a one-sided focus on risk can lead to over-prediction of violence risk, and poor risk management and treatment planning. Rogers (2000) argued that risk-only evaluations are inherently inaccurate and implicitly biased, often resulting in negative consequences to forensic populations. In particular, over-prediction (i.e., too many false positives) can lead to pessimism among therapists and unnecessarily long treatment or overly restrictive risk management, which are costly for both society, in terms of financial burden, and for the individual in terms of limited liberties (Miller, 2006). Third, deficit-focused assessments can be stigmatizing for criminal justice clients. In particular, research by Attrill and Liell (2007) among prisoners and ex-prisoners emphasized the feelings of unfairness of the assessors’ focus on risk to the exclusion of any recognition for positive accomplishments. For example, one prisoner in their study reported his view that, “From my experience risk assessment isn’t fair as it’s just pure negatives that people look at, not positives.” Such testimony raises the possibility that the emphasis on risks found in most current assessment processes will have a negative impact on the relationship between the assessor and the assessee, and consequently perhaps on the rehabilitation process itself.

These risky aspects of risk assessment may be offset by paying more than lip service to the concept of *protective factors* in assessment work. By this term, we mean factors that enable or assist desistance from (sexual) offending among those that have already offended. In the criminology field, some work has focused on the assessment of protective factors (e.g., Herrenkohl et al., 2003) or individual *strengths* as a way of complementing the deficit-driven focus on risks and needs (e.g., Maruna & LeBel, 2003). Others have sought to subtly shift the focus away from assessing predictors of

recidivism to those factors associated with successful desistance from crime (e.g., Farrall, 2004; McNeill, 2006; Robinson & Shapland, 2008).

Before protective factors can be fully incorporated into sexual offending assessment frameworks, however, we need to (a) identify potential protective factors from exploratory research and the theoretical literature, (b) build theoretical models to explain how the identified protective factors reduce risk, (c) articulate and systematically collect data on these variables and examine their relationship with recidivism, and (d) build and validate tools for the assessment of protective factors for sexual violence. The present article seeks to complete the first of these steps, that is, examine the existing literature to identify and propose potential protective factors for sexual offending.

Conceptualizing Protective Factors

A starting point in seeking to define protective factors for sexual offending might be to mirror accepted definitions of risk factors (e.g., Andrews & Bonta, 2006) by stating that a protective factor is *a feature of a person that lowers the risk of reoffending*. In addition to internal, psychological features, there is a question about whether or not external, environmental, or circumstantial features of an individual's life situation could also be considered to be protective factors. Certainly, criminological research into desistance indicates that an ex-offender's social situation is an important factor associated with desistance. In fact, some desistance researchers would argue that external factors are more important than internal ones (for a discussion, see LeBel, Burnett, Maruna, & Bushway, 2008). This is in line with results from a protective factors study by Ullrich and Coid (2011) in a sample of violent and sexual offenders, which found that protection was primarily related to social network factors. In the case of sexual offending in particular, restrictive external circumstances are frequently imposed on the individual against his preference, such as incarceration, residency restrictions, social isolation, and restricted employment opportunities. If these external circumstances are guided by empirical evidence, they can be an important part of risk management processes to create more protective environments. Therefore, we believe that the definition of a protective factor should encompass social, interpersonal, and environmental factors as well as psychological and behavioral features.

In pursuit of an approach to risk reduction based on building protective resources, we could profitably further differentiate between static/unchangeable protective factors (e.g., secure attachment in childhood) and those that are behavioral or otherwise potentially changeable. In line with a recent theory of risk factors (Mann, Hanson, & Thornton, 2010), we also suggest that it is helpful to distinguish between the protective factor as an *underlying propensity* (psychological or personality characteristic) and observable *manifestations* of that propensity. For example, holding down a job may be a manifestation of several underlying propensities (e.g., work ethic, plus self-discipline, plus ability to manage social relationships), which together enable stable employment, along with external factors (e.g., economy, employment discrimination).

In another example, the underlying propensities of good social skills may be manifest in generally well-functioning intimate relationships.

Some researchers (e.g., Farrington, 2003) have divided the factors associated with positive desistance outcomes into two categories depending on whether the positive factor has a direct influence on desistance irrespective of risk level (termed *promotive factor*) or whether the positive factor moderates the impact of risk factors (i.e., has greater risk-reducing effects for those people deemed to be at high-risk of offending than for those deemed to be low-risk—the more precise use of the term *protective factor* or *resilience*). Ullrich and Coid (2011) did not find indications that protective factors have different effects at different levels of risk, whereas Lodewijks, de Ruiter, and Doreleijers (2010) found proof for a buffering or mitigating effect of protective factors on risk factors in adolescent samples. As we are equally concerned with both types of positive factors, and as the sexual offending protective factor literature is still in its infancy, these distinctions are probably too fine for the current state of knowledge, and so we use the term *protective factors* here as a general term to refer to both types.

To develop the definition further, we propose that protective factors must exist as definable propensities or manifestations thereof in their own right, rather than being no more than the absence of a risk factor. Accordingly, it should be possible to define individual protective factors without the use of negatives. To illustrate, “capacity for intimacy” would meet this condition, but “lack of hostility” would not. Put another way, some protective factors are likely to be the opposite of risk factors, a proposal that we explore in more detail below, but in this argument we draw a clear distinction between the *opposite* of a risk factor and the *absence* of a risk factor.

In addition, protective factors and risk factors can conceivably co-occur in the same domain. That is, even protective factors that are the opposite, or “healthy pole,” of risk factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive entities from the risk factor. An example in which protective and risk factors can co-occur is in the domain of social influences. Negative social influences are generally considered a risk factor, at the same time positive social influences are considered a protective factor. However, it is quite possible for individuals to have both negative and positive social influences in their lives, that is, for strengths and risk factors to co-exist even though they seem like opposites. For example, a person could both belong to a drug-using social group and, separately, attend university classes with students learning engineering. A single measure of social influences “positive or negative?” would not capture this common complexity. A risk assessment tool that poses strengths as the opposites of vulnerabilities, yet measures both ends of risk domains simultaneously is the *Short-Term Assessment of Risk and Treatability* (START; Webster, Martin, Brink, Nicholls, & Middleton, 2004). However, despite good results for predicting non-violence with the strengths scale, no incremental predictive validity over vulnerabilities has yet been reported (e.g., Braithwaite, Charette, Crocker, & Reyes, 2010; Chu, Thomas, Ogloff, & Daffern, 2011; Viljoen, Nicholls, Greaves, de Ruiter, & Brink, 2011). Another risk assessment tool that incorporates protective strengths in addition to risk factors is the *Inventory of Offender Risk, Needs, and Strengths* (IORNS; Miller, 2006), which is a self-report measure to determine risks, needs, and protective factors for all types of offenders. In a sample of

American pre-release prisoners, the IORNS subscales Protective Strength Index and the Personal Resources Scale were able to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful reintegration (Miller, 2006). As far as we know, to date, no sexual offender predictive validity studies have been carried out with either of these tools.

Recently, two promising SVR assessment tools have been developed that include protective factors for juvenile sexual offending. Print and colleagues (2009) developed a tool designed to guide the assessment of young people (aged 12-18) who are known to have sexually abused others: the AIM-2 (Print et al., 2009). The tool includes 24 protective factors (termed *strengths* or *resiliencies*) as well as 51 risk factors, grouped into four domains: developmental issues, family issues, current environment, and offence-specific issues. An initial validation study suggested that a high score on the strengths scale acted as a protective factor even for juvenile sexual offenders with a high score on the concerns scale (Griffin, Beech, Print, Bradshaw, & Quayle, 2008). Intending to contribute to a more comprehensive assessment for adolescent sexual recidivism, Worling (2013) developed a new tool specifically to assess protective factors for juvenile sexual offending: *Desistance for Adolescents Who Sexually Harm* (DASH-13). The tool consists of a checklist of 13 factors: 7 related specifically to future sexual health and 6 concerning more general, pro-social functioning. Investigation of the psychometric properties of the tool is currently in process.

Finally, protective factors can be the result of social development factors (families, peers, communities) as well as from biological and psychological maturation. As with risk factors (see Ward & Beech, 2006), there may well be neural mechanisms associated with protective factors, possibly originating from pre-natal or peri-natal conditions or early childhood experiences. Such mechanisms need to be uncovered and understood, to assist treatment providers' efforts to strengthen an individual's protective factors, or provide him or her with *prosthetics* to compensate for under-developed or "missing" protective factors. Although the medical analogy is far from ideal, we use the term *prosthetics* here to refer to "artificial" (or coached) protective factors that effectively compensate for the absence of "organically" occurring protective factors. Examples would be structured problem-solving skills or learned ways of expressing feelings assertively. Psychiatric medications (e.g., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) or anti-libidinal medications) could be considered to be prosthetic protective factors if they have the effect of reducing the intensity of sexual drive or enhancing sexual self-control.

Identifying Protective Factors for Sexual Offending

Mirroring the accepted definition of a risk factor for sexual offending, a protective factor should be empirically related to desistance from sexual offending. A stringent standard, equivalent to the standard set for a risk factor (see Mann et al., 2010), would require at least three separate studies, when meta-analytically integrated, to demonstrate that the presence of the protective factor was associated with lower reconviction rates. However, as the literature into protective factors for sexual offending is in its infancy with few empirical studies yet reported, there is a minimal evidence base to consider (see also Laws & Ward, 2011).

Moreover, there may be additional ways of identifying protective factors besides reconviction studies. After all, desistance research starts from a different point than treatment research by putting the individual (not the program) at the center of the change process. Rather than asking “what works” and comparing the reconviction rates of treatment and control groups, desistance studies ask how change works and seek to identify those factors that support the individual in his or her efforts to maintain desistance (for reviews, see Farrall & Calverley, 2005; Laub & Sampson, 2001). Therefore, in this article, we also draw on qualitative and quantitative desistance studies to identify *potential* protective factors in sexual offending. The hope is that future evaluation research might empirically test the protective factors proposed in this article and complement the understanding of desistance from sexual offending. In addition, it would be valuable if sexual offending research were to differentiate between protective factors associated with desistance from general or violent offending and protective factors associated specifically with desistance from sexual offending, as these may not necessarily be the same factors.

We will consider a variety of sources of ideas about what psychological propensities or sociological circumstances might aid desistance from sexual offending. Our exploration of potential protective factors concentrates on three areas: (a) the sex offending risk factor literature, to consider when the opposing/healthy end of a risk domain could be considered protective; (b) the desistance literature in criminology specifically on sexual violence; and (c) the content of an existing measure of protective factors intended to be applicable for violent as well as sexual offending assessment. The aim is to integrate the findings from these diverse sources to create a list of potential protective factors for sexual offending.

Protective Factors as the Opposite of Risk Factors for Sexual Offending

As already discussed, it seems likely that often protective factors and risk factors would be two sides of the same coin. That is, the unhealthy pole of a continuum represents a risk factor (e.g., offence-supportive beliefs), whereas the healthy pole represents a protective factor (e.g., in this example, beliefs supportive of respectful and age-appropriate sexual relationships). As proposed earlier, protective factors must exist as definable propensities rather than being no more than the absence of a risk factor. However, in some cases, risk factors are actually formulated as the absence of a healthy propensity or skill (e.g., “poor problem-solving skills”), so the presence of the healthy propensity (in this example, “good problem-solving skills”) could be considered a protective factor.

Table 1 shows the risk factors for sexual offending that have the strongest empirical support (see Mann et al., 2010, for an account of the evidence base for these factors). For each of these factors, a description is given of the suggested corresponding positive pole, that is, the healthy propensities of these risk factors (see Table 1). The healthy poles of the 14 factors identified as most valid for sexual offending are proposed to be *Moderate intensity sexual drive*, *Sexual preference for consenting adults*, *Attitudes supportive of respectful and age-appropriate sexual relationships*, *Preference for*

Table 1. Established and Promising Risk Factors for Sexual Offending and Their Corresponding Healthy Poles.

Risk factor	Corresponding healthy pole
Sexual preoccupation	Moderate intensity sexual drive A preference for having sex with someone you are emotionally attached to and who is attached to you. Romantic or emotionally intimate connection is seen as being as desirable as sexual gratification.
Deviant sexual interest	Sexual preference for consenting adults A preference for sex with consenting sexual partners of adult age. Desire for potentially reciprocal sexual activities in which the adult partner is more likely than not to also be interested in the activity.
Offence-supportive attitudes	Attitudes supportive of respectful and age-appropriate sexual relationships Weighs the rights of others equally with own wants and desires. Recognizes the right to refuse sexual activity and opposes sexual abuse. Recognizes the nature of childhood and the implications of emotional & physical immaturity for likely harm that would be caused by early sexual activity.
Emotional congruence with children	Preference for emotional intimacy with adults Recognizes the nature of childhood developmental stages and the more limited capacity of children in relation to adult-oriented constructs such as reciprocal emotional intimacy.
Lack of emotionally intimate relationships with adults	Capacity for lasting emotionally intimate relationships with adults Has one or more emotional confidantes; has lasting intimate relationships including sexual relationships; can maintain a stable relationship for longer period of time; relationships are characterized by mutual disclosure of vulnerability and acceptance of each other's faults. Sustained emotionally intimate marital type relationships; emotionally intimate friendships; cooperative and discriminating approach to casual social/work contacts.
Lifestyle impulsiveness (poor self-regulation, impulsive and reckless, unstable work patterns)	Self-control Able to set and achieve medium and long-term goals through effortful goal-directed actions. Considers consequences before taking decisions, and weighs consequences to others at least as highly as consequences to self. Values pro-social solutions and seeks to achieve peaceful resolutions of difference rather than aggressive resolutions. Regulating immediate impulses, stress reactions, and general lifestyle.
Poor cognitive problem solving	Effective problem-solving skills Able to articulate different solutions to a problem, including pro-social solutions, and choose between solutions by considering the consequences, to self and others, of each option. Weights long-term gain over short-term gain.
Resistance to rules and supervision	Acceptance of rules and supervision Capacity to connect with people in authority. Meaningful relationships with supervising or treating professionals. Able to accept rules and regulations and keep to agreements with treatment staff, employers, probation officers and other professionals. Manages to obey imposed legal conditions.
Grievance/hostility	Trustful and forgiving orientation An orientation to others that is typically trustful and peaceful, seeing the others' point of view/perspective, preferring peaceful solutions to interpersonal conflict and generally able to offer forgiveness after being wronged.
Negative social influences	Law-abiding social network Social network primarily or entirely composed of stable, law-abiding individuals who promote pro-social activity and who offer support and strengthen self-control.

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Risk factor	Corresponding healthy pole
Hostility toward women	Positive attitudes toward women Generally pro-social, trusting and respectful attitudes toward women. Views women as equal to men. Believes women have good intentions.
Machiavellianism	Honest and respectful attitudes Views others as equal. Recognizes others' abilities and strengths. Values honesty and does not take advantage of others.
Lack of concern for others/ callousness	Care and concern for others Shows interest in others. Cares about other people's feelings and well-being. Attempts to help others when in need. Does not act on own needs before considering those of others.
Dysfunctional coping	Functional coping Dealing with negative emotions (like anger, anxiety, or rejection) through appropriate, socially acceptable strategies. Managing stress in a calm, non-sexual, and effective manner.

emotional intimacy with adults, Capacity for lasting emotionally intimate relationships with adults, Self-control, Effective problem solving skills, Acceptance of rules and supervision, Trustful and forgiving orientation, Law-abiding social network, Positive attitudes toward women, Honest and respectful attitudes, Care and concern for others, and Functional coping. Given the strong empirical base for the risk poles of these sexual offending factors, it is hypothesized that their healthy poles are equally strong related to reductions in sexually violent recidivism.

Protective Factors in the Desistance Literature

“Desistance from crime” has become a dominant area of research activity within criminology over the last 20 years (see Farrall & Calverley, 2005). The concept of desistance relates to the process of abstaining from crime after repeated or habitual engagement in criminal activities (Maruna, 2001). Desistance processes often involve key turning points or disorienting life episodes (Laub & Sampson, 2001), but desistance is not a single moment or event in a person's life. Instead, desistance is widely understood as a long-term maintenance process involving a slow recognition of the need to change, motivational fluctuation, and possible false starts followed by lapses or relapses. By changing the focus of inquiry from investigating why some ex-prisoners “fail” (or re-offend) and instead trying to understand how and why some individuals succeed or “go straight,” desistance research has opened up new understandings in criminology with distinct implications for assessment and treatment practice.

General desistance factors. The factors identified by the criminological literature for desistance from general criminal offending may also be relevant to sexual offending (Laws & Ward, 2011). For example, aging, stable employment, marriage, sobriety, lack of stress, and good mental health have all been found to have a protective effect

on criminal behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2001). Moreover, research with ex-prisoners suggests that long-term, persistent offenders tend to lack a sense of hope or feelings of agency (Maruna, 2001; Zamble & Quinsey, 1997). However, reformed ex-prisoners are characterized by hope and optimism: They seem to maintain an overly optimistic sense of control over their future and strong internal beliefs about their own self-worth and personal destinies (Burnett & Maruna, 2006; LeBel et al., 2008; Maruna, 2001). Desisters also seem to embrace change-enhancing cognitive patterns: consistent patterns of cognition that encompass the ability to evaluate one's behavior and learn from one's mistakes (Maruna, 2001). Arguably, one potential indicator of this willingness to change is the individual's persistence with a course of intervention to change risk-relevant behavior. In addition, desisters seem to possess a sense of achievement and accomplishment (see Maruna & LeBel, 2003). Making meaningful contributions to one's community or family can lead to grounded increments in self-esteem, feelings of meaningful purposiveness, and a cognitive restructuring toward responsibility for young people in trouble with the law (Toch, 2000). Such successful achievements can predict successful desistance (LeBel et al., 2008) or abstinence from crime (Uggen & Janikula, 1999). Last, the desistance literature has established the importance of moving away from groups of delinquent peers (Warr, 1998) and establishing meaningful intimate relationships (Laub & Sampson, 2001). The latter also being the opposite pole of "lack of emotional intimacy with others," which is a strongly evidenced risk factor for sexual offending (Mann et al., 2010).

Sex offending desistance factors. To date studies of desistance from sexual crimes are few (see Laws & Ward, 2011). Farmer, Beech, and Ward (2012) studied the self-narratives of individuals convicted of child molestation who had apparently desisted from offending, comparing them with individuals who were thought to be still actively seeking opportunities to offend. Several factors differentiated the desistance group from the active group. The desisters appeared to have an *enhanced sense of personal agency*, had a *stronger internal locus of control*, were consistently more able to *find positive outcomes from negative events*, identified *treatment as* having provided them with a *turning point*, and, most strikingly, seemed to have found a *place within a social group or network*. They described belonging to three particular types of social groups or communities: family, friends, and church. In contrast, the "active" or at-risk group all described themselves as socially alienated or isolated from others (Farmer et al., 2012).

Measure of Protective Factors

In this section, we review a structured assessment tool developed specifically for the assessment of protective factors for adult violent as well as sexual offending: the *Structured Assessment of Protective Factors for violence risk* (SAPROF; de Vogel, de Ruiter, Bouman, & de Vries Robbé, 2009, 2012). The SAPROF was designed to assess general protective factors for recidivism in adults convicted of any violent crime (including sexual). The tool aims to form a positive supplement to risk focused

structured professional judgment (SPJ) tools like the *Historical Clinical Risk Management-20* (HCR-20 Version 2; Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997), its revision the HCR-20 Version 3 (HCR-20^{V3}; Douglas, Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013), or related SPJ risk tools. However, it can also be used in addition to actuarial risk tools such as the STABLE-2007. The SAPROF contains 17 protective factors, which are mostly dynamic in nature and divided into three scales: internal factors, motivational factors, and external factors (similarly to psychological, behavioral, and environmental features). Each factor is provided with a rationale describing its empirical background, which largely relies on general violent crime research and to a lesser extent incorporates research on sexual offending. After completing the scale, the assessor has the option to mark factors as critical for the overall protection or for treatment planning (“keys” and “goals”) and makes a “final protection judgment.” The results from the assessment are intended to be integrated with results from a risk tool to come to an overall final judgment on the level of risk, which incorporates both the present risk—and protective factors.

Previous results with forensic psychiatric patients convicted of violent offending showed good predictive validities for the SAPROF for violent incidents toward others and self-harm during treatment (Abidin et al., 2013) as well as for violent recidivism after discharge from treatment (de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, & de Spa, 2011). Moreover, incremental predictive value of assessing the SAPROF protective factors in addition to the HCR-20 risk factors was demonstrated (de Vries Robbé et al., 2013). The first empirical SAPROF study that concentrated solely on patients convicted of sexual offending was recently carried out (de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, Koster, & Bogaerts, 2015). In this study, the predictive validity of the protective factors in the SAPROF for non-recidivism among 83 discharged treated sexual offenders was analyzed. The total score of the 17 protective factors was significantly predictive of no new convictions for any (including sexual) violence for short-term as well as long-term (15-year) follow-up as was the final protection judgment. When only sexually violent recidivism was used as outcome measure, the SAPROF total score was also a significant predictor at different follow-up times. The protective factors remained significantly predictive of general violent re-offending and sexually violent re-offending when controlling for ratings on the HCR-20 and SVR-20 risk factors. Prospective clinical studies into the predictive validity of the protective factors in the SAPROF for no violent incidents toward others during treatment of forensic psychiatric patients (follow-up 12 months) also showed good results for those patients convicted of sexual offending (de Vries Robbé, de Vogel, Wever, Douglas, & Nijman, 2014). Although these results are promising, the research samples are still small and replication of these findings is essential. Additional studies into the predictive validity of the SAPROF for different categories of sexual crime types will also need to be conducted in the near future.

Proposed Protective Factors for Sexual Offending

We propose that the various literatures discussed in the preceding review can be summarized into eight “protective domains” that could be hypothesized to assist desistance

from sexual offending. Table 2 provides an overview of the protective factors derived from the preceding review and their relationship to the proposed protective domains. The factors are categorized by source: (a) the healthy poles of SVR domains, (b) desistance factors for sexual offending, and (c) protective factors from the general risk assessment tool for violent and sexual offending (general protective factors).

Healthy Sexual Interests

This domain refers to a propensity to prefer sexual relationships with consenting adults co-existing with a moderate intensity sexual drive. Individuals with protective factors in this domain are likely to show a balance between a desire for sexual fulfillment and a desire for other types of fulfillment. They will have adequate sexual knowledge and beliefs that support age-appropriate and consenting relationships. This domain is construed as the healthy poles of two, well-established sexual offending risk factors: *Sexual preference for consenting adults* and *Moderate intensity sexual drive*. Additional evidence for healthy sexual interests may be found in the presence of *Attitudes supportive of respectful and age-appropriate sexual relationships* (the healthy pole of the risk factor *Offence-supportive attitudes*). The protective factor *Medication* could have a protective effect on sexual drive.

Capacity for Emotional Intimacy

This domain refers to a propensity to form and maintain emotionally close and satisfying relationships with other adults. Individuals with protective factors in this domain will most likely have a *Trustful and forgiving orientation to others* (healthy pole for the risk factor *Grievance/hostile attitude to others*), a *Preference for emotional intimacy with adults* rather than children (healthy pole for the risk factor *Emotional congruence with children*), and the ability to communicate effectively. The most obvious manifestation of this propensity is that the individual has, or has had, long-lasting and emotionally stable intimate relationships with adult partners (e.g., the risk factor healthy pole *Capacity for lasting emotionally intimate relationships with adults*). The healthy poles *Positive attitudes toward women*, *Honest and respectful attitudes*, and *Care and concern for others* all reflect underlying personality traits which enhance capacity for emotional intimacy. This domain is also reflected in different general protective factors: *Intimate relationship*, *Secure attachment in childhood*, and *Empathy*.

Constructive Social and Professional Support Network

This protective domain refers to the capability of forming constructive relationships with other adults, both socially and with persons in professional support and authority roles. Individuals with protective factors in this domain will have a law-abiding social network. This is represented in the sexual offending desistance factor *Place within a social group or network* and in the risk factor healthy pole *Law-abiding social network*.

Table 2. Proposed Protective Domains and Evidence.

Proposed protective domains	Evidence		
	Healthy poles of risk factors	Desistance factors	General protective factors
1. Healthy sexual interests	Moderate intensity sexual drive Sexual preference for consenting adults Attitudes supportive of respectful and age-appropriate sexual relationships		Medication
2. Capacity for emotional intimacy	Preference for emotional intimacy with adults Capacity for lasting emotionally intimate relationships with adults Trustful and forgiving orientation Positive attitudes toward women Honest and respectful attitudes Care and concern for others		Empathy Secure attachment in childhood Intimate relationship
3. Constructive social and professional support network	Acceptance of rules and supervision Law-abiding social network Honest and respectful attitudes Empathy	Treatment as turning point Place within a social group or network	Motivation for treatment Attitudes toward authority Professional care Living circumstances Network
4. Goal-directed living	Self-control	Enhanced sense of personal agency Stronger internal locus of control	Self-control Financial management Life goals Intelligence
5. Good problem solving	Effective problem-solving skills Functional coping		Coping
6. Engaged in employment or constructive leisure activities		Place within a social group or network	Work Leisure activities
7. Sobriety	Self-control		Self-control Professional care External control
8. Hopeful, optimistic and motivated attitude to desistance		Find positive outcomes from negative events Treatment as turning point	Motivation for treatment Medication

Additional support is provided by the general protective factor *Network*. Individuals with protective factors in this domain may also have meaningful relationships with professionals, reflected by sexual offending desistance factor *Treatment as turning point* and demonstrated in general protective factors *Motivation for treatment*, *Professional care*, and *Living circumstances*. Furthermore, they may have a positive attitude to authority, risk factor healthy pole *Acceptance of rules and supervision* and general protective factor *Attitudes toward authority*. The risk factors healthy poles *Honest and respectful attitudes* and *Care and concern for others* provide underlying traits which facilitate the development of a constructive social and professional support network.

Goal-Directed Living

This protective domain refers to the capacity to set goals and direct daily activities so that progress can be made toward those goals (general protective factor *Life goals*). Individuals with protective factors in this domain will show effortful, positive, goal-directed behaviors (the risk factor healthy pole *Self-control*), will have *Enhanced sense of personal agency* and *Stronger internal locus of control* (both desistance factors), and will show good self-discipline (reflected in general protective factors *Self-control* and *Financial management*).

Good Problem Solving

This protective domain refers to the capacity to manage life's daily problems without becoming overwhelmed or resorting to anti-social or avoidance techniques to regain control. Such a propensity is reflected by the risk factor healthy poles *Functional coping* and *Effective problem-solving skills* and general protective factor *Coping*. Protective factor *Intelligence* may reflect underlying abilities for good problem solving.

Engaged in Employment or Constructive Leisure Activities

This protective domain refers to the propensity to live a life that involves constructive and rewarding activity and ideally also a sense of intrinsic satisfaction and accomplishment. Employment is the most obvious protective factor, reflected by general protective factor *Work*. Equal results could be obtained from engaging in personally meaningful leisure or social activities such as sports, social hobbies, or caring for others (reflected in general protective factor *Leisure activities* and sexual offending desistance factor *Place within a social group or network*).

Sobriety

This protective domain refers to the abstention from drug or alcohol misuse. It is an established protective factor in the literature with *Self-control* as a risk factor healthy

pole (and general protective factor), indicating the likelihood of sobriety intentions to succeed. External motivation through general protective factors *Professional care* and *External control* may provide assistance with sobriety.

Hopeful, Optimistic and Motivated Attitude to Desistance

This protective domain refers to optimistic change-enhancing cognitive patterns. Individuals with protective factors in this domain are likely to *Find positive outcomes from negative events* and see *Treatment as a turning point* (both sexual offending desistance factors). As a result they are often motivated to work with treatment providers or other helping agencies (reflected in general protective factors *Motivation for treatment* and *Medication*).

In summary, eight protective domains are proposed based on being healthy poles of well-established sexual offending risk domains or being desistance factors for sexual offending. Additional support for the proposed domains is found in general protective factors from the SAPROF, which preliminarily proved predictive of sexual and violent re-offending by sexual offenders. We propose that each domain represents an underlying propensity, which may be pre-existing, may have developed as the individual reflects on his life and the consequences of his offending, or may have developed as a prosthetic through a rehabilitative intervention. The presence of each propensity may be observed in a range of possible behavioral indicators, or manifestations of the propensity.

Limitations

The biggest limitation of this exploration study of protective factors for future offending for those who have sexually offended in the past is that very few studies on this topic are available. For the general protective factors assessment tool discussed few studies have been found on sexual offender samples. Similarly, only one specific empirical desistance study was found for sexual offending. The results from these studies need to be replicated in other sexual offender samples to be able to generalize the findings. Given the limited resources, the current study design aimed to include direct as well as indirect evidence for the proposed domains. Nevertheless, the domains are not supported by a large body of empirical evidence and should be viewed as a preliminary proposal. This article presents a first step toward more in-depth studies into protective factors for sexual offending and their potential value for risk assessment and treatment of sexually violent offenders. Hopefully, this will spark enthusiasm among researchers and clinicians to incorporate protective factors in their studies of sexual offending, which will result in a broader evidence base for more comprehensive sexual offender assessment.

Conclusion and Implications for Research

De Ruiter and Nicholls (2011) describe the study of protective factors as a new frontier in forensic mental health which needs to be explored to increase our knowledge on

what works in risk prevention. We know very little about what those who have offended sexually value, what makes them happy, and what skills and strengths are related to their desistance from offending. The desistance literature is very sparse in relation to sexual offending. We therefore urgently need desistance studies that focus on sexual offending. We also need to further investigate whether and to what extent assessments of protective factors increase the accuracy of SVR assessment. We may need to create additional structured schemes for identifying protective factors specifically for sexual reoffending, and use these routinely, so that we can collect and compare data from samples of individuals convicted of different types of sexual crimes and relate these to risk focused tools, treatment efforts, and recidivism outcome.

The above described domain of *Healthy sexual interests* is the only proposed protective domain which is identified as exclusively relevant for *sexual* offending. It would be valuable to develop tools for adult sexual offenders that specifically assess protective factors in this domain, in a similar fashion as has been done for juvenile offenders in the DASH-13 (Worling, 2013). The other seven domains can be considered general protective domains and are represented in many of the factors in the SAPROF, which is not surprising given that this tool provided input for the domains. These factors can primarily be described as “dynamic improving,” meaning that potentially they could change for the better, serve as positive goals for treatment efforts and be used for evaluating treatment progress. Large-scale prospective follow-up research is needed to be able to validate their assumed potential for desistance from sexual offending.

In this article, we have argued for a greater focus on protective factors in assessment, research and practice. In recent years, those who work in sexual offender treatment have shown an extensive interest in the *Good Lives Model* of offender rehabilitation (Ward & Gannon, 2006). As a strengths-based approach to understanding and treating sexual offending this has played an important role in enabling treatment practice to move away from the more confrontational approaches that were typical in the 1980s. However, the field of sexual offending risk assessment still uses a predominantly deficit-focused approach. It takes some years to collect and analyze the data necessary to validate new risk prediction and prevention items or scales. We therefore believe that it is necessary for those engaged in sexual offender assessment to incorporate the notion of protective factors into their research and practice as a matter of urgency. A sea change in our approach to risk assessment could yield multiple benefits, both to treatment clients and to society.

Authors' Note

Michiel de Vries Robbé is co-author of one of the tools described in the manuscript (SAPROF).

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Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994

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November 2003, NCJ 198281

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Introduction and highlights	1	Four measures of recidivism	13	State where rearrested for any type of crime
Definitions	3	Four measures		All sex offenders (table 19)
Imprisonment offense		All sex offenders (table 7)		Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders
Sex offender		Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 19)
Rapist		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 7)		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 20)
Sexual assaulter		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 8)		
Child molester		Time to recidivism		Rearrest and reconviction for a new sex crime
Statutory rapist		All sex offenders (table 9)		24
First release		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 9)		Rearrest and reconviction
Prior arrest		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 10)		All sex offenders (table 21)
Rearrest				Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders
Reconviction		Rearrest for any type of crime	18	Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 21)
Returned to prison		Demographic characteristics		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 22)
— with a new sentence		All sex offenders (table 11)		Time to rearrest
— with or without a new sentence		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 11)		All sex offenders (table 23)
		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 12)		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 23)
Demographic characteristics	7	Time served before 1994 release		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 24)
All sex offenders (table 1)		All sex offenders (table 13)		Demographic characteristics
Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 1)		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 13)		All sex offenders (table 25)
Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 2)		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 14)		Time served before 1994 release
				All sex offenders (table 26)
Sentence length and time served	9	Prior arrest for any type of crime		Prior arrest for any type of crime
All sex offenders (table 3)		All sex offenders (table 15)		All sex offenders (table 27)
Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 3)		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 15)		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 27)
Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 4)		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 16)		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 28)
				Number of prior arrests for any type of crime
Prior criminal record	11	Number of prior arrests for any type of crime		All sex offenders (table 29)
All sex offenders (table 5)		All sex offenders (table 17)		Prior arrest for a sex crime
Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 17)		All sex offenders (table 30)
Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 5)		Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 18)		Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 30)
Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 6)				Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 31)
				State where rearrested for a sex crime
				All sex offenders (table 32)
				Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders
				Rapists and sexual assaulters (table 32)
				Child molesters and statutory rapists (table 33)

**Rearrest for a sex crime
against a child 30**

Undercounts of sex crimes
against children

No data on precise ages
of molested children

Rearrest

All sex offenders (table 34)

Sex offenders compared to non-sex
offenders

Rapists and sexual assaulters
(table 34)

Child molesters and statutory
rapists (table 35)

Prior arrest for a sex crime
against a child

All sex offenders (table 36)

Rapists and sexual assaulters
(table 36)

Child molesters and statutory
rapists (table 37)

Molester's and child's age at time
of imprisonment offense

Child molesters (table 38)

State where rearrested for a sex crime
against a child

All sex offenders (table 39)

Sex offenders compared to non-sex
offenders

Rapists and sexual assaulters
(table 39)

Child molesters and statutory
rapists (table 40)

**Rearrest for other
types of crime 34**

All sex offenders (table 41)

Rapists and sexual assaulters
(table 41)

Child molesters and statutory
rapists (table 42)

Victims of sex crimes 36

Characteristics of victims of rape or
sexual assault (unnumbered
table)

Methodology 37

Number of sex offenders released
from State prisons in 1994 and
number selected for this report,
by State (Appendix table)

Introduction

In 1994, prisons in 15 States released 9,691 male sex offenders. The 9,691 men are two-thirds of all the male sex offenders released from State prisons in the United States in 1994. This report summarizes findings from a survey that tracked the 9,691 for 3 full years after their release. The report documents their "recidivism," as measured by rates of rearrest, reconviction, and reimprisonment during the 3-year followup period.

This report gives recidivism rates for the 9,691 combined total. It also separates the 9,691 into four overlapping categories and gives recidivism rates for each category:

- 3,115 released rapists
- 6,576 released sexual assaulters
- 4,295 released child molesters
- 443 released statutory rapists.

The 9,691 sex offenders were released from State prisons in these 15 States: Arizona, Maryland, North Carolina, California, Michigan, Ohio, Delaware, Minnesota, Oregon, Florida, New Jersey, Texas, Illinois, New York, and Virginia.

Highlights

The 15 States in the study released 272,111 prisoners altogether in 1994. Among the 272,111 were 9,691 men whose crime was a sex offense (3.6% of releases).

On average the 9,691 sex offenders served 3½ years of their 8-year sentence (45% of the prison sentence) before being released in 1994.

Rearrest for a new sex crime

Compared to non-sex offenders released from State prisons, released sex offenders were 4 times more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime. Within the first 3 years following their release from prison in 1994, 5.3% (517 of the 9,691) of released sex offenders were rearrested for a sex crime. The rate for the 262,420 released non-sex offenders was lower, 1.3% (3,328 of 262,420).

The first 12 months following their release from a State prison was the period when 40% of sex crimes were allegedly committed by the released sex offenders.

Recidivism studies typically find that, the older the prisoner when released, the lower the rate of recidivism. Results reported here on released sex offenders did not follow the familiar pattern. While the lowest rate of rearrest for a sex crime (3.3%) did belong to the oldest sex offenders (those age 45 or older), other comparisons between older and younger prisoners did not consistently show older prisoners' having the lower rearrest rate.

The study compared recidivism rates among prisoners who served different lengths of time before being released from prison in 1994. No clear association was found between how long they were in prison and their recidivism rate.

Before being released from prison in 1994, most of the sex offenders had been arrested several times for different types of crimes. The more prior arrests they had, the greater their likelihood of being rearrested for another sex crime after leaving prison. Released sex offenders with 1 prior arrest (the arrest for the sex crime for which they were imprisoned) had the lowest rearrest rate for a sex crime, about 3%; those with 2 or 3 prior arrests for some type of crime, 4%; 4 to 6 prior arrests, 6%; 7 to 10 prior arrests, 7%; and 11 to 15 prior arrests, 8%.

Rearrest for a sex crime against a child

The 9,691 released sex offenders included 4,295 men who were in prison for child molesting.

Of the children these 4,295 men were imprisoned for molesting, 60% were age 13 or younger.

Half of the 4,295 child molesters were 20 or more years older than the child they were imprisoned for molesting.

On average, the 4,295 child molesters were released after serving about 3 years of their 7-year sentence (43% of the prison sentence).

Compared to the 9,691 sex offenders and to the 262,420 non-sex offenders, released child molesters were more likely to be rearrested for child molesting. Within the first 3 years following release from prison in 1994, 3.3% (141 of 4,295) of released child molesters were rearrested for another sex crime against a child. The rate for all 9,691 sex offenders (a category that includes the 4,295 child molesters) was 2.2% (209 of 9,691). The rate for all 262,420 non-sex offenders was less than half of 1% (1,042 of the 262,420).

Of the approximately 141 children allegedly molested by the child molesters after their release from prison in 1994, 79% were age 13 or younger.

Released child molesters with more than 1 prior arrest for child molesting were more likely to be rearrested for child molesting (7.3%) than released child molesters with no more than 1 such prior arrest (2.4%).

Rearrest for any type of crime

Compared to non-sex offenders released from State prison, sex offenders had a lower overall rearrest rate. When rearrests for any type of crime (not just sex crimes) were counted, the study found that 43% (4,163 of 9,691) of the 9,691 released sex offenders were rearrested. The overall rearrest rate for the 262,420 released non-sex offenders was higher, 68% (179,391 of 262,420).

The rearrest offense was a felony for about 75% of the 4,163 rearrested sex offenders. By comparison, 84% of the 179,391 rearrested non-sex offenders were charged by police with a felony.

Reconviction for a new sex crime

Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, 3.5% (339 of the 9,691) were reconvicted for a sex crime within the 3-year followup period.

Reconviction for any type of crime

Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, 24% (2,326 of the 9,691) were reconvicted for a new offense. The reconviction offense included all types of crimes.

Returned to prison for any reason

Within 3 years following their release, 38.6% (3,741) of the 9,691 released sex offenders were returned to prison. They were returned either because they received another prison sentence for a new crime, or because of a technical violation of their parole, such as failing a drug test, missing an appointment with their parole officer, or being arrested for another crime.

Imprisonment offense The 9,691 prisoners were men released from State prisons in 1994 after serving some portion of the sentence they received for committing a sex crime. The sex crime they committed is referred to throughout the report as their “imprisonment offense.” Their imprisonment offense should not be confused with any new offense they may have committed after release.

Sex offender The 9,691 released men were all violent sex offenders. They are called “violent” because the crimes they were imprisoned for are widely defined in State statutes as “violent” sex offenses. “Violent” means the offender used or threatened force in the commission of the crime or, while not actually using force, the offender did not have the victim’s “factual” or “legal” consent. Factual consent means that, for physical reasons, the victim did not give consent, such as when the offender had intercourse with a sedated hospital patient or with a woman who had fallen unconscious from excessive drug taking. “Legal” consent means that the victim willingly participated but, in the eyes of the law, the victim was not old enough or not sufficiently mentally capable (perhaps due to mental illness or mental retardation) to give his or her “legal” consent.

State statutes give many different names to violent sex offenses: “forcible rape,” “statutory rape,” “object rape,” “sexual assault,” “sexual abuse,” “forcible sodomy,” “sexual misconduct,” “criminal sexual conduct,” “lascivious conduct,” “carnal abuse,” “sexual contact,” “unlawful sexual intercourse,” “sexual battery,” “unlawful sexual activity,” “lewd act with minor,” “indecent liberties with a child,” “carnal knowledge of a child,” “incest with a minor,” and “child molesting.”

“Violent” sex offenses are distinguished from “nonviolent” sex offenses and from “commercialized sex offenses.” Nonviolent sex offenses include morals and decency offenses (for example,

indecent exposure and peeping tom), bestiality and other unnatural acts, adultery, incest between adults, and bigamy. Commercialized sexual offenses include prostitution, pimping, and pornography. As used throughout this report, the terms “sex crimes” and “sex offenders” refer exclusively to violent sex offenses.

Each of the 9,691 sex offenders in this report is classified as either a rapist or a sexual assaulter. Classification was based on information about the imprisonment offense contained in prison records supplied for each sex offender released from prison in 1994. Also based on imprisonment offense information, an inmate could be categorized as a child molester and/or a statutory rapist. Classification to either of these two categories is in addition to, not separate from, classification as a rapist or sexual assaulter. For example, of the 3,115 sex offenders classified as rapists, 338 were child molesters. Or, to put it another way, the imprisonment offense for 338 of the 4,295 child molesters identified in this report was rape. Similarly, 3,957 of the 4,295 child molesters were also sexual assaulters.

	Total	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Child molesters	4,295	338	3,957
Statutory rapists	443	21	422

The report gives statistics for all sex offenders and each of the four types — rapists, sexual assaulters, child molesters, and statutory rapists. (See *Methodology* on page 37 for details on how sex offenders were separated into categories.)

Rapist “Violent sex crimes” are separated into two categories: “rape” (short for “forcible rape”) and “other sexual assault.” As used throughout this report the term “rapist” refers to a released sex offender whose imprisonment offense was defined by State law as forcible intercourse (vaginal, anal, or oral) with a female or male. Rape includes “forcible sodomy” and “penetration with a foreign object.” Rape excludes statutory rape or any

other nonforcible sexual act with a minor or with someone unable to give legal or factual consent. As used throughout this report, “rape” always means “forcible rape.” “Statutory rape” is not a type of forcible rape.

A total of 3,115 sex offenders are identified in the report as released rapists — about a third (32%) of the 9,691 released sex offenders. However, enough information to clearly distinguish rapists from other sexual assaulters was not always available in the prison records used to categorize sex offenders into different types. Consequently, the number of rapists among the 9,691 was almost certainly greater than 3,115; how much greater is unknown.

An obstacle to identifying rapists from penal code information is that the label “rape” is not used in about half the 50 States. However, released sex offenders whose imprisonment offense was rape could still be identified. To illustrate, in one State, the term criminal sexual conduct refers to all types of sex crimes. The statutory language was consulted to determine if an offender’s imprisonment offense involved “intercourse” that was “forcible,” in accordance with the definition of rape used in this report. If the offense was not found to involve intercourse (or penetration), then the inmate was not classified as a rapist. The same was true of force; if the statutory language did not include a reference to force (or coercion), the offense was not categorized as rape.

Sexual assaulter By definition in the report, all sex offenders are either “rapists” or “sexual assaulters.” Sex offenders whose imprisonment offense could not be positively identified as “rape” were placed in the “sexual assault” category. To the extent that rapists were reliably distinguished from sexual assaulters, “sexual assaulters” identified in this report were released sex offenders whose imprisonment

offense was “sexual assault,” defined as one of the following:

1. forcible sexual acts, not amounting to intercourse, with a victim of any age,
2. nonforcible sexual acts with a minor (such as statutory rape or incest with a minor or fondling), or
3. nonforcible sexual acts with someone unable to give legal or factual consent because of mental or physical reasons (for example, a mentally ill or retarded person or a sedated hospital patient).

A total of 6,576 sex offenders are identified in this report as released sexual assaulters. The 6,576 sexual assaulters made up about two-thirds (68%) of the 9,691 released sex offenders.

Child molester Many of the 9,691 sex offenders were released prisoners whose imprisonment offense was the rape or sexual assault of a child. Throughout the report, released sex offenders whose forcible or nonforcible sex crime was against a child are referred to as “child molesters.” The sex crime did not have to involve intercourse to fit the definition of child molestation.

Of the 9,691 sex offenders, 4,295 were identified as child molesters based on prison records made available for the study. However, because complete information was not always supplied, not every child molester could be identified. Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, undoubtedly more than 4,295 were child molesters, but 4,295 represent all who could be identified from the information available. One reason child molesters were not easily identified from penal code information is that most States do not use the term “child molester” in their penal code. Nevertheless, all States have laws against sexual activity with children, which does facilitate identification. As a result of the uncertainty regarding the number of child molesters among the 9,691 sex offenders, the study cannot say what percentage of the victims of

the 9,691 sex offenders’ offenses were children, and what percentage were adults.

In short, the 4,295 released child molesters in this report were men who —

- a. had forcible intercourse with a child or
- b. committed “statutory rape” (meaning nonforcible intercourse with a child) or
- c. with or without force, engaged in any other type of sexual contact with a child.

Of the 4,295, at least 338 (about 8%) had forcible intercourse, and at least 443 (10%) committed statutory rape.

Statutory rapist State laws define various circumstances in which intercourse between consenting partners is illegal: for example, when one of the partners is married or when the two are blood relatives or when one is a “child.” Laws that criminalize consensual intercourse based solely on the marital status of the partners are called “adultery laws.” Those that criminalize it based solely on blood relationship are “incest laws.” Laws that prohibit consensual sexual intercourse based solely on the ages of the partners are called “statutory rape laws.”

Statutory rape pertains exclusively to consensual intercourse, as opposed to other types of sexual contact with a child, such as forcible intercourse, forcible fondling, or consensual fondling. Statutory rape is one specific form of what this study calls “child molestation.” The child victim of statutory rape can be male or female, and the offender can be male or female. The offender can be almost any relative (“statutory rape” includes incest with a child), an unrelated person well known to the child (such as a school teacher, neighbor, or minister), someone the child hardly knows, or a stranger.

Statutory rape laws define a “child” as a person who is below the “age of

consent,” meaning below the minimum age at which a person can legally consent to having intercourse. Age of consent in the 50 States ranges from 14 to 18. Most States set age of consent at 16. In those States, consensual intercourse with someone age 16 or older is usually not a criminal offense, but intercourse with someone below 16 generally is. However, all States make exceptions to their age rules. Consequently, consensual intercourse with children below the age of consent is not always a crime, and consensual intercourse with children who are old enough to give consent is not always legally permissible.

Exceptions for children below age of consent Certain statutory exceptions exist to legal prohibitions against nonforcible intercourse with children who are below the age of consent. One way exceptions are made in statutes is by specifying the minimum age the offender must be (for example, at least age 18, at least age 20) for intercourse to be unlawful. Persons below this minimum age generally cannot be prosecuted. Another common way exceptions are made (virtually every State has these provisions in its laws) is by specifying how much older than the victim the perpetrator must be for criminal prosecution to occur. For example, by law in one State where age of consent is 16, no prosecution can occur unless the age difference is at least 3 years. In that State it is legal for a 17-year-old to have consensual intercourse with a 15-year-old, even though 15 is below the age of consent; but the same act with a 15-year-old is illegal when the other is 18. That is because the 17-year-old is not 3 years older than the 15-year-old, whereas the 18-year-old is. The aim of such exceptions is to distinguish teen behavior from exploitative relationships between adults and children. Another exception is consensual intercourse between husband and wife; no prosecution can occur if one spouse is below the age of consent.

Exceptions for children old enough to give consent Certain adults can be prosecuted for having consensual intercourse with a child who has reached the age of consent. For example, in one State it is a third degree felony for a psychotherapist to have intercourse with a 17-year-old client even though 17 is over the minimum age of consent in that State. In another State, where an adult generally cannot be prosecuted for having consensual intercourse with a 16-year-old, an exception is made when the adult is the child's school teacher. In that case the teacher can be prosecuted for a "class A" misdemeanor. Exceptions are made for other professions as well (clergy, for example).

In this report, 443 of the 9,691 released sex offenders are identified as statutory rapists based on information supplied by the prisons that released them. There were more than 443 statutory rapists among the 9,691 released male sex offenders, but the 443 are all that could be positively identified with the limited information available. One reason statutory rapists are not easily identified from penal code information available on the released sex offenders is that most States do not use the term "statutory rape" in their laws.

First release Though all 9,691 sex offenders in the study were released in 1994, for a fourth of the offenders 1994 was not the first year of release since receiving their prison sentence. This group had previously served a portion of the sentence and were released, then violated parole and were returned to prison to continue serving time still left on that sentence. For the remaining 75% of sex offenders released, the 1994 release was their "first release," meaning their first discharge from prison since being convicted and sentenced to prison.

"First release" should not be confused with first ever release from a prison. "First release" pertains solely to the sentence for the imprisonment offense

(as defined above). It does not pertain to any earlier prison sentences offenders may have served for some other offense.

Attention is drawn to first releases because certain statistics in the report — for example, "average time served," "percent of sentence served," "child molester's age when he committed the sex crime for which he was imprisoned" — could only be computed for those prisoners classified as first releases. For such statistics, date first admitted to prison for their imprisonment offense was needed. Since prison records made available for the study only provided this admission date on first releases, first releases necessarily formed the basis for the statistics.

Prior arrest Statistics on prior arrests were calculated using arrest dates from the official criminal records of the 9,691 released sex offenders. Only dates of arrest were counted, not the number of arrest charges associated with that arrest date. To illustrate, one man was arrested on March 5, 1970, and that one arrest resulted in 3 separate arrest charges being filed against him. In this study, that March 5 arrest is considered one prior arrest.

Prior arrests were measured two different ways in this report. The first way did not include the imprisonment offense for which the sex offender was in prison in 1994. Prior arrest statistics that did not include the imprisonment offense are found in sections of the report that describe the criminal records of the 9,691 sex offenders at the time of release from prison. In this case, any arrest that had occurred on a date prior to the sex offender's arrest for his imprisonment offense was considered a prior arrest. For example, one released sex offender was found to have four different dates of arrest prior to the date of arrest for his imprisonment offense. Those four arrests resulted in 17 different charges being brought against him. When describing

this released prisoner's criminal record, he is considered to have four prior arrests.

The second way of measuring prior arrests did include the imprisonment offense of the released sex offender. Prior arrest statistics that did include the imprisonment offense are found in sections of the report that describe the recidivism rates of the 9,691 sex offenders following their release from prison. In this case, any arrest that had occurred on a date prior to the sex offender's release from prison was considered a prior arrest. By definition, all 9,691 sex offenders had at least one arrest prior to their release, which was the sex crime arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. This means that the sex offender who was arrested on four different dates prior to the arrest for his imprisonment offense under the first definition of prior arrest was, under this second definition, classified as having five prior arrests, once his imprisonment offense is included.

Thirteen tables in the report provide statistics on prior arrests (and, in 2 of the 13, prior convictions and prior imprisonments). In tables 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, and 37, "prior arrests" includes the sex crime arrest for the imprisonment offense; these tables have the heading "prior to 1994 release." In tables 5 and 6, "prior arrests" excludes that arrest; these tables have the heading "prior to the sex crime for which imprisoned."

In all tables, the same counting rule was used: arrest dates, not arrest charges, were counted to obtain the number of prior arrests.

Rearrest Unless stated otherwise, this recidivism measure is defined as the number or percentage of released prisoners who, within the first three years following their 1994 release, were arrested either in the same State that released them (in this report those arrests are called "in-State" arrests) or in a different State (those arrests are

referred to as “out-of-State” arrests). Data on arrests came from State RAP sheets and FBI RAP sheets. RAP sheets (Records of Arrest and Prosecution) are law enforcement records intended to document a person’s entire adult criminal history, including every arrest, prosecution and adjudication for a felony or serious misdemeanor offense. Arrests, prosecutions and adjudications for minor traffic offenses, public drunkenness, and other petty crimes are not as fully recorded as those for serious crimes. The “percent rearrested” is calculated by dividing the number rearrested by the number released from prison in 1994.

All measures of recidivism based on criminal records are subject to two types of errors. Type 1 errors arise when the arrest or the conviction in the released prisoner’s record is for a crime that person did not commit. Type 2 errors arise when the released prisoner commits a crime but he is not arrested for it, or, even if he is, the arrest does not result in his conviction.

Some amount of type 1 and type 2 error is inevitable, however recidivism is measured. But that does not mean that all recidivism measures are equally suitable, no matter the purpose they are intended to serve. The main purpose of this recidivism study was to document the percentage of sex offenders who continued their involvement in various types of crime after their release from prison in 1994. The more suitable measure for that is the one with the fewest type 2 errors: the one, in other words, less prone to saying someone is not committing crimes when he actually is. Between rearrest and reconviction as the recidivism measure, the one less likely to make that type of error is rearrest. One reason is that the rigorous standard used to convict someone — “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” — makes it certain that guilty persons will sometimes go free. Another reason is record keeping: the justice system does better at recording arrests than

convictions in RAP sheets. For such reasons, this study uses rearrest more often than reconviction as the measure of recidivism.

Rearrest forms a conservative measure of reoffending because many crimes do not result in arrest. Not all types of crime are alike in this regard. Crimes committed in nonpublic places (such as in the victim’s home) by one family member against another (such as by the husband against his wife, or by the father against his own child) are a type that is less likely than many other types to be reported to police and, consequently, less likely to result in arrest. Sex crimes, particularly those against children, are a specific example of this type. While some sex offenders in this study probably committed a new sex crime after their release and were not arrested or convicted, the study cannot say how many.

As mentioned above, one reason why sex offenders are not arrested is that no one calls the police. Results from the National Crime Victimization Survey indicate that the offenses of rape/sexual assault are the least likely crimes to be reported to the police. (See *Reporting Crime to the Police*, 1993-2000, March 2003, <<http://www.ojp.usdoj/bjs/abstract/rcp00.htm>>.)

Reconviction Except where stated otherwise, this recidivism measure pertains to State and Federal convictions in any State (not just convictions in the State that released them) in the three years following release. Information on convictions came from State and FBI RAP sheets. RAP sheets are intended to document every conviction for a felony or serious misdemeanor, but not every conviction for a minor offense. “Percent reconvicted” is calculated by dividing the number reconvicted by the number released from prison in 1994. (It is not calculated by dividing the number reconvicted by the number rearrested.)

Return to prison Two recidivism measures are returned to prison — with a new sentence with or without a new sentence. Recidivism defined as *Returned to prison with a new sentence* pertains exclusively to sex offenders who, within 3 years following release, were reconvicted for any new crime in any State following their release and received a new prison sentence for the new crime.

Recidivism defined as *Returned to prison with or without a new sentence* includes resentenced offenders plus any who were returned to prison within 3 years because they had violated a technical condition of their release. Technical violations include things such as failing a drug test, missing an appointment with their parole officer, or being arrested for a new crime. Offenders returning to prison for such violations are sometimes referred to as “technical violators.”

Prisons should not be confused with jails. A prison is a State or Federal correctional facility reserved for convicted persons with relatively long sentences (generally over a year). A jail is a local correctional facility for convicted persons with short sentences or for persons awaiting trial. Returns to prison refer to any prison, not necessarily the same prison that released the offender in 1994.

The “percent returned to prison with a new sentence” is calculated by dividing the number returned to prison with a new sentence by the number released from prison in 1994. The “percent returned to prison with or without a new sentence” is calculated by dividing the number returned to prison with or without a new sentence by the number released from prison in 1994.

Data on returns with a new sentence are based on State and FBI RAP sheets. Data on returns with or without a new sentence are based on State and FBI RAP sheets plus prison records.

Demographic characteristics

All sex offenders

Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, approximately —

- 6,503 (67.1% of the 9,691) were white males (table 1)
- 3,053 (31.5%) were black males
- 136 (1.4%) were males of other races (Asian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, and Alaska Native).

The vast majority of sex offenders were non-Hispanic males (80.1%). Half were over the age of 35 when released.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

As defined in this report, all sex offenders are either “rapists” or “sexual assaulters.” Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, 3,115 were rapists and the remaining 6,576 were sexual assaulters.

Of the 3,115 rapists, 1,735 (55.7% of 3,115) were white males and 1,327 (42.6%) were black males. Of the 6,576 sexual assaulters, 4,768 (72.5% of 6,576) were white males and 1,723 (26.2%) were black males.

Rapists and sexual assaulters were close in age at time of release: over 70% were age 30 or older. Median age at time of release was about 35 years for both rapists and sexual assaulters.

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

Prisoner characteristic	Percent of released prisoners		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Total	100%	100%	100%
Race			
White	67.1%	55.7%	72.5%
Black	31.5	42.6	26.2
Other	1.4	1.7	1.3
Hispanic origin			
Hispanic	19.9%	22.6%	18.9%
Non-Hispanic	80.1	77.4	81.1
Age at release			
18-24*	12.2%	10.6%	13.0%
25-29	16.4	17.3	16.0
30-34	20.0	22.4	18.8
35-39	19.1	20.9	18.3
40-44	13.3	13.3	13.3
45 or older	19.0	15.5	20.6
Age at release			
Average	36.8 yrs	36.1 yrs	37.1 yrs
Median	35.3	34.9	35.5
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. Data identifying race were reported for 98.5% of 9,691 released sex offenders; Hispanic origin for 82.5%; age for virtually 100%.

*Age at release 18-24 includes the few who were under age 18 when released from prison in 1994.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Some of the 9,691 sex offenders were men whose imprisonment offense was a sex offense against a child. Precisely how many is unknown. In this report, the 4,295 who could be identified are called “child molesters” (table 2). The 4,295 identified child molesters included some (443 out of the 4,295) whose specific sex offense against a child was non-forcible intercourse. These 443 are called “statutory rapists.” There were more than 443 among the 4,295, but 443 were all that could be identified from the limited information obtained for the study.

Both the 4,295 child molesters and the 443 statutory rapists were predominantly non-Hispanic white males. Nearly three-fourths of the child molesters (73.2%) were age 30 or older. Just over half the statutory rapists (54%) were 30 or older at the time they were released from prison.

Among the released child molesters there were 3,333 white men (77.6% of 4,295) and 889 black men (20.7%). The 443 statutory rapists included 324 white men (73.2% of 443) and 110 black men (24.8%).

Table 2. Demographic characteristics of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994

Prisoner characteristic	Percent of released prisoners	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Total	100%	100%
Race		
White	77.6%	73.2%
Black	20.7	24.8
Other	1.7	2.0
Hispanic origin		
Hispanic	23.5%	15.9%
Non-Hispanic	76.5	84.1
Age at release		
18-24*	11.4%	24.8%
25-29	15.4	21.2
30-34	17.7	14.7
35-39	18.6	14.9
40-44	14.3	10.2
45 or older	22.6	14.2
Age at release		
Average	37.8 yrs	33.6 yrs
Median	36.5	31.0
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column “child molesters.” Data identifying race were reported for 99.5% of 4,295 released child molesters; Hispanic origin for 87.8%; and age for 100%.

*Age at release 18-24 includes the few who were under age 18 when released from prison in 1994.

Sentence length and time served

All sex offenders

All 9,691 sex offenders selected to be in this study had a prison sentence greater than 1 year. The shortest terms were a day over 1 year; the longest were life sentences. The fact that sex offenders with a life sentence (18 offenders in the study) were among the 9,691 released in 1994 should not be surprising because only rarely do life sentences in the United States literally mean imprisonment for the remainder of a person's life. Most felons receiving a life sentence are eventually paroled (unpublished tabulation of data from the 1997 BJS Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities).

On average, a sex offender released from prison in 1994 had an 8-year term and served 3½ years of that sentence (45%) before being released (table 3). Half of the released sex offenders had a sentence length of 6 years or less. Half had served no more than a third of their sentence before being released. When released, the majority (54.5%) had more than 3 years of their sentence remaining to be served.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Rape always involves forcible intercourse, whereas sexual assault (as the term is used here) never does, although it can involve other types of forcible sexual assault. Because forcible intercourse is considered to be a more serious offense than other forms of forcible sexual assault, penalties for rape are generally more severe than those for sexual assault.

Consistent with the more serious nature of rape —

- on average a released rapist had a longer sentence (just over 11 years) than a sexual assaulter (just under 7 years)

- on average a rapist spent more time in confinement before being released (5¼ years) than a sexual assaulter (just under 3 years)
- median sentence length was longer for rapists (half of the rapists had a sentence of 9 years or more, while half of the sexual assaulters had a sentence of 5½ years or more)
- 39.2% of the 3,115 rapists were in prison for over 5 years prior to release, while 12.5% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters served 61 months or more
- rapists served 49% of their sentence before being released, compared to 43% for sexual assaulters.

Depending on the length of their sentence and the amount of time they had served before being released, some of the released sex offenders would have been on parole (or some other type of conditional release) throughout the full 3 years they were tracked in this study. For example, when released, 63.3% of rapists had more than 3 years left to serve on their sentence. In their case, any new crimes they committed during this 3-year followup period were offenses committed while still on parole. By comparison, just over half of released sexual assaulters had more than 3 years left to serve.

Table 3. Sentence length and time served for sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

Characteristic	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Sentence length (in months)			
Mean	97.3 mo	134.0 mo	82.5 mo
Median	72.0	108.0	66.0
Time served (in months)			
Mean	42.3 mo	62.6 mo	34.1 mo
Median	32.3	48.2	26.5
Percent of sentence served	44.9%	49.3%	43.1%
Upon release in 1994, percent who had served —			
6 months or less	4.5%	3.1%	5.0%
7-12	9.5	3.0	12.1
13-18	16.5	10.5	19.0
19-24	9.7	5.1	11.5
25-30	8.1	6.1	8.9
31-36	9.9	8.0	10.7
37-60	21.6	24.9	20.2
61 months or more	20.2	39.2	12.5
Upon release in 1994, percent with time still remaining to be served			
6 months or less	2.8%	2.4%	2.9%
7-12	5.0	5.7	4.7
13-18	8.4	6.2	9.2
19-24	12.8	9.3	14.2
25-30	8.1	6.2	8.8
31-36	8.5	6.9	9.1
37-60	25.1	22.8	26.0
61 months or more	29.4	40.5	24.9
Total first releases	6,470	1,859	5,860

Note: The 6,470 sex offenders were released in 13 States. Figures are based on first releases only. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

Child molesters and sexual assaulters

On average, child molesters were released after serving nearly 3 years (33.7 months) of their nearly 7-year sentence (81.1 months) (table 4). Statutory rapists were released after serving a little over 2 years of their approximately 4-year sentence. Upon release, almost half of the child molesters still had at least 3 years of their sentence remaining to be served, compared to 15% of statutory rapists.

Table 4. Sentence length and time served for child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994

Characteristic	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Sentence length (in months)		
Mean	81.1 mo	49.5 mo
Median	66.0	36.0
Time served (in months)		
Mean	33.7 mo	27.6 mo
Median	25.8	19.4
Percent of sentence served	43.3%	52.8%
Upon release in 1994, percent who had served —		
6 months or less	5.7%	9.6%
7-12	12.6	20.4
13-18	20.8	18.2
19-24	10.1	14.3
25-30	7.2	8.6
31-36	11.2	7.0
37-60	19.7	13.4
61 months or more	12.8	8.6
Upon release in 1994, percent with time still remaining to be served		
6 months or less	2.5%	10.8%
7-12	5.4	17.4
13-18	10.2	26.9
19-24	16.1	13.1
25-30	7.9	8.5
31-36	8.9	8.5
37-60	24.9	9.2
61 months or more	24.1	5.6
Total first releases	3,104	317
Note: The 3,104 child molesters were released in 13 States; the 317 statutory rapists in 10 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters." Figures are based on first releases only. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.		

All sex offenders

Arrests and convictions for minor traffic offenses, public drunkenness, and other petty crimes are often not entered into official criminal records. Since official records formed the basis for this study's statistics on arrests and convictions, these statistics understate levels of contact with the justice system. Statistics shown throughout this report on arrests and convictions pertain mostly to arrests and convictions for felonies and serious misdemeanors.

Statistics on prior arrests in this section of the report do not include the imprisonment offense for which the sex offender was in prison in 1994.

At the time the 9,691 male sex offenders were arrested for the sex crime that resulted in their imprisonment —

- 78.5% (7,607 of the 9,691 men) had been arrested at least one earlier time (table 5)
- half had 3 or more prior arrests for some type of crime
- 58.4% (5,660 men) had at least one prior criminal conviction
- 13.9% (1,347 men) had a prior conviction for a violent sex offense
- 4.6% (446 men) had been convicted for a sex crime against a child
- nearly a quarter had served time in a State or Federal prison at least once before for some type of crime.

All 9,691 were in prison in 1994 because they had been arrested and convicted for a sex offense. For 71.5% of the 9,691 men (6,929), that arrest was their first ever for a violent sex crime. In other words, these 6,929 men had no previous arrest for a sex offense. For the remaining 28.5% (2,762 men), that arrest was not their first sex offense arrest. Some had been arrested once before for a sex crime and some two or more times before.

To illustrate, one of the 9,691 sex offenders in this study had his first arrest for a sex crime in 1966, when he was age 19; he was also arrested for sex crimes in the 1970's and 1980's, in three different States. The arrest for his

imprisonment offense was in 1982. In the early part of 1983, 4 months after his arrest, he was convicted of sexual assault and began serving a 25-year prison term. Eleven years later, in 1994 at age 47, he was released.

For 75% of the 9,691 sex offenders, their 1994 release represents their first release since being sentenced for their sex offense. The remaining 25% had previously served time under the same sentence, had been released, had violated one or more conditions of their parole and, consequently, were returned to prison to continue serving time still remaining on their sentence.

Table 5. Prior criminal record of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

Prior to the sex crime for which imprisoned	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent with at least 1 prior arrest for — ^a			
Any crime	78.5%	83.1%	76.3%
Any sex offense	28.5	28.7	28.4
Sex offense against a child	10.3	5.7	12.5
Prior arrests for any crime^a			
Mean	4.5	5.0	4.2
Median	3	3	2
Percent with at least 1 prior conviction for — ^a			
Any crime	58.4%	62.9%	56.2%
Any sex offense	13.9	14.6	13.5
Sex offense against a child	4.6	3.4	5.2
Prior convictions for any crime^a			
Mean	1.8	2.0	1.7
Median	1	1	1
Percent with prior prison sentence for any crime^a	23.7%	28%	21.6%
Percent who were first releases^b	74.9%	66.9%	78.7%
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

^a"Prior" does not include the arrest, conviction, or prison sentence that was the reason the sex offenders were in prison in 1994. Persons with no prior arrest or prior convictions were coded zero and were included in the calculations of mean and median priors. Calculation of prior convictions excluded Ohio, and calculation of prior prison sentences excluded Ohio and Virginia.

^bData on first releases are based on releases from 13 States. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

A total of 262,420 non-sex offenders were released from State prisons in 1994 in the 15 States. Of the 262,420 non-sex offenders, 94% had at least 1 prior arrest and 82% had at least 1 prior conviction (not in a table). Overall, the 9,691 sex offenders had a shorter criminal history than the 262,420 non-sex offenders. Before the arrest that resulted in their prison sentence, sex offenders had been arrested 4.5 times, on average. This prior arrest record was about half that of non-sex offenders (8.9 prior arrests). In addition, among the 1994 prison releases, 23.7% of the sex offenders (2,297), compared to 44.3% of non-sex offenders (116,252), had served prior prison sentences.

Sex offenders were more likely to have been arrested (28.5%) or convicted (13.9%) for a sexual offense than non-sex offenders (6.5% with a prior arrest for a sex crime; 0.2% with a prior conviction for a sex crime). The same is true for child molesting — about 1 in 10 sex offenders had a prior arrest for a sex offense against a child, compared to about 1 in 100 non-sex offenders.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

For approximately 71% of the 3,115 rapists, the arrest for rape that resulted in their imprisonment was their first for a sex crime. The remaining 29% had one or more prior sex crime arrests. Likewise, for sexual assaulters, the sexual assault arrest that led to their imprisonment was the first arrest for a sex crime for 72% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters. The remaining 28% had been arrested at least once before for some type of sex crime.

Table 6. Prior criminal record of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994

Prior to the sex crime for which imprisoned	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent with at least 1 prior arrest for — ^a		
Any crime	76.8%	80.6%
Any sex offense	29.0	38.4
Sex offense against a child	18.3	19.6
Prior arrests for any crime^a		
Mean	4.1	4.8
Median	2	3
Percent with at least 1 prior conviction for — ^a		
Any crime	54.6%	64.6%
Any sex offense	11.9	21.2
Sex offense against a child	7.3	11.5
Prior convictions for any crime^a		
Mean	1.6	2.2
Median	1	1
Percent with prior prison sentence for any crime^a	19.3%	23.4%
Percent who were first releases^b	74.5%	73.7%
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

^a"Prior" does not include the arrest, conviction, or prison sentence that was the reason the sex offenders were in prison in 1994. Persons with no prior arrest or prior convictions were coded zero and were included in the calculations of mean and median priors. Calculation of prior convictions excluded Ohio, and calculation of prior prison sentences excluded Ohio and Virginia.

^bData on first releases are based on releases from 13 States. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

Child molesters and sexual assaulters

The 4,295 child molesters had at least 1 arrest for child molesting (the arrest that led to their imprisonment). For 3,509 (81.7%) of them, that arrest was their first ever arrest for child molesting (table 6). For the other 786 men (18.3% of the 4,295), that was not their first. Some had one prior arrest for a sex offense against a child, some had two, and others had three or more.

Among those with three or more priors was a man whose first arrest for child molesting was in 1966, when he was age 20. When released in 1994, he was serving an 11-year sentence for molesting a child under age 14. The prior criminal record of this serial pedophile spanned three decades, with arrests for child molesting in the 1970's, the 1980's, and the 1990's.

Four measures of recidivism

This section measures recidivism four ways:

- percent rearrested for any type of crime
- percent reconvicted for any type of crime
- percent returned to prison with a new prison sentence for any type of crime
- percent returned to prison with or without a new prison sentence.

"Percent rearrested" is calculated by dividing "the number rearrested" by "the number released from prison in 1994."

"Percent reconvicted" is obtained by dividing "the number reconvicted" by "the number released from prison in 1994." (It is *not* calculated by dividing "the number reconvicted" by "the number rearrested.")

"Percent returned to prison with a new sentence" is calculated by dividing "the number returned to prison with a new sentence" by "the number released from prison in 1994." (It is *not* calculated by dividing "the number returned to prison with a new sentence" by "the number reconvicted.")

Except where stated otherwise, all four recidivism measures —

- refer to the full 3-year period following the prisoner's release in 1994
- include both "in-State" and "out-of-State" recidivism.

"In-State" recidivism refers to new offenses committed within the State that released the prisoner in 1994. "Out-of-State" recidivism is any new offenses in States other than the one that released him in 1994.

Not all 4 of the recidivism measures are based on data from 15 States —

- "Percent rearrested" is based on 15 States

• "Percent reconvicted" is based on 14 of the 15 States participating in the study

• "Percent returned to prison with a new sentence" is based on 13 of the 15 States

• "Percent returned to prison with or without a new sentence" is based on 9 of the 15.

Three of the four recidivism measures were calculated from data on fewer than 15 States because the information needed to perform the calculations was not available (or not readily available) from each of the 15 participating States. Notes at the bottom of the tables alert readers to such missing data.

Four measures

All sex offenders

The 9,691 sex offenders in this study were all released from prison in 1994.

Within the first 3 years following their release —

• 43% (4,163 of the 9,691) were rearrested for at least 1 new crime (table 7)

• 24% (2,326 of the 9,691) were reconvicted for any type of crime

• 11.2% (1,085 of the 9,691) were returned to prison with another sentence

• 38.6% (3,741 of the 9,691) were returned to prison with or without a new sentence.

For approximately three-fourths of the 4,163 men who were rearrested for some new crime, their most serious rearrest offense was a felony; for the remaining fourth, the most serious was a misdemeanor (not shown in table).

Of the 4,163 men rearrested for some new offense, nearly 9 in 10 (87%) were still on parole when taken into custody (not shown in table).

Table 7. Recidivism rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by recidivism measure and type of sex offender

Recidivism measure	Percent of released prisoners		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Within 3 years following release:			
Rearrested for any type of crime	43.0%	46.0%	41.5%
Reconvicted for any type of crime ^a	24.0%	27.3%	22.4%
Returned to prison with a new sentence for any type of crime ^b	11.2%	12.6%	10.5%
Returned to prison with or without a new sentence ^c	38.6%	43.6%	36.1%
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

^aBecause of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted.

^b"New prison sentence" includes new sentences to State or Federal prisons but not to local jails. Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio and Virginia were excluded from the calculation of percent returned to prison with a new sentence.

^c"With or without a new sentence" includes prisoners with new sentences to State or Federal prisons plus prisoners returned for technical violations. Because of missing data, prisoners released in 6 States (Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia) were excluded from the calculation of percent returned to prison with or without a new sentence. New York State custody records did not always distinguish prison returns from jail returns. Consequently, some persons received in New York jails were probably mistakenly classified as prison returns. Also, California with a relatively high return-to-prison rate affects the overall rate of 38.6%. When California is excluded, the return-to-prison rate falls to 27.9%.

The 2,326 reconvicted for a new crime consisted of 1,672 (71.9%) whose most serious conviction offense was a felony, and 654 (28.1%) whose most serious offense was a misdemeanor (not shown in table).

Of the 2,326 reconvicted for any new crime after their release, 1,085 were resentenced to prison, and the remaining 1,241 were placed on probation or ordered to pay a fine or sentenced to short-term confinement in a local jail. The 1,241 not resentenced to prison made up a little over half (53%) of the total 2,326 reconvicted. One reason why over half were not resentenced to prison was that the new conviction offense for about 650 of the 2,326 newly convicted men (approximately 30%) was a misdemeanor rather than a felony, and State laws usually do not permit State prison sentences for misdemeanors.

Altogether, 3,741 (38.6%) of the 9,691 released sex offenders were returned to prison either because of a new sentence or a technical violation. Of the 3,741, 2,656 (71%) were returned for a technical violation, such as failing a drug test, missing an appointment with the parole officer, or being arrested for another crime; and 1,085 were returned with a new prison sentence. The 2,656 consisted of 664 who were reconvicted but not resentenced to prison, plus 1,992 not reconvicted.

As previously explained, a total of 1,241 released sex offenders were reconvicted but not resentenced to prison for their new crime. The 1,241 included 664 (described immediately above) who were returned to prison for a technical violation. The 664 were 54% of the 1,241, indicating that most of those who were reconvicted but not given a new prison sentence were, nevertheless, returned to prison.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

The 15 States in this study released 272,111 prisoners altogether in 1994. The 9,691 released sex offenders made up 3.6% of that total. The remaining 262,420 released prisoners were non-sex offenders. Of the 262,420 non-sex offenders, 68% (179,391 men and women out of the 262,420) were rearrested for a new crime within 3 years (not shown in table). The 43% overall rearrest rate of the 9,691 released sex offenders (4,163 out of 9,691) was low by comparison.

Another difference was the rearrest charge. The rearrest offense was a felony for about 3 out of 4 (75%) of the 4,163 rearrested sex offenders (not shown in table). By comparison, about 84% of the 179,391 non-sex offenders were charged by police with a felony (not shown in table).

Of the 4,163 sex offenders rearrested for a new crime, nearly 9 in 10 (87%) were on parole when taken into custody; of the 179,391 rearrested non-sex offenders, also about 9 in 10 (85%) were on parole (not shown in table).

There was a difference in reconvictions. The reconviction rate for the 9,691 released sex offenders was 24.0%, compared to 47.8% for 262,420 non-sex offenders released in 1994 (not shown in table). The 2,326 sex offenders reconvicted for any new crime included 1,672 (71.9%) whose most serious conviction offense was a felony (not shown in table). Of the 262,420 non-sex offenders, 125,437 (47.8%) were reconvicted, which included 94,078 (75.0%) whose most serious reconviction offense was a felony (not shown in table).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Within the first 3 years following release —

- 46.0% of the 3,115 rapists (1,432 men) and 41.5% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters (2,731 men) were rearrested for all types of crimes (table 7)
- 27.3% of the 3,115 rapists (850 men) were reconvicted, compared to 22.4% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters (1,473 men) for all types of crimes
- 12.6% of the 3,115 rapists (392 men) and 10.5% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters (690 men) were resentenced to prison for their reconviction offense
- 43.6% of the 3,115 rapists (1,358 men) and 36.1% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters (2,374 men) were returned to prison either because of a new sentence or because of a technical violation of their parole.

For approximately three-fourths of the 1,432 rapists who were rearrested for a new crime, the crime was a felony; for the remainder, the most serious was a misdemeanor (not shown in table). As indicated earlier, 2,731 sexual assaulters were rearrested for a new offense after their release, and for about three-fourths, their most serious rearrest offense was a felony; for the remainder, the most serious crime was a misdemeanor (not shown in table).

The 850 rapists reconvicted for any new crime included 617 (72.6%) whose most serious reconviction offense was a felony; the 1,473 reconvicted sexual assaulters included 1,052 (71.4%) who were reconvicted for a felony (not shown in table).

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Of the child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994 —

- 1,693 of the 4,295 child molesters (39.4%) and 221 of the 443 statutory rapists (49.9%) were rearrested for a new crime (not necessarily a new sex crime) (table 8)
- 876 of the 4,295 child molesters (20.4%) and 145 of the 443 statutory rapists (32.7%) were reconvicted for any type of crime
- 9% of the 4,295 child molesters and 13% of the 443 statutory rapists

were resentenced to prison for their new conviction offense

- 38% of the 4,295 child molesters and 46% of the 443 statutory rapists were back in prison within 3 years as a result of either a new prison sentence or a technical violation of their parole.

The most serious offense for three-fourths of the 1,693 child molesters who were rearrested was a felony, and a misdemeanor for the remainder (not shown in table). Following their release in 1994, 221 statutory rapists were rearrested for a new crime. The most serious offense that approximately

three-fourths were charged with was a felony (not shown in table).

The 876 child molesters reconvicted for any type of crime included 643 (73.4%) whose most serious reconviction offense was a felony; the 145 reconvicted statutory rapists included 97 (66.7%) whose most serious was a felony (not shown in table).

Table 8. Recidivism rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by recidivism measure

Recidivism measure	Percent of released prisoners	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Within 3 years following release:		
Rearrested for any type of crime	39.4%	49.9%
Reconvicted for any type of crime ^a	20.4%	32.7%
Returned to prison with a new sentence for any type of crime ^b	9.1%	13.2%
Returned to prison with or without a new sentence ^c	38.2%	45.7%
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

^aBecause of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted.

^b"New prison sentence" includes new sentences to State or Federal prisons but not to local jails. Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio and Virginia were excluded from the calculation of percent returned to prison with a new sentence.

^c"With or without a new sentence" includes prisoners with new sentences to State or Federal prisons plus prisoners returned for technical violations. Because of missing data, prisoners released in 6 States (Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia) were excluded from the calculation of percent returned to prison with or without a new sentence. New York State custody records did not always distinguish prison returns from jail returns. Consequently, some persons received in New York jails were probably mistakenly classified as prison returns. Also, California with a relatively high return-to-prison rate affects the overall rate of 39.4%. When California is excluded, the return-to-prison rate falls to 23.4%.

Time to recidivism

All sex offenders

Within 6 months following their release, 16% of the 9,691 men were rearrested for a new crime (not necessarily another sex offense) (table 9). Within 1 year, altogether 24.2% were rearrested. Within 2 years the cumulative total reached 35.5%. By the end of the 3-year followup period, 43% (4,163 of the 9,691) were rearrested for some type of crime.

These statistics indicate that most recidivism within the first 3 years following release occurred in the first year (56%, since $24.2\% / 43\% = 56\%$).

While the bulk of rearrests occurred in the first year, that period did not account for the bulk of reconvictions or reimprisonments. This is largely because a sizable number of those rearrested in the first year were not reconvicted and reimprisoned until sometime in the second year, due to the additional time needed to prosecute, convict, and sentence a criminal defendant. For example, by the end of the first year, 8.6% of the 9,691 released sex offenders were reconvicted, and by the end of the third year, a cumulative total of 24% were reconvicted, indicating that the first year accounted for a relatively small percentage of all the reconvictions in the 3 years (36%, since $8.6\% / 24\% = 36\%$).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Forty-six percent of released rapists were rearrested within 3 years, and over half of those rearrests (56%) occurred in the first year (since $25.8\% /$

$46.0\% = 56\%$). Similarly, 41.5% of released sexual assaulters were rearrested within the first 3 years following their 1994 release, and over half of those rearrests (56%) occurred in the first year (since $23.4\% / 41.5\% = 56\%$).

Table 9. Recidivism rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of recidivism measure, type of sex offender, and time after release

Time after 1994 release	Cumulative percent of sex offenders released from prison in 1994		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Rearrested for any type of crime within —			
6 months	16.0%	16.3%	15.8%
1 year	24.2	25.8	23.4
2 years	35.5	38.6	34.0
3 years	43.0	46.0	41.5
Reconvicted for any type of crime within —^a			
6 months	3.6%	4.3%	3.3%
1 year	8.6	10.0	8.0
2 years	17.2	19.9	15.9
3 years	24.0	27.3	22.4
Returned to prison with a new sentence for any type of crime within —^b			
6 months	1.8%	1.9%	1.8%
1 year	4.0	4.1	3.9
2 years	8.0	9.0	7.5
3 years	11.2	12.6	10.5
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

^aBecause of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted.

^b"New sentence" includes new sentences to State or Federal prisons but not to local jails. Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio and Virginia were excluded from the calculation of percentage returned to prison with a new sentence.

Table 10. Recidivism rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by type of recidivism measure and time after release

Time after 1994 release	Cumulative percent of sex offenders released from prison in 1994	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Rearrested for any type of crime within —		
6 months	16.0%	18.5%
1 year	22.9	29.8
2 years	32.9	42.4
3 years	39.4	49.9
Reconvicted for any type of crime within —^a		
6 months	3.0%	4.5%
1 year	7.1	13.6
2 years	14.5	24.4
3 years	20.4	32.7
Returned to prison with a new sentence for any type of crime within —^b		
6 months	1.5%	0.9%
1 year	3.1	4.0
2 years	6.5	9.3
3 years	9.1	13.2
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

^aBecause of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted.

^b"New sentence" includes new sentences to State or Federal prisons but not to local jails. Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio and Virginia were excluded from the calculation of percentage returned to prison with a new sentence.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Of the 4,295 released child molesters, 1,693 (39.4%) were rearrested during the 3-year followup period (table 10). The majority of those charged (approximately 982 of the 1,693, or 58%) were charged in the first 12 months. While 49.9% of released statutory rapists were rearrested within 3 years, nearly three-fifths of those rearrests occurred within the first year following release (29.8% / 49.9% = 60%).

Table 11. Rearrest rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender and demographic characteristics of released prisoners

Prisoner characteristic	Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Race			
White	36.7%	39.1%	35.8%
Black	56.1	55.0	57.0
Other	40.4	38.5	41.7
Hispanic origin			
Hispanic	42.2%	47.7%	39.6%
Non-Hispanic	45.9	50.2	44.3
Age at release			
18-24	59.8%	58.6%	60.2%
25-29	54.2	53.8	54.3
30-34	48.8	52.6	46.7
35-39	41.4	46.1	38.9
40-44	34.7	41.2	31.6
45 or older	23.5	23.0	23.7
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. Data identifying race were reported for 98.5%; Hispanic origin for 82.5%; age for virtually 100%.

Demographic characteristics

All sex offenders

Race Black men (56.1%) released in 1994 were more likely than white men (36.7%) to be rearrested for a new crime (not limited to just a new sex crime) within the first 3 years following their release (table 11).

Hispanic origin Among released sex offenders, non-Hispanics (45.9%) were more likely than Hispanics (42.2%) to have a new arrest within the 3-year followup period.

Age The younger the prisoner when released, the higher the rate of recidivism. For example, of all the sex offenders under age 25 at the time of discharge from prison, 59.8% were

Table 13. Rearrest rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender and time served before release

Time served in prison before 1994 release	Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
6 months or less	45.7%	48.3%	45.0%
7-12	42.1	32.1	43.1
13-18	38.9	37.6	39.2
19-24	46.7	51.1	45.9
25-30	44.6	42.9	45.1
31-36	35.7	42.6	33.7
37-60	38.9	43.2	36.7
61 months or more	39.9	43.4	35.5
Total first releases	6,470	1,859	5,860

Note: The 6,470 sex offenders were released in 13 States. Figures are based on first releases only. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

Table 12. Rearrest rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by demographic characteristics of released prisoners

Prisoner characteristic	Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Race		
White	36.2%	46.0%
Black	51.7	61.5
Other	37.8	55.6
Hispanic origin		
Hispanic	37.1%	56.9%
Non-Hispanic	41.9	48.8
Age at release		
18-24	59.6%	70.0%
25-29	51.4	56.4
30-34	46.5	47.7
35-39	38.0	37.9
40-44	28.0	44.4
45 or older	23.8	23.8
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Data identifying race were reported for 98.5%; Hispanic origin for 82.5%; age for virtually 100%.

rearrested for some type of crime within 3 years, or more than double the 23.5% of those age 45 or older.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Race Among releasees whose imprisonment offense was sexual assault, 57% of black men and 35.8% of white men were rearrested for all types of crimes. A higher rearrest rate for blacks was also found among released rapists.

Hispanic origin Among released rapists, non-Hispanics (50.2%) were more likely than Hispanics (47.7%) to be rearrested within the 3-year followup period. The same was true among released prisoners whose imprisonment offense was sexual assault.

Age For both rapists and sexual assaulters, younger releasees had higher rearrest rates than older releasees.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Race The rearrest rate among released child molesters was 51.7% for black men and 36.2% for white men (table 12). Among statutory rapists, black men (61.5%) had a higher rearrest rate than white men (46.0%).

Hispanic origin Among released prisoners whose imprisonment offense was statutory rape, Hispanics (56.9%) were more likely than non-Hispanics (48.8%) to be rearrested within the 3-year followup period. The opposite was true of child molesters, as Hispanics had a lower rearrest rate (37.1%) than non-Hispanics (41.9%).

Age The younger the sex offender was when released, the higher was his likelihood of being rearrested. For example, the rearrest percent for statutory rapists younger than 25 was higher (70.0%) than the rearrest percent for statutory rapists ages 25 to 30 (56.4%). The same was true among child molesters.

Time served before 1994 release

All sex offenders

Sex offenders who served the shortest amount of time in prison before being released (6 months or less) had a higher rearrest rate (45.7%) than those who served the longest (over 5 years, 39.9% rate) (table 13). Similarly, prisoners who served 6 months or less had a higher rearrest rate (45.7%) than those who served 7 months to 1 year (42.1%). However, other comparisons did not indicate a connection between serving more time and lower recidivism. For example, among sex offenders who served 1 to 1½ years in prison before being released, 38.9% were rearrested for all types of crimes, compared to 46.7% of sex offenders who served a bit longer — 1½ to 2 years. Similarly, released prisoners

Table 14. Rearrest rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by time served before being released

Time served in prison before 1994 release	Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
6 months or less	42.9%	56.7%
7-12	39.7	45.3
13-18	34.5	43.9
19-24	45.5	48.9
25-30	39.4	25.9
31-36	27.2	59.1
37-60	31.5	21.4
61 months or more	29.9	33.3
Total first releases	3,104	317

Note: The 3,104 child molesters were released in 13 States; the 317 statutory rapists in 10 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters." Figures are based on first releases only. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

who served between 3 and 5 years in prison had a higher rate of rearrest (38.9%) than released prisoners who served 2½ to 3 years (35.7%). Because of these mixed results, and others illustrated below, the data do not warrant any general conclusion about an association between the level of recidivism and the amount of time served.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Among sexual assaulters who served no more than 6 months, 45.0% were rearrested for all types of crimes. Those who served a little longer — from about 6 months to 1 year — had a lower rearrest rate, 43.1%. Those released after serving even more time — 1 to 1½ years — had an even lower rate, 39.2%. However, there are numerous instances where serving more time was not linked to lower recidivism. For example, rapists released after about 1 to 1½ years in prison had a 37.6% rearrest rate, while those imprisoned a little longer — from about 1½ to 2 years — had a higher rate, 51.1%.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Among released statutory rapists and child molesters, the results continued to be mixed regarding an association between the rate of recidivism and the amount of time served (table 14). For example, child molesters released after serving about 2 to 2½ years had a higher rate of rearrest for all types of crimes (39.4%) than those who served somewhat longer — about 2½ to 3 years (27.2%). However, the rearrest rate rose (31.5%) among molesters who served more time — 3 to 5 years.

Table 15. Rearrest rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender and prior arrest for any type of crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years			
Total	43.0%	46.0%	41.5%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for any type of crime	24.8	28.3	23.6
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	47.9	49.6	47.1
Percent of released prisoners			
Total	100%	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for any type of crime	21.5	16.9	23.7
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	78.5	83.1	76.3
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the sex crime arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Prior arrest for any type of crime

All sex offenders

For 2,084 sex offenders (21.5% of the 9,691 total), their only arrest prior to being released in 1994 was the arrest for their imprisonment offense (a sex offense) (table 15). Among these 2,084 released sex offenders with just 1 prior arrest, 24.8% were rearrested for a new crime (not necessarily a new sex crime). For the remaining 7,607 (78.5% of 9,691), their prior record showed an arrest for the sex offense responsible for their current imprisonment plus at least 1 earlier arrest for some type of crime. Of these 7,607 prisoners, 47.9% were rearrested, or about double the rate of their counterparts with 1 prior arrest (24.8%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Of the 3,115 released rapists, 83.1% (2,589 rapists) had more than 1 arrest

for some type of crime prior to their release from prison in 1994, and 16.9% (526 rapists) had just 1 prior arrest, the arrest for the sex crime that resulted in their being in prison in 1994. The multiple prior arrests for the 2,589 rapists included the arrest for their imprisonment offense plus at least 1 other arrest for any type of crime. The 2,589 with more than 1 prior arrest had a rearrest rate (49.6%) nearly double that of the 526 with just 1 prior (28.3%).

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Of the 4,295 child molesters, 76.8% (3,299 men) had more than 1 prior arrest (table 16). These 3,299 child molesters had a rearrest rate (44.3%) nearly double the 23.3% rate of the 996 molesters with just 1 prior arrest (996 is 23.2% of 4,295). The 357 statutory rapists with more than 1 prior arrest (357 is 80.6% of 443) had a rearrest rate (55.7%) more than double the 25.6% rate of the 86 statutory rapists with 1 prior arrest (86 is 19.4% of 443).

Table 16. Rearrest rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by prior arrest for any type of crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years		
Total	39.4%	49.9%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*		
Their first arrest for any type of crime	23.3	25.6
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	44.3	55.7
Percent of released prisoners		
Total	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*		
Their first arrest for any type of crime	23.2	19.4
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	76.8	80.6
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the sex crime arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Number of prior arrests for any type of crime

Statistics on prior arrests in this section of the report do include the imprisonment offense of the released sex offender.

All sex offenders

The number of times a prisoner was arrested in the past was a relatively good predictor of whether that prisoner would continue his criminality after release (table 17). Prisoners with just one prior arrest for any type of crime had a 24.8% rearrest rate for all types of crimes. With two priors, the percentage rearrested rose to 31.9%. With three, it increased to 36.9%. With four, it went up to 42.6%. With additional priors, there were further increases, ultimately reaching a rearrest rate of 67.0% for released prisoners with the longest criminal record (more than 15 prior arrests).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Both rapists and sexual assaulters followed the pattern described immediately above: the more prior arrests they had, the more likely they were to have a new arrest for some type of crime after their release in 1994.

Table 17. Rearrest rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender and number of prior arrests for any type of crime

Number of adult arrests prior to 1994 release*	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years			
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	24.8%	28.3%	23.6%
2	31.9	36.4	29.9
3	36.9	36.3	37.1
4	42.6	47.2	40.4
5	50.5	48.6	51.6
6	49.7	47.3	50.9
7-10	59.0	59.6	58.6
11-15	65.1	63.7	66.0
16 or more	67.0	66.1	67.5
Percent of released prisoners			
All sex offenders	100%	100%	100%
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	21.5	16.9	23.7
2	16.0	15.2	16.3
3	11.9	12.1	11.8
4	9.0	9.2	8.9
5	7.2	8.0	6.8
6	6.3	6.6	6.1
7-10	14.4	15.8	13.8
11-15	7.9	8.9	7.4
16 or more	5.8	7.2	5.2
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. In this table, that arrest is counted as 1 prior arrest.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Among released prisoners with the smallest number of prior arrests (1 prior arrest), 23.3% of child molesters and 25.6% of statutory rapists were rearrested for all types of crimes within 3 years (table 18). Rearrest rates generally rose with each increase in the number of prior arrests. Among released prisoners with the largest number of prior arrests (more than 15), 62.0% of child molesters and 76.2% of statutory rapists had at least 1 new arrest after being released in 1994.

State where rearrested for any type of crime

The State where the rearrest occurred was not always the State that released the prisoner. In some cases, the released sex offender left the State where he was imprisoned and was rearrested for a new crime in a different State. For example, a sex offender released from prison in California may have traveled to Nevada, where he was arrested for committing another crime.

Sex offenders

A total of 4,163 sex offenders were rearrested for some type of new crime after their 1994 release. Of the 4,163 arrests, 16.0% — or 1 in 6 — were outside the State where the prisoner was released (table 19). The rest (84.0%) were made in the State that released them.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

The 15 States in this study released 262,420 non-sex offenders in 1994, of whom 179,391 were rearrested for a new crime within 3 years (not shown in table). Of the 179,391 arrests for any type of crime, 11.2%, or 20,092 arrests, were arrests that occurred outside the State that released them.

Table 18. Rearrest rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by number of prior arrests for any type of crime

Number of adult arrests prior to 1994 release*	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for any type of crime within 3 years		
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	23.3%	25.6%
2	28.0	29.3
3	32.4	46.9
4	39.2	41.0
5	47.4	60.6
6	50.2	53.8
7-10	58.1	65.1
11-15	62.9	81.3
16 or more	62.0	76.2
Percent of released prisoners		
All sex offenders	100%	100%
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	23.2	19.4
2	17.2	13.1
3	12.1	11.1
4	8.5	8.8
5	7.0	7.4
6	6.4	5.9
7-10	13.6	18.7
11-15	7.3	10.8
16 or more	4.8	4.7
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least one arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. In this table, that arrest is counted as 1 prior arrest.

Rearrested sex offenders had a higher percentage: 1 in 6 of their rearrests for any type of crime were in a State other than the one that released them.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Following their 1994 release, 1,432 rapists and 2,731 sexual assaulters

were rearrested for any new crime (table 19). For 17.4% of the 1,432 rearrested rapists, and 15.2% of the 2,731 rearrested sexual assaulters, the place where the arrest occurred was in a different State than the one that released them.

Table 19. Where sex offenders were rearrested for any new crime following release from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Total	100%	100%	100%
Same State where released	84.0	82.6	84.8
Another State	16.0	17.4	15.2
Total rearrested for any new crime	4,163	1,432	2,731

Note: The 4,163 rearrested sex offenders were released in 15 States, but table percentages are based on 14 States.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Out of the 4,295 child molesters, 1,693 were rearrested for any new crime after being released from prison in 1994 (table 20). The 1,693 recidivists consisted of 84.8% whose new arrest was in the same State that released them in 1994, and 15.2% whose alleged violation occurred in a different State.

About half of all statutory rapists were not rearrested for any type of crime after their release. Of the 221 who were, 16.6% were rearrested outside the State where they were released.

Table 20. Where child molesters and statutory rapists were rearrested for any new crime following release from prison in 1994

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Total	100%	100%
Same State where released	84.8	83.4
Another State	15.2	16.6
Total rearrested for any new crime	1,693	221

Note: The 1,693 rearrested child molesters were released in 15 States, but table percentages are based on 14 States. The 221 rearrested statutory rapists were released in 11 States, but table percentages are based on 10 States.

Rearrest and reconviction

All sex offenders

Based on official arrest records, 517 of the 9,691 released sex offenders (5.3%) were rearrested for a new sex crime within the first 3 years following their release (table 21). The new sex crimes for which these 517 men were arrested were forcible rapes and sexual assaults. For virtually all of the 517, the most serious sex crime for which they were rearrested was a felony. Their victims were children and adults. The study cannot say what percentage were children and what percentage were adults because arrest files did not record the victim's age.

Of the total 9,691 released sex, 3.5% (339 of the 9,691) were reconvicted for a sex crime (a forcible rape or a sexual assault) within 3 years.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

The 15 States in this study released a total of 272,111 prisoners in 1994. The 9,691 released sex offenders made up less than 4% of that total. Of the remaining 262,420 non-sex offenders, 3,328 (1.3%) were rearrested for a new sex crime within 3 years (not shown in table). By comparison, the 5.3% rearrest rate for the 9,691 released sex offenders was 4 times higher.

Assuming that the 517 sex offenders who were rearrested for another sex crime each victimized no more than one victim, the number of sex crimes they committed after their prison release totaled 517. Assuming that the 3,328 non-sex offenders rearrested for a sex crime after their release also victimized one victim each, the number of sex crimes they committed was 3,328. The combined total number of sex crimes is 3,845 (517 plus 3,328 = 3,845). Released sex offenders accounted for 13% and released non-sex offenders accounted for 87% of the 3,845 sex crimes committed by

all the prisoners released in 1994 (517 / 3,845 = 13% and 3,328 / 3,845 = 87%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Of the 3,115 rapists, 5.0% (155 men) had a new arrest for a sex crime (either a sexual assault or another forcible rape) after being released. Of the 6,576 released sexual assaulters, 5.5% (362 men) were rearrested for a new sex crime (either a forcible rape or another sexual assault).

A total of 100 released rapists were reconvicted for a sex crime. The 100 men were 3.2% of the 3,115 rapists released in 1994. Among the 6,576 released sexual assaulters, 3.7% (243 men) were reconvicted for a sex crime.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

After their release, 5.1% (221 men) of the child molesters and 5.0% (22 men) of the statutory rapists were rearrested for a new sex crime (table 22). Not all of the new sex crimes were against children. The new sex crimes were forcible rapes and various types of sexual assaults.

Following their release, 3.5% (150 men) of the 4,295 released child molesters were convicted for a new sex crime against a child or an adult. The sex crime reconviction rate for the 443 statutory rapists was 3.6% (16 reconvicted men).

Table 21. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested and percent reconvicted for any new sex crime, by type of sex offender

	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years	5.3%	5.0%	5.5%
Percent reconvicted for any new sex crime within 3 years*	3.5%	3.2%	3.7%
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.
 *Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted. Due to data quality concerns, calculation of percent reconvicted excluded Texas prisoners classified as "other type of release."

Table 22. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested and percent reconvicted for any new sex crime

	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years	5.1%	5.0%
Percent reconvicted for any new sex crime within 3 years*	3.5%	3.6%
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."
 *Because of missing data, prisoners released in Ohio were excluded from the calculation of percent reconvicted. Due to data quality concerns, calculation of percent reconvicted excluded Texas prisoners classified as "other type of release."

Time to rearrest

All sex offenders

Within 6 months following their release, 1.4% of the 9,691 men were rearrested for a new sex crime (table 23). Within 1 year the cumulative total grew to 2.1% rearrested. By the end of the 3-year followup period, altogether 5.3% had been rearrested for another sex crime. The first year was the period when 40% of the new sex crimes were committed (since 2.1% / 5.3% = 40%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

The first year following release accounted for 40% of the new sex crimes committed by both released rapists (since 2.0% / 5.0% = 40%) and released sexual assaulters (since 2.2% / 5.5% = 40%).

Child molesters and statutory rapists

For child molesters and statutory rapists, the first year following their release was the period when the largest number of recidivists were rearrested. Similar to rapists and sexual assaulters, about 40% of the arrests for new sex crimes committed by child molesters and statutory rapists occurred during the first year (table 24).

Demographic characteristics

All sex offenders

Race Among sex offenders released from prison in 1994, black men (5.6%) and white men (5.3%) were about equally likely to be rearrested for another sex crime (table 25).

Hispanic origin Among released sex offenders, non-Hispanics were more likely to be rearrested for a new sex offense (6.4%) than Hispanics (4.1%). One reason for the lower rearrest rate for Hispanics may be that some were deported immediately following their release.

Age Recidivism studies typically find that, the older the prisoner when released, the lower the rate of recidivism. Results reported here on released sex offenders did not follow the familiar pattern. While the lowest rate of rearrest for a sex crime (3.3%) did belong to the oldest sex offenders (those age 45 or older), other comparisons between older and younger prisoners did not consistently show older prisoners' having the lower rearrest rate.

Table 23. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by type of sex offender and time after release

Time after 1994 release	Cumulative percent rearrested for any new sex crime within specified time		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
6 months	1.4%	1.3%	1.4%
1 year	2.1	2.0	2.2
2 years	3.9	3.7	4.1
3 years	5.3	5.0	5.5
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

Table 24. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by time after release

Time after 1994 release	Cumulative percent rearrested for any new sex crime within specified time	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
6 months	1.3%	1.4%
1 year	2.2	2.0
2 years	3.9	3.2
3 years	5.1	5.0
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

Table 25. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by demographic characteristics of released prisoners

Prisoner characteristic	Percent of released sex offenders rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years
Total released	5.3%
Race	
White	5.3%
Black	5.6
Other	4.4
Hispanic origin	
Hispanic	4.1%
Non-Hispanic	6.4
Age at release	
18-24	6.1%
25-29	5.5
30-34	5.8
35-39	6.1
40-44	5.6
45 or older	3.3
Total released	9,691

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. Data identifying race were reported for 98.5% of 9,691 released sex offenders; Hispanic origin for 82.5%; age for virtually 100%.

Time served before 1994 release

All sex offenders

The study compared recidivism rates among prisoners who served different lengths of time before being released from prison in 1994. No clear association was found between how long they were in prison and their recidivism rate (table 26). For example, those sex offenders who served from 7 to 12 months were rearrested for a new sex crime at a higher rate (5.2%) than those who served slightly less time (3.8%), which seemed to suggest that serving more time raised the recidivism rate. But other comparisons suggested the opposite. Compared to men who were confined for 7 to 12 months (5.2% rearrest rate), those who served more time (13 to 18 months) were less likely to be rearrested for any new sex crime (4.1%).

Table 26. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by time served before being released

Time served in prison before 1994 release	Percent of released sex offenders rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years
6 months or less	3.8%
7-12	5.2
13-18	4.1
19-24	6.4
25-30	5.2
31-36	3.3
37-60	5.2
61 months or more	4.9
Total first releases	6,470

Note: The 6,470 sex offenders were released in 13 States. Figures are based on first releases only. First releases include only those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release.

Prior arrest for any type of crime

All sex offenders

Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, 21.5% (2,084 of the 9,691) had only 1 arrest in their criminal record up to the time they were released (table 27). That one arrest was the arrest for the sex crime that resulted in a prison term. The remaining 78.5% (7,607 men) had the arrest for their imprisonment offense in their record, and they also had at least 1 earlier arrest for some type of crime. For example, some had an earlier arrest for theft or a drug offense. Most of them did not have an earlier arrest for a sex crime.

Compared to the 2,084 sex offenders with the 1 arrest in their criminal record, the 7,607 with a longer prior arrest record were more likely to be

rearrested for another sex crime (5.9% compared to 3.3%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Of the 3,115 released rapists, the majority (83.1% of the 3,115, or 2,589 men) had more than 1 arrest (for any type of crime) prior to release from prison in 1994. Of these 2,589 released rapists, 5.4% (140) had a new arrest for a sex crime. The rate was lower (3.0%) for the 526 released rapists with no prior arrest.

Results for sexual assaulters followed the same pattern: the 5,017 sexual assaulters with more than 1 prior arrest (76.3% of 6,576 is 5,017) were more likely to be rearrested for a new sex crime (6.2%) than the 1,559 with just the 1 prior arrest (23.7% of 6,576 is 1,559).

Table 27. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by type of sex offender and prior arrest for any type of crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years			
Total	5.3%	5.0%	5.5%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for any type of crime	3.3	3.0	3.4
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	5.9	5.4	6.2
Percent of released prisoners			
Total	100%	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for any type of crime	21.5	16.9	23.7
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	78.5	83.1	76.3
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for any type of crime" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was the sex offense arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Released child molesters with more than one prior arrest were more likely than those with only one arrest in their criminal record to be rearrested for a new sex crime (5.7% compared to 3.2%) (table 28). The same was true of statutory rapists (5.3% compared to 3.5%).

Number of prior arrests for any type of crime

All sex offenders

The more arrests (for any type of crime) the sex offender had in his criminal record, the more likely he was to be rearrested for another sex crime after his release from prison (table 29). Sex offenders with one prior arrest (the arrest for the sex crime for which they had been imprisoned) had the lowest rate, about 3%; those with 2 or 3 prior arrests for some type of crime, 4%; 4 to 6 prior arrests, 6%; 7 to 10 prior arrests, 7%; and 11 to 15 prior arrests, 8%.

Table 28. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by prior arrest for any type of crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years		
Total	5.1%	5.0%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *		
Their first arrest for any type of crime	3.2	3.5
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	5.7	5.3
Percent of released prisoners		
Total	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *		
Their first arrest for any type of crime	23.2	19.4
Not their first arrest for any type of crime	76.8	80.6
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for any type of crime" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was the sex offense arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Table 29. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by number of prior arrests for any type of crime

Number of adult arrests prior to 1994 release	Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years
All sex offenders	5.3%
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	3.3
2	4.3
3	4.4
4	5.8
5	6.3
6	6.1
7-10	6.9
11-15	7.8
16 or more	7.4
Percent of released prisoners	
All sex offenders	100%
1 prior arrest for any type of crime	21.5
2	16.0
3	11.9
4	9.0
5	7.2
6	6.3
7-10	14.4
11-15	7.9
16 or more	5.8
Total released	9,691

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. In this table, that arrest is counted as one prior arrest.

Prior arrest for a sex crime

All sex offenders

Prior to their release in 1994, 2,762 of the sex offenders (28.5% of the total 9,691) had 2 or more arrests for a sex offense in their criminal record: the arrest for the sex offense that resulted in their imprisonment, plus at least 1 earlier arrest for a sex crime (table 30). For the remaining 6,929 (71.5% of the total 9,691), their only prior arrest for a sex crime was the arrest that brought them into prison. (Any other prior arrests the 6,929 may have had were for non-sex crimes.) Following their release, the 2,762 with more than 1 sex crime in their criminal background were about twice as likely to be rearrested for another sex crime (8.3%) as the 6,929 with a single prior arrest (4.2%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Rapists (4.0%) and sexual assaulters (4.2%) with one prior arrest for a sex crime were less likely to be rearrested for another sex crime than rapists (7.4%) and sexual assaulters (8.7%) who had been arrested two or more times for a sex crime prior to release from prison in 1994.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

By definition, all 4,295 child molesters had been arrested for a sex offense at least once prior to their release in 1994 — the sex offense that landed them in prison. For 3,049 of them (71% of 4,295), that arrest was their only prior arrest for a sex offense (table 31). The remaining 1,246 child molesters (29% of 4,295) had at least 2 prior arrests for a sex crime: the arrest for their imprisonment offense plus at least 1 other prior arrest for a sex offense (not necessarily one against a child). Of the 1,246 child molesters with multiple sex crimes in their past, 8.4% (105 of the 1,246) were rearrested for another sex crime (not necessarily another sex crime against a child), or more than double the 3.8% rate for the 3,049

released child molesters with just 1 prior arrest for a sex crime.

Similar results were found for released statutory rapists. Those with a more

extensive record of prior arrests for sex crimes were more likely to be rearrested for another sex crime (8.8%) than those with just one past arrest (2.6%).

Table 30. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by type of sex offender and prior arrest for any sex crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years			
Total	5.3%	5.0%	5.5%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *			
Their first arrest for any sex crime	4.2	4.0	4.2
Not their first arrest for any sex crime	8.3	7.4	8.7
Percent of released prisoners			
Total	100%	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *			
Their first arrest for any sex crime	71.5	71.3	71.6
Not their first arrest for any sex crime	28.5	28.7	28.4
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for any sex crime" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was the sex offense arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Table 31. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for any new sex crime, by prior arrest for any sex crime

Arrest prior to 1994 release	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for any new sex crime within 3 years		
Total	5.1%	5.0%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *		
Their first arrest for any sex crime	3.8	2.6
Not their first arrest for any sex crime	8.4	8.8
Percent of released prisoners		
Total	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was — *		
Their first arrest for any sex crime	71.0	61.6
Not their first arrest for any sex crime	29.0	38.4
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists, 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for any sex crime" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was the sex offense arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

State where rearrested for a sex crime

When sex offenders were arrested for new sex crimes after their release, the new arrest typically occurred in the same State that released them. Those arrests are referred to as "in-State" arrests. When released sex offenders left the State where they were incarcerated and were charged by police with new sex crimes, those arrests are referred to as "out-of-State" arrests.

All sex offenders

Of the 9,691 released sex offenders, 517 were rearrested for a new sex crime within 3 years. Most of those sex crime arrests (85.2% of the 517, or 440 men) were in the same State that released them (table 32). Seventy-seven of them (14.8% of the 517) were arrests in a different State.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

The 15 States in this study released 262,420 non-sex offenders in 1994, of whom 3,328 were rearrested for a new sex crime within 3 years (not shown in table). Of the 3,328 non-sex offenders arrested for a new sex crime, an estimated 10% were men rearrested outside the State that released them. The 15% figure for released sex offenders was high by comparison (table 32).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

A total of 155 released rapists and 362 released sexual assaulters were rearrested for a new sex crime within the 3-year followup period. In-State arrests for new sex crimes accounted for 85% of the rearrested rapists and 85% of the rearrested sexual assaulters. Out-of-State arrests accounted for the rest.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

A total of 221 child molesters were rearrested for a new sex crime (not necessarily against a child) after their release (table 33). Among the 221 were 191 (86.6%) whose new sex crime arrest was in the same State that

released them in 1994. For the remaining 13.4%, the arrest was elsewhere.

Of all statutory rapists, 5% (22) were rearrested for a new sex crime after their release. Of these 22, none had the new arrest outside the State that released them.

Table 32. Where sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime following their release from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Total	100%	100%	100%
Same State where released	85.2	85.2	85.2
Another State	14.8	14.8	14.8
Total rearrested for a new sex crime	517	155	362

Note: The 517 rearrested sex offenders were released in 15 States, but table percentages are based on 14 States.

Table 33. Where child molesters and statutory rapists were rearrested for a new sex crime following their release from prison in 1994

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Total	100%	100%
Same State where released	86.6	100
Another State	13.4	0
Total rearrested for a new sex crime	221	22

Note: The 221 rearrested child molesters were released in 14 States, but table percentages are based on 13 States. The 22 rearrested statutory rapists were released in 6 States, but table percentages are based on 5 States.

Undercounts of sex crimes against children

This section documents percentages of men who were arrested for a sex crime against a child after their release from prison in 1994. To some unknown extent, these recidivism rates undercount actual rearrest rates. That is because the arrest records that the study used to document sex crime arrests did not always contain enough information to identify those sex crime arrests in which the victim of the crime was a child. Some sense of the potential size of the undercount can be gained by comparing rearrests for any sex crime and rearrests for any sex crime against a child. Rates of rearrest for a sex crime (tables 21 and 22) are from 2 to 3½ percentage points higher than rates of rearrest for a sex crime against a child (tables 34 and 35), suggesting that rates of rearrest for a sex crime against a child could be, at most, a few percentage points below actual rates.

No data on precise ages of molested children

This section also documents the ages of the children that the men were alleged to have molested after their release from prison. Sex crime statutes contained in the arrest records of the released prisoners were used to obtain ages. The first step was to identify those sex crime statutes that were applicable just to children. Among those that were, some were found to apply just to children whose age fell within a certain range (for example, under 12, or 13 to 15, or 16 to 17). Those statutes applicable to children within specified age ranges became the source of information on the approximate ages of the allegedly molested children. Information on precise ages could not be determined because statutes applicable just to children of a specific age (for example, just to 12-year-olds, or just to age 15-year-olds) do not exist.

Rearrest

All sex offenders

Following their release in 1994, 209 of the total 9,691 released sex offenders (2.2%) were rearrested for a sex offense against a child (table 34). For virtually all 209, the rearrest offense was a felony. For the reason given earlier, the 2.2% figure undercounts the percentage rearrested for a sex offense against a child. It seems unlikely that the correct figure could be as high as 5.3% (table 21), which is the percentage rearrested for a sex crime against a person of any age. The only way it could be that high is if none of the sex crime arrests after release were crimes in which the victim was an adult, an unlikely possibility. The more likely possibility is that the 2.2% figure undercounts the rate by a maximum of 1 or 2 percentage points.

An estimated 76% of the children allegedly molested by the 209 men after their prison release were age 13 or younger, 12% were 14- or 15-years-old, and the remaining 12% were 16- or 17-years-old.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

Prisons in the 15 States in the study released 272,111 prisoners altogether in 1994, 9,691 of whom were the sex offenders in this report. As previously stated, 2.2% of the 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested for a child sex crime after their release. That rate is high compared to the rate for the remaining 262,420 non-sex offenders. Of the 262,420 non-sex offenders, less than half of 1 percent (1,042 of the 262,420) were rearrested for a sex offense against a child within the 3-year followup period (not shown in table).

Since each of the 1,042 was charged at arrest with molesting at least 1 child, the total number they allegedly molested was conservatively estimated at 1,042. Of the conservatively estimated 1,042 children, 65% were age 13 or younger, 11% were 14- or 15-years-old, and 24% were 16- or 17-years-old (not shown in table). (These percentages were based on the 554 cases out of the 1,042 in which the approximate age of the child could be determined.)

Table 34. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child, and percent of their alleged victims, by age of victim and type of sex offender

	Percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child within 3 years		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Total	2.2%	1.4%	2.5%
Number released	9,691	3,115	6,576
Age of child that sex offender was charged with molesting after release	Percent of allegedly molested children		
13 or younger	76.2%	89.3%	72.3%
14-15	11.5	0.0*	14.9
16-17	12.3	10.7*	12.8
Number of molested children	209	44	165

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. The approximate ages of the children allegedly molested by the 209 prisoners after their release were available for 58.4% of the 209. "Number of molested children" was set to equal the number of released sex offenders rearrested for child molesting.

*Percentage based on 10 or fewer cases.

Assuming that the 209 sex offenders who were rearrested for a sex crime against a child each victimized no more than one child, the number of sex crimes they committed against children after their prison release totaled 209. Assuming that the 1,042 non-sex offenders rearrested for a sex crime against a child after their release also victimized only one child, the number of sex crimes against a child that they committed was 1,042. The combined total number of sex crimes is 1,251 (209 plus 1,042 = 1,251). Released sex offenders accounted for 17% and released non-sex offenders accounted for 83% of the 1,251 sex crimes against children committed by all the prisoners released in 1994 (209 / 1,251 = 17% and 1,042 / 1,251 = 83%).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Following their 1994 release, 1.4% of the 3,115 rapists (44 men) and 2.5% of the 6,576 sexual assaulters (165 men) were rearrested for molesting a child (table 34).

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Within 3 years following their release from prison in 1994, 141 (3.3%) of the released 4,295 child molesters and 11 (2.5%) of the 443 released statutory rapists were rearrested for molesting another child (table 35). For the reasons outlined earlier, these percentages undercount actual rearrest rates by a few percentage points at most.

Each of the 141 released molesters rearrested for repeating their crime represented at least 1 child victim. Of the conservatively estimated 141 children allegedly molested by released child molesters, 79% were age 13 or younger, 9% were 14 or 15 years of age, and 12% were ages 16 or 17.

Table 35. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child, and percent of their alleged victims, by age of victim

	Percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child within 3 years	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Total	3.3%	2.5%
Number released	4,295	443
Age of child that sex offender was charged with molesting after release	Percent of allegedly molested children	
13 or younger	79.2%	30.0**%
14-15	9.1	10.0*
16-17	11.7	60.0*
Number of molested children	141	11

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters." The approximate ages of the children allegedly molested by the 141 prisoners after their release were available for 54.6% of the 141. "Number of molested children" was set to equal the number of released sex offenders rearrested for child molesting.

*Percentage based on 10 or fewer cases.

Prior arrest for a sex crime against a child

All sex offenders

After their 1994 release from prison, sex offenders with a prior arrest for

child molesting were more likely to be arrested for child molesting (6.4%) than those who had no arrest record for sex with a child (1.7%) (table 36).

Table 36. Of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child, by prior arrest for a sex crime against a child and type of sex offender

Arrest prior to 1994 release	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child within 3 years			
Total	2.2%	1.4%	2.5%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	1.7	1.3	1.9
Not their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	6.4	4.0	6.9
Percent of released prisoners			
Total	100%	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*			
Their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	89.7	94.3	87.5
Not their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	10.3	5.7	12.5
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States.

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release: namely, the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for a sex crime against a child" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was the sex offense arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

After being released in 1994, 4.0% of rapists with a prior arrest record for child molesting and 1.3% of those without were arrested for child molesting. The same pattern — having a history of alleged child molesting was associated with a greater likelihood of arrest for child molesting — was found for sexual assaulters. Those with a prior arrest had a 6.9% rate; those without, 1.9%.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

The 4,295 released child molesters fell into 2 categories: 1) 3,509 (81.7% of the 4,295) whose criminal record prior to their 1994 release contained no more than 1 arrest for a sex offense against a child (this was the offense for which they were imprisoned); and 2) 786 (18.3%) whose record showed the arrest for their imprisonment offense plus at least one earlier arrest for a sex offense against a child (table 37). After release, 7.3% of the 786 and 2.4% of the 3,509 were rearrested for molesting another child, indicating that child molesters with multiple arrests for child molesting in their record posed a greater risk of repeating their crime than their counterparts.

Similarly, the 443 statutory rapists consisted of —

- 356 (80.4%) whose first arrest for a sex offense against a child was the arrest that resulted in their current imprisonment
- 87 (19.6%) with more than 1 prior arrest for a sex offense against a child.

The 87 were more likely to be rearrested for child molesting (6.9%) than the 356 (1.4%).

Molester's and child's ages at time of imprisonment offense

Child molesters

The released child molesters were all men who were arrested, convicted, and

Table 37. Of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child, by prior arrest for a sex crime against a child

Arrest prior to 1994 release	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child within 3 years	3.3%	2.5%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*		
Their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	2.4	1.4
Not their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	7.3	6.9
Percent of released prisoners	100%	100%
The arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994 was —*		
Their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	81.7	80.4
Not their first arrest for a sex crime against a child	18.3	19.6
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters."

*By definition, all sex offenders had at least 1 arrest prior to their release the arrest responsible for their being in prison in 1994. "First arrest for a sex crime against a child" pertains exclusively to those released prisoners whose first arrest was responsible for their being in prison in 1994.

Table 38. Among child molesters released from prison in 1994, the molester's age when he committed the crime that resulted in his imprisonment, the child's age, and percent rearrested for a sex crime against a child

Age characteristic	Percent of total	Percent of released child molesters rearrested for a sex crime against a child within 3 years
Child molester's age when he committed the sex crime for which imprisoned^a		
18-24	19.7%	4.1%
25-29	17.4	3.1
30-34	18.7	3.3
35-39	16.3	1.2
40-44	11.5	2.8
45 or older	16.4	3.0
Age of child he was imprisoned for molesting^b		
13 or younger	60.3%	2.8%
14-15	30.5	3.7
16-17	9.2	1.2
How much older he was than the child he was imprisoned for molesting		
Up to 5 years older	3.9%	4.9*%
5 to 9 years older	13.6	3.6
10 to 19 years older	34.1	3.2
20 or more years older	48.4	2.5
Total first releases	3,104	3,104

Note: The 3,104 child molesters were released in 13 States. Figures are based on first releases only, those offenders leaving prison for the first time since beginning their sentence. First releases exclude those who left prison in 1994 but who had previously been released under the same sentence and had returned to prison for violating the conditions of release. Data identifying the child molester's age were reported for 100% of the released child molesters. Data identifying the approximate age of the child were reported for 88.1%.

^aThe molester's age at the time of the crime for which imprisoned was estimated by subtracting 6 months (the approximate average time from arrest to sentencing) from his age at admission.

^bThe approximate age of the child "he was imprisoned for molesting" was usually obtained from the State statute the molester was convicted of violating.

*Percentage based on 10 or fewer cases.

sentenced to prison for a sex crime against a child. At the time they committed their imprisonment offense, most (62.9%) were age 30 and older, and most (60.3%) molested a child who was age 13 or younger (table 38). Some of the victims were below age 7. Nearly half of the men (48.4%) were 20 years or more older than the child they were imprisoned for molesting.

Among the men who were in prison for molesting a child age 13 or younger and who were released in 1994 for that crime, 2.8% were subsequently arrested for molesting another child. Of those whose imprisonment offense was against a 14- or 15-year-old, 3.7% had a new arrest for child molesting after their release. Of the men who were in prison for molesting a 16- or 17-year-old, 1.2% were arrested by police for molesting another child after leaving prison in 1994.

Among the men who were 20 years or more older than the child they were imprisoned for molesting, 2.5% were rearrested for another sex offense against a child within the first 3 years following their release. That is a lower rate than the 3.2% rate for men who were 10 to 19 years older than the child victim in their imprisonment offense, and compared to the 3.6% for those 5 to 9 years older than the victim in their imprisonment offense.

State where rearrested for a sex crime against a child

When sex offenders were arrested for new sex crimes against children after their release, the new arrest typically occurred in the same State that released them. Those arrests are referred to as "in-State" arrests. When arrests occurred in a different State, they are referred to as "out-of-State."

All sex offenders

Of the 9,691 sex offenders, 209 were rearrested for child molesting after their

release from prison in 1994 (table 39). In 180 cases (86.3%), the alleged crime took place in the State that released him. In the 29 others (13.7%), it occurred elsewhere.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

The 15 States in this study released 262,420 non-sex offenders in 1994, of whom 1,042 were rearrested for a sex crime against a child (not shown in table). Of the 1,042 arrests, 11% were out-of-State rearrests. The comparable figure for released sex offenders was higher: 14% (table 39).

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Forty-four released rapists and 165 released sexual assaulters were rearrested for a sex crime against a

child within 3 years. Out-of-State arrests for child molesting accounted for 13.5% of the 44 rearrested rapists and 13.7% of the 165 rearrested sexual assaulters.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Police arrested 141 of the 4,295 released child molesters for repeating their crime (table 40). For 126 of them (89.2%), the new arrest for child molesting was in the same State that released them. For 15 (10.8%), the new charges for child molesting were filed in a different State.

Of the 443 statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, 11 were rearrested for child molesting. All 11 of the arrests were in the same State that released the men.

Table 39. Where sex offenders were rearrested for a sex crime against a child following their release from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
Total	100%	100%	100%
Same State where released	86.3	86.5	86.3
Another State	13.7	13.5	13.7
Total rearrested for a new sex crime against a child	209	44	165

Note: The 209 rearrested sex offenders were released in 10 States, but table percentages are based on 9 States.

Table 40. Where child molesters and statutory rapists were rearrested for a sex crime against a child following their release from prison in 1994

State where rearrested within 3 years	Percent of rearrested prisoners	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
Total	100%	100%
Same State where released	89.2	100
Another State	10.8	0
Total rearrested for a new sex crime against a child	141	11

Note: The 141 rearrested child molesters were released in 9 States, but table percentages are based on 8 States. The 11 rearrested statutory rapists were released in 3 States, but table percentages are based on 2 States.

Rearrest for other types of crime

All sex offenders

Of the 9,691 male sex offenders released from prison in 1994 —

- 43% (4,163 men) were rearrested for a crime of any kind (table 41)
- 5.3% (517 men) were rearrested for a sex offense
- 17.1% (1,658 men) were rearrested for a violent crime
- 13.3% (1,285 men) were rearrested for a property crime of some kind.

Of the 9,691 released men, 168 (1.7%) were rearrested for rape and 396 (4.1%) were rearrested for sexual assault. The 168 rearrested for rape plus the 396 rearrested for sexual assault totals 564, which is 47 greater than the total 517 who were rearrested for a sex crime. The reason is that 47 men were rearrested for both rape and sexual assault.

The category of violent crime for which a prisoner was most likely to be rearrested was assault (8.8%, or 848 of the 9,691); the category least likely was homicide (0.5%, or 45 of the 9,691 men).

Just over 1 in 5 sex offenders (2,045 out of 9,691) were rearrested for a public-order offense, such as a parole violation or traffic offense.

Rapists and sexual assaulters

Among the 3,115 released rapists —

- 46% (1,432) were rearrested for a crime of any kind
- 18.7% (582) were rearrested for a violent crime
- 0.7% (22) were rearrested for homicide
- 14.7% (459) were rearrested for a property offense.

A relatively small percentage of rapists (2.5%, or 78 of the 3,115) were charged with repeating the crime for which they were imprisoned.

Among the 6,576 released sexual assaulters —

- 41.5% (2,731) were rearrested for a crime of any kind
- 16.4% (1,076) were rearrested for a violent crime
- 0.3% (23) were rearrested for killing someone

- 12.6% (826) were rearrested for a property offense.

Nearly 1 in 20 released sexual assaulters (4.7%, or 308 of the 6,576) were charged with committing the same type of crime for which had just served time in prison.

Table 41. Rearrest rate of sex offenders released from prison in 1994, by type of sex offender and charge at rearrest

Rearrest charge	Percent rearrested for specified offense within 3 years		
	All	Rapists	Sexual assaulters
All charges ^a	43.0%	46.0%	41.5%
Violent offenses ^b	17.1%	18.7%	16.4%
Homicide ^c	0.5	0.7	0.3
Sex offense ^d	5.3	5.0	5.5
Rape	1.7	2.5	1.4
Sexual assault	4.1	2.8	4.7
Robbery	2.7	3.9	2.1
Assault	8.8	8.7	8.8
Property offenses ^e	13.3%	14.7%	12.6%
Burglary	3.8	4.4	3.5
Larceny/theft	5.7	6.1	5.6
Motor vehicle theft	1.7	2.3	1.4
Fraud	2.1	1.8	2.2
Drug offenses ^f	10.0%	11.2%	9.4%
Public-order offenses ^g	21.1%	20.4%	21.4%
Other offenses	5.9%	5.0%	6.3%
Total released	9,691	3,115	6,576

Note: The 9,691 sex offenders were released in 15 States. Detail may not add to totals because persons may be rearrested for more than one type of charge.

^aAll offenses include any offense type listed in footnotes *b* through *f* plus "other" and "unknown" offenses.

^bTotal violent offenses include homicide, kidnapping, rape, other sexual assault, robbery, assaults, and other violence.

^cHomicide includes murder, voluntary manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, negligent manslaughter, nonnegligent manslaughter, unspecified manslaughter, and unspecified homicide.

^dIncludes both rape and sexual assault.

^eTotal property offenses include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, fraud, forgery, embezzlement, arson, stolen property, and other forms of property offenses.

^fDrug offenses include drug trafficking, drug possession, and other forms of drug offenses.

^gPublic-order offenses include traffic offenses, weapon offenses, probation and parole violations, court-related offenses, disorderly conduct, and other such offenses.

Child molesters and statutory rapists

Of the 4,295 child molesters released from prison in 1994 —

- 39.4% (1,693) were rearrested for a crime of any kind (table 42)
- 0.4% (17) were rearrested for intentionally or negligently killing someone.

Child molesters were less likely to be rearrested for a property crime (10.6%, 456 of 4,295) than a violent crime (14.1%, 607 of 4,295).

Of the 443 statutory rapists released in 1994 —

- 49.9% (221) were rearrested for some new crime
- 0.7% (3) were rearrested for homicide
- 22.6% (100) were rearrested for a property crime
- 21.2% (94) were rearrested for a violent crime.

Table 42. Rearrest rate of child molesters and statutory rapists released from prison in 1994, by charge at rearrest

Rearrest charge	Percent rearrested for specified offense within 3 years	
	Child molesters	Statutory rapists
All charges ^a	39.4%	49.9%
Violent offenses ^b	14.1%	21.2%
Homicide ^c	0.4	0.7
Sex offense ^d	5.1	5.0
Rape	1.3	1.6
Sexual assault	4.4	3.6
Robbery	1.7	4.3
Assault	7.1	12.6
Property offenses ^e	10.6%	22.6%
Burglary	2.8	4.3
Larceny/theft	4.6	10.8
Motor vehicle theft	1.5	3.8
Fraud	1.9	3.6
Drug offenses ^f	8.6%	12.0%
Public-order offenses ^g	20.0%	27.1%
Other offenses	7.8%	4.3%
Total released	4,295	443

Note: The 4,295 child molesters were released in 15 States; the 443 statutory rapists in 11 States. Because of overlapping definitions, all statutory rapists also appear under the column "child molesters." Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

^aAll offenses include any offense type listed in footnotes *b* through *f* plus "other" and "unknown" offenses.

^bTotal violent offenses include homicide, kidnaping, rape, other sexual assault, robbery, assaults, and other violence.

^cHomicide includes murder, voluntary manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, negligent manslaughter, nonnegligent manslaughter, unspecified manslaughter, and unspecified homicide.

^dIncludes both rape and sexual assault.

^eTotal property offenses include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, fraud, forgery, embezzlement, arson, stolen property, and other forms of property offenses.

^fDrug offenses include drug trafficking, drug possession, and other forms of drug offenses.

^gPublic-order offenses include traffic offenses, weapon offenses, probation and parole violations, court-related offenses, disorderly conduct, and other such offenses.

Survey of State inmates

The 9,691 prisoners in this study were all men sentenced to prison for sex crimes. Characteristics of the victims of these sex crimes were largely unavailable for the study. For information on imprisoned sex offenders and their victims, data were drawn from a survey covering the approximately 73,000 male sex offenders in State prisons nationwide in 1997.

Of the 73,000 victims of their sex crimes —

- about 90% were female
- nearly 75% were white
- 89% were non-Hispanic
- 36% were below age 13
- altogether, 70% were under age 18.

Child victims of sex crimes were more likely than adult victims to be male (11% versus 3%). Whites made up 76% of child victims and 66% of adult victims.

The biggest difference between child victims and adult victims was their relationship to the man who committed the sex crime:

Among cases where the victim was under 18, the boy or girl was the prisoner's own child (16%), stepchild (16%), sibling or stepsibling (2%), or other relative (13%) in nearly half of all child victim cases (46%). Among cases where the victim was an adult, the victim was a relative less often (11%).

Among inmates who were in prison for a sex crime against a child, the child was the prisoner's own child or step-child in a third of the cases. Seven

percent of the inmates reported their child victims to have been strangers. Among adult victims, 34% were strangers to their attacker.

Characteristics of victims of rape or sexual assault, for which male inmates were serving a sentence in State prisons, 1997

Victim characteristic	Percent of victims of rape or sexual assault		
	All	Victim age	
		18 years or older	Under 18 years
Total	100%	100%	100%
Gender			
Male	8.8%	2.8%	11.1%
Female	91.2	97.2	88.9
Race			
White	73.2%	66.0%	76.4%
Black	22.8	30.2	19.4
Other	4.0	3.8	4.2
Hispanic origin			
Hispanic	11.3%	9.9%	12.1%
Non-Hispanic	88.7	90.1	87.9
Age			
12 or under	36.4%	--	51.6%
13-17	34.1	--	48.4
18-24	10.8	36.7%	--
25-34	11.2	37.9	--
35-34	7.0	23.8	--
55 or over	0.5	1.6	--
Victim was the prisoner's —			
Spouse	1.1%	3.8%	0%
Ex-spouse	0.6	2.0	0
Parent/stepparent	0.6	0.4	0.6
Own child	11.5	1.4	15.7
Stepchild	11.2	0.4	15.8
Sibling/stepsibling	1.3	0.4	1.7
Other relative	9.4	2.1	12.7
Boy/girlfriend	5.5	8.2	4.4
Ex-boy/girlfriend	1.1	2.0	0.8
Friend/ex-friend	22.7	24.8	22.0
Acquaintance/other	19.4	20.1	19.6
Stranger	15.6	34.4	6.7
Total estimated number	73,116	20,958	50,027

Note: Data are from the BJS Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, 1997. This table is based on 73,116 prisoners who reported having one victim in the crime for which they were sentenced to prison. (They accounted for approximately 84% of all incarcerated male sex offenders in 1997.) Data identifying victim's sex were reported for 99.8% of the 73,116 males incarcerated for sex crimes; victim's race were reported for 98.9%; Hispanic origin for 98.2%; victim's age for 97.1%; victim's relationship to prisoner for 98.3%. Detail may not sum to total due to missing data for age of victim.

--Not applicable.

3-year followup period

For analytic purposes, "3 years" was defined as 1,096 days from the day of release from prison. Any rearrest, reconviction, or re-imprisonment occurring after 1,096 days from the 1994 release was not included. A conviction after 1,096 days was not counted even if it resulted from an arrest within the period.

Separating sex offenders into four types

The report gives statistics for four types of sex offenders. Separating sex offenders into the four types was done using information — in particular, the statute number for the imprisonment offense, the literal version of the statute, a numeric FBI code (called the "NCIC" code, short for "National Crime Information Center") indicating what the imprisonment offense was, and miscellaneous other information — available in the prison records on the 9,691 men. However, the prison records obtained for the study did not always contain all four pieces of information on the imprisonment offense. Moreover, the available offense information was not always detailed enough to reliably distinguish different types of sex offenders.

The process of sorting sex offenders into different types involved first creating the study's definitions of the four types, and then determining which State statute numbers, which literal versions of those statutes, and which NCIC codes conformed to the definitions. Each inmate was next classified into one of the types (or possibly into more than one type, since the four are not mutually exclusive) depending on whether the imprisonment offense information available on him fit the study's definition.

An obstacle to classifying sex offenders into types was that the labels "rape," "sexual assault," "child molestation," "statutory rape" were not widely used in

State statutes, and when they were used they did not always conform to the study's definitions of them. In deciding which type of sex offender to classify the prisoner as, importance was attached not to the label the law gave to his conviction offense, but to how well the law's definition of the offense fit the study's definition of the type.

Sex offenders compared to non-sex offenders

In 1994, prisons in 15 States released 272,111 prisoners, representing two-thirds of all prisoners released in the United States that year. Among the 272,111 were 262,420 released prisoners whose imprisonment offense was not a sex offense. Non-sex offenders include inmates, both male and female, who were in prison for violent crimes (such as murder or robbery), property crimes (such as burglary or motor vehicle theft), drug crimes, and public order offenses. Like the 9,691 male sex offenders examined in this report, all non-sex offenders were serving prison terms of one year or more in State prison when they were released in 1994.

At various places, this report compares 9,691 released male sex offenders to 262,420 released non-sex offenders. While labeled "non-sex offenders," the 262,420 actually includes a small number- 87- who are sex offenders. The 87 are all the female sex offenders released from prisons in the 15 States in 1994.

Ages of molested and allegedly molested children

Information on the ages of molested children was needed for two calculations: 1) age of the child the released sex offender was sent to prison for molesting, and 2) age of the child allegedly molested by the released sex offender during the 3-year follow-up period. The most frequent source of both was a sex statute: either the sex

statute the offender was imprisoned for violating, or the statute the released prisoner was charged with violating when he was rearrested for a sex crime. The former was obtained from the prison records assembled for the study; the latter, from the assembled arrest records.

None of the sex statutes was found to apply to a victim of a specific age; for example, just to 12-year-olds. But some were found to apply just to children in a certain age range; for example, under 12, or 13 to 15, or 16 to 17. While specific ages of children could not be obtained from statutes, the availability of information on age ranges at least made it possible to obtain approximate ages. The rule that was adopted was to record the victim's (or alleged victim's) age as the upper limit of a statute's age range. To illustrate, a statute might indicate that the complainant/victim be "at least 13 but less than 16 years of age." In that case, the age of the child was recorded as 15, since the statute indicated the upper limit of the age range as any age "less than 16." As another example, if a statute indicated the complainant/victim be "under 12 years of age," the child's age was recorded as 11, as the phrasing of the age range did not include 12-year-olds, only those "under 12." Because the victim (or alleged victim) was always assigned the age of the oldest person in the age range, the study made the victims (or alleged victims) appear older than they actually were.

How missing data were handled in the report

In many instances, the data needed to calculate a statistic were not available for all 9,691 released sex offenders. For example, the 9,691 were released in 15 States, but data needed to determine the number reconvicted were only available for the 9,085 released in 14 of the 15. Of the 9,085, 2,180 (24%) were reconvicted. When data were missing, the statistic was computed on those

cases in which the data were available, but treated both in the tables and in the text as though it were based on the total population. For example, “24%” is the statistic that appears in all tables and text that give the percent reconvicted; and since 24% of 9,691 is 2,326, the text says that “2,326 of the 9,691 were reconvicted,” despite the fact that the “24%” was actually obtained by dividing 2,180 by 9,085. The text could have been written to say “2,180 of the 9,085 were reconvicted,” but that wasn’t done because introducing a new denominator (9,085) into the text would have created confusion for the reader.

Missing data on out-of-State rearrests

Because of missing information, the study was unable to determine how many inmates released from New York prisons were rearrested outside of New York. The study was able to document how many prisoners released in the other 14 States were rearrested outside the State that released them. Because of incomplete New York data, the report’s recidivism rates are somewhat deflated.

Missing data on rearrest for a sex crime

According to arrest records compiled in the study, 4,163 of the 9,691 released sex offenders were rearrested for a new crime of some kind. It was not always possible to determine from these records whether the new crime was a sex crime. For 202 rearrested prisoners, the arrest record did not identify the type of crime. For the rest the record did identify the type but the offense label was not always specific enough to distinguish sex crimes from other crimes. For example, if the label said “contributing to the delinquency of a minor,” “indecent,” “morals offense,” “family offense,” or “child abuse,” the offense was coded as a non-sex crime even though, in some unknown number of cases, it was actually a sex crime.

According to arrest records, 5.3% of the 9,691 (517 out of 9,691) released sex offenders were rearrested for another sex crime. For the two reasons described immediately above, 5.3% was probably an undercount of how many were rearrested for a sex crime. How much of an undercount could not be firmly determined from the data assembled for the study. However, a conservative measure of the size of the undercount was obtained from the data. The study database included 121 rearrested sex offenders whose arrest record did not indicate they were rearrested for a sex crime (the rearrest was either for a non-sex crime or for an unknown type of crime) but whose court record did indicate they were charged with a sex crime. When the study calculated the percentage rearrested for a sex crime, the 121 were not included among the 517 with a rearrest for a sex crime. Had the 121 been included in the calculation of the rearrest rate, the total number rearrested for a sex crime would have been 638 rather than 517, and the percentage rearrested for a sex crime would have been 6.6% rather than 5.3%. This suggests an undercount of about 1 percentage point.

Texas prisoners classified as “other type of release”

Texas released 692 male sex offenders in 1994, of which 129 were classified as release category “17”, defined as “other type of release.” Numerous data quality checks were run on the 129 and the 64 of them who were rearrested. The rearrest rate for the 129 was about average for Texas releases. But numerous anomalies were found for the 64 who were rearrested:

1. The rearrest offense for the 64 was always missing from their arrest record
2. The date of rearrest for the 64 was always the same as their release date
3. Virtually all 64 were reconvicted for a sex crime
4. The sentence length imposed for their new sex crime was identical to the

sentence they were serving when released in 1994.

Because of these anomalies, the 129 were excluded from the calculation of “percent reconvicted for a sex crime.”

Counting rules

In this report, rearrest was measured by counting the number of different persons who were rearrested at least once. A released prisoner who was rearrested several times or had multiple rearrest charges filed against him was counted as only one rearrested person. The same counting rule applied to reconviction and the other recidivism measures.

If a released prisoner was rearrested several times, his earliest rearrest was used to calculate his time-to-rearrest. The same counting rule applied to reconviction and recidivism defined as a new prison sentence.

If a released prisoner had both in-State and out-of-State rearrests, he was counted as having an out-of-State rearrest regardless of whether the out-of-State rearrest was his earliest rearrest. The same rule applied in cases where the released prisoner had both felony and misdemeanor rearrests, or both sex crime and non-sex crime rearrests. The person was counted as having a felony rearrest or a sex crime rearrest regardless of temporal sequence.

The aim of these rules was to count people, not events. The only tables in the report that do not follow the rule are tables 41 and 42.

First release

All 15 States had first releases, but they could not be identified in 1 State (Ohio). They could be identified in Michigan, but Michigan data on sentence length did not fit the study’s definition. Since sentence length was critical to several statistics calculated

from data on first releases (for example, percent of sentence served), Michigan was excluded from all tables based on first releases.

Analysis of statutory rape laws

The publication's analysis of statutory rape laws in the United States benefited greatly from the report "Sexual Relationships Between Adult Males and Young Teen Girls: Exploring the Legal and Social Responses," by Sharon G. Elstein and Noy Davis, American Bar Association, Center on Children and the Law, October 1997.

Sampling error

In 1994 State prisons in 15 States released 302,309 prisoners altogether. A total of 38,624 were sampled for a recidivism study. Results of that study and information regarding sampling and other methodological details are available in the BJS publication *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, NCJ 193427, June 2002.

The 302,309 total released consisted of 10,546 released sex offenders plus 291,763 released non-sex offenders. The 38,624 sample consisted of 10,546 released sex offenders plus 28,078 released non-sex offenders. The number of sex offenders in the sample was the same as the number in the 302,309 total because all sex offenders released in 1994 in the 15 States were selected for the study, not a sample of them.

Because no sampling was used to select sex offenders, numbers and percentages in this report for sex offenders were not subject to sampling error. However, comparisons in the report between sex offenders and non-sex offenders were subject to sampling error because sampling was used to select non-sex offenders. Where sex offenders were compared to all non-sex offenders released in 1994, sampling error was taken into account. All differences discussed were statistically significant at the .05 level.

Not all 10,546 sex offenders in the sample were used in the report. To be in the report, the sex offender had to be male and meet all 4 of the following criteria:

1. A RAP sheet on the prisoner was found in the State criminal history repository.
2. The released prisoner was alive throughout the entire 3-year followup period. (This requirement resulted in 21 sex offenders' being excluded.)
3. The prisoner's sentence was greater than 1 year (missing sentences were treated as greater than 1 year).
4. The State department of corrections that released the prisoner in 1994 did not designate him as any of the following release types: release to custody/detainer/warrant, absent without leave, escape, transfer, administrative release, or release on appeal.

A total of 9,691 released male sex offenders met the selection criteria. The number of them released in each State is shown in the appendix table.

Other methodological details

To help the reader understand the percentages provided in the report, both the numerator and denominator were often given. In most cases, the reader could then reproduce the percentages. For example, the report indicates 38.6% (3,741) of the 9,691 sex offenders were returned to prison.

Appendix table. Number of sex offenders released from State prisons in 1994 and number selected for this report, by State

State	Sex offenders released from prison in 1994	
	Total	Selected to be in this report
Total	10,546	9,691
Arizona	156	122
California	3,503	3,395
Delaware	53	45
Florida	1,053	965
Illinois	775	710
Maryland	277	243
Michigan	477	444
Minnesota	249	239
New Jersey	449	429
New York	799	692
North Carolina	508	441
Ohio	824	606
Oregon	452	408
Texas	708	692
Virginia	263	260

Note: "Total released" includes both male and female sex offenders; "Total selected to be in this report" includes only male sex offenders.

Using the 3,741 and the 9,691, the reader could exactly reproduce the results. However, the reader should be aware that in a few places, the calculated percentages will differ slightly from the percentages found in the report. This is due to rounding. For example, 43.0%, or 4,163, of the 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested; however, 4,163 / 9,691 is 42.96%, which was rounded to 43.0%.

Offense definitions and other methodological details are available in the BJS publication *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, NCJ 193427, June 2002.

3-year followup period

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According to arrest records, 5.3% of the 9,691 (517 out of 9,691) released sex offenders were rearrested for another sex crime. For the two reasons described immediately above, 5.3% was probably an undercount of how many were rearrested for a sex crime. How much of an undercount could not be firmly determined from the data assembled for the study. However, a conservative measure of the size of the undercount was obtained from the data. The study database included 121 rearrested sex offenders whose arrest record did not indicate they were rearrested for a sex crime (the rearrest was either for a non-sex crime or for an unknown type of crime) but whose court record did indicate they were charged with a sex crime. When the study calculated the percentage rearrested for a sex crime, the 121 were not included among the 517 with a rearrest for a sex crime. Had the 121 been included in the calculation of the rearrest rate, the total number rearrested for a sex crime would have been 638 rather than 517, and the percentage rearrested for a sex crime would have been 6.6% rather than 5.3%. This suggests an undercount of about 1 percentage point.

Texas prisoners classified as “other type of release”

Texas released 692 male sex offenders in 1994, of which 129 were classified as release category “17”, defined as “other type of release.” Numerous data quality checks were run on the 129 and the 64 of them who were rearrested. The rearrest rate for the 129 was about average for Texas releases. But numerous anomalies were found for the 64 who were rearrested:

1. The rearrest offense for the 64 was always missing from their arrest record
2. The date of rearrest for the 64 was always the same as their release date
3. Virtually all 64 were reconvicted for a sex crime
4. The sentence length imposed for their new sex crime was identical to the

sentence they were serving when released in 1994.

Because of these anomalies, the 129 were excluded from the calculation of “percent reconvicted for a sex crime.”

Counting rules

In this report, rearrest was measured by counting the number of different persons who were rearrested at least once. A released prisoner who was rearrested several times or had multiple rearrest charges filed against him was counted as only one rearrested person. The same counting rule applied to reconviction and the other recidivism measures.

If a released prisoner was rearrested several times, his earliest rearrest was used to calculate his time-to-rearrest. The same counting rule applied to reconviction and recidivism defined as a new prison sentence.

If a released prisoner had both in-State and out-of-State rearrests, he was counted as having an out-of-State rearrest regardless of whether the out-of-State rearrest was his earliest rearrest. The same rule applied in cases where the released prisoner had both felony and misdemeanor rearrests, or both sex crime and non-sex crime rearrests. The person was counted as having a felony rearrest or a sex crime rearrest regardless of temporal sequence.

The aim of these rules was to count people, not events. The only tables in the report that do not follow the rule are tables 41 and 42.

First release

All 15 States had first releases, but they could not be identified in 1 State (Ohio). They could be identified in Michigan, but Michigan data on sentence length did not fit the study’s definition. Since sentence length was critical to several statistics calculated

from data on first releases (for example, percent of sentence served), Michigan was excluded from all tables based on first releases.

Analysis of statutory rape laws

The publication's analysis of statutory rape laws in the United States benefited greatly from the report "Sexual Relationships Between Adult Males and Young Teen Girls: Exploring the Legal and Social Responses," by Sharon G. Elstein and Noy Davis, American Bar Association, Center on Children and the Law, October 1997.

Sampling error

In 1994 State prisons in 15 States released 302,309 prisoners altogether. A total of 38,624 were sampled for a recidivism study. Results of that study and information regarding sampling and other methodological details are available in the BJS publication *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, NCJ 193427, June 2002.

The 302,309 total released consisted of 10,546 released sex offenders plus 291,763 released non-sex offenders. The 38,624 sample consisted of 10,546 released sex offenders plus 28,078 released non-sex offenders. The number of sex offenders in the sample was the same as the number in the 302,309 total because all sex offenders released in 1994 in the 15 States were selected for the study, not a sample of them.

Because no sampling was used to select sex offenders, numbers and percentages in this report for sex offenders were not subject to sampling error. However, comparisons in the report between sex offenders and non-sex offenders were subject to sampling error because sampling was used to select non-sex offenders. Where sex offenders were compared to all non-sex offenders released in 1994, sampling error was taken into account. All differences discussed were statistically significant at the .05 level.

Not all 10,546 sex offenders in the sample were used in the report. To be in the report, the sex offender had to be male and meet all 4 of the following criteria:

1. A RAP sheet on the prisoner was found in the State criminal history repository.
2. The released prisoner was alive throughout the entire 3-year followup period. (This requirement resulted in 21 sex offenders' being excluded.)
3. The prisoner's sentence was greater than 1 year (missing sentences were treated as greater than 1 year).
4. The State department of corrections that released the prisoner in 1994 did not designate him as any of the following release types: release to custody/detainer/warrant, absent without leave, escape, transfer, administrative release, or release on appeal.

A total of 9,691 released male sex offenders met the selection criteria. The number of them released in each State is shown in the appendix table.

Other methodological details

To help the reader understand the percentages provided in the report, both the numerator and denominator were often given. In most cases, the reader could then reproduce the percentages. For example, the report indicates 38.6% (3,741) of the 9,691 sex offenders were returned to prison.

Appendix table. Number of sex offenders released from State prisons in 1994 and number selected for this report, by State

State	Sex offenders released from prison in 1994	
	Total	Selected to be in this report
Total	10,546	9,691
Arizona	156	122
California	3,503	3,395
Delaware	53	45
Florida	1,053	965
Illinois	775	710
Maryland	277	243
Michigan	477	444
Minnesota	249	239
New Jersey	449	429
New York	799	692
North Carolina	508	441
Ohio	824	606
Oregon	452	408
Texas	708	692
Virginia	263	260

Note: "Total released" includes both male and female sex offenders; "Total selected to be in this report" includes only male sex offenders.

Using the 3,741 and the 9,691, the reader could exactly reproduce the results. However, the reader should be aware that in a few places, the calculated percentages will differ slightly from the percentages found in the report. This is due to rounding. For example, 43.0%, or 4,163, of the 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested; however, 4,163 / 9,691 is 42.96%, which was rounded to 43.0%.

Offense definitions and other methodological details are available in the BJS publication *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, NCJ 193427, June 2002.

123 S.Ct. 1140
Supreme Court of the United States
Delbert W. SMITH and Bruce M. Botelho, Petitioners,

v.

John DOE I, et al.

No. 01–729.

Argued Nov. 13, 2002. Decided March 5, 2003. Rehearing Denied April 28, 2003. See 538 U.S. 1009, 123 S.Ct. 1925.

Synopsis

Convicted sex offenders, and wife of one of offenders, brought § 1983 action challenging constitutionality of Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) as a violation of the ex post facto clause. Following reversal of determination that plaintiffs would not be allowed to proceed under pseudonyms, 884 F.Supp. 1372, parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russell Holland, J., granted summary judgment to state. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, 259 F.3d 979, reversed and remanded. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that the Act was nonpunitive and therefore its retroactive application did not violate the ex post facto clause.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined.

West Headnotes (10)

1 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Constitutional Law Punishment in general

In considering whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause, a court must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings; if the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry, but if the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, the court must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem it civil. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

458 Cases that cite this headnote

2 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

For purpose of determining whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

251 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Action Civil or criminal

Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is first of all a question of statutory construction; a court considers the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.

26 Cases that cite this headnote

4 Mental Health Registration and Community Notification

An imposition of restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous was a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective of state's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), even if that objective was consistent with the purposes of the state's criminal justice system. AS 12.63.010 et seq.

128 Cases that cite this headnote

5 Action Civil or criminal

Formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes, are probative, but not dispositive, of the legislature's intent as to whether a statute is civil or criminal.

8 Cases that cite this headnote

6 Constitutional Law Registration

Mental Health Sex offenders

For purpose of ex post facto analysis, intent of Alaska Legislature in adopting Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime; although the Act's registration provisions were codified in state's criminal code, some of the Act's provisions related to criminal administration, and the state's criminal pleading rule required informing a defendant of the Act's requirements, the Act's stated objective of protecting the public from sex offenders was nonpunitive, the Act contained many provisions not involving criminal punishment, parts of the Act were codified in civil provisions, and the Act mandated no procedures other than duty to register, and instead vested authority to promulgate implementing regulations with administrative agency. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; AS 12.63.010 et seq.; Alaska Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 11(c)(4).

253 Cases that cite this headnote

7 Constitutional Law Constitutional Prohibitions in General

Constitutional Law Punishment in general

In analyzing the effects of a law for purpose of ex post facto analysis, relevant factors include whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment, and whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, or is excessive with respect to this purpose. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

217 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Constitutional Law Registration

Mental Health Sex offenders

Effects of Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) were nonpunitive, and thus, retroactive application of the Act, whose purpose was also nonpunitive, did not violate the ex post facto clause; any stigma was not integral part of Act's objective, Act imposed no physical restraint, there was no evidence of substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for registrants that would not otherwise have occurred, periodic updates were not required to be made in person, Act's purpose was not retributive, Act had legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which was reasonably advanced by alerting public, duration of reporting duty was not excessive, and notification system was passive. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; AS 12.63.010 et seq.

291 Cases that cite this headnote

9 Constitutional Law Power to enact

The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

49 Cases that cite this headnote

10 Constitutional Law Registration

Mental Health Sex offenders

Alaska's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class in state's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, did not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; AS 12.63.010 et seq.

732 Cases that cite this headnote

**1142 Syllabus*

Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in the State must register with the Department of Corrections within 30 days before his release, providing his name, address, and other specified information. If the individual is at liberty, he must register with local law enforcement authorities within a working day of his conviction or of entering the State. If he was convicted of a single, nonaggravated sex crime, the offender must provide annual verification of the submitted information for 15 years. If he was convicted of an aggravated sex offense or of two or more sex offenses, he must register for life and verify the information quarterly. The offender's information is forwarded to the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. Some of the data, such as fingerprints, driver's license number, anticipated change of address, and whether the offender has had medical treatment afterwards, are kept confidential. The offender's name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, description, license and identification numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime, date and place of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender is in compliance with the Act's update requirements or cannot be located are, however, published on the Internet. Both the Act's registration and notification requirements are retroactive.

Respondents were convicted of aggravated sex offenses. Both were released from prison and completed rehabilitative programs for sex offenders. Although convicted before the Act's passage, respondents are covered by it. After the initial registration, they are required to submit quarterly verifications and notify the authorities of any changes. Both respondents, along with the wife of one of them, also a respondent here, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to declare the Act void as to them under, *inter alia*, the *Ex Post Facto* Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The District Court granted petitioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit disagreed in relevant part, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the *Ex Post Facto* Clause.

***85 Held:** Because the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is nonpunitive, its retroactive application does not violate the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. Pp. 1146–1154.

(a) The determinative question is whether the legislature meant to establish “civil proceedings.” *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501. If the intention was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, the Court must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate ****1143** the State's intention to deem it civil. *E.g., ibid.* Because the Court ordinarily defers to the legislature's stated intent, *ibid.*, only the clearest proof will suffice to override that intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. See, *e.g., ibid.* Pp. 1146–1147.

(b) The Alaska Legislature's intent was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime. The Court first considers the statute's text and structure, *Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, asking whether the legislature indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other, *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450. Here, the statutory text states the legislature's finding that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending, identifies protecting the public from sex offenders as the law's primary interest, and declares that release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the public will assist in protecting the public safety. This Court has already determined that an imposition of restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective. *Hendricks*, 521 U.S., at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Here, as in *Hendricks*, nothing on the statute's face suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than a civil scheme designed to protect the public from harm. *Id.*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The contrary conclusion is not required by the Alaska Constitution's inclusion of the need to protect the public as one of the purposes of criminal administration. Where a legislative restriction is an incident

of the State's power to protect the public health and safety, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment. *E.g., Flemming v. Nestor*, supra, at 616, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435. Other formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes, are probative of the legislature's intent, see, *e.g., Hendricks*, 521 U.S., at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, but are open to debate in this case. The Act's notification provisions are codified in the State's Health, Safety, and Housing Code, confirming the conclusion that the statute was intended as a nonpunitive regulatory measure. Cf., *ibid.* The fact that the Act's registration provisions are codified in the State's Code of Criminal Procedure is not ***86** dispositive, since a statute's location and labels do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one. See *United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms*, 465 U.S. 354, 364–365, and n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361. The Code of Criminal Procedure contains many other provisions that do not involve criminal punishment. The Court's conclusion is not altered by the fact that the Act's implementing procedural mechanisms require the trial court to inform the defendant of the Act's requirements and, if possible, the period of registration required. That conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, aside from the duty to register, the statute itself mandates no procedures. Instead, it vests the authority to promulgate implementing regulations with the Department of Public Safety, an agency charged with enforcing both criminal *and* civil regulatory laws. Also telling is the fact that the Act does not require the procedures adopted to contain any safeguards associated with the criminal process. By contemplating distinctly civil procedures, the legislature indicated clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction. *United States v. Ursery*, 518 U.S. 267, 289, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549. Pp. 1147–1149.

(c) Respondents cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the Act's effects negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. In analyzing the effects, the Court refers to the seven factors noted in *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, as a useful ****1144** framework. First, the regulatory scheme, in its necessary operation, has not been regarded in the Nation's history and traditions as a punishment. The fact that sex offender registration and notification statutes are of fairly recent origin suggests that the Act was not meant as a punitive measure, or, at least, that it did not involve a traditional means of punishing. Respondents' argument that the Act, particularly its notification provisions, resembles shaming punishments of the colonial period is unpersuasive. In contrast to those punishments, the Act's stigma results not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is already public. The fact that Alaska posts offender information on the Internet does not alter this conclusion. Second, the Act does not subject respondents to an affirmative disability or restraint. It imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble imprisonment, the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint. *Hudson*, 522 U.S., at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488. Moreover, its obligations are less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which the Court has held to be nonpunitive. See, *e.g., ibid.* Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's assertion, the record contains no evidence that the Act has led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred. Also unavailing is that court's assertion that the periodic update requirement imposed an affirmative disability. The ***87** Act, on its face, does not require these updates to be made in person. The holding that the registration system is parallel to probation or supervised release is rejected because, in contrast to probationers and supervised releasees, offenders subject to the Act are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. While registrants must inform the authorities after they change their facial features, borrow a car, or seek psychiatric treatment, they are not required to seek permission to do so. Third, the Act does not promote the traditional aims of punishment. That it might deter future crimes is not dispositive. See, *e.g., id.*, at 105, 118 S.Ct. 488. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the Act's registration obligations were retributive. While the Act does differentiate between individuals convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses and those convicted of a single nonaggravated offense, these broad categories and the reporting requirement's corresponding length are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory

objective. Fourth, the Act has a rational connection to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose, public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community. That the Act may not be narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose is not dispositive, since such imprecision does not suggest that the Act's nonpunitive purpose is a "sham or mere pretext." *Hendricks, supra*, at 371, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Fifth, the regulatory scheme is not excessive with respect to the Act's purpose. The State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not render the Act punitive. See, e.g., *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 197, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002; *Hendricks, supra*, at 357–368, 364, 117 S.Ct. 2072, distinguished. Moreover, the wide dissemination of offender information does not render the Act excessive, given the general mobility of the population. The question here is not whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy, but whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. The Act meets this standard. Finally, the two remaining *Mendoza-Martinez* factors—whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is already ****1145** a crime—are of little weight in this case. Pp. 1149–1154.

259 F.3d 979, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, *post*, p. 1154. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, *post*, p. 1154. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, ***88** *post*, p. 1156. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined, *post*, p. 1159.

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Opinion

***89** Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act requires convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement authorities, and much of the information is made public. We must decide whether the registration requirement is a retroactive punishment prohibited by the *Ex Post Facto* Clause.

I

A

The State of Alaska enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) on May 12, 1994. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41. Like its counterparts in other States, the Act is termed a "Megan's Law." Megan Kanka was a 7-year-old New Jersey girl who was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by a

neighbor who, unknown to the victim's family, had prior convictions for sex offenses against children. The crime gave impetus to laws for mandatory registration of sex offenders and corresponding community notification. In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, title 17, 108 Stat.2038, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, which conditions certain federal law enforcement funding on the States' adoption of sex offender registration laws and sets **90* minimum standards for state programs. By 1996, every State, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government had enacted some variation of Megan's Law.

The Alaska law, which is our concern in this case, contains two components: a registration requirement and a notification system. Both are retroactive. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 12(a). The Act requires any “sex offender or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state” to register, either with the Department of Corrections (if the individual is incarcerated) or with the local law enforcement authorities (if the individual is at liberty). Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010(a), (b) (2000). Prompt registration is mandated. If still in prison, a covered sex offender must register within 30 days before release; otherwise he must do so within a working day of his conviction or of entering the State. § 12.63.010(a). The sex offender must provide his name, aliases, identifying ***1146* features, address, place of employment, date of birth, conviction information, driver's license number, information about vehicles to which he has access, and postconviction treatment history. § 12.63.010(b)(1). He must permit the authorities to photograph and fingerprint him. § 12.63.010(b)(2).

If the offender was convicted of a single, nonaggravated sex crime, he must provide annual verification of the submitted information for 15 years. §§ 12.63.010(d)(1), 12.63.020(a)(2). If he was convicted of an aggravated sex offense or of two or more sex offenses, he must register for life and verify the information quarterly. §§ 12.63.010(d)(2), 12.63.020(a)(1). The offender must notify his local police department if he moves. § 12.63.010(c). A sex offender who knowingly fails to comply with the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. §§ 11.56.835, 11.56.840.

The information is forwarded to the Alaska Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. § 18.65.087(a). Some of the data, such as fingerprints, driver's license number, anticipated change of address, and whether the offender has had medical treatment **91* afterwards, are kept confidential. §§ 12.63.010(b), 18.65.087(b). The following information is made available to the public: “the sex offender's or child kidnapper's name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, description[,] license [and] identification numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender or kidnapper is in compliance with [the update] requirements ... or cannot be located.” § 18.65.087(b). The Act does not specify the means by which the registry information must be made public. Alaska has chosen to make most of the nonconfidential information available on the Internet.

B

Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, an aggravated sex offense. John Doe I pleaded *nolo contendere* after a court determination that he had sexually abused his daughter for two years, when she was between the ages of 9 and 11; John Doe II entered a *nolo contendere* plea to sexual abuse of a 14-year-old child. Both were released from prison in 1990 and completed rehabilitative programs for sex offenders. Although convicted before the passage of the Act, respondents are covered by it. After the initial registration, they are required to submit quarterly verifications and notify the authorities of any changes. Both respondents, along with respondent Jane Doe, wife of John Doe I, brought an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to declare the Act void as to them under the *Ex Post Facto* Clause of Article I, § 10, cl. 1, of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment for petitioners. In agreement with the District Court, the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined the state legislature had intended the Act to be a nonpunitive, civil ***92** regulatory scheme; but, in disagreement with the District Court, it held the effects of the Act were punitive despite the legislature's intent. In consequence, it held the Act violates the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. *Doe I v. Otte*, 259 F.3d 979 (C.A.9 2001). We granted certiorari. 534 U.S. 1126, 122 S.Ct. 1062, 151 L.Ed.2d 966 (2002).

II

1,2 This is the first time we have considered a claim that a sex offender registration and notification law constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. The framework for our inquiry, however, is well established. We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ****1147** ‘civil’ proceedings.” *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’” *Ibid.* (quoting *United States v. Ward*, 448 U.S. 242, 248–249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,” *Hendricks*, *supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting *Ward*, *supra*, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636); see also *Hendricks*, *supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072; *United States v. Ursery*, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); *United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms*, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984).

A

3 Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal “is first of all a question of statutory construction.” *Hendricks*, *supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also *Hudson*, *supra*, at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. We consider the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective. *Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). A conclusion that the legislature ***93** intended to punish would satisfy an *ex post facto* challenge without further inquiry into its effects, so considerable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.

4 The courts “must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” *Hudson*, *supra*, at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Alaska Legislature expressed the objective of the law in the statutory text itself. The legislature found that “sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending,” and identified “protecting the public from sex offenders” as the “primary governmental interest” of the law. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1. The legislature further determined that “release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist in protecting the public safety.” *Ibid.* As we observed in *Hendricks*, where we examined an *ex post facto* challenge to a postincarceration confinement of sex offenders, an imposition of restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is “a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.” 521 U.S., at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072. In this case, as in *Hendricks*, “[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than a civil ... scheme designed to protect the public from harm.” *Id.*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072.

Respondents seek to cast doubt upon the nonpunitive nature of the law's declared objective by pointing out that the Alaska Constitution lists the need for protecting the public as one of the purposes of criminal administration. Brief for Respondents 23 (citing Alaska Const., Art. I, § 12). As the Court stated in *Flemming v. Nestor*, rejecting an *ex post facto* challenge to a law terminating benefits to deported aliens, where a legislative restriction “is an incident of the State's power to protect the health and safety of

its citizens,” it will be considered “as evidencing an intent to exercise that *94 regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.” 363 U.S., at 616, 80 S.Ct. 1367 (citing *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898)). The Court repeated this principle in 89 *Firearms*, upholding a statute requiring **1148 forfeiture of unlicensed firearms against a double jeopardy challenge. The Court observed that, in enacting the provision, Congress “‘was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest.’” 465 U.S., at 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099 (quoting *Huddleston v. United States*, 415 U.S. 814, 824, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974)). This goal was “plainly more remedial than punitive.” 465 U.S., at 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099. These precedents instruct us that even if the objective of the Act is consistent with the purposes of the Alaska criminal justice system, the State's pursuit of it in a regulatory scheme does not make the objective punitive.

5 Other formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures it establishes, are probative of the legislature's intent. See *Hendricks*, *supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072; *Hudson*, *supra*, at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488; 89 *Firearms*, *supra*, at 363, 104 S.Ct. 1099. In this case these factors are open to debate. The notification provisions of the Act are codified in the State's “Health, Safety, and Housing Code,” § 18, confirming our conclusion that the statute was intended as a nonpunitive regulatory measure. Cf. *Hendricks*, *supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (the State's “objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the Act within the [State's] probate code, instead of the criminal code” (citations omitted)). The Act's registration provisions, however, are codified in the State's criminal procedure code, and so might seem to point in the opposite direction. These factors, though, are not dispositive. The location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one. In 89 *Firearms*, the Court held a forfeiture provision to be a civil sanction even though the authorizing statute was in the criminal code. 465 U.S., at 364–365, 104 S.Ct. 1099. *95 The Court rejected the argument that the placement demonstrated Congress' “intention to create an additional criminal sanction,” observing that “both criminal and civil sanctions may be labeled ‘penalties.’” *Id.*, at 364, n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 1099.

6 The same rationale applies here. Title 12 of Alaska's Code of Criminal Procedure (where the Act's registration provisions are located) contains many provisions that do not involve criminal punishment, such as civil procedures for disposing of recovered and seized property, *Alaska Stat. § 12.36.010 et seq.* (2000); laws protecting the confidentiality of victims and witnesses, § 12.61.010 *et seq.*; laws governing the security and accuracy of criminal justice information, § 12.62.110 *et seq.*; laws governing civil postconviction actions, § 12.72.010 *et seq.*; and laws governing actions for writs of habeas corpus, § 12.75.010 *et seq.*, which under Alaska law are “independent civil proceeding[s],” *State v. Hannagan*, 559 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 1977). Although some of these provisions relate to criminal administration, they are not in themselves punitive. The partial codification of the Act in the State's criminal procedure code is not sufficient to support a conclusion that the legislative intent was punitive.

The procedural mechanisms to implement the Act do not alter our conclusion. After the Act's adoption Alaska amended its Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning the acceptance of pleas and the entering of criminal judgments. The rule on pleas now requires the court to “infor[m] the defendant in writing of the requirements of [the Act] and, if it can be determined by the court, the period of registration required.” Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(4) (2002). Similarly, the written judgments for sex offenses and child kidnappings “must set out the requirements of [the Act] and, if it can be determined by the court, whether that conviction will require the offender or kidnapper to register **1149 for life or a lesser period.” *Alaska Stat. § 12.55.148(a)* (2000).

The policy to alert convicted offenders to the civil consequences of their criminal conduct does not render the consequences *96 themselves punitive. When a State sets up a regulatory scheme, it is logical to provide those persons subject to it with clear and unambiguous notice of the requirements and the

penalties for noncompliance. The Act requires registration either before the offender's release from confinement or within a day of his conviction (if the offender is not imprisoned). Timely and adequate notice serves to apprise individuals of their responsibilities and to ensure compliance with the regulatory scheme. Notice is important, for the scheme is enforced by criminal penalties. See §§ 11.56.835, 11.56.840. Although other methods of notification may be available, it is effective to make it part of the plea colloquy or the judgment of conviction. Invoking the criminal process in aid of a statutory regime does not render the statutory scheme itself punitive.

Our conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, aside from the duty to register, the statute itself mandates no procedures. Instead, it vests the authority to promulgate implementing regulations with the Alaska Department of Public Safety, §§ 12.63.020(b), 18.65.087(d)—an agency charged with enforcement of both criminal *and* civil regulatory laws. See, e.g., § 17.30.100 (enforcement of drug laws); § 18.70.010 (fire protection); § 28.05.011 (motor vehicles and road safety); § 44.41.020 (protection of life and property). The Act itself does not require the procedures adopted to contain any safeguards associated with the criminal process. That leads us to infer that the legislature envisioned the Act's implementation to be civil and administrative. By contemplating “distinctly civil procedures,” the legislature “indicate[d] clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal sanction.” *Ursery*, 518 U.S., at 289, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).

We conclude, as did the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that the intent of the Alaska Legislature was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime.

*97 B

7 In analyzing the effects of the Act we refer to the seven factors noted in *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), as a useful framework. These factors, which migrated into our *ex post facto* case law from double jeopardy jurisprudence, have their earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder and the *Ex Post Facto* Clauses. See *id.*, at 168–169, and nn. 22–28, 83 S.Ct. 554. Because the *Mendoza-Martinez* factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts, we have said they are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive,” *United States v. Ward*, 448 U.S., at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636; 89 *Firearms*, 465 U.S., at 365, n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1099, but are “useful guideposts,” *Hudson*, 522 U.S., at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.

8 A historical survey can be useful because a State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a means deemed punitive in our tradition, so that the public will recognize it as such. The Court of Appeals observed that the sex offender registration and notification statutes “are of fairly recent origin,” 259 F.3d, at 989, which suggests that the statute was not meant as a punitive measure, or, at least, that it did not involve a traditional means of punishing. Respondents argue, ****1150** however, that the Act—and, in particular, its notification provisions—resemble shaming punishments of the colonial period. Brief for Respondents 33–34 (citing A. Earle, *Curious Punishments of Bygone Days* 1–2 (1896)).

Some colonial punishments indeed were meant to inflict public disgrace. Humiliated offenders were required “to stand in public with signs cataloguing their offenses.” Hirsch, *From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal* ***98** *Incarceration in Early Massachusetts*, 80 Mich. L.Rev. 1179, 1226 (1982); see also L. Friedman, *Crime and Punishment in American History* 38 (1993). At times the labeling would be permanent: A murderer might be branded with an “M,” and a thief with a “T.” R. Semmes, *Crime and Punishment in Early Maryland* 35 (1938); see also Massaro, *Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law*, 89 Mich. L.Rev. 1880, 1913 (1991). The aim was to make these offenders suffer “permanent

stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.” *Ibid.*; see also Friedman, *supra*, at 40; Hirsch, *supra*, at 1228. The most serious offenders were banished, after which they could neither return to their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one. T. Blomberg & K. Lucken, *American Penology: A History of Control* 30–31 (2000). Respondents contend that Alaska's compulsory registration and notification resemble these historical punishments, for they publicize the crime, associate it with his name, and, with the most serious offenders, do so for life.

Any initial resemblance to early punishments is, however, misleading. Punishments such as whipping, pillory, and branding inflicted physical pain and staged a direct confrontation between the offender and the public. Even punishments that lacked the corporal component, such as public shaming, humiliation, and banishment, involved more than the dissemination of information. They either held the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming or expelled him from the community. See Earle, *supra*, at 20, 35–36, 51–52; Massaro, *supra*, at 1912–1924; Semmes, *supra*, at 39–40; Blomberg & Lucken, *supra*, at 30–31. By contrast, the stigma of Alaska's Megan's Law results not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is already public. Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as punishment. On the contrary, ***99** our criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence. Transparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused. The publicity may cause adverse consequences for the convicted defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment to social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.

The fact that Alaska posts the information on the Internet does not alter our conclusion. It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could have been designed in colonial times. These facts do not render Internet notification punitive. The purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.

The State's Web site does not provide the public with means to shame the offender by, say, posting comments underneath ****1151** his record. An individual seeking the information must take the initial step of going to the Department of Public Safety's Web site, proceed to the sex offender registry, and then look up the desired information. The process is more analogous to a visit to an official archive of criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in public with some visible badge of past criminality. The Internet makes the document search more efficient, cost effective, and convenient for Alaska's citizenry.

We next consider whether the Act subjects respondents to an “affirmative disability or restraint.” *Mendoza-Martinez, supra*, at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. Here, we inquire how the effects of the ***100** Act are felt by those subject to it. If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.

The Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint. *Hudson*, 522 U.S., at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488. The Act's obligations are less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive. See *ibid.* (forbidding further participation in the banking industry); *De Veau v. Braisted*, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (forbidding work as a union official); *Hawker v. New*

York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (revocation of a medical license). The Act does not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences.

The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish *Hawker* and cases which have followed it on the grounds that the disability at issue there was specific and “narrow,” confined to particular professions, whereas “the procedures employed under the Alaska statute are likely to make [respondents] *completely unemployable*” because “employers will not want to risk loss of business when the public learns that they have hired sex offenders.” 259 F.3d, at 988. This is conjecture. Landlords and employers could conduct background checks on the criminal records of prospective employees or tenants even with the Act not in force. The record in this case contains no evidence that the Act has led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background checks by employers and landlords. The Court of Appeals identified only one incident from the 7-year history of Alaska's law where a sex offender suffered community hostility and damage to his business after the information he submitted to the registry became public. *Id.*, at 987–988. This could have occurred in any event, because the information about the individual's conviction was already in the public domain.

***101** Although the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the Act's registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public record. The State makes the facts underlying the offenses and the resulting convictions accessible so members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with the registrant.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the requirement of periodic updates imposed an affirmative disability. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals was under a misapprehension, albeit one created by the State itself during the argument below, that the offender had to update the registry in person. *Id.*, at 984, n. 4. The State's representation was erroneous. The Alaska statute, on its face, does not require these updates to be made in person. And, as respondents conceded at the oral argument before us, the record contains no indication that an in-person appearance requirement has been imposed on any sex offender subject to the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26–28.

****1152** The Court of Appeals held that the registration system is parallel to probation or supervised release in terms of the restraint imposed. 259 F.3d, at 987. This argument has some force, but, after due consideration, we reject it. Probation and supervised release entail a series of mandatory conditions and allow the supervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release in case of infraction. See generally *Johnson v. United States*, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). By contrast, offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. Although registrants must inform the authorities after they change their facial features (such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek psychiatric treatment, they are not required to seek permission to do so. A sex offender ***102** who fails to comply with the reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal prosecution for that failure, but any prosecution is a proceeding separate from the individual's original offense. Whether other constitutional objections can be raised to a mandatory reporting requirement, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this opinion. It suffices to say the registration requirements make a valid regulatory program effective and do not impose punitive restraints in violation of the *Ex Post Facto* Clause.

The State concedes that the statute might deter future crimes. Respondents seize on this proposition to argue that the law is punitive, because deterrence is one purpose of punishment. Brief for Respondents 37. This proves too much. Any number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment. “To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ ...

would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation.” *Hudson, supra*, at 105, 118 S.Ct. 488; see also *Ursery*, 518 U.S., at 292, 116 S.Ct. 2135; *89 Firearms*, 465 U.S., at 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099.

The Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Act's registration obligations were retributive because “the length of the reporting requirement appears to be measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the extent of the risk posed.” 259 F.3d, at 990. The Act, it is true, differentiates between individuals convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses and those convicted of a single nonaggravated offense. *Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1)* (2000). The broad categories, however, and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.

The Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a “[m]ost significant” factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive. *Ursery, supra*, at 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, the Act has a legitimate ***103**nonpunitive purpose of “public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their communit[y].” 259 F.3d, at 991. Respondents concede, in turn, that “this alternative purpose is valid, and rational.” Brief for Respondents 38. They contend, however, that the Act lacks the necessary regulatory connection because it is not “narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose.” *Ibid*. A statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. The imprecision respondents rely upon does not suggest that the Act's nonpunitive purpose is a “sham or mere pretext.” *Hendricks*, 521 U.S., at 371, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).

In concluding the Act was excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose, the Court of Appeals relied in large part on two propositions: first, that the statute ****1153** applies to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness; and, second, that it places no limits on the number of persons who have access to the information. 259 F.3d, at 991–992. Neither argument is persuasive.

Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism. The legislature's findings are consistent with grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class. The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is “frightening and high.” *McKune v. Lile*, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002); see also *id.*, at 33, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (“When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault” (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 27 (1997); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997))).

9,10 The *Ex Post Facto* Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences. ***104** We have upheld against *ex post facto* challenges laws imposing regulatory burdens on individuals convicted of crimes without any corresponding risk assessment. See *De Veau*, 363 U.S., at 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146; *Hawker*, 170 U.S., at 197, 18 S.Ct. 573. As stated in *Hawker*: “Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and become in fact possessed of a good moral character. But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of universal application....” *Ibid*. The State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the *Ex Post Facto* Clause.

Our decision in *Hendricks*, on which respondents rely, Brief for Respondents 39, is not to the contrary. The State's objective in *Hendricks* was involuntary (and potentially indefinite) confinement of “particularly dangerous individuals.” 521 U.S., at 357–358, 364, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The magnitude of the

restraint made individual assessment appropriate. The Act, by contrast, imposes the more minor condition of registration. In the context of the regulatory scheme the State can dispense with individual predictions of future dangerousness and allow the public to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate information about the registrants' convictions without violating the prohibitions of the *Ex Post Facto* Clause.

The duration of the reporting requirements is not excessive. Empirical research on child molesters, for instance, has shown that, “[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several years after release,” but may occur “as late as 20 years following release.” National Institute of Justice, R. Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues* 14 (1997).

The Court of Appeals' reliance on the wide dissemination of the information is also unavailing. The Ninth Circuit **105* highlighted that the information was available “world-wide” and “[b]roadcast[ed]” in an indiscriminate manner. 259 F.3d, at 992. As we have explained, however, the notification system is a passive one: An individual must seek access to the information. The Web site warns that the use of displayed information “to commit a criminal act against another person is subject to criminal prosecution.” [http:// www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/](http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/) (as visited Jan. 17, 2003) (available in the Clerk of Court's case file). Given the general mobility of our population, for Alaska to make its registry system available and easily accessible throughout the State was not so excessive a regulatory requirement as to become a punishment. See D. Schram & **1154* C. Milloy, *Community Notification: A Study of Offender Characteristics and Recidivism* 13 (1995) (38% of recidivist sex offenses in the State of Washington took place in jurisdictions other than where the previous offense was committed).

The excessiveness inquiry of our *ex post facto* jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. The Act meets this standard.

The two remaining *Mendoza–Martinez* factors—whether the regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime—are of little weight in this case. The regulatory scheme applies only to past conduct, which was, and is, a crime. This is a necessary beginning point, for recidivism is the statutory concern. The obligations the statute imposes are the responsibility of registration, a duty not predicated upon some present or repeated violation.

Our examination of the Act's effects leads to the determination that respondents cannot show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the law negate Alaska's intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme. The Act is nonpunitive, **106* and its retroactive application does not violate the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion upholding the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) against *ex post facto* challenge. I write separately, however, to reiterate that “there is no place for [an implementation-based] challenge” in our *ex post facto* jurisprudence. *Seling v. Young*, 531 U.S. 250, 273, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Instead, the determination whether a scheme is criminal or civil must be limited to the analysis of the obligations actually created by statute. See *id.*, at 273–274, 121 S.Ct. 727 (“[T]o the extent that the conditions result from the fact that the statute is not being applied according to its terms, the conditions are *not* the effect of the statute, but rather the

effect of its improper implementation”). As we have stated, the categorization of a proceeding as civil or criminal is accomplished by examining “the statute on its face.” *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, ASORA does not specify a means of making registry information available to the public. It states only that

“[i]nformation about a sex offender ... that is contained in the central registry ... is confidential and not subject to public disclosure except as to the sex offender's ... name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, description of motor vehicles, license numbers of motor vehicles, and vehicle identification numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a *107 statement as to whether the offender ... is in compliance with requirements of AS 12.63 or cannot be located.” *Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(b) (2000)*.

By considering whether Internet dissemination renders ASORA punitive, the Court has strayed from the statute. With this qualification, I concur.

Justice SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act does not amount to an *ex post facto* law. But the majority comes to that conclusion by a different **1155path from mine, and I concur only in the judgment.

As the Court says, our cases have adopted a two-step enquiry to see whether a law is punitive for purposes of various constitutional provisions including the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. At the first step in applying the so-called *Kennedy-Ward* test, we ask whether the legislature intended a civil or criminal consequence; at the second, we look behind the legislature's preferred classification to the law's substance, focusing on its purpose and effects. See *United States v. Ward*, 448 U.S. 242, 248–249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980); *Kennedy v. Mendoza—Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). We have said that “ ‘only the clearest proof ’ ” that a law is punitive based on substantial factors will be able to overcome the legislative categorization. *Ward, supra*, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636 (quoting *Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). I continue to think, however, that this heightened burden makes sense only when the evidence of legislative intent clearly points in the civil direction. See *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 113–114, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment). This means that for me this is a close case, for I not only agree with the Court that there is evidence pointing to an intended civil characterization of the Act, but also see considerable evidence pointing the other way.

The Act does not expressly designate the requirements imposed as “civil,” a fact that itself makes this different from *108 our past cases, which have relied heavily on the legislature's stated label in finding a civil intent. See *Hudson, supra*, at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488; *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997); *Allen v. Illinois*, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). The placement of the Act in the State's code, another important indicator, see *Hendricks, supra*, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, also leaves matters in the air, for although the section establishing the registry is among the code's health and safety provisions, which are civil, see *Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087 (2000)*, the section requiring registration occurs in the title governing criminal procedure, see *§ 12.63.010*. What is more, the legislature made written notification of the requirement a necessary condition of any guilty plea, see Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(4) (2002), and, perhaps most significant, it mandated a statement of the requirement as an element of the actual judgment of conviction for covered sex offenses, see *Alaska Stat. § 12.55.148 (2000)*; Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 32(c) (2002). Finally, looking to enforcement, see *Hudson, supra*, at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488, offenders are obliged, at least initially, to register

with state and local police, see §§ 12.63.010(b), (c), although the actual information so obtained is kept by the State's Department of Public Safety, a regulatory agency, see § 18.65.087(a). These formal facts do not force a criminal characterization, but they stand in the way of asserting that the statute's intended character is clearly civil.

The substantial indicators relevant at step two of the *Kennedy-Ward* analysis likewise point in different directions. To start with purpose, the Act's legislative history shows it was designed to prevent repeat sex offenses and to aid the investigation of reported offenses. See 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1; Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 13. Ensuring public safety is, of course, a fundamental regulatory goal, see, e.g., *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), and this objective should be given serious weight in the analyses. But, at the same time, it would be naive to look no *109 further, given pervasive attitudes toward sex offenders, see *infra*, at 1156, n. See *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (*Ex Post Facto* Clause was meant to prevent “arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation”). The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably **1156 sweeping in a significant number of people who pose no real threat to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of safety is going on; when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose burdens that outpace the law's stated civil aims, there is room for serious argument that the ulterior purpose is to revisit past crimes, not prevent future ones. See *Kennedy*, *supra*, at 169, 83 S.Ct. 554.

That argument can claim support, too, from the severity of the burdens imposed. Widespread dissemination of offenders' names, photographs, addresses, and criminal history serves not only to inform the public but also to humiliate and ostracize the convicts. It thus bears some resemblance to shaming punishments that were used earlier in our history to disable offenders from living normally in the community. See, e.g., Massaro, *Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law*, 89 Mich. L.Rev. 1880, 1913 (1991). While the Court accepts the State's explanation that the Act simply makes public information available in a new way, *ante*, at 1150–1151, the scheme does much more. Its point, after all, is to send a message that probably would not otherwise be heard, by selecting some conviction information out of its corpus of penal records and broadcasting it with a warning. Selection makes a statement, one that affects common reputation and sometimes carries harsher consequences, such as exclusion from jobs or housing, harassment, and physical harm.*

*110 To me, the indications of punitive character stated above and the civil indications weighed heavily by the Court are in rough equipoise. Certainly the formal evidence of legislative intent does not justify requiring the “ ‘clearest proof’ ” of penal substance in this case, see *Hudson*, 522 U.S., at 113–114, 118 S.Ct. 488 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment), and the substantial evidence does not affirmatively show with any clarity that the Act is valid. What tips the scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State's law. That presumption gives the State the benefit of the doubt in close cases like this one, and on that basis alone I concur in the Court's judgment.

Justice STEVENS, dissenting in No. 01–729 and concurring in the judgment in No. 01–1231.* These two cases raise questions about statutes that impose affirmative obligations on convicted sex offenders. The question in No. 01–729 is whether the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is an *1157 *ex post facto* law, and in No. 01–1231 *111 it is whether Connecticut's similar law violates the Due Process Clause.

The Court's opinions in both cases fail to decide whether the statutes deprive the registrants of a constitutionally protected interest in liberty. If no liberty interest were implicated, it seems clear that neither statute would raise a colorable constitutional claim. Cf. *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Proper analysis of both cases should therefore begin with a consideration of the impact of the statutes on the registrants' freedom.

The statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply. In Alaska, an offender who has served his sentence for a single, nonaggravated crime must provide local law enforcement authorities with extensive personal information—including his address, his place of employment, the address of his employer, the license plate number and make and model of any car to which he has access, a current photo, identifying features, and medical treatment—at least once a year for 15 years. If one has been convicted of an aggravated offense or more than one offense, he must report this same information at least quarterly for life. Moreover, if he moves, he has *one* working day to provide updated information. Registrants may not shave their beards, color their hair, change their employer, or borrow a car without reporting those events to the authorities. Much of this registration information is placed on the Internet. In Alaska, the registrant's face appears on a webpage under the label “Registered Sex Offender.” His physical description, street address, employer address, and conviction information are also displayed on this page.

The registration and reporting duties imposed on convicted sex offenders are comparable to the duties imposed on other convicted criminals during periods of supervised release or parole. And there can be no doubt that the “[w]idespread public access,” *ante*, at 1150 (opinion in No. 01–729), ***112** to this personal and constantly updated information has a severe stigmatizing effect. See Brief for the Office of the Public Defender for the State of New Jersey et al. as *Amici Curiae* 7–21 (providing examples of threats, assaults, loss of housing, and loss of jobs experienced by sex offenders after their registration information was made widely available). In my judgment, these statutes unquestionably affect a constitutionally protected interest in liberty. Cf. *Wisconsin v. Constantineau*, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).

It is also clear beyond peradventure that these unique consequences of conviction of a sex offense are punitive. They share three characteristics, which in the aggregate are not present in any civil sanction. The sanctions (1) constitute a severe deprivation of the offender's liberty, (2) are imposed on everyone who is convicted of a relevant criminal offense, and (3) are imposed only on those criminals. Unlike any of the cases that the Court has cited, a criminal conviction under these statutes provides both a *sufficient* and a *necessary* condition for the sanction.

To be sure, there are cases in which we have held that it was not punishment and thus not a violation of the *Ex Post Facto* Clause to deny future privileges to individuals who were convicted of crimes. See, e.g., *De Veau v. Braisted*, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (upholding prohibition of convicted felons from working for waterfront unions); *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (upholding prohibition of doctors who had been convicted of a felony from practicing medicine). Those cases are distinguishable because in each the prior conviction was a sufficient condition for the imposition of the burden, but it was not a necessary one. That is, one may be barred from participation in a union because he has not paid fines imposed on ****1158** him. See *NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.*, 388 U.S. 175, 191–192, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). And a doctor may not be permitted to practice medicine because she is no longer competent to do so. See, e.g., *N.J. Stat. Ann.* § 45:1–21 (West Supp.2002).

***113** Likewise, in *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), the Court held that a law that permitted the civil commitment of persons who had committed or had been charged with a sexually violent offense was not an *ex post facto* law. But the fact that someone had been convicted was not sufficient to authorize civil commitment under Kansas law because Kansas required another proceeding to determine if such a person suffered from a “ ‘mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ” *Id.*, at 352, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Nor was the conviction even a necessary predicate for the commitment. See *ibid.* (Kansas' civil commitment procedures also applied to individuals charged with a sexually violent offense but found incompetent to stand for trial, or found not guilty by reason of insanity or by reason of mental disease or

defect). While one might disagree in other respects with *Hendricks*, it is clear that a conviction standing alone did not make anyone eligible for the burden imposed by that statute.

No matter how often the Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests that have been applied in wholly dissimilar cases involving only one or two of these three aspects of these statutory sanctions, it will never persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that are imposed on convicted sex offenders *and on no one else* as a result of their convictions are not part of their punishment. In my opinion, a sanction that (1) is imposed on everyone who commits a criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else, and (3) severely impairs a person's liberty is punishment.

It is therefore clear to me that the Constitution prohibits the addition of these sanctions to the punishment of persons who were tried and convicted before the legislation was enacted. As the Court recognizes, “recidivism is the statutory concern” that provides the supposed justification for the imposition of such retroactive punishment. *Ante*, at 1154 (opinion in No. 01–729). That is the principal rationale that underlies the “three strikes” statute that the Court has upheld **114* in *Ewing v. California*, *post*, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Reliance on that rationale here highlights the conclusion that the retroactive application of these statutes constitutes a flagrant violation of the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy and *Ex Post Facto* Clauses of the Constitution.

I think it equally clear, however, that the State may impose registration duties and may publish registration information as a part of its punishment of this category of defendants. Looking to the future, these aspects of their punishment are adequately justified by two of the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence. Moreover, as a matter of procedural fairness, Alaska requires its judges to include notice of the registration requirements in judgments imposing sentences on convicted sex offenders and in the colloquy preceding the acceptance of a plea of guilty to such an offense. See Alaska Rules Crim. Proc. 11(c)(4) and 32(c) (2002). Thus, I agree with the Court that these statutes are constitutional as applied to postenactment offenses.

Accordingly, I would hold that the Alaska statute violates the constitutional prohibition on *ex post facto* laws. Because I believe registration and publication are a permissible component of the punishment for this category of crimes, however, for those convicted of offenses committed after the effective date of such legislation, there would be no separate procedural due process violation so long as a defendant is provided a constitutionally adequate trial. ***1159* I therefore concur in the Court's disposition of the Connecticut case, No. 01–1231, and I respectfully dissent from its disposition of the Alaska case, No. 01–729.

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER joins, dissenting.

As Justice SOUTER carefully explains, it is unclear whether the Alaska Legislature conceived of the State's Sex Offender Registration Act as a regulatory measure or as a **115* penal law. See *ante*, at 1154–1156 (opinion concurring in judgment). Accordingly, in resolving whether the Act ranks as penal for *ex post facto* purposes, I would not demand “the clearest proof” that the statute is in effect criminal rather than civil. Instead, guided by *Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), I would neutrally evaluate the Act's purpose and effects. See *id.*, at 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554 (listing seven factors courts should consider “[a]bsent conclusive evidence of [legislative] intent as to the penal nature of a statute”); cf. *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 115, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]n fact if not in theory, the Court has simply applied factors of the *Kennedy* variety to the matter at hand.”).¹

Measured by the *Mendoza–Martinez* factors, I would hold Alaska's Act punitive in effect. Beyond doubt, the Act involves an “affirmative disability or restraint.” 372 U.S., at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. As Justice STEVENS and Justice SOUTER spell out, Alaska's Act imposes onerous and intrusive obligations on

convicted sex offenders; and it exposes registrants, through aggressive public notification of their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism. See *ante*, at 1156, and n. (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment); *ante*, at 1157 (STEVENSON, J., dissenting in No. 01–729 and concurring in judgment in No. 01–1231).

Furthermore, the Act's requirements resemble historically common forms of punishment. See *Mendoza–Martinez*, 372 U.S., at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. Its registration and reporting provisions are comparable to conditions of supervised release or parole; its *116 public notification regimen, which permits placement of the registrant's face on a webpage under the label “Registered Sex Offender,” calls to mind shaming punishments once used to mark an offender as someone to be shunned. See *ante*, at 1157 (STEVENSON, J., dissenting in No. 01–729 and concurring in judgment in No. 01–1231); *ante*, at 1156 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment).

Telling too, as Justice SOUTER observes, past crime alone, not current dangerousness, is the “touchstone” triggering the Act's obligations. *Ante*, at 1155 (opinion concurring in judgment); see *ante*, at 1157–1158 (STEVENSON, J., dissenting in No. 01–729 and concurring in judgment in No. 01–1231). This touchstone adds to the impression that the Act retributively targets past guilt, *i.e.*, that it “revisit[s] past crimes [more than it] prevent[s] future ones.” *Ante*, at 1156 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment); see *Mendoza–Martinez*, 372 U.S., at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554.

Tending the other way, I acknowledge, the Court has ranked some laws civil and nonpunitive although they impose significant disabilities or restraints. See, *e.g.*, *Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) (termination of accrued disability benefits payable to deported resident aliens); *Kansas v. Hendricks*, **1160 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (civil confinement of mentally ill sex offenders). The Court has also deemed some laws nonpunitive despite “punitive aspects.” See *United States v. Ursery*, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996).

What ultimately tips the balance for me is the Act's excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose. See *Mendoza–Martinez*, 372 U.S., at 169, 83 S.Ct. 554. As respondents concede, see Brief for Respondents 38, the Act has a legitimate civil purpose: to promote public safety by alerting the public to potentially recidivist sex offenders in the community. See *ante*, at 1152 (majority opinion). But its scope notably exceeds this purpose. The Act applies to all convicted sex offenders, without regard to their future dangerousness. And the duration of the reporting requirement is keyed not *117 to any determination of a particular offender's risk of reoffending, but to whether the offense of conviction qualified as aggravated. The reporting requirements themselves are exorbitant: The Act requires aggravated offenders to engage in perpetual quarterly reporting, even if their personal information has not changed. See *ante*, at 1146. And meriting heaviest weight in my judgment, the Act makes no provision whatever for the possibility of rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period, even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation or conclusive proof of physical incapacitation.² However plain it may be that a former sex offender currently poses no threat of recidivism, he will remain subject to long-term monitoring and inescapable humiliation.

John Doe I, for example, pleaded *nolo contendere* to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor nine years before the Alaska Act was enacted. He successfully completed a treatment program, and gained early release on supervised probation in part because of his compliance with the program's requirements and his apparent low risk of reoffense. Brief for Respondents 1. He subsequently remarried, established a business, and was reunited with his family. *Ibid.* He was also granted custody of a minor daughter, based on a court's determination that he had been successfully rehabilitated. See *Doe I v. Otte*, 259 F.3d 979, 983 (C.A.9 2001). The court's determination rested in part on psychiatric evaluations concluding that Doe had “a very low risk of re-offending” and is “not a pedophile.” *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

Notwithstanding this strong evidence of rehabilitation, the Alaska Act requires Doe to report personal information to the State four times per year, and permits the State publicly *118 to label him a “Registered Sex Offender” for the rest of his life.

Satisfied that the Act is ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect, I would hold its retroactive application incompatible with the *Ex Post Facto* Clause, and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Footnotes

*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

*I seriously doubt that the Act's requirements are “less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment” that we upheld in *Hudson v. United States*, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), *De Veau v. Braisted*, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960), and *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898). See *ante*, at 1151. It is true that the Act imposes no formal proscription against any particular employment, but there is significant evidence of onerous practical effects of being listed on a sex offender registry. See, e.g., *Doe v. Pataki*, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (C.A.2 1997) (noting “numerous instances in which sex offenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of notification—ranging from public shunning, picketing, press vigils, ostracism, loss of employment, and eviction, to threats of violence, physical attacks, and arson”); *E.B. v. Verniero*, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (C.A.3 1997) (“The record documents that registrants and their families have experienced profound humiliation and isolation as a result of the reaction of those notified. Employment and employment opportunities have been jeopardized or lost. Housing and housing opportunities have suffered a similar fate. Family and other personal relationships have been destroyed or severely strained. Retribution has been visited by private, unlawful violence and threats and, while such incidents of ‘vigilante justice’ are not common, they happen with sufficient frequency and publicity that registrants justifiably live in fear of them”); Brief for Office of the Public Defender for the State of New Jersey et al. as *Amici Curiae* 7–21 (describing specific incidents).

*[This opinion applies also to No. 01–1231, *Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe*, *post*, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003).]

1 The *Mendoza–Martinez* factors include “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of *scienter*, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative [nonpunitive] purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” 372 U.S., at 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554.

2 For the reasons stated by Justice SOUTER, see *ante*, at 1156, n. (opinion concurring in judgment), I do not find the Court's citations to *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898), and *De Veau v. Braisted*, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960), see *ante*, at 1152–1153 (majority opinion), convincingly responsive to this point.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SERIES

Recidivism after Release from Prison



August 2016

Office of the Secretary Research and Policy Unit

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November 2, 2017

To: Executive Planning

From: Jon E. Litscher, Secretary

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jon E. Litscher".

I am pleased to share with you the fourth in a series of "Recidivism after Release from Prison" reports, produced by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections' cross-divisional Research and Policy Unit.

This report provides updated recidivism trends for more than 156,000 offenders who were released from the Wisconsin correctional system between 1990 and 2013. Following a steady decrease beginning in 1993, recidivism rates have remained relatively stable in recent years.

In addition to updating overall trends in recidivism, this report adds new measures of recidivism. These new measures include recidivism rates by offenders' original incarceration offenses, and an analysis of the degree to which recidivists specialize in certain offense types. The report also includes recidivism rates by risk to reoffend. These measures will assist the Department in its continued efforts to match offenders with appropriate services to ensure their successful reentry into the community.

The Department will continue to identify and implement policies and procedures based on evidence-based principles to achieve the best possible outcomes for offenders, staff, and tax payers. Ultimately, our goal is to create safer communities. I'd like to thank all of the staff involved in the compilation of this report.

Recidivism after Release from Prison

August 2016

Table of Contents

Executive Summary _____	4
Introduction _____	5
Release from Prison Recidivism Rates _____	6
Recidivism Rate Trends _____	6
Recidivism Rates by Gender _____	7
Recidivism Rates by Age at Release _____	8
Recidivism Rates by Race _____	9
Time to Recidivism Event _____	10
Recidivism Rates by Length of Prison Stay _____	11
Recidivism Rates by Risk Level _____	12
Recidivism Rates by Original Offense Type _____	13
Offense Type Specialization _____	14
Appendix A _____	15
Definition of Recidivism _____	15
Methodology _____	15
Recidivism vs. Reincarceration _____	19
Appendix B _____	20
Table 1. Trends 1990-2013 _____	20
Table 2. by Gender 2000-2013 _____	21
Table 3. by Length of Prison Stay 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up _____	22
Table 4. by Risk Level 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up _____	23
Table 5. by Original Offense Type 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up _____	24

Executive Summary

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WI DOC) defines recidivism as a new offense resulting in a conviction and sentence to the WI DOC. One, two, and three-year follow-up periods are calculated beginning on the day the offender is released from prison. Recidivism rates represent the number of persons who have recidivated divided by the total number of persons in a defined population. All recidivism rates are based on only Wisconsin offenses that have resulted in court dispositions that include custody or supervision under the

WI DOC. This report summarizes recidivism rates for a total of 156,026 offenders released from the Wisconsin prison system between 1990 and 2013.

Recidivism Rates by Follow-up Period

Release Year	Follow-up Period	Recidivism Rate
2013	1-year	14.5%
2012	2-year	25.1%
2011	3-year	31.3%

Recidivism rates over the most recent several release years have remained relatively stable. Offenders released in 2009 had the lowest three-year recidivism rate in 20 years at 30.8%. Since then, the three-year rate increased slightly for those released in 2011, to 31.3%. One- and two-year recidivism rates have also

remained fairly constant over the last several release years, with the one-year rate decreasing by 0.7 percentage points from 2011 to 2013, and the two-year rate increasing by 0.3 percentage points from 2010 to 2012.

Highlights:

Gender. Males recidivated at a consistently higher rate than females for all release years and follow-up periods.

Age at Release. Younger offenders were more likely to recidivate compared to older offenders. Offenders aged 20 to 29 made up the largest group of released offenders and recidivists.

Race. Black offenders had slightly higher recidivism rates than White offenders, but the difference between the two groups was the smallest for the entire report period (one percentage point) for 2011 releases.

Time to Recidivism Event. Half of the offenders who recidivated within the three-year follow-up period did so within the first year following their release from prison.

Length of Prison Stay. Recidivism increased with shorter lengths of stay. The lowest recidivism rates were found among offenders released from a period of incarceration that was five years or longer.

Risk Level. High risk offenders demonstrated the highest recidivism rates, followed by moderate risk offenders, then low risk offenders.

Original Offense Type. Offenders originally incarcerated for property offenses had the highest recidivism rates and those originally incarcerated for violent offenses had the lowest.

Offense Type Specialization. Recidivists whose original incarceration was for a violent offense were least likely to commit another violent offense, while public order recidivists were most likely to commit another public order offense.

Introduction

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WI DOC) defines recidivism as the following:

Following an episode of incarceration with the WI DOC, to commit a criminal offense that results in a new conviction and sentence to WI DOC custody or supervision.

WI DOC recidivism rates represent the number of persons who have recidivated divided by the total number of persons released from an episode of confinement that included one or more adult conviction prison sentences. Recidivism rates are based only on Wisconsin offenses that have resulted in court dispositions that include custody or supervision under the WI DOC. This means that persons who have committed offenses, and are subsequently serving their sentences under other state or federal jurisdictions, are not counted as recidivists under this definition. Furthermore, offenses that result in only jail dispositions, fines or forfeitures, or municipal violations are not included in recidivism rate calculations.

Recidivism rates for three different follow-up periods are presented throughout this report. A follow-up period is the timeframe during which an offender is tracked to determine if he/she committed a new criminal offense. Recidivism rates are reported for one-, two-, and three-year follow-up periods. Additionally, this report includes recidivism rates for groups of offenders released between 1990 and 2013. A group of offenders released in the same year is referred to as a release cohort. [Appendix A](#) (see page 15) provides a detailed description of the methodology used to calculate recidivism rates.


WI DOC considers the offense date the date of the recidivism event. Offenders are often not apprehended and convicted until many years after an offense occurs. WI DOC does not obtain data for an offense until a court sentences an offender to WI DOC custody or supervision. This means that historical recidivism rates can change depending on when the analysis is done. For example, if an offender was released from prison in 1995 and committed an offense in 1996, but was not arrested, convicted, and sentenced until 2011, the recidivism rate for 1995 releases as calculated in 2010 would not count the offender as a recidivist. However, when the rate was calculated again in 2012, the offender would be counted as a recidivist for the 1995 release cohort. Therefore, it is important to note that for this reason, recidivism rates reported in the last [Recidivism after Release from Prison](#) report may differ slightly from rates in the present report.

This report updates recidivism rates previously presented in the June 2014 *Recidivism after Release from Prison* report. More specifically, rates for additional release years are reported for overall trends in recidivism rates, and for recidivism rates by gender, age at release, race, time to recidivism event, and length of prison stay. The present report also includes new data on recidivism rates broken down by risk to reoffend, offenders' original offense types (violent, property, etc.), and offense type specialization.

Release from Prison Recidivism Rates

Recidivism Rate Trends

The figure below shows recidivism rates for releases from prison beginning in 1990, by release year and follow-up period. Overall, recidivism rates have significantly decreased since 1990, with the three-year rate decreasing by 27.2% (11.7 percentage points) from 1990 to 2011. In the last several years recidivism rates have remained relatively stable, with a slight increase in the two- and three-year rates, and a slight decrease in the one-year rate since 2009. Recidivism rates are calculated at one, two, and three years post-release and are cumulative (meaning that the longer follow-up periods include all instances of recidivism from the shorter follow-up periods).¹



Recidivism Trends for Select Release Years*

Release Year	1-Year Follow-up			2-Year Follow-up			3-Year Follow-up		
	Total Releases**	Recidivists***		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
1990	2,841	621	21.9%	2,834	986	34.8%	2,828	1,215	43.0%
1995	4,943	1,087	22.0%	4,934	1,659	33.6%	4,920	2,026	41.2%
2000	7,161	1,283	17.9%	7,129	2,174	30.5%	7,120	2,820	39.6%
2005	8,604	1,438	16.7%	8,567	2,310	27.0%	8,534	2,908	34.1%
2011	7,689	1,167	15.2%	7,647	1,908	25.0%	7,612	2,379	31.3%
2012	7,521	1,134	15.1%	7,486	1,881	25.1%	—	—	—
2013	7,661	1,109	14.5%	—	—	—	—	—	—

* See [Table 1](#) in Appendix B (page 20) for a table including all release years.


** Total release numbers may differ from those in past years' reports. Data sets are re-run for every new report, and numbers may change slightly due to corrections in data entry regarding release dates or release types for past years.

*** Recidivism rates may differ slightly from those in past reports due to recent convictions and sentences to WI DOC for offenses that occurred many years before the offender was apprehended. See [Recidivism Event](#) subsection of Appendix A (pages 17-18) for a more detailed explanation.

¹ Offenders who died within the timeframe of each specified follow-up period were removed from each cohort prior to recidivism rate calculations. This resulted in slightly different numbers of offenders released and recidivists for each follow-up period for each given release year.

Recidivism Rates by Gender

Male offenders recidivated at a higher rate than female offenders for every release year and follow-up period. The average recidivism rate for males released between 2000 and 2011 (with a three-year follow-up period) was 35.3% while for females it was 26.1%. Male offender recidivism rates followed the same pattern as the overall trend for WI DOC recidivism rates. However, the trend for females was less consistent. This is likely due to the comparatively small number of female offenders released each year (see table below). Within a small release cohort, slight variations in the number of recidivists can cause the recidivism rate to fluctuate more so than within a large release cohort.




Recidivism Rates by Gender: 3-Year Follow-up*

Release Year	Females			Males		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	682	187	27.4%	6,438	2,633	40.9%
2001	663	187	28.2%	6,200	2,514	40.5%
2002	633	186	29.4%	6,888	2,558	37.1%
2003	672	171	25.4%	7,184	2,718	37.8%
2004	705	204	28.9%	7,611	2,792	36.7%
2005	729	203	27.8%	7,805	2,705	34.7%
2006	695	165	23.7%	7,677	2,656	34.6%
2007	677	183	27.0%	7,844	2,636	33.6%
2008	775	172	22.2%	8,317	2,637	31.7%
2009	690	163	23.6%	7,981	2,512	31.5%
2010	635	146	23.0%	7,833	2,579	32.9%
2011	625	164	26.2%	6,987	2,215	31.7%

* See [Table 2](#) in Appendix B (page 21) for table including all follow-up periods.

Recidivism Rates by Age at Release

Younger offenders exhibited consistently higher recidivism rates than older offenders. Offenders aged 20 to 29 represented the largest number of releases and recidivists for all follow-up years. Recidivism rates for those younger than 20 and older than 59 are not reported due to the small number of offenders in each category.² For links to complete tables of recidivists by age at release click [here](#).




Recidivism Rates by Age for Select Release Years: 3-Year Follow-up

Age Category	2000			2011		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
19 and Under	297	157	---	100	54	---
20-24	1,683	756	44.9%	1,231	512	41.6%
25-29	1,388	558	40.2%	1,674	582	34.8%
30-34	1,249	520	41.6%	1,220	386	31.6%
35-39	1,152	432	37.5%	924	271	29.3%
40-44	729	240	32.9%	893	239	26.8%
45-49	341	108	31.7%	714	175	24.5%
50-54	157	37	---	497	111	22.3%
55-59	76	8	---	219	39	---
60-64	24	1	---	90	7	---
65 or Older	24	3	---	50	3	---

² A sub-group of offenders must make up at least five percent of the total release cohort for recidivism rates to be reported. Recidivism rates for very small populations can be misleading as slight changes in numbers of recidivists can produce large changes in recidivism rates.

Recidivism Rates by Race

Recidivism rates for Black and White offenders decreased between 2000 and 2011, with the gap between the two groups narrowing to just one percentage point in 2011. This is the smallest difference in recidivism rates between Black and White offenders in the reporting period (the largest gap was 7.6 percentage points for offenders released in 2002). Recidivism rates for American Indian/Alaskan Native and Asian or Pacific Islander offenders are not reported due to the small number of offenders in each category.³ Of those offenders released in 2011, 650 reported Hispanic ethnicity, and of those, 27.2% recidivated within three years (offenders in any race category can also be Hispanic).




Recidivism Rates by Race: 3-Year Follow-up*

Release Year	American Indian/ Alaskan Native			Asian or Pacific Islander			Black			White		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	229	107	---	34	9	---	3,829	1,614	42.2%	3,014	1,087	36.1%
2001	246	121	---	33	5	---	3,441	1,424	41.4%	3,134	1,150	36.7%
2002	264	112	---	39	8	---	3,722	1,491	40.1%	3,491	1,133	32.5%
2003	250	114	---	43	11	---	3,852	1,509	39.2%	3,707	1,255	33.9%
2004	298	140	---	51	15	---	3,873	1,480	38.2%	4,084	1,361	33.3%
2005	314	137	---	65	17	---	3,978	1,424	35.8%	4,155	1,329	32.0%
2006	318	133	---	49	10	---	3,906	1,391	35.6%	4,081	1,287	31.5%
2007	322	129	---	63	18	---	3,898	1,311	33.6%	4,223	1,359	32.2%
2008	357	141	---	51	15	---	4,036	1,301	32.2%	4,634	1,351	29.2%
2009	335	129	---	62	14	---	3,768	1,187	31.5%	4,472	1,345	30.1%
2010	321	140	---	57	10	---	3,602	1,190	33.0%	4,468	1,385	31.0%
2011	320	144	---	54	12	---	3,142	984	31.3%	4,088	1,238	30.3%

³ A sub-group of offenders must make up at least five percent of the total release cohort for recidivism rates to be reported. Recidivism rates for very small populations can be misleading as slight changes in numbers of recidivists can produce large changes in recidivism rates.

Time to Recidivism Event


The graph below displays the timeframe in which recidivists committed new offenses. The majority of offenders who recidivated within a three-year follow-up period did so less than two years after being released. Twenty-five percent of recidivists released between 2000 and 2011 committed an offense within 4.5 months, 50% did so within 11.5 months, and 75% committed an offense within 21 months of their release from prison. For a link to a complete table of recidivists by time to recidivism event click [here](#).



Recidivism Rates by Length of Prison Stay

Of the offenders released in 2011, those with a prison stay of one year or less prior to release had the highest recidivism rates compared to all other lengths of stay. For longer lengths of stay, the recidivism rates were progressively lower, and those offenders who spent five or more years in prison prior to release had the lowest recidivism rates.

More than half (54.0%) of the offenders released from prison stays of one year or less were released following admissions for revocations; therefore short lengths of stay do not necessarily indicate short overall sentences (the remaining short lengths of stay were likely due to jail credit). One possible contributor to the differences in recidivism rates between offenders released from shorter and longer lengths of stay could be the larger proportion of sex offenders released from longer lengths of stay (24.4% of those released from a stay of five or more years had active sex offenses compared to 6.5% of those released from a length of stay of one year or less). Wisconsin data shows that recidivism rates for sex offenders are generally much lower than rates for other types of offenders (for more information see the [Sex Offender Recidivism after Release from Prison Report](#)). The ages of offenders in each length of stay category could also contribute to the differences in recidivism rates; offenders age 40 or older made up 27.3% of those released from lengths of stay of one year or less, but made up 38.3% of those released from lengths of stay of more than five years. See Appendix B ([Table 3](#), page 22) for a complete table of recidivism rates by length of prison stay.




Recidivism Rates by Length of Prison Stay: 2011 Releases, 3-Year Follow-up

Length of Stay in Prison	Total Releases	Recidivists	Recidivism Rate
One year or less	2,482	884	35.6%
1-2 years	2,586	846	32.7%
2-3 years	1,053	329	31.2%
3-5 years	786	209	26.6%
>5 years*	705	111	15.7%

* Average Length of Stay = 9.2 years (Minimum = 5.1 years; Maximum = 28.9 years)

Recidivism Rates by Risk Level

Offenders identified as high risk to recidivate (using a risk proxy tool; see [Appendix A](#), page 18 for a description of the tool) had consistently higher recidivism rates than those identified as moderate and low risk. Moderate risk offenders also had consistently higher recidivism rates than low risk offenders. Recidivism rates for moderate and low risk offenders decreased slightly over the report period while recidivism rates for high risk offenders decreased more sharply between 2000 and 2011 (12.1 percentage points). See Appendix B ([Table 4](#), page 23) for a complete table of recidivism rates by risk level.




Recidivism Rates by Risk Level for Select Release Years: 3-Year Follow-up*

Risk Level	2000			2006			2011		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
High Risk	2,505	1,356	54.1%	2,323	1,088	46.8%	1,632	685	42.0%
Moderate Risk	2,802	1,075	38.4%	3,719	1,270	34.1%	3,752	1,280	34.1%
Low Risk	1,812	388	21.4%	2,324	461	19.8%	2,222	411	18.5%

* See [Table 4](#) in Appendix B (page 23) for a table including all release years.

Recidivism Rates by Original Offense Type

The graph below shows recidivism rates for offenders released between 2000 and 2011, by the most serious offense committed that led to their original incarceration (note that recidivists did not necessarily commit the same type of offense as the original commitment offense). Those offenders incarcerated for property offenses demonstrated the highest recidivism rates and those incarcerated for violent offenses demonstrated the lowest. Recidivism rates for those originally incarcerated for public order offenses decreased significantly (18 percentage points) between 2000 and 2011. See Appendix B ([Table 5](#), page 24) for a complete table of recidivism rates by offense type.



The table below shows the percentage of offenders in each offense type category who were designated low, moderate, or high risk to recidivate at the time of their release. Notably, the largest proportions of high risk offenders were those in the property and drug offense categories (those offenders with the highest recidivism rates). The violent and public order offense categories contained the largest proportions of low risk offenders (and the lowest recidivism rates).

Most Serious Offense from Original Incarceration by Risk Level (2011)

Total Number of Releases in Each Category

Total Number of Releases in Each Category								
Offense Type Prior to Release	Risk Level						Total	
	Low Risk		Moderate Risk		High Risk			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Violent Offense	890	28.9%	1,579	51.2%	613	19.9%	3,082	100.0%
Property Offense	373	22.0%	873	51.4%	453	26.7%	1,699	100.0%
Drug Offense	345	23.7%	752	51.6%	359	24.7%	1,456	100.0%
Public Order Offense	609	44.9%	543	40.0%	205	15.1%	1,357	100.0%

Offenses were categorized based on the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA) Performance-Based Measures System (PBMS) standards (see [Appendix A](#), page 19 for more information). To provide an example of the types of offenses in each category, the table below shows the top five offenses in each category for offenders in the 2011 release cohort.

Most Common Offenses in Each Offense Type Category*

Violent Offense		Property Offense		Drug Offense		Public Order Offense	
Statute Description	N	Statute Description	N	Statute Description	N	Statute Description	N
2nd Degree Sexual Assault of Child	378	Burglary-Building or Dwelling	728	Manufacture/Deliver Cocaine (≤1g)	168	Operating while under Influence (5th or 6th)	547
Armed Robbery	289	Forgery-Uttering	163	Possess. with Intent.-Cocaine (>1-5g)	126	Possession of Firearm by Felon	176
Substantial Battery-Intend Bodily Harm	213	Drive or Operate Vehicle w/o Consent	117	Manufacture/Deliver Cocaine (>1-5g)	91	Failure to Support Child (120 Days+)	88
1st Degree Sexual Assault of Child	176	Misappropriate ID Info - Obtain Money	76	Possess w/Intent-Cocaine (>5-15g)	86	Bail Jumping-Felony	83
Battery	167	Theft-Movable Property (≤\$2500)	58	Possess w/Intent-THC (≤200 grams)	72	Vehicle Operator Flee/Elude Officer	57

*Data from 2011 release cohort, 3-year follow-up period. Only the top five most common offenses are listed as an example of the offenses in each offender type category.

Offense Type Specialization

Offense type specialization is the tendency for offenders to be reconvicted for an offense type that is the same as the one they were originally incarcerated for. The table below displays the percentage of recidivists in each original offense type category who committed new offenses in the same category after release from prison. The circled values represent the proportion of recidivists who committed new offenses in the same category as the offense that led to their original incarceration. Overall, offense type specialization was most evident for public order offenses, with 52.6% of recidivists who were originally incarcerated for a public order offense committing another public order offense. This is partly accounted for by specialization among OWI offenders (a subset of the public order offense category), as more than half (58.2%) of the OWI offenders who recidivated committed another OWI offense. Specialization was least evident for violent offenses. Of those recidivists originally incarcerated for violent offenses, 28.3% committed another violent offense. Property and drug offenses fell in the middle with just under half (46.9%) of the recidivists incarcerated for property offenses committing another property offense, and 43.9% of the recidivists incarcerated for drug offenses committing another drug offense.

Percent of Recidivists Convicted for the Same Offense Type as Their Original Incarceration Offense 2011 Releases, 3-Year Follow-up (*recidivists only*)

Original Incarceration Offense Type	Post-Release Recidivism Offense Type			
	Violent Offense	Property Offense	Drug Offense	Public Order Offense
Violent Offense	28.3%	18.8%	16.0%	36.9%
Property Offense	16.0%	46.9%	13.3%	23.9%
Drug Offense	17.9%	12.3%	43.9%	25.8%
Public Order Offense	21.4%	15.1%	10.9%	52.6%

Appendix A

Definition of Recidivism

The WI DOC defines recidivism as a new offense resulting in a conviction and sentence to the WI DOC. This definition of recidivism is based on a rather straightforward, yet fundamental principle in defining public safety. That is, generally, when members of the public are asked what they expect of an offender who is placed on probation supervision, or released from prison following a conviction for a crime, many simply respond "...that they do not commit another crime." Therefore, the WI DOC method for calculating recidivism rates centers on an offense date for which the offender, through full due process of the legal system, is ultimately convicted of another crime. These events can be substantiated through documentation of actions taken by the court (e.g., a Judgment of Conviction).

A notable limitation to fully applying this principle to calculating recidivism rates involves not having full access to data containing information on court dispositions that do not come under the custody or supervision of the WI DOC (see bulleted list at right). As additional data on municipal violations, fines, jail-only sentences, or convictions resulting in sentences in other state or federal correctional systems becomes available to the WI DOC, and can meet stringent validation standards, the Department will expand the scope of its recidivism calculations to include these documented incidents of new criminal behavior. Under current circumstances, the Department can only measure what it is able to count and verify as accurate. Despite this limitation, it is important to note that the WI DOC uses the same methodology to calculate recidivism rates for all past recidivism rates, and will continue to use this methodology for all future rates, allowing for consistent reporting of recidivism trends over time.

Wisconsin recidivism rate calculations do not include:


- persons convicted/sentenced in another state
- persons convicted/sentenced in Federal court
- persons convicted/sentenced in another country
- persons arrested with no conviction
- persons charged with no conviction
- persons with municipal ordinance violations
- persons convicted of a crime that results in a court disposition that *does not* lead to custody or supervision under the WI DOC
- persons admitted to jail or prison without a new conviction
- persons who have not been apprehended or convicted of a new crime

Methodology

There are three key components involved in recidivism rate calculations:

- **Starting point** – This defines the cohort, or the group of offenders being examined to see if they recidivated. For example, offenders released from prison in 2007, or offenders beginning supervision in 2005.
- **Follow-up period** – Timeframe in which an offender has the opportunity to engage in a recidivism event. The standard timeframe used for follow-up periods is three years, but other follow-up periods (one, two, five, ten years) are common as well. To accurately measure recidivism rates all offenders in the cohort must have the same amount of follow-up time.

- **Recidivism event** – The measure that identifies whether and when recidivism occurred. Some commonly used recidivism events are arrest, new conviction, new prison sentence, and admission to prison. WI DOC defines a recidivism event as an offense that results in a new conviction and sentence to WI DOC custody or supervision. The WI DOC uses the date of the offense that resulted in the conviction as the date of the recidivism event. Note that the conviction and sentence can occur after the end of an offender’s follow-up period.



It is important to note what starting point, follow-up period, and recidivism event are being used when comparing results from different recidivism studies, as rates are not comparable when any one of these components are different.

Starting Point

For this report, offenders released from a WI DOC facility between 1990 and 2013 were included in the various release year cohorts with the following exception: offenders who were released from a temporary stay in a WI DOC facility, such as a hold, an alternative to revocation (ATR), or an alternative to prison (ATP) were not included in the release cohorts. Only those offenders who were released from a period of incarceration due to completing the confinement portion of their sentence or revocation were included in each release cohort.

An offender was only counted once in any given cohort. If an offender was released more than once during a calendar year, the last release in the year was used as the offender’s starting point for his or her follow-up period.

Follow-up Period

Follow-up periods for a given starting point cohort were the same for every offender in the cohort. Meaning if an offender was released from prison on January 1, 1995, he was followed until December 31, 1997 for a three-year follow-up period, while an offender released on December 31, 1995 was followed until December 30, 1998.

Offenders who died within the timeframe of each specified follow-up period were removed from the starting point cohort. For example, an offender who died one and a half years after being released would not be included in the two-year follow-up cohort, because he died before the two years were complete. However, this offender would still be included in the one-year follow-up cohort, because he did not die until after he had been in the community for the entire one year following his release. The WI DOC is only able to track the deaths of offenders who are under the supervision of the WI DOC at the time of their deaths. Therefore offenders who died and were not under WI DOC custody or supervision at that time remain in the cohort.

Recidivism Event

An offender was considered a recidivist if he or she committed a new crime and was convicted and sentenced to WI DOC custody or supervision within his or her follow-up period. Although an offender must be convicted and sentenced to WI DOC custody or supervision to be considered a recidivist, it is the date of the actual offense that is considered the date of the recidivism event, not the date of conviction, sentencing, or admission to prison. Therefore, the offense itself must have occurred during the offender's follow-up period. If an offender had multiple offense dates in a given follow-up period the earliest offense date was counted as the recidivism event. An offender can only be counted as a recidivist once within any given cohort.

For some older data, offense dates were missing but corresponding sentence dates were available. Estimated offense dates were calculated for all missing offense dates using the following equation:

$$\text{Estimated Offense Date} = \text{Sentence Date} - 209 \text{ days}^*$$

*Median number of days between offense and sentence dates based on sentence dates that occurred between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2011

If an estimated offense date fell within an offender's follow-up period he or she was counted as a recidivist.

WI DOC's methodology considers the date of an offense as the date of the recidivism event. Often an offender is not arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced until years after committing an offense. The WI DOC does not obtain data for that offense until the time that the offender is sentenced to custody or supervision under the Department. Therefore, past recidivism rates can change depending on when data are analyzed. For example, if an offender released in 1995 was arrested, convicted, and sentenced in 2011 for an offense committed in 1996, a recidivism rate calculated in 2010 for a 1995 starting point cohort would not count the offender as a recidivist. However, if that rate was calculated again in 2012, the offender would be considered a recidivist for the 1995 starting point cohort.

Even when an offender is arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced shortly after the occurrence of an offense, the WI DOC still will not obtain offense data until 209 days (on average) after the offense. Therefore, recidivism rates calculated by the WI DOC provide for a minimum one-year lag time to account for the time between apprehension for a new crime and subsequent court disposition. This allows the Department to capture data on offenders who committed crimes during the last year of their follow-up periods, but who were not convicted and sentenced until sometime after the follow-up period. For example, a report of 2013 release from prison recidivism rates with a three-year follow-up period would not be published until after 2017, allowing for the three-year follow-up period (ending in 2016) and the one-year lag time (ending in 2017).

Furthermore, WI DOC is only able to calculate recidivism rates based on the data that is available to the Department. Therefore, offenses that result in fines or convictions to only county jail are not counted as recidivism events because the WI DOC is not notified when offenders receive these types of sentences or court dispositions. At this point in time, the WI DOC is only able to obtain and validate data on offenders who are under WI DOC custody or supervision.

Percentage Change in Recidivism Rate

The percentage change in the recidivism rate reported in the executive summary and on page six is calculated by dividing the percentage-point change by the initial recidivism rate and multiplying the resulting number by 100. This yields the percentage by which the recidivism rate changed. For example, in 1990 the recidivism rate was 43.0%, and it decreased 11.7 percentage points to 31.3% in 2011. Therefore, the resulting change in the recidivism rate was 27.2%.

Age at Release

An offender's age at release was calculated as the number of years between the offender's date of birth and his or her release date. The offender's age was rounded down, meaning that if 25 years and 300 days had passed between an offender's date of birth and release date, that offender was identified as being 25 years old.

Time to Recidivism Event

Time to recidivism event was calculated as the number of months between the offender's date of release and the date of his or her recidivism offense. The number of months was rounded down, such that if the time between the release and the recidivism offense was two months and 27 days, the offender was categorized as having recidivated in two months from his or her release.

Length of Prison Stay

Length of prison stay was calculated as the number of months between the offender's admission date and release date. The category of 1-2 years includes offenders whose lengths of stay were 24 months; the 2-3 year category includes lengths of stay of 36 months; and the 3-5 year category includes lengths of stay of 60 months.

Risk Level

Offender risk level was calculated using the WI DOC version of a proxy risk screening instrument (see [Bogue, Woodward and Joplin, 2006](#)) in order to capture a complete historical analysis of risk level. Though WI DOC currently uses the COMPAS Risk Assessment to capture a more detailed picture of offender criminogenic risk, the measure has only been in use since mid-2012 and would provide incomplete recidivism-by-risk trends. The WI DOC proxy risk instrument incorporates three items to broadly estimate general risk for recidivism: 1) age at release from prison, 2) age at first sentence to WI DOC custody, and 3) number of prior felony convictions in Wisconsin. Scores from the proxy risk screening instrument are used to define three overall risk categories: low, moderate, and high.

Original Offense Type and Offense Type Specialization

Offense type categories were based on the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA) Performance-Based Measures System (PBMS) standards. While the ASCA standards were followed as closely as possible in the categorization of offenses, supplementary rules were developed to aid in categorizing statutes that did not clearly fit into one category or another. Offense categorization methodology is available upon request.

Recidivism rates by original offense type were determined using the most serious active offense at the time of an offender's release from prison.

For offense type specialization, if an offender committed offenses on multiple dates within his or her follow-up period, the first offense date was selected as the date on which the offender became a recidivist. To determine the offender's most serious recidivist offense, the offenses committed on that offense date only were examined.

Recidivism vs. Reincarceration

Reincarceration rates are also commonly reported by corrections agencies, and are sometimes confused with recidivism rates. A reincarceration rate represents the percentage of offenders released from prison who then return to prison for a revocation, a revocation with a new sentence, or a new sentence within a specified follow-up period. The WI DOC tracks reincarceration rates as a means to report on prison bed utilization and population projections, and as an additional outcome measure, but not as a means to calculate recidivism rates.

Appendix B

Table 1. Recidivism Trends 1990-2013

Release Year	1-Year Follow-Up			2-Year Follow-Up			3-Year Follow-Up		
	Total Releases*	Recidivists**		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
1990	2,841	621	21.9%	2,834	986	34.8%	2,828	1,215	43.0%
1991	3,605	827	22.9%	3,593	1,258	35.0%	3,581	1,530	42.7%
1992	3,649	857	23.5%	3,640	1,257	34.5%	3,631	1,542	42.5%
1993	4,274	1,011	23.7%	4,261	1,572	36.9%	4,252	1,929	45.4%
1994	4,049	892	22.0%	4,035	1,440	35.7%	4,018	1,755	43.7%
1995	4,943	1,087	22.0%	4,934	1,659	33.6%	4,920	2,026	41.2%
1996	4,840	1,074	22.2%	4,819	1,617	33.6%	4,808	1,991	41.4%
1997	5,009	998	19.9%	4,989	1,595	32.0%	4,979	1,969	39.5%
1998	4,780	969	20.3%	4,771	1,476	30.9%	4,760	1,799	37.8%
1999	5,183	1,025	19.8%	5,176	1,639	31.7%	5,171	2,083	40.3%
2000	7,161	1,283	17.9%	7,129	2,174	30.5%	7,120	2,820	39.6%
2001	6,901	1,323	19.2%	6,876	2,164	31.5%	6,863	2,701	39.4%
2002	7,550	1,344	17.8%	7,539	2,188	29.0%	7,521	2,744	36.5%
2003	7,921	1,438	18.2%	7,883	2,270	28.8%	7,856	2,889	36.8%
2004	8,376	1,471	17.6%	8,342	2,376	28.5%	8,316	2,996	36.0%
2005	8,604	1,438	16.7%	8,567	2,310	27.0%	8,534	2,908	34.1%
2006	8,451	1,450	17.2%	8,407	2,253	26.8%	8,372	2,821	33.7%
2007	8,572	1,407	16.4%	8,543	2,217	26.0%	8,521	2,819	33.1%
2008	9,151	1,412	15.4%	9,112	2,243	24.6%	9,092	2,809	30.9%
2009	8,741	1,312	15.0%	8,704	2,072	23.8%	8,671	2,675	30.8%
2010	8,554	1,276	14.9%	8,499	2,104	24.8%	8,468	2,725	32.2%
2011	7,689	1,167	15.2%	7,647	1,908	25.0%	7,612	2,379	31.3%
2012	7,521	1,134	15.1%	7,486	1,881	25.1%	—	—	—
2013	7,661	1,109	14.5%	—	—	—	—	—	—

* Total release numbers may differ from those in past years' reports. Data sets are re-run for every new report, and numbers may change slightly due to corrections in data entry regarding release dates or release types for past years.

** Recidivism rates may differ slightly from those in past reports due to recent convictions and sentences to WI DOC for offenses that occurred many years before the offender was apprehended. See [Recidivism Event](#) subsection of Appendix A (pages 17-18) for a more detailed explanation.

Table 2. Recidivism Rates by Gender 2000-2013

Release Year	1-Year Follow-Up						2-Year Follow-Up						3-Year Follow-Up					
	Females			Males			Females			Males			Females			Males		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	682	92	13.5%	6,479	1,191	18.4%	682	138	20.2%	6,447	2,036	31.6%	682	187	27.4%	6,438	2,633	40.9%
2001	667	84	12.6%	6,234	1,239	19.9%	665	139	20.9%	6,211	2,025	32.6%	663	187	28.2%	6,200	2,514	40.5%
2002	638	86	13.5%	6,912	1,258	18.2%	636	142	22.3%	6,903	2,046	29.6%	633	186	29.4%	6,888	2,558	37.1%
2003	678	79	11.7%	7,243	1,359	18.8%	677	138	20.4%	7,206	2,132	29.6%	672	171	25.4%	7,184	2,718	37.8%
2004	707	82	11.6%	7,669	1,389	18.1%	705	153	21.7%	7,637	2,223	29.1%	705	204	28.9%	7,611	2,792	36.7%
2005	732	103	14.1%	7,872	1,335	17.0%	730	152	20.8%	7,837	2,158	27.5%	729	203	27.8%	7,805	2,705	34.7%
2006	701	80	11.4%	7,750	1,370	17.7%	697	136	19.5%	7,710	2,117	27.5%	695	165	23.7%	7,677	2,656	34.6%
2007	679	102	15.0%	7,893	1,305	16.5%	678	144	21.2%	7,865	2,073	26.4%	677	183	27.0%	7,844	2,636	33.6%
2008	779	73	9.4%	8,372	1,339	16.0%	777	129	16.6%	8,335	2,114	25.4%	775	172	22.2%	8,317	2,637	31.7%
2009	695	76	10.9%	8,046	1,236	15.4%	692	127	18.4%	8,012	1,945	24.3%	690	163	23.6%	7,981	2,512	31.5%
2010	641	55	8.6%	7,913	1,221	15.4%	637	115	18.1%	7,862	1,989	25.3%	635	146	23.0%	7,833	2,579	32.9%
2011	631	80	12.7%	7,058	1,087	15.4%	627	138	22.0%	7,020	1,770	25.2%	625	164	26.2%	6,987	2,215	31.7%
2012	596	65	10.9%	6,925	1,069	15.4%	590	121	20.5%	6,896	1,760	25.5%	—	—	—	—	—	—
2013	607	65	10.7%	7,054	1,044	14.8%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 3. Recidivism Rates by Length of Prison Stay 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up

Release Year	One Year or Less			1-2 Years			2-3 Years			3-5 Years			>5 Years		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	2,654	1,121	42.2%	2,064	829	40.2%	1,103	421	38.2%	807	307	38.0%	492	142	28.9%
2001	2,467	1,058	42.9%	1,929	751	38.9%	944	350	37.1%	909	342	37.6%	614	200	32.6%
2002	2,685	1,090	40.6%	2,067	758	36.7%	1,042	371	35.6%	942	319	33.9%	785	206	26.2%
2003	2,707	1,131	41.8%	2,283	828	36.3%	1,060	366	34.5%	927	317	34.2%	879	247	28.1%
2004	3,036	1,262	41.6%	2,412	830	34.4%	1,089	385	35.4%	877	290	33.1%	902	229	25.4%
2005	3,157	1,195	37.9%	2,566	901	35.1%	1,137	380	33.4%	865	265	30.6%	809	167	20.6%
2006	3,157	1,196	37.9%	2,479	824	33.2%	1,131	383	33.9%	908	254	28.0%	697	164	23.5%
2007	3,323	1,254	37.7%	2,655	875	33.0%	1,027	344	33.5%	862	234	27.1%	654	112	17.1%
2008	3,325	1,173	35.3%	2,991	918	30.7%	1,140	348	30.5%	877	223	25.4%	759	147	19.4%
2009	3,210	1,163	36.2%	2,746	804	29.3%	1,194	347	29.1%	788	223	28.3%	733	138	18.8%
2010	3,029	1,094	36.1%	2,839	947	33.4%	1,056	320	30.3%	849	225	26.5%	695	139	20.0%
2011	2,482	884	35.6%	2,586	846	32.7%	1,053	329	31.2%	786	209	26.6%	705	111	15.7%

Table 4. Recidivism Rates by Risk Level 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up

Release Year	High Risk			Moderate Risk			Low Risk		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	2,505	1,356	54.1%	2,802	1,075	38.4%	1,812	388	21.4%
2001	2,321	1,296	55.8%	2,746	1,030	37.5%	1,794	374	20.8%
2002	2,367	1,207	51.0%	3,138	1,111	35.4%	2,012	424	21.1%
2003	2,380	1,231	51.7%	3,311	1,191	36.0%	2,160	466	21.6%
2004	2,430	1,197	49.3%	3,515	1,269	36.1%	2,371	530	22.4%
2005	2,416	1,179	48.8%	3,707	1,268	34.2%	2,409	460	19.1%
2006	2,323	1,088	46.8%	3,719	1,270	34.1%	2,324	461	19.8%
2007	2,253	1,060	47.0%	3,874	1,259	32.5%	2,393	499	20.9%
2008	2,254	982	43.6%	4,169	1,311	31.4%	2,662	514	19.3%
2009	2,033	922	45.4%	4,121	1,304	31.6%	2,512	444	17.7%
2010	1,911	845	44.2%	4,098	1,372	33.5%	2,453	507	20.7%
2011	1,632	685	42.0%	3,752	1,280	34.1%	2,222	411	18.5%

Table 5. Recidivism Rates by Original Offense Type 2000-2011: 3-Year Follow-up

Release Year	Violent Offender			Property Offender			Drug Offender			Public Order Offender		
	Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists		Total Releases	Recidivists	
2000	2,707	976	36.1%	2,217	1,006	45.4%	1,538	534	34.7%	650	301	46.3%
2001	2,634	933	35.4%	2,148	988	46.0%	1,343	460	34.3%	717	312	43.5%
2002	2,917	943	32.3%	2,332	946	40.6%	1,447	523	36.1%	816	328	40.2%
2003	3,096	995	32.1%	2,196	912	41.5%	1,644	601	36.6%	916	380	41.5%
2004	3,092	1,023	33.1%	2,396	1,016	42.4%	1,823	600	32.9%	1,004	357	35.6%
2005	3,047	899	29.5%	2,227	926	41.6%	2,083	654	31.4%	1,174	428	36.5%
2006	3,093	944	30.5%	2,150	859	40.0%	1,975	614	31.1%	1,148	402	35.0%
2007	3,170	934	29.5%	2,167	883	40.7%	1,891	551	29.1%	1,286	448	34.8%
2008	3,351	936	27.9%	2,271	822	36.2%	2,007	607	30.2%	1,453	442	30.4%
2009	3,342	940	28.1%	2,063	799	38.7%	1,733	497	28.7%	1,506	432	28.7%
2010	3,338	965	28.9%	1,954	795	40.7%	1,640	519	31.6%	1,515	443	29.2%
2011	3,084	840	27.2%	1,701	708	41.6%	1,457	446	30.6%	1,358	384	28.3%

Examining the Effects of Residential Situations and Residential Mobility on Offender Recidivism

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Abstract

Drawing from theories of social control, this study involved an examination of the time-varying effects of six different residential situations and residential mobility on offenders' odds of recidivism during the year immediately following their release from prison. Analyses of data collected on a statewide sample of offenders released under supervision in Ohio generated results favoring a control perspective. Both residential mobility and residential situations such as living with a spouse or parent were relevant for understanding differences among offenders in their odds of recidivism. Stable characteristics of offenders such as gender and prior criminal history were also linked to recidivism.

Keywords

parole, recidivism, offender, social control

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Because of their high recidivism rates, offenders released from prisons contribute significantly to crime rates and state prison populations (Blumstein & Beck, 2005; Rosenfeld, Wallman, & Fornango, 2005; Travis & Lawrence, 2002). Understanding the factors that influence offenders' odds of recidivism can guide the development of practical solutions to the problem (e.g., classification instruments and correctional treatment programs) and inform theories of offender behavior (Committee on Community Supervision and Desistance From Crime, 2008; Travis & Visser, 2005).

Empirical findings from longitudinal studies of offending patterns have underscored the importance of continuity and change in individuals' behavior (see, for example, Committee on Community Supervision and Desistance From Crime, 2008; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Even though studies of offender recidivism are typically restricted to short intervals of time (e.g., 1 year after release), researchers in this area have recognized the contribution of continuity and change and begun to focus on the potential effects of both time-varying life circumstances, such as offenders' employment or relationship status, and time-invariant offender characteristics, such as offenders' prior record (e.g., MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Uggen, 2000). These few studies to date have provided evidence that short-term changes in offenders' situations or local life circumstances can influence their odds of offending (Horney, Osgood, & Marshall, 1995; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; McGloin, Sullivan, Piquero, & Pratt, 2007; Sullivan, McGloin, Pratt, & Piquero, 2006). One potentially relevant, and often varying, life circumstance could be offenders' residential situation (i.e., who they live with). Using a statewide sample of offenders released from prison under postrelease supervision in Ohio, we add to the limited research on offender behavior by examining the effects of different residential situations and residential mobility on recidivism, while controlling for other relevant predictors of recidivism. Drawing from theories of social control, we posit that different residential situations and residential mobility coincide with variation in the level of social control present in offenders' lives. Variation in the level of social control can affect offenders' odds of recidivism.

Theoretical Framework

The focus of this study is on recidivism during the year immediately following offenders' release from prison. Although the recidivism process can occur over a longer period of time (see, for example, Maltz, 1984), examination of the factors associated with recidivism during a restricted period of time can still inform our understanding of the recidivism process (Committee on Community Supervision and Desistance From Crime, 2008; Maruna & Toch, 2005). In addition,

large-scale studies of recidivism have determined that most offenders who recidivate do so within the 1st year after their release (e.g., Langan & Levin, 2002), underscoring that this period of offenders' reentry is perhaps the most critical time to understand. Furthermore, determination of the factors that influence offenders' likelihood of recidivism in the short term is of particular relevance to correctional administrators because, in general, they only deal with offenders for a narrow period of time (La Vigne, Thomson, Visser, Kachnowski, & Travis, 2003). In the jurisdiction under examination in this study (Ohio), for example, the majority of offenders are sentenced to postrelease control (PRC; mandatory parole) for 3 years or less. In practice, however, offenders typically serve only 1 to 1.5 years under supervision.¹ Thus, longitudinal studies of offenders who are restricted to short intervals of time can inform theories of offender behavior (e.g., desistance) and provide correctional agencies with practical information regarding factors that reflect continuity (i.e., static factors) and induce change (i.e., dynamic factors) in offender behavior on a more day-to-day basis (see Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996, for a discussion of the practical application of static and dynamic predictors of recidivism).

In this study, we link potential predictors to recidivism using a social control perspective. A control perspective is well suited to studying adult offenders because it recognizes continuity and change in individuals' behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Continuity is reflected by stable differences between individuals in their propensities to offend (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). In contrast, within-individual changes in exposure to institutions of formal and informal social control often induce turning points that can be the triggering events that influence offenders' odds of recidivism (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Change can be viewed as a long-term process or in the short term as a response to variations in individuals' situations or local life circumstances (Horney et al., 1995; Laub & Sampson, 2003). In this context, the residential situations and related residential stability of offenders released from prison are life circumstances that are likely to affect the degree of social control over offenders' behavior. We hypothesize that variations in offenders' residential situations and residential mobility influence their odds of recidivism.²

Offenders' Residential Situations, Mobility, and Recidivism

The link between offenders' residential situation and offending has been grounded in a social control perspective (Horney et al., 1995; Laub & Sampson, 2003; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Sampson & Laub, 1993). For instance, individuals who are married and cohabitating could be less likely to recidivate

because of the direct control of spouses and because marriage can restrict opportunities for recidivism by altering social networks and/or changing daily routines (Horney et al., 1995; Laub & Sampson, 2003; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Compared with individuals who are simply married or living with a boyfriend/girlfriend, individuals who are married and cohabitating may also have a higher level of commitment to their relationship (Holtzworth-Munroe, Smutzler, & Bates, 1997; Stets & Straus, 1989). A greater level commitment to a relationship may influence the quality and level of attachment in the marriage, which can affect offenders' odds of recidivism (Laub, Nagin, & Sampson, 1998; Laub & Sampson, 2003). In support of these ideas, Horney et al. (1995) uncovered that men who were married and cohabitating were less likely to offend, whereas men living with a girlfriend were more likely to offend. Similarly, MacKenzie and De Li (2002) observed that men who were living with their spouse were less likely to commit nondrug crime. In contrast, living with a girlfriend had no effect on this type of offending. Neither living situation had an effect on drug dealing, however.

Sampson and Laub (1993) underscored the importance of family in inhibiting offending during individuals' childhood years. Yet, the potential effects of parents or other relatives have not received much empirical attention within the context of adulthood. This is probably because for most adults relationships with friends and significant others become more important, and familial effects on adult behaviors become less proximate. However, offenders returning from prison are often devoid of social networks and/or ties, and parents and other family members can be (and often are) one of their few available resources that may facilitate successful reentry (Clear, Waring, & Scully, 2005; Visser, Baer, & Naser, 2006; Visser & Courtney, 2007). Living with a parent or other relative may provide indirect control over offenders' behavior because even though the strength of the attachment between parent and child or between family members may weaken during the offender's incarceration, it could also strengthen more quickly than potential attachments between offenders and other prosocial individuals. Parents and other relatives also have a vested interest in seeing their family member succeed, and so they may be willing to assist parole authorities in the supervision (direct control) of the offender. Although it is likely that some offenders' parents are poor and some parents or other relatives exhibit antisocial tendencies themselves, it is also true that even people who are deviant themselves can be good parents and "bad parents" are good parents much of the time (Clear et al., 2005; Uggen, Wakefield, & Western, 2005). In addition, parole authorities often restrict offenders from living with individuals (other than parents and spouses) who are also under supervision or have a criminal history (Glaser, 1969; Petersilia, 2003).

Prosocial ties (such as between an offender and his or her law-abiding relative) can inhibit offending by bringing new resources to the offender and/or altering or expanding social networks (Clear et al., 2005; Uggen et al., 2005). For all these reasons, it is reasonable to expect that offenders who live with their parents or other relatives will be less likely to recidivate.

Parole authorities not only have the power to restrict who offenders live with but also to direct where offenders live. Released offenders can be placed in halfway houses or homeless shelters, or referred to inpatient treatment programs. These referrals or placements can occur as the result of community sanctions for violations of conditions of postrelease supervision or as a part of case-management plans designed to address offenders' reentry needs. Regardless of how offenders are placed in residential programming, involvement in the program can formally control offenders' behavior by structuring their routines, increasing supervision over their behaviors, and limiting opportunities to violate the terms of their release (Petersilia, 2003).

In contrast to offenders who live in the aforementioned residential situations, offenders who are homeless or have absconded are in situations that lack supervision, assistance, and/or prosocial associations. Offenders living in these situational contexts often have fewer ties to conventional others and/or less to lose by deviating from (or further from) supervision. For those offenders in these situations, conformity may be less likely.

Offenders' residential mobility may also influence the level of control over their behavior. The inability to find and maintain stable housing can inhibit the forming of prosocial networks and decrease involvement in conventional activities (Sampson, 1988; Sampson, 1991). Residential instability may also weaken offenders' stake in conformity or attachment to their community (Sampson, 1991; Wooldredge & Thistlethwaite, 2002). Findings from related studies suggest that offenders who move more often are more likely to recidivate (Meredith, Speir, & Johnson, 2007; Visher & Courtney, 2007).

Other Relevant Controls Over Offenders' Behavior

A reliable examination of the effects of different residential situations and residential mobility on recidivism requires consideration of other variables that can be included in a model as statistical controls. These predictors of recidivism might also proxy various aspects of informal control over offenders' behavior. For example, age may be inversely related to recidivism because younger offenders often have fewer conventional relationships and are less likely to be involved in activities reflecting more conformist lifestyles. Studies have revealed support for a negative relationship between age and recidivism (e.g., Gendreau

et al., 1996; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; MacKenzie, Browning, Skroban, & Smith, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 2005).

African American offenders (particularly males) may be more likely to recidivate because of the overrepresentation of minority offenders from economically and socially disadvantaged neighborhoods (Rose & Clear, 1998), where feelings of resentment and hostility toward legal authority are pervasive among residents (Anderson, 2001; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). If African American offenders do not hold much respect for the rules of supervision because they question the legitimacy of those rules, recidivism may be more likely. Evidence regarding the effect of offenders' race, however, is mixed. (see, for example, DeJong, 1997; Gendreau et al., 1996; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; Huebner, Varano, & Bynum, 2007; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2005).

Employment might exhibit control over offenders, as they might have more to lose by engaging in deviance (MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Uggen et al., 2005). Offenders' involvement in employment may also be suggestive of a greater commitment to convention (Hirschi, 1969; Toby, 1957). Employment can also restrict opportunities for deviance and assist offenders in altering existing social networks (Uggen et al., 2005). Empirical findings from related studies suggest that offenders who are employed have lower odds of recidivism (DeJong, 1997; Gendreau et al., 1996; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Uggen et al., 2005; Visser & Courtney, 2007).

Also important to consider are indicators of offenders' committing offense and prior criminal history (DeJong, 1997; Gendreau et al., 1996; MacKenzie et al., 1999; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Visser & Courtney, 2007). The salience of continuity in offending behavior is well documented (e.g., Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993), and so offenders who have lengthier criminal histories or more prior violations of release conditions should be more likely to recidivate. Researchers have revealed that offenders convicted of drug or property offenses (as opposed to other offenses) are more likely to recidivate (Langan & Levin, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2005; Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005).

Related to the potential importance of offenders' prior criminal history may be offenders' prior associates. Offenders who were previously associated with organized or territorial groups of other offenders (e.g., gangs) may have more difficulty altering their social networks. For example, Anderson (2001) documented the struggles that some offenders have when they return to communities and attempt to negotiate the line between the decent and the street life. For offenders who have ties to antisocial peer groups, the pull of those groups away from convention may make street life and consequently recidivism more likely. In support of these ideas, Huebner et al. (2007) found that offenders who were involved in a gang prior to their incarceration were more likely to recidivate after their release.

Method

The data for this study were collected as a part of a larger project designed to evaluate the effects of a change to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) parole-violation sanction policy.³ The target populations for the larger study included all offenders released on discretionary parole or PRC (mandatory parole) in Ohio during a 3-month period before (October-December, 2003) and after (August-October, 2005) the violation sanction policy was implemented statewide.⁴ The larger study revealed that the change to the sanctioning policy had no effect on various measures of offender recidivism (see Martin & Van Dine, 2008), and so the two samples were combined for the purposes of the current study.

Data and Measures

The samples used for the larger study were selected using the same procedures. Offenders were selected from a list of all the offenders released under postrelease supervision in Ohio for the first time in their current case during the periods mentioned above. All of the female offenders on the list were selected to ensure adequate representation. Male offenders were selected randomly with the goal of 95% confidence intervals for parameter estimates. The male sample also included an oversample of 20% to account for unusable cases (e.g., interstate compacts), cases with missing data, and so forth. These procedures resulted in 1,040 and 1,012 offenders for the two samples, respectively, and a combined sample of 2,052 offenders. Sample weights were derived to adjust for the oversampling of female offenders. These weights were normalized for the multivariate analyses.

Information regarding each offender was collected from a number of official sources (e.g., case files), which were cross-referenced against each other to increase the reliability of the data. The data regarding offenders' residential situations were particularly strong because of the nature of parole work (e.g., parole officers are required to track offenders' whereabouts in their field notes) and because officers were required to enter all address changes into a computer database as soon as they became aware of them. Printed documentation of these address changes were commonly found in the offender files. The data were collected by two researchers, and offenders were followed for a full year after their release or, if applicable, until the date they recidivated.

From the sample of 2,052 offenders, cases were removed if they were interstate compact cases ($n = 27$), were offenders released to detainees ($n = 8$), or had missing data on any of the variables of interest ($n = 33$). These procedures reduced the sample used here to 1,984 offenders released under supervision in

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Final Study Sample (Weighted) and the Ohio Release Population.

Measure	Study Sample		Ohio Release Population	
	Proportion or <i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Proportion or <i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Age	34.72	(10.32)	34.01	(9.72)
Female	0.09		0.09	
Non-White	0.53		0.52	
Incarcerated for drug offense	0.15		0.14	
Incarcerated for property offense	0.22		0.22	
Discretionary parole	0.28		0.25	
<i>n</i>	1,984		19,757	

Note: All measures are dummy coded except age.

the state of Ohio. Table 1 contains descriptions of the weighted sample and the population of offenders released in Ohio during 2003 and 2005 based on measures that were available electronically. Comparisons between the population parameters and sample statistics reported in Table 1 suggest that the sample was not significantly different from the populations on measures of age, race, gender, or committing offense type.

Recently released offenders are a highly mobile group. Visser and Courtney (2007) found that more than 60% of their sample moved at least once during the year after they were released, and nearly a third of the offenders moved several times. The data analyzed for this study revealed a similar level of mobility. Regardless of the outcome examined, more than half of the offenders moved at least once and a substantial minority ($\approx 27\%$) moved more than once ($M \approx 2.12$, $SD \approx 1.27$). The need to recognize multiple residential situations within the same offender and attribute the outcome variables to the correct situation required the creation of a longitudinal person-period data set. Specifically, months were nested within offenders, permitting us to assess monthly changes in offenders' residential situations, mobility, and so forth.⁵ This was particularly important for the examination of residential situations because it was not uncommon for offenders to live in a residential situation without incident for the majority of the study period but experience problems within a month or two after they had moved to a new situation. Only months that the offenders were living in the community were included in the study.⁶

All the measures included in the final models and the final Level 1 sample sizes are described in Table 2. Important to note is that the descriptions of the

Table 2. Sample Means and Standard Deviations (Unweighted).

Measures	Rearrested	Rearrested for Felony
Outcomes		
Rearrested hazard rate	0.05 (0.22)	—
Rearrested for felony hazard rate	—	0.02 (0.16)
Within-individual predictors		
Lived with spouse	0.05 (0.22)	0.05 (0.22)
Lived with boyfriend/girlfriend	0.08 (0.28)	0.09 (0.28)
Lived with parent	0.35 (0.48)	0.34 (0.47)
Lived with other relative	0.20 (0.40)	0.19 (0.40)
Lived in residential program	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.32)
Homeless or at large	0.05 (0.21)	0.06 (0.23)
Number of prior residences	0.46 (0.80)	0.66 (1.04)
Prior violation	0.28 (0.45)	0.39 (0.49)
n_1	16,626	19,086
Between-individual predictors		
Age	34.83 (10.26)	
Female	0.19 (0.39)	
African American	0.51 (0.50)	
Employed	0.62 (0.48)	
Retired, disabled, or receiving SSI	0.09 (0.28)	
Incarcerated for drug offense	0.16 (0.36)	
Incarcerated for property offense	0.23 (0.42)	
High risk	0.16 (0.37)	
Low risk	0.43 (0.50)	
Gang member	0.14 (0.35)	
Discretionary parole	0.28 (0.45)	
n_2	1,984	

Note: SSI = supplemental security income. All measures are dummy coded except number of prior residences and age.

outcome measures and within-individual measures reported in Table 2 are summary statistics that are based on the number of offenders in the sample who were at risk for each month of the study, rather than simply the number of offenders. Recidivism was measured with two variables, including whether an offender was arrested for a new offense or a violation of their release conditions (*rearrested*) and whether an offender was arrested for a new felony offense (*rearrested for felony*). Both outcome measures were examined because some changes in offenders' residential situations could technically be considered violations of their release conditions and therefore may have been more likely to result in an arrest.

Rearrests were chosen over other measures (e.g., reincarceration) to avoid problems associated with measures that require further procession into the criminal justice system (see Maltz, 1984). Each of the measures of recidivism is technically an official measure and therefore may underestimate the offenders' actual offending behavior (see MacKenzie et al., 1999). Even though official measures of recidivism have been considered a valid indicator of offender behavior (e.g., Farrall, 2005), the limitations of the measures should be kept in mind when interpreting the findings.

In addition to the outcome variables, offenders' residential situations, residential mobility, and one of the control variables were measured within individuals to allow their effects to vary over time (monthly). We examined six different residential situations, including whether an offender *lived with spouse, lived with boyfriend/girlfriend, lived with parent, lived with other relative, lived in residential program*, or *was homeless or at large*.⁷ All of the other possible residential situations (e.g., living with a roommate) were pooled and designated as the reference category. Living with a parent was distinguished from living with other relatives because the strength of the attachment between individuals and their parents or spouse is often greater than their attachment to siblings or other relatives (Sampson & Laub, 1993). Thus, the degree of control over offenders who lived in those types of situations was expected to be greater. In addition, and in contrast to other relatives, parole authorities rarely restricted offenders from living with significant others or parents.⁸

Other within-individual measures included *number of prior residences* and *prior violation*. Number of prior residences measures the total number of residential moves an offender accrued prior to the beginning of each month. Prior violation reflects whether an offender had committed a technical violation prior to the beginning of each month.

We also included between-individual predictors measuring each offenders' *age* at the start of supervision, whether they were *female, African American, employed, or retired, disabled, or receiving supplemental security income (SSI)*. Employed indicates whether an offender had a period of steady employment during the follow-up period. Although other researchers have measured employment within individuals (e.g., Horney et al., 1995; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002), we were unable to do so here. We observed too much between-officer variability in the quality of their field notes with regard to dates of employment to ascertain whether or when offenders changed or lost their jobs. For example, it was often the case that officers would record that an offender had obtained employment but several months later note that the offender was still searching for work (indicating they had lost their previous job). As such, we chose to error on the side of caution and measure employment between individuals.

Several variables tapping offenders' prior criminal behavior were also included. Specifically, we included whether an offender was *incarcerated for a drug offense* or a *property offense*, classified *high* or *low risk*, as well as whether they were designated a *gang member*. The measures of high and low risk were taken from the ODRC's additive static risk assessment that primarily comprised of indicators of an offenders' prior criminal history and ranks individuals as either high, medium, or low risk. The measure of gang membership was retrieved from ODRC prison records and indicates participation in a security threat group. Similar to Huebner et al.'s (2007) measure of gang membership, the measure used in this study does not indicate whether offenders continued their gang involvement after their release from prison. Finally, we examined whether offenders were released on *discretionary parole* as opposed to mandatory parole (in Ohio, PRC).

Statistical Analysis

As discussed above, the focus on time-varying and time-invariant predictors of recidivism required the creation of a person-period data set, with repeated monthly observations nested within each of the offenders. The dichotomous indicators of recidivism during the monthly observations were examined with discrete time-hazard models. However, the focus on within-individual change raised concerns about the applicability of the traditional discrete time-hazard model (e.g., within-individual changes in offenders' behavior may not be independent of offenders' stable characteristics). These potential problems for the traditional discrete time-hazard model was overcome by incorporating the model within a multilevel estimation method (see Hedeker & Mermelstein, 2011; Osgood, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The multilevel discrete time-hazard modeling technique (a) facilitated the examination of changes in residential situations and residential mobility for each offender that were observed during the time frame of the study, (b) adjusted for the dependence among multiple observations within the same offender, (c) permitted the hypothesis tests to be based on the appropriate sample sizes (months vs. offenders), and (d) removed (through group-mean centering) between-offender variation from the within-offender observations that might have corresponded with differences in recidivism rates across offenders.⁹ Group-mean centering also restricted the Level 1 analyses to within-individual variation, permitting the examination of the effects of within-individual changes on recidivism.¹⁰

The analysis proceeded in several stages. First, an unconditional model revealed significant variance ($p \leq .05$) in each outcome at Level 1 (within offenders) and Level 2 (between offenders). Next, various specifications of the baseline hazard functions were examined to determine the appropriate

representation for the main effect of time. The Level 1 predictors were then added to the models. Each of these predictors was fixed across all supervision units; however, the Level 1 model intercepts were allowed to vary across supervision units. Consistent with objective (d) from above, the measures of offenders' residential situations were centered on their means for each offender. Finally, the Level 2 predictors were entered, allowing for examination of the main effects of the Level 2 predictors on the Level 1 intercepts.

A potential concern with using bi-level estimation methods with these data involved the limited number of months within some of the offenders (e.g., some offenders were rearrested soon after release). This situation raised concerns about the reliability of the Level 1 intercepts, and so the Empirical Bayes (EB) estimates of Level 1 intercepts were modeled at Level 2 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). As the Level 1 predictors were group-mean centered, these models also included control variables representing the Level 2 means of the Level 1 explanatory variables (e.g., proportion of months living with spouse; Osgood, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).¹¹

Findings

Table 2 reveals that the average hazard rates for the two outcomes were .05 (rearrested) and .02 (rearrested for felony), respectively. In other words, offenders typically had a conditional probability of .05 that they were rearrested and a conditional probability of .02 that they were rearrested for a new felony offense during each month of the study period. During the entire year after their release from prison, 44% of these offenders were rearrested, whereas 24% of the offenders were rearrested for a new felony. Examination of the monthly conditional probabilities of the two measures of recidivism (not shown) revealed minimal variability across the 12 months examined here.¹² Examination of preliminary models with a general specification for the time predictors resulted in time coefficients that were nearly identical, suggesting that there was no discernable relationship between time and the odds of recidivism. For these reasons, we constrained the effect of time on recidivism (hazard) to be constant across all the time periods examined in this study. Treating the effect of time as constant across the time periods contributed to a more parsimonious model and generated more stable coefficient estimates of the effects of the predictor variables (Singer & Willett, 2003).

Table 3 contains the bivariate relationships between offenders' residential situations and both measures of recidivism. These analyses are presented in addition to the multivariate analyses because the bivariate relationships permit comparisons between the effects of each residential situation relative to all the

Table 3. Bivariate Relationships Between Offenders' Residential Situations and Recidivism.

	Rearrested	Rearrested for Felony
	β	β
Lived with spouse	-1.00** (.17)	-0.48** (.13)
Lived with boyfriend/girlfriend	0.77** (.09)	0.77** (.07)
Lived with parent	-1.12** (.07)	-1.26** (.06)
Lived with other relative	-0.78** (.09)	-0.44** (.07)
Lived in residential program	-1.35** (.08)	-0.98** (.06)
Homeless or at large	3.28** (.12)	1.69** (.07)

Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (with standard errors) generated from discrete time-hazard models reported.

** $p \leq .01$.

other situations, as opposed to comparisons between the residential situations and the reference category. Regarding the multivariate analyses, the results from the Level 1 (within individual) models are contained in Table 4, and Table 5 displays the Level 2 (between individual) effects.¹³

Rearrest

The bivariate analyses (Table 3) revealed that offenders who lived with their spouse, a parent, other relative, or in a residential program were at lower risk to be rearrested. Offenders who lived with their boyfriend/girlfriend or were homeless or at large had higher odds of being rearrested.

Turning to the multivariate analysis, the results from the within-individual model (Table 4) revealed that offenders who lived with their spouse, parent, other relative, or in a residential program were less likely to be rearrested. Offenders who lived with their boyfriend/girlfriend or were homeless or at large had a higher likelihood of being rearrested. Offenders who moved more frequently or had a prior violation were also more likely to be arrested. Based on the odds ratios reported in Table 4, compared with the reference category, offenders who lived with their spouse had 43% lower odds of being rearrested. In contrast, in

Table 4. Level I Discrete Time-Hazard Models Predicting Recidivism.

	Rearrested		Rearrested for Felony	
	β	e^{β}	β	e^{β}
Constant	-2.04		-2.81	
Lived with spouse	-0.55** (.17)	0.57	-0.62** (.11)	0.54
Lived with boyfriend/girlfriend	0.60** (.10)	1.82	0.27** (.06)	1.31
Lived with parent	-0.18* (.09)	0.83	-0.85** (.06)	0.43
Lived with other relative	-0.33** (.08)	0.72	-0.47** (.06)	0.62
Lived in residential program	-0.23** (.09)	0.79	-0.43** (.05)	0.65
Homeless or at large	1.50** (.12)	4.48	0.04 (.06)	1.04
Number of prior residences	1.19** (.03)	3.28	1.08** (.02)	2.96
Prior violation	0.81** (.05)	2.25	0.92** (.04)	2.52
n_1	16,626		19,086	
Proportion within-individual variation explained	0.40		0.51	

Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (with standard errors) and odds ratios reported.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$.

the months offenders lived with their boyfriend or girlfriend, their odds of being rearrested was 82% higher. Compared with the reference category, offenders who lived with a parent had a 17% lower risk of being rearrested, whereas offenders who lived with a relative had 28% lower odds of being rearrested. During the months offenders lived in a residential program, they had a 20% lower risk of being rearrested. Finally, each time an offender moved was associated with a 125% increase in the risk, they were rearrested. The significant predictors in the model accounted for 40% of the within-individual variation in this outcome.

The results of the between-offender model are presented in Table 5. Younger offenders and male offenders were both more likely to be rearrested. Offenders who were employed, retired, disabled, receiving SSI, classified low risk, or released on discretionary parole had a lower rate of rearrest. By contrast,

Table 5. Level 2 Main Effects on Recidivism (Level 1 *eb* Intercepts as Outcomes).

	Rearrested		Rearrested for Felony	
	γ	<i>b</i>	γ	<i>b</i>
Intercept	-1.98		-4.15	
Age	-0.03** (.01)	-.10	-0.05** (.01)	-.11
Female	-0.70** (.15)	-.09	-0.91** (.30)	-.06
African American	-0.16 (.12)	-.03	0.05 (.18)	-.01
Employed	-0.87** (.13)	-.14	-1.67** (.20)	-.18
Retired, disabled, or receiving SSI	-0.71** (.23)	-.07	-1.75** (.36)	-.11
Incarcerated for property offense	0.47** (.14)	.07	0.58** (.21)	.06
Incarcerated for drug offense	0.10 (.16)	.01	0.15 (.25)	.01
High risk	0.57** (.17)	.07	0.65** (.25)	.06
Low risk	-0.89** (.13)	-.15	-0.86** (.19)	-.10
Gang member	0.57** (.17)	.07	0.59** (.24)	.05
Discretionary parole	-0.49** (.14)	-.07	-0.67** (.20)	-.07
n_2	1,984			
Proportion between individual variation explained	0.32		0.29	

Note: SSI = supplemental security income. Unstandardized coefficients (with standard errors) and standardized coefficients reported. Models include controls for mean levels of all the Level 1 predictors.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$.

offenders who were incarcerated for property offenses, classified high risk, or designated a gang member were more likely to be rearrested. Whether offenders were African American or incarcerated for a drug offense had no effect on their rate of rearrest. The significant predictors explained 32% of the between-individual variation in the rate of rearrest.

Rearrest for Felony

The findings from the bivariate analyses (Table 3) were consistent with those from the analyses of rearrest. Offenders who lived with their spouse, a parent, other relative, or in a residential program had lower odds of rearrest for a new felony. Offenders who lived with their boyfriend/girlfriend or were homeless or at large had higher odds of rearrest for a new felony.

The analysis of within-individual effects on rearrest for a new felony (Table 4) revealed that offenders who lived with a spouse, parent, other relative, or in a residential program had a lower probability of rearrest for a new felony. By contrast, offenders who lived with their boyfriend/girlfriend had a higher likelihood of rearrest for a new felony. These results were all consistent with the analysis of rearrest. Unique to this outcome, however, having been homeless or at large had no effect on offenders' likelihood of rearrest for a felony. Consistent with the models of rearrest, offenders who moved more frequently or had a prior violation of their release conditions had higher odds of being rearrested for a new felony. The odds ratios reported in Table 4 suggest that, compared with the reference group, offenders who lived with their spouse had 46% lower odds of being rearrested for a new felony. However, during the months offenders lived with their boyfriend/girlfriend, they had a 31% higher risk of being rearrested for a new felony. Offenders who lived with a parent or lived with a relative had 57% and 38% lower odds of recidivism, respectively. During the months offenders were living in a residential program, their odds of being rearrested for a new felony were 35% lower. Each time an offender moved was associated with a 196% increase in the odds of recidivism. The model explained 51% of the within-individual variation in rearrest for a new felony.

The offender-level analysis of the rate of rearrest for a new felony (Table 4) revealed findings that were completely consistent with those derived from the model of the rate of rearrest. Younger offenders and male offenders were both more likely to be rearrested for a new felony. Offenders who were employed, retired, disabled, receiving SSI, classified low risk, or released on discretionary parole had a lower probability of being rearrested for a new felony. Offenders incarcerated for property offenses, classified as high risk, or designated gang members had higher rates of rearrest for a new felony. Neither race (African American) nor incarcerated for a drug offense had any effect on the rearrest rate for a new felony. Taken together, the relevant predictors explained 29% of the between-individual variation in the rate of rearrest for a new felony.

Discussion and Conclusions

The findings from this study underscore the importance of offenders' residential situations and residential mobility on their likelihood of recidivism. Each of the residential situations that we examined here was related to at least one of the two measures of recidivism. Consistent with our predictions, during the months offenders lived with their spouse, parent, other relative, or in a residential program, they were less likely to recidivate. During the months that offenders lived with a boyfriend/girlfriend or were homeless or at large, they typically had higher odds of recidivism. Offenders who moved more frequently were also more likely to recidivate. These findings are consistent with those derived from other studies that suggest that the situational context or local life circumstances of offenders can affect their likelihood of offending (e.g., Horney et al., 1995; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003).

Taken together, the results from this study are also favorable to a social control perspective and suggest that future studies should examine more direct measures of the concepts that were examined here. For example, we uncovered differences between the effects of living with a spouse versus living with a boyfriend/girlfriend. These findings are consistent with Horney et al.'s (1995) and underscore Sampson and Laub's (1993) discussion regarding the importance of involvement in quality relationships. Specifically, they argued that it is the strength of the attachment to the relationship that affects offenders' likelihood of reoffending (see, for example, Laub et al., 1998; Laub & Sampson, 2003). It may be worthwhile to go beyond comparisons between measures of married and cohabitating versus other cohabitating relationships, and examine more directly the strength of offenders' attachment to their relationship with significant others.

We also observed that offenders who live with a parent or other relative were less likely to recidivate. The effects of parents or other family members on individuals' likelihood of deviance have received considerable attention within the context of juvenile delinquency (see, for example, Sampson & Laub, 1993, for a review of this literature), but the potential effect of parents or other relatives on adult offending has rarely been examined. The dearth of attention to potential parental or other familial effects is probably attributable to the assumption that most individuals leave their parents' home after reaching adulthood. Contact with other relatives may also be less frequent in adulthood, weakening the ties between individuals and these other family members. Within the context of prisoner reentry, however, parents and other relatives are often one of the few resources for released offenders to draw from (Visser & Courtney, 2007). Future studies may want to examine the content and quality

of parental or other familial relationships, to shed light on whether the effect of parents or other relatives on offenders' likelihood of recidivism results from the direct supervision these individuals provide, or whether the attachment between parent or other relatives and offenders becomes stronger when offenders return home to their parents' or other family members' residence.

Future studies may also want to examine more directly the countering influence of supervising officials on offender's self-selection into high-risk residential situations. We speculated that parole officials may restrict offenders from living with individuals, including family members (aside from parents or spouses), who were under supervision or had criminal histories. Our speculations were based on (a) nonsystematic observations made during the collection of the data for this study and (b) department policy that required the release authorities in Ohio to investigate all potential residential situations where offenders may reside on their release. Factors that were considered relevant for restricting offenders from living in a residence include the availability of firearms, criminal records of individuals living in the residence, familial relationships, family members attitudes, and so forth. Pursuant to conditions of release, related factors could be used by Ohio parole officers to deny changes of residence if offenders request to change their residence. Nonsystematic observations made during the collection of the data used for this study suggested that denial of initial placements was quite common. Residence changes were also denied, although to a lesser extent. It is worth mentioning, however, that offenders' self-selection into high-risk residential situations was not always countered by formal control. This seemed especially true in the case of significant others, who in some cases may not have provided the supportive environment that offenders returning to communities often require. An important, and policy relevant, question may be whether or when parole officials should restrict offenders from cohabitating with certain individuals (e.g., family members).

The effects of formal controls on this population were also persistent. During the months that offenders lived in a residential program, they were less likely to recidivate, perhaps because of the formal control the program provided over their behavior. By contrast, individuals who lived in situations devoid of control such as being homeless or at large were more likely to recidivate. Taken together, these findings are consistent with other studies of the effects of formal controls (e.g., Committee on Community Supervision and Desistance From Crime, 2008; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002) and from a more practical perspective, support the use of residential programming for encouraging prosocial behavior among this population.

Aside from the substantive findings concerning offenders' residential situations, we also observed other results that were consistent with much of the prior research on offender recidivism. In support of findings regarding continuity of

offending behavior (see, for example, Laub & Sampson, 2003), we found relatively consistent relationships between our measures of recidivism and offenders' risk level, committing offense type (property), and their prior violation history. We also observed that female offenders, older offenders, and those offenders who were employed during supervision were less likely to recidivate, whereas gang members were more likely to recidivate. These findings reinforce related findings from other recent studies of offender recidivism (see, for example, DeJong, 1997; Gendreau et al., 1996; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; Huebner et al., 2007; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002; Uggen et al., 2005; Visher & Courtney, 2007).

Interestingly, we did not observe effects for offenders' race. These findings contrast those derived from other studies (e.g., DeJong, 1997; Gendreau et al., 1996; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). The differences in the findings between studies could be due to model specification, as we were able to include a number of predictors that, due to data restrictions, could not be included in some prior studies. Our findings could also be the result of the examination of a statewide sample. Many of the existing studies have examined more restricted samples such as offenders released in a city or county. Recall that we argued that the effects of offenders' race may be linked to the neighborhood in which the offenders are released (see also Rose & Clear, 1998). Although we could not examine this idea directly here, it may very well be that the relationship that has been observed in other studies was attenuated here by the inclusion of offenders who shared similar characteristics but were released in nonurban areas.

From a more practical perspective, our findings reinforce observations regarding the influence of both static and dynamic factors on offenders' likelihood of recidivism (see, for example, Gendreau et al., 1996). Although we discussed these processes within the context of continuity and change, the findings derived from this study can just as easily be interpreted in a more applied context. To be sure, studies that examine the influences of offender recidivism in the short term may be of particular importance to correctional administrators because they often work with offenders for only short intervals of time. Recall that the typical period of supervision in Ohio is less than a year and a half. Findings from studies that examine both time-invariant (static) and time-variant (dynamic) predictors of recidivism can be useful not only for guiding the development of offender assessment tools but also for informing correctional administrators about the factors that are associated with changes in offenders' odds of reoffending during the course of the supervision period. This information could, in turn, be used to inform treatment and supervision strategies designed to reduce recidivism.

Finally, it is worth mentioning some important limitations to this study that should be kept in mind when considering the findings. First, many of the measures included here only proxy some of the concepts that we discussed such as

offenders' attachment to their spouse. Additional studies that include more direct measures of some of these concepts are needed to determine the relevance of the ideas supported in part by these analyses. Future studies may also seek to examine whether residential situations or residential mobility are only proxies for some other factors that affect offenders' odds of recidivism. For instance, it might be important to examine not only the effects of whether offenders live in certain situations or are more mobile but also *why* they choose certain situations or decide to move from one situation to the next. Second, the decision to only follow offenders for 1 year following their release may limit the generalizability of the findings. Although the majority of offenders released in Ohio are only under supervisions for a period of time less than a year and a half, this may not be the case in other jurisdictions, in particular, states with indeterminate sentencing schemes. However, in their national-level study, Langan and Levin (2002) observed that more than 65% of all offenders who were rearrested within a 3-year period were arrested in the 1st year of their release, and so the problem may be less of a concern. Third, the examination of dichotomous indicators of recidivism created a potential problem for the offender-level estimates. Specifically, the estimates derived from the offender-level analyses were potentially influenced by the relative stability of the individual offenders' rates of recidivism. Even though additional analyses indicated that our results were valid, the problem could not be completely overcome. The problem could also be more severe in other data sets with similar structures. Researchers seeking to examine within-individual change in the future may want to proceed with caution when examining outcomes similar to ours. Relatedly, future researchers may want to collect repeated measures of dichotomous indicators of recidivism, so as to permit the estimation of more stable recidivism rates. Finally, it is worth reiterating that the outcome measures and a number of the predictor variables (including offenders' residential situations) were created from information retrieved from official sources. Even though attempts were made to increase the reliability of the measures by cross-referencing the information across multiple sources, the information and timing of information was still potentially subject to some discretionary recording by parole officers. All causal inferences drawn from this study were, in part, dependent on the accuracy of the dates contained within parole officials' records.

The limitations of the study aside, the findings derived from this sample of offenders released under supervision in Ohio offer some important insights regarding offender behavior in the short term, but additional research on this rapidly growing, high-risk population is sorely needed. Only after a number of studies uncover consistent effects on offender recidivism, both in the short- and long term, can parole administrators use this information to derive more

sensible methods for addressing the problem. The relevance of returning offender populations for public safety underscores the importance of examining the influences on offender recidivism for improving supervision strategies classification instruments, and developing of community treatment, not to mention informing our understanding of offender behavior.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

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Notes

1. According to Ohio Revised Code (5120:1-1-41), the parole board must order a period of postrelease control (PRC) of 5 years for offenders sentenced for sexual offenses or felony one offenses and 3 years for offenders sentenced for felony two offenses and felony three offenses where the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person. The parole board may order a period of PRC of up to 3 years for all nonviolent felony three offenses, felony four offenses, and felony five offenses. (In practice, a 1-year period of PRC is typically imposed.) The parole board may also terminate or modify the period of PRC before the supervision period is concluded. For example, during the years 2004 to 2008, the average length of PRC served by offenders in Ohio was about 1.4 years.
2. The model described here does not permit an empirical test of control theory *per se* because more direct measures of relevant concepts are needed. We chose control theory because it provides a unified framework for studying many of the within- and between-individual predictors found to be relevant in related research (see, for example, Laub & Sampson, 2003). It is worth noting, however, that other theories could be applied because the measures examined here can only proxy informal social controls. For instance, some of our measures could be construed as proxies for various aspects of strain theory (Agnew, 1999, 2001). As an example, offenders who were unemployed could have felt greater strain because they were not earning a legitimate income, possibly increasing their odds of recidivism.
3. The violation sanction policy was designed to structure officers' responses to offenders' violations of the conditions of their release. The primary intent of the policy was to promote consistency in offender treatment and reduce officers' reliance on violation hearings. A more detailed description of the policy can be found in Martin and Van Dine (2008).

4. The state of Ohio has been a determinate-sentencing state since 1996. Although the implementation of sentencing guidelines abolished discretionary parole release, the guidelines still provided for PRC supervision for those offenders who would have previously received parole and discretionary PRC placement for nonviolent offenders. Offenders sentenced before the implementation of the sentencing guidelines, but released during the period of the study, were still released under discretionary parole supervision.
5. In cases where an offender moved during the month, the residential situation where they lived for the majority of the month was used.
6. The number of months at risk differed across offenders because some offenders recidivated (as defined for this study) before the study-end date and also because some offenders were incarcerated for portions of the study period for reasons other than those resulting in their recidivism (as measured for this study). Thus, the number of months modeled at Level 1 reflects the number of "street" months for each offender.
7. This decision to combine all other relatives into the same category was based on (a) the discussion of parole officials restricting offenders from residing with family members (other than parents and spouses) who had a criminal record or were also on supervision and (b) the similarity of bivariate relationships between different measures of familial relationships (e.g., sibling vs. other relative) and the outcomes examined in this study. Although it is often the case that offenders are in violation of their release conditions when they do not maintain a stable residence, a measure reflecting whether an offender was homeless or at large was included in the models as a statistical control, but also for theoretical reasons. The logic behind this decision may be questioned, but violations of release conditions do not always result in formal action (see, for example, McCleary, 1978) and those that do are sometimes handled in the community without an arrest. Even though the majority of offenders who were homeless or at large for extended periods of time were rearrested, we were also interested in the effects of being homeless or at large on other measures of recidivism that were not linked to the behavior of parole officials (e.g., rearrested for a felony). For these reasons, along with the need to control the effect of being homeless or at large on recidivism, we included the measure in all of the models.
8. Ohio Adult Parole Authority policy requires release authorities to investigate all potential residential situations where offenders may reside on their release. Factors that are considered relevant for restricting offenders from living in a residence include the availability of firearms, criminal records of individuals living in the residence, familial relationships, family members attitudes, and so forth. Pursuant to conditions of release, related factors could be used by Ohio parole officers to deny changes of residence if offenders request to change their residence. Information on parole officials' decisions to restrict offenders from living in certain

residential situations was not collected. During the collection of the data for this study, however, we did observe that residency restrictions were a relatively frequent occurrence.

9. It is not uncommon for some types of offenders to self-select into certain residential situations (e.g., younger offenders may have been more likely to live with a parent); however, by group-mean centering the time-varying predictors, any between-offender variation that may have influenced the within-offender effects was removed, permitting estimation of within-offender effects that were independent of between-offender differences (Osgood, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
10. Estimation of a multilevel discrete time-hazard model also adjusts for problems (e.g., biased standard errors) associated with data that are unbalanced (Hedeker & Mermelstein, 2011; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The data examined in this study were unbalanced for two reasons: (a) offenders who recidivated were censored and (b) the months offenders spent in jail for issues other than those that would constitute the relevant measure of recidivism were not included in the analyses (e.g., detained for an outstanding warrant).
11. Prior studies of within-individual change have examined the number of self-reported behaviors per month (e.g., Horney et al., 1995; Griffin & Armstrong, 2003; MacKenzie & De Li, 2002). The outcomes examined here were dichotomous measures of recidivism, only measured once during the 1-year follow-up period. Although this was not a problem for estimating the time-varying effects (Level 1), this situation did create a potential problem for the offender-level (Level 2) estimates. Specifically, the Level 2 outcome (the recidivism rate) was necessarily influenced by the differences in the number of months offenders were at risk. In hierarchical analyses of dichotomous outcomes, the Level 2 outcome becomes an adjusted rate of the Level 1 outcome. (Technically, the Level 2 intercepts that were generated from these models were not adjusted for the Level 1 effects because the Level 1 predictors were group-mean centered.) For the analyses performed for this study, the numerator of the Level 2 outcome (recidivated, 0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*) was standardized by the number of Level 1 units (months an offender was at risk, 1 to 12). Thus, an offender who was rearrested in the 2nd month after his or her release would have a substantially different value than an offender who was rearrested in the 8th month after his or her release. Although we could not eliminate this problem, we did estimate the models (with the same predictors included) predicting a dichotomous indicator of each outcome. Comparisons across the two analyses revealed no substantive differences in the offender-level effects.
12. For both outcomes, the range of the monthly conditional probabilities of recidivism was less than .02, and most of the monthly conditional probabilities of recidivism fell within .01 of the average conditional probability for the respective measure of recidivism. The only exception was the conditional probability an offender was

rearrested during Month 12 (the study-end date), which was heavily influenced by the density of nonrecidivists. Still, the difference between the highest conditional probability of rearrest and the conditional probability of rearrest for Month 12 was .026, and the difference between the average conditional probability of rearrest and the conditional probability of rearrest during Month 12 was .014.

13. The coefficient estimates contained in Tables 3 and 4 can be interpreted similar to logistic regression coefficients. To facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of the Level 1 effects, odds ratios are also reported. The Level 2 (offender level) estimates contained in Table 5 can be interpreted in the same way as ordinary least squares estimates. Recall that in multilevel analyses of dichotomous outcomes, the outcome becomes [the] adjusted (to the) rate of the Level 1 outcome (recidivism) at Level 2 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To gauge the magnitudes of effects, standardized coefficients (β weights) are also reported.

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895 F.3d 515
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Joshua VASQUEZ and Miguel Cardona, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

Kimberly M. FOXX, in her official capacity as the State's Attorney of Cook
County, and City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-1061

Argued November 28, 2017Decided July 11, 2018Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc* Denied
August 14, 2018

Synopsis

Background: Convicted child sex offenders required to register as sex offenders and comply with state residential restrictions brought § 1983 action against city and state's attorney alleging that amendment to state residency statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Cause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Amy J. St. Eve, J., 2016 WL 7178465, granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Sykes, Circuit Judge, held that:

- 1 city was not proper defendant;
- 2 residency restrictions did not implicate Ex Post Facto Clause;
- 3 offenders failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to takings claim;
- 4 residency restrictions did not constitute a taking;
- 5 residency restrictions did not violate procedural due process; and
- 6 residency restrictions did not violate substantive due process.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (15)

1 Civil Rights Criminal law enforcement: prisons

City could not be held liable on convicted child sex offenders' § 1983 claims for violations of due process, the Takings Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause based on city police officers' enforcement of state law prohibiting offenders from residing within 500 feet of day-care home, where police department did not enforce a city ordinance or other municipal policy, and offenders failed to establish causal connection between city's monitoring of sex offenders' compliance with state law and offenders' alleged constitutional injury. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

2 Civil Rights Governmental Ordinance, Policy, Practice, or Custom

A municipality is subject to § 1983 liability only if one of its policies caused a constitutional injury. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

3 Civil Rights Governmental Ordinance, Policy, Practice, or Custom

The official policy analysis required for determining municipal liability under § 1983 isolates ultimate responsibility for a claimed constitutional violation, distinguishing the acts of a municipality from the acts of its employees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

4 Civil Rights Governmental Ordinance, Policy, Practice, or Custom

A municipality's enforcement of a state law does not constitute an actionable official policy, for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

5 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactive punishment, that is, the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

6 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

A statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law unless it is both retroactive and penal. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

1 Case that cites this headnote

7 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Amendment to Illinois statute imposing residency restrictions on convicted child sex offenders was not retroactive, and thus did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause; even though amendment applied to offenders who were convicted of child sex offenses before amendment was adopted, its requirements and any criminal penalty applied only to conduct occurring after its enactment, i.e., knowingly maintaining a residence within 500 feet of a child day-care home or group day-care home. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Amendment to Illinois statute prohibiting convicted child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of day-care homes was nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme, and thus did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, where statute merely kept child sex offenders from living in very close proximity to places where children were likely to congregate, but did not force them to leave their communities, statute did not control any other aspect of offenders' lives and thus did not resemble the comprehensive control of probation and supervised release, and statute imposed no physical restraint and so did not resemble the punishment of imprisonment. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

1 Case that cites this headnote

9 Eminent Domain Conditions precedent to action; ripeness

Convicted child sex offenders failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to claim against state's attorney challenging statute imposing residency restrictions on offenders prohibiting them from residing within 500 feet of child day-care home as violating the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, where offenders failed to seek damages in state court. U.S. Const. Amend. 5; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

10 Eminent Domain Conditions precedent to action; ripeness

To exhaust a takings claim, the plaintiff must seek relief in state court unless doing so would be futile. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

11 Eminent Domain Criminal justice in general

Amendment to Illinois statute imposing residency restrictions on convicted child sex offenders was not a taking for which offenders were entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment; although offenders could not reside within the 500-foot of child day-care homes, offenders were left with broad market to sell or sublease their residences at full market value, and because amendment was effective when offenders purchased home and leased apartment, its terms were necessarily part of any property-rights expectations they could have held. U.S. Const. Amend. 5; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

12 Eminent Domain What Constitutes a Taking; Police and Other Powers Distinguished

Factors to be considered in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred include (1) the nature of the government action, (2) the severity of its economic impact on the property owner, and (3) the degree of interference with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

13 Eminent Domain What Constitutes a Taking; Police and Other Powers Distinguished

A taking may more readily be found when interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

14 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Amendment to Illinois statute prohibiting convicted child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of day-care homes was not unconstitutionally enforced in violation of procedural due process, where statute placed restrictions on all child offenders regardless of individual risk of recidivism, and thus offenders were not entitled to a hearing for an individualized risk assessment to determine whether they actually posed a continued threat to children. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

15 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health Sex offenders

Amendment to Illinois statute prohibiting convicted child sex offenders from residing within 500 feet of day-care home did not violate substantive due process, where protecting children from child sex offenders was legitimate and compelling governmental interest, and creating a buffer between a child day-care home and the home of a child sex offender could have protected at least some children from harm. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-9.3(b-10).

1 Case that cites this headnote

***517** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 16-cv-8854—**Amy J. St. Eve**, *Judge*.

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Before Bauer, Rovner, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Sykes, Circuit Judge.

Joshua Vasquez and Miguel Cardona are convicted child sex offenders who live in Chicago and are required to register as sex offenders and comply with state restrictions on where they may live. For example, a child sex offender may not knowingly live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or child-care center. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (b-10). A few years after Vasquez and Cardona were convicted, Illinois added child day-care homes and group day-care homes to the list of places included in the 500-foot residential buffer zone. § 5/11-9.3(b-10). When Vasquez and Cardona updated their sex-offender registrations in August 2016, the Chicago Police Department told them they had to move because child day-care homes had opened up within 500 feet of their residences. The Department gave them 30 days to come into compliance with the statute.

Vasquez and Cardona sued the City of Chicago and Kimberly M. Foxx, the Cook ***518**County State's Attorney,¹ seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on four alleged constitutional violations. First, they claimed that the amendment to the residency statute imposes retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Next, they alleged that applying the amended statute to them amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Finally, they asserted two due-process claims, one procedural and one substantive: they complained that the

statute is enforced without a hearing for an individualized risk assessment and is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

The district judge rejected each claim at the pleadings stage and we affirm. Under Supreme Court and circuit precedent, the amended statute is neither impermissibly retroactive nor punitive, so it raises no ex post facto concerns. The plaintiffs' claim under the Takings Clause fails for two independent reasons: it is unexhausted and the amendment was adopted before they acquired their homes, so it did not alter their property-rights expectations. The procedural due-process claim is a nonstarter for the straightforward reason that there is no right to a hearing to establish a fact not material to the statute. And the law is not unconstitutional in substance: it easily satisfies rational-basis review.

I. Background

Illinois first adopted residency restrictions for child sex offenders in 2000. Act of July 7, 2000, Pub. Act No. 91–911, 2000 Ill. Laws 2051. As originally enacted the law prohibited child sex offenders from knowingly residing within 500 feet of a “playground or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward persons under 18 years of age.” *Id.* In subsequent years the Illinois legislature amended the statute to add other places to the list. At issue here is a 2008 amendment prohibiting child sex offenders from knowingly residing within 500 feet of a “day care home” or “group day care home.” Act of Aug. 14, 2008, Pub. Act No. 95–821, 2008 Ill. Laws 1383. Noncompliance is a Class 4 felony punishable by up to three years in prison. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–9.3(f); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5–4.5–45(a).

Plaintiff Joshua Vasquez was convicted of child-pornography possession in 2001 and must register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. His conviction also makes him a child sex offender within the meaning of the residency statute. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11–9.3(d)(1). On August 25, 2016, Vasquez visited the Chicago Police Department headquarters to complete his annual sex-offender registration. As of that date, he had lived in his Chicago apartment for three years with his wife and daughter, and his lease continued through August 19, 2017. The Department notified him that a child day-care home had opened 480 feet from his apartment and told him he had to move within 30 days. Vasquez alleges that he has been unable to find suitable and affordable housing that complies with the residency requirements. He also alleges that his daughter's schooling will be disrupted if the family has to move outside the school district.

Plaintiff Miguel Cardona was convicted of indecent solicitation of a child in 2004.²***519** Like Vasquez, Cardona's conviction makes him a child sex offender subject to the requirements of the residency statute. *Id.* Cardona has lived in his Chicago home for roughly 25 years, but he did not purchase it until 2010 so he cannot claim an exemption for offenders who owned their homes prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendment. § 5/11–9.3(b–10). When Cardona completed his annual sex-offender registration on August 17, 2016, the Chicago Police Department notified him that a child day-care home had opened 475 feet from his residence. Like Vasquez, he was given 30 days to move. Cardona alleges that he cannot afford to move into compliant housing. He also alleges that the day-care home in question has been open since 2014 and his proximity to it has caused no problems.

Vasquez and Cardona challenge the 2008 amendment facially and as applied to them. They sued the City of Chicago and State's Attorney Foxx seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 for violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Cause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The judge entered an order enjoining the defendants from forcing the plaintiffs to vacate their homes or otherwise enforcing the amended statute against them while the case was pending.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the judge granted the motion. She held that the 2008 amendment created only prospective legal obligations

and thus raised no concerns under the Ex Post Facto Clause. On the takings claim she concluded that the plaintiffs had not suffered an unconstitutional taking of their property under the test announced in *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Finally, the judge ruled that the complaint failed to state a procedural or substantive due-process claim because there is no right to a hearing to establish a fact not material under the statute and the challenged residency restriction is a rational means of protecting children from convicted child sex offenders.

Vasquez and Cardona appealed, and the judge granted their motion to extend her order maintaining the status quo through the pendency of the appeal. In the meantime Vasquez renewed his lease, and Cardona lives in the same home.

II. Discussion

1,2,3,4 We review the judge’s dismissal order de novo. *Roberts v. City of Chicago*, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Before taking up the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we note that the City is not a proper defendant on any of them, at least not as the claims were pleaded. A municipality is subject to § 1983 liability only if one of its policies caused the constitutional injury. *Swanigan v. City of Chicago*, 881 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.*, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). The “official policy” analysis isolates ultimate responsibility for a claimed constitutional violation, distinguishing the acts of a municipality from the acts of its employees. *Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau*, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007). A municipality’s enforcement of a state law does not constitute an actionable official policy. *See Surplus Store & Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi*, 928 F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 1991) (“It is difficult to imagine a municipal policy more innocuous and constitutionally permissible, and whose causal connection to the alleged violation is more attenuated, than the ‘policy’ of enforcing state law.”).

***520** The City’s police department did not enforce a Chicago ordinance or other municipal policy; rather, this suit challenges a state law. The City can be held liable only if it has “as a matter [of] policy or custom, enforce[d] the law in a manner or method that caused the constitutional violation.” *Id.* Vasquez and Cardona contend that the City exercises discretion in enforcing the residency statute—for example, by checking for compliance annually when sex offenders register and by giving sex offenders 30 days’ notice to move. But the complaint does not allege a causal connection between the City’s compliance monitoring and the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. *Id.* at 790. The plaintiffs do face a continuing threat of prosecution if they fail to comply with the 2008 amendment, but the State’s Attorney is the proper defendant to sue for redress of that injury. For this independent reason, which the City preserved below but the judge did not need to address, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against the City.

A. Ex Post Facto Clause

5,6 The Ex Post Facto Clause³ forbids retroactive punishment—that is, “the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred.” *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). So a statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law unless it is *both* retroactive *and* penal. *United States v. Leach*, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011).

7 Our decision in *Leach* is conclusive on the retroactivity question. There we considered an ex post facto challenge to the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). *Id.* at 770–71. Enacted in 2006, SORNA requires all convicted sex offenders—including those who were convicted before the Act was adopted—to register in each jurisdiction where they live, work, or attend school; the Act also imposes criminal penalties for failure to register or update a registration following interstate travel. *Id.* at 771 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)). Donald Leach was convicted of child molestation in 1990, long before SORNA came into being, and he was charged with failing to

update his registration when he moved to another state. He argued that SORNA could not be applied to him because it retroactively increased his punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

We rejected that argument and affirmed Leach’s conviction. We began by noting that SORNA’s registration duty and the criminal penalty for failure to comply are plainly *prospective* in operation. In other words, the new regulatory scheme applies only to conduct occurring *after* the law’s enactment—that is, a sex offender’s failure to register or update his registration following interstate travel. Accordingly, we held that SORNA “merely creates new, prospective legal obligations based on the person’s prior history.” *Id.* at 773.

So too here. Although the 2008 amendment to the Illinois residency statute applies to Vasquez, Cardona, and others like them who were convicted of child sex offenses before the amendment was adopted, its requirements and any criminal penalty apply only to conduct occurring *after* its enactment—i.e., knowingly maintaining a residence within 500 feet of a child day-care home or group day-care home.

⁸ We also held in *Leach* that under *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), SORNA’s registration regime for sex offenders is not penal in nature. *Id.* *Smith* upheld Alaska’s sex-offender *521 registration statute against an ex post facto challenge. The Court found that the Alaska registration regime was a nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme and thus raised no ex post facto concerns. 538 U.S. at 105–06, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Because SORNA is indistinguishable from the Alaska statute upheld in *Smith*, we concluded in *Leach* that the federal law is likewise a civil regulatory scheme and not a penal statute. 639 F.3d at 773.

Again, the same is true here. The Illinois residency statute is similar enough to the sex-offender registration statutes at issue in *Smith* and *Leach* that it’s safe to apply those holdings and reject the plaintiffs’ challenge without further ado. If more is needed, we briefly address the two-step framework the Court used in *Smith* and explain why the Illinois residency statute is not punitive under that test.

The Court’s framework asks if the legislature intended to impose punishment, and if not, whether the civil regulatory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the legislature’s nonpunitive intent. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quotation marks omitted). Vasquez and Cardona do not argue that the Illinois legislature intended to impose additional punishment, so we skip directly to the second step. To determine if Alaska’s registration law was punitive in effect, the Court examined several factors: whether the regulatory regime “in its necessary operation ... [would be] regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment[,] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint[,] promotes the traditional aims of punishment[,] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose[,] or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” *Id.* at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Court assigned no particular priority or weight to any of these factors: they are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive” but merely “relevant.” *Id.*

As for the first factor, Vasquez and Cardona compare the Illinois residency restrictions to the historical punishments of shaming and banishment. As the Court noted in *Smith*, however, early shaming punishments “inflict[ed] public disgrace,” and “[t]he aim was to make these offenders suffer permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.” *Id.* at 97–98, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Alaska registration requirement did not shame child sex offenders in this way, *id.*, and neither do the Illinois residency restrictions. Nor do the residency restrictions resemble banishment. Under that early form of punishment, “[t]he most serious offenders ... could neither return to their original community nor, reputation tarnished, be admitted easily into a new one.” *Id.* (citing THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, *AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF CONTROL* 30–31 (2000)). The Illinois residency statute merely keeps child sex offenders from living in very close proximity to places where children are likely to congregate; it does not force them to leave their communities.

Vasquez and Cardona also compare the residency restrictions to criminal punishments such as probation and supervised release. The comparison is inapt; the Court rejected it in *Smith*, noting that “offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens[] with no supervision.” *Id.* at 101, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Although the Illinois residency restrictions limit where sex offenders may live, the statute does not control any other aspect of their lives and thus does not resemble the comprehensive control of probation and supervised release.

The Court also examined the extent to which the Alaska law imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders, *522 observing that “[i]f the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.” *Id.* at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. We accept for present purposes that Vasquez and Cardona have had difficulty finding suitable compliant housing in their neighborhoods. We also recognize that including child day-care homes within the 500-foot buffer zone creates some unpredictability: schools and playgrounds are typically known and fixed, but a private residential property can become a day-care home without anyone in the neighborhood noticing. However, like the registration scheme at issue in *Smith*, the residency law “imposes no physical restraint[] and so does not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint.” *Id.*

Another relevant factor in the *Smith* framework is whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment, but the Court strictly limited the scope of this inquiry, asking only whether the law is retributive. 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Vasquez and Cardona do not develop an argument on this point, perhaps because the residency restrictions are so clearly *not* retributive. As in *Smith*, the obvious aim of the statute is to protect children from the danger of recidivism by convicted child sex offenders. *Id.*

The last two factors in the *Smith* framework are related: the Court asked whether the Alaska statute was rationally connected to a nonpunitive purpose and whether its requirements were excessive with respect to that purpose. *Id.* at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. At this step of the analysis, the challenger is required to show that the statute’s “nonpunitive purpose is a sham or mere pretext.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Vasquez and Cardona maintain that sex offenders do not reoffend more than other criminals. Even if we accept that assertion, similar recidivism rates across different categories of crime would not establish that the nonpunitive aim of this statute—protecting children—is a sham. Indeed, *Smith* holds that states may make “reasonable categorical judgments ... without any corresponding risk assessment.” *Id.* at 103–04, 123 S.Ct. 1140.

In short, under *Smith* and *Leach*, the 2008 amendment to the sex-offender residency statute is neither retroactive nor punitive and thus raises no ex post facto concerns.⁴ The judge was right to dismiss this claim.

B. Takings Clause

⁹ Next, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the judge wrongly dismissed their claim that the 2008 amendment effectively “takes” their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. But neither plaintiff pursued state remedies prior to filing *523 this suit, and current law requires exhaustion of state mechanisms for obtaining compensation before a takings claim can be brought in federal court. *Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City*, 473 U.S. 172, 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).⁵

¹⁰ To exhaust a takings claim, the plaintiff must seek relief in state court unless doing so would be “futile.” *Peters v. Village of Clifton*, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007). Relying on *Callahan v. City of Chicago*, 813 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016), the judge assumed that the Illinois state courts could not provide relief for this claim. In *Callahan*, however, we accepted Chicago’s concession that a suit for relief on a takings claim in an Illinois state court would be futile. *Id.* at 660. Foxx has not made a similar concession

here. And as we explained in *Sorrentino v. Godinez*, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), the Illinois Court of Claims can provide damages for a regulatory taking. By failing to seek damages in state court, the plaintiffs have not exhausted their challenge to the residency requirements.⁶

11,12,13 Even if we looked past this procedural barrier, the takings claim would fail on the merits. Under the Supreme Court’s *Penn Central* test, we’re instructed to examine “(1) the nature of the government action, (2) the severity of [its] economic impact on the [property] owner, and (3) the degree of interference with the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.” *Bettendorf v. St. Croix County*, 631 F.3d 421, 430 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the first of these factors, a taking “may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” *Penn Central*, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (citation omitted). Although the Illinois law restricts a child sex offender’s use of his property, it cannot be characterized as a physical invasion. The law merely adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life.

Moving on to the economic impact of the 2008 amendment, we keep in mind that a regulation does not amount to a taking simply because the property owner can no longer make the “most beneficial use of the property.” *Id.* at 125, 98 S.Ct. 2646. Even the denial of a traditional property right does not necessarily amount to a taking. For example, in *Andrus v. Allard*, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a law preventing the sale of certain artifacts did not amount to a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the regulation did not compel the surrender of the artifacts and that the owners could still derive some economic benefit by “exhibit[ing] the artifacts for an admissions charge.” **524 Id.* at 66, 100 S.Ct. 318. The economic impact of the 2008 amendment to the Illinois residency statute is minimal in comparison to *Andrus*. Although Vasquez and Cardona cannot reside within the 500-foot buffer zone, there is no question that many others can, leaving open a broad market to sell or sublease their residences at full market value.

The third factor in the *Penn Central* analysis seals the fate of the plaintiffs’ takings claims. We’re instructed to look at their “expectation concerning the use of the parcel” and whether they can obtain a “reasonable return” on their investment. *Penn Central*, 438 U.S. at 136, 98 S.Ct. 2646. Vasquez and Cardona assert that they had no reasonable expectation they would have to move. They rely on *Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections*, 282 Ga. 754, 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007), which held that a sex-offender residency statute “positively precludes appellant from having any reasonable investment-backed expectation in any property purchased as his private residence.” *Id.* at 744. But *Penn Central* simply does not support this expansive understanding of a property owner’s investment-backed expectations.

A properly focused inquiry looks to the effect of the 2008 amendment on the plaintiffs’ property-rights expectations. And because the amendment was on the books when Cardona purchased his home and Vasquez leased his apartment, its terms were necessarily part of any property-rights expectations they could have held. That’s enough to doom this takings claim on the merits. *See, e.g., Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis*, 736 F.3d 1060, 1074 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the bar owners’ reasonable expectations included the expansion of the smoking ban); *Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga*, 800 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]hose who buy into a regulated field ... cannot object when regulation is later imposed.”).

C. Procedural Due Process

14 The procedural aspect of the due-process claim rests on the plaintiffs’ allegation that the 2008 amendment is unconstitutionally enforced against them without a hearing or other procedure to determine whether they actually pose a continued threat to children. This claim is squarely foreclosed by *Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003).

There the Supreme Court considered whether a sex-offender registration statute required a determination that the offender was currently dangerous. *Id.* at 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160. The answer was “no.” The Court reasoned that “due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.” *Id.*; *see also id.* at 8, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] validly enacted statute suffices to provide all the process that is ‘due’ ”); *Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization*, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915) (“General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.”). The Illinois statute places residency restrictions on *all* child sex offenders regardless of their individual risk of recidivism. Vasquez and Cardona are not entitled to a hearing for an individualized risk assessment.

D. Substantive Due Process

¹⁵ Finally, Vasquez and Cardona argue that the 2008 amendment to the residency statute is substantively unconstitutional. They urge us to apply heightened scrutiny, claiming that the residency requirements were enacted out of pure animus toward child sex offenders, a politically unpopular group. *See, e.g.,* *525 *United States v. Windsor*, 570 U.S. 744, 770, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013); *U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528, 556–58, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). Heightened scrutiny does not apply. The residency statute is facially neutral and advances a compelling governmental interest: protecting children from recidivism by child sex offenders. The plaintiffs also press for heightened scrutiny because the statute infringes their fundamental right to “establish a home.” *See Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 761, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). This argument is meritless. A law limiting where sex offenders may live does not prevent them from establishing a home; it just constrains where they can do so.

This law triggers only rational-basis review, so we ask whether its intrusion upon liberty is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. *Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp.*, 743 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2014). No one questions that protecting children from child sex offenders is a legitimate governmental interest; indeed, it is a compelling interest. *See Doe v. City of Lafayette*, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the City’s interest in protecting minors from child sex offenders is “not merely legitimate, it is compelling”). The plaintiffs thus “have the burden to negate every conceivable basis [that] might support [the statute].” *Goodpaster*, 736 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotation marks omitted).

It’s self-evident that creating a buffer between a child day-care home and the home of a child sex offender may protect at least some children from harm. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in *Smith*, a state legislature “could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism.” 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Vasquez and Cardona insist that “scant evidence” supports the public-safety rationale of this statute; they also argue that the harsh burdens placed on sex offenders are highly disproportionate to any benefit. But our role is not to second-guess the legislative policy judgment by parsing the latest academic studies on sex-offender recidivism. *See Goodpaster*, 736 F.3d at 1071 (“Under rational basis review, a state law is constitutional even if it is unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This residency restriction on child sex offenders cannot be called irrational.

AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

*Circuit Judge Amy J. St. Eve took no part in the consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc.

¹ Anita Alvarez was the Cook County State’s Attorney when the suit was filed. Foxx replaced her in that office on December 1, 2016, and was substituted as a defendant. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).

2 The complaint alleges that Cardona’s conviction requires him to register as a sex offender through 2017. Although his registration duty has expired, he remains subject to the residency restrictions.

3 “No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.

4 Vasquez and Cardona rely heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in *Does #1–5 v. Snyder*, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016), but that case is easily distinguishable. The plaintiffs there challenged a series of amendments to the Michigan sex-offender registration law, which the court characterized as imposing “a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex offenders.” *Id.* at 697. The challenged provisions included a residency restriction prohibiting sex offenders from “living, working, or ‘loitering’ within 1,000 feet of a school.” *Id.* at 698. The plaintiffs also challenged a provision publicly classifying registrants “into three tiers, which ostensibly correlate to current dangerousness, but which are based[] not on individual assessments, but solely on the crime of conviction.” *Id.* Finally, the plaintiffs challenged a provision requiring registrants to “appear in person ‘immediately’ to update information such as new vehicles or ‘internet identifiers.’ ” *Id.* The court considered these provisions collectively and concluded that this package of civil regulatory restrictions were punitive in effect. *Id.* at 702–06. The single 2008 amendment at issue in this case does not remotely compare.

5 *Williamson County* has been criticized, and the Supreme Court may revisit and overrule it next term. *Knick v. Township of Scott*, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), *cert. granted*, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 1262, 200 L.Ed.2d 416 (Mem.) (2018). For now it remains good law.

6 Vasquez and Cardona argue that if they cannot proceed on an as-applied takings claim, they should be permitted to raise a facial takings claim. This argument is based on a line of caselaw holding that a facial takings challenge need not meet the *Williamson County* exhaustion requirement. *Peters v. Village of Clifton*, 498 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2007). But Vasquez and Cardona did not develop an argument that the 2008 amendment is facially unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. The issue is therefore waived. *See Judge v. Quinn*, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010).

743 Fed.Appx. 10

This case was not selected for publication in West's Federal Reporter. See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also U.S.Ct. of App. 7th Cir. Rule 32.1. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Patrick James WERNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF GREEN BAY,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-2426

|

Submitted July 30, 2018*

|

Decided July 30, 2018

Municipal ordinances that restricted where sex offender could reside while he was on parole did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, even though ordinances were enacted after he was convicted, where ordinances had no retroactive effect, and \$500 penalty for violating ordinance was minor. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

[2] **Constitutional Law** 🔑 Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Mental Health 🔑 Effect of assessment or determination; notice and registration

City sex offender residence board's denial of sex offender's requests to reside at one specific residence while on parole did not violate his procedural due process rights, where board gave offender several hearings for individualized risk assessments, and eventually city changed its residency restrictions to categorically exempt halfway house where he wanted to live. *U.S. Const. Amend. 14*.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 15-CV-216, *Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge*.

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Before *DIANE P. WOOD*, Chief Judge, *ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER*, Circuit Judge, *DIANE S. SYKES*, Circuit Judge

*11 ORDER

Patrick Werner, a sex offender who is now incarcerated, challenges municipal ordinances that restricted where he could reside while he was on parole. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. Because the ordinances do not impose retroactive punishment and Werner was not deprived of due process, we affirm the judgment.

Our decision in Werner's prior appeal recounts his struggle to secure housing as a sex offender. See *Werner v. Wall*, 836 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016). As relevant here, Werner was convicted in 1999 of second-degree sexual assault of a child and attempted child enticement. Since being paroled initially in 2004, he has been reincarcerated at least four times for violating conditions of supervision. When Warner has not been incarcerated, his probation officers have required him to live in Brown County (Wisconsin), the county where he was convicted. See *id.* at 754; Wis. Stat. § 301.03(20)(a)(1). But Werner's housing options there have been limited since 2007, when the City of Green Bay enacted residency restrictions for sex offenders. See Green Bay Mun. Code § 27.620 (repealed). The relevant ordinance prohibited sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of certain designated places where "children are known to congregate." It exempted residences that offenders share with relatives, and it contained procedures for seeking additional exemptions from the City's Sex Offender Residence Board.

On several occasions from 2009 to 2012, Werner sought permission to live at a particular halfway house within the restricted area. Each time the Sex Offender Residence Board, after a hearing, denied Werner's request. These denials affected Werner most significantly beginning in March 2010, when his inability to find appropriate housing resulted in his being detained in the Brown County Jail for more than a year

beyond his scheduled release date. During that period, Werner was let out of jail for four hours each weekday to look for housing and employment, yet not until July 2011 did Werner finally secure housing in Bellevue, a village just outside of Green Bay. In 2012 Green Bay replaced its ordinance with a similar one that categorically exempts halfway houses from the residency restrictions. Green Bay Mun. Code § 27.622. Werner later moved to the halfway house in Green Bay, where he lived until his most recent parole revocation in January 2013.

Werner alleges in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the application of these ordinances to him violates both the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and his right to procedural due process. A magistrate judge, presiding by consent, entered summary judgment for the City. The judge ruled that although the ordinances applied “retroactively to his convictions,” that did not pose an ex post facto problem because the effects of the ordinance were not punitive. See *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 92-106, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). The judge also rejected Werner’s due-process claim, reasoning that he was not entitled to due process regarding the enactment of the ordinances, see *Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), and Werner’s hearings before the Sex Offender Residence Board comported with the basic requirements of due process, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard, see *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).

On appeal Werner maintains that the ordinances are impermissible ex post facto ^{*12} laws and violate his right to procedural due process. But we recently rejected nearly identical arguments in *Vasquez v. Foxx*, No. 17-1061, 895 F.3d 515, 2018 WL 3372403 (7th Cir. July 11, 2018). In *Vasquez* we considered a challenge to an Illinois statute that made it a felony for a sex offender to live within 500 feet of a day-care home. *Id.* at 517–18, at ^{*1}. After noting that “a statute is not an impermissible ex post facto law unless it is *both* retroactive *and* penal,” *id.* at 520–21, at ^{*3} (citing *United States v. Leach*, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011)), we explained that the Illinois statute raised no ex post

facto concerns because it had no retroactive effect at all; it applied “only to conduct occurring *after* its enactment—i.e., knowingly maintaining a residence within 500 feet of a child day-care home or group day-care home,” *id.* After considering the factors in *Smith*, we added that the statute was not punitive. *Id.* at 520–23, at ^{*3-5}. And responding to the plaintiffs’ procedural due-process argument that the statute was enforced against them without a hearing to assess whether they actually posed a threat to children, we concluded that no hearing was required because the statute applied to “all child sex offenders regardless of their individual risk of recidivism.” *Id.* at 524, at ^{*6}.

[1] Werner’s challenges to the Green Bay ordinances fail for the same reasons. That the City of Green Bay enacted the ordinances after Werner’s convictions does not pose an ex post facto problem because the ordinances have no retroactive effect. See *id.* at 520–51, at ^{*3}. Moreover, the penalty for violating the ordinance—a \$500 fine—is minor compared to the possible three-year prison sentence faced by the plaintiffs in *Vasquez*, underscoring that the Green Bay ordinances were not punitive. *Id.* at 520–23, at ^{*3-5}.

[2] Likewise, Werner is wrong when he asserts that the Board’s denial of his requests “to reside at one specific residence ... requires a finding of [the] denial of due process.” Werner is not entitled to any “hearing for an individualized risk assessment.” See *id.* at 524, at ^{*6}; see also *Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety*, 538 U.S. at 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160. Yet here the Sex Offender Residence Board gave Werner several such hearings, and eventually the City changed its residency restrictions to categorically exempt the halfway house where Werner wanted to live. Moreover, Werner does not articulate any coherent argument for why he thinks the Board’s procedures were inadequate.

AFFIRMED

All Citations

743 Fed.Appx. 10

Footnotes

- * We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

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CITY OF SOUTH MILWAUKEE, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.

Todd J. KESTER, Defendant–Appellant.[†]

No. 2012AP724.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 10, 2013. Opinion Filed March 13, 2013.

Synopsis

Background: City brought action against sex offender, seeking to declare his residency within 1,000 feet of an elementary school a public nuisance and to enjoin him from living in the home. The Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Maxine A. White, J., granted the injunction and ordered offender to move. Offender appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Reilly, J., held that:

- 1 offender's status coupled with his residency within 1,000 feet of an elementary school constituted a public nuisance per se;
 - 2 entry of injunction and order without first conducting a hearing to determine offender's dangerousness did not deny offender procedural due process;
 - 3 State's comprehensive regulatory scheme regarding sex offenders did not preempt City's public nuisance ordinance; and
 - 4 City ordinance was a nonpunitive measure such that its retroactive application to offender did not violate his right of protection against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.
- Affirmed.

West Headnotes (25)

1 Nuisance Acts authorized or prohibited by public authority

Nuisance Abatement by act of public authorities

Status of sex offender, having been convicted of sexual assault of a child, coupled with his residency within 1,000 feet of an elementary school constituted a public nuisance per se under the public nuisance ordinance, which prohibited certain types of child sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of certain facilities, and thus, city was not required to perform an independent risk assessment and establish offender's dangerousness before seeking and obtaining an injunction and order requiring him to relocate away from the school. W.S.A. 948.02(2).

2 Municipal Corporations Nuisances in general

Municipalities have broad authority through their police powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their residents, including the ability to define and take action against public nuisances. W.S.A. 62.11(5).

3 Nuisance Nature and elements of private nuisance in general

Nuisance Trial or hearing

Nuisance Questions for jury

A nuisance per se may be established by law, and no actual injurious consequences are required to support a finding of a nuisance per se.

4 Municipal Corporations Police power and regulations

When a municipality has enacted an ordinance that defines a public nuisance per se, courts should not interfere in this determination absent a showing of oppressiveness or unreasonableness.

5 Nuisance Nuisances subject to abatement or injunction

An injunction is a permissible remedy to enforce an ordinance establishing a nuisance per se.

6 Constitutional Law Classification and registration; restrictions and obligations

Nuisance Actions

Entry of injunction and order prohibiting sex offender from residing within 1,000 feet of an elementary school upon finding that the location of offender's residence constituted a nuisance per se under the public nuisance ordinance, without first conducting a hearing to determine whether offender's continued residency substantially interfered with the safety of others, did not deny offender procedural due process; subject to a limited list of exceptions, the only material issues were whether offender was convicted of one of the child sex offenses listed in the ordinance and, if so, whether he was living within 1,000 feet of a school, and offender had an opportunity to contest each issue. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

7 Constitutional Law Notice and Hearing

Procedural due process requires that a party whose rights may be affected by government action be given an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Constitutional Law Notice and Hearing

An opportunity to be heard in court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner satisfies procedural due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

9 Appeal and Error Constitutional Rights, Civil Rights, and Discrimination in General

Due process claims raise questions of law that are reviewed de novo. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

10 Municipal Corporations Concurrent and Conflicting Exercise of Power by State and Municipality Nuisance Nature of remedy

State's comprehensive regulatory scheme regarding sex offenders did not preempt City's public nuisance ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of elementary schools; state's regulatory scheme provided for both the reassimilation of sex offenders into the larger community and the protection of the public, and the ordinance did not defeat the purpose or violate the spirit of the state laws regulating child sex offenders. W.S.A. 301.03(19).

1 Case that cites this headnote

11 Appeal and Error State preemption of local law

Whether state law preempts a local ordinance raises a question of law that is reviewed de novo.

12 Municipal Corporations Local legislation

A city's authority to act under its home-rule powers is limited when it comes to subject matters of statewide concern. W.S.A. Const. Art. 11, § 3; W.S.A. 62.11(5).

13 Municipal Corporations Local legislation

In determining whether an ordinance is preempted by state law, a court must first determine whether the subject area being regulated is one of statewide concern. W.S.A. Const. Art. 11, § 3; W.S.A. 62.11(5).

14 Mental Health Effect of assessment or determination; notice and registration

Restricting where convicted child sex offenders may live in relation to where children congregate is within the discretion granted to the corrections department; however, regulation of convicted child sex offenders, including where they may live after release from confinement, is clearly a matter of both statewide and local concern. W.S.A. 301.48(2g), (3)(c).

15 Municipal Corporations Concurrent and Conflicting Exercise of Power by State and Municipality

An ordinance regulating an area of statewide concern is preempted only if: (1) the Legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; (2) the ordinance logically conflicts with state legislation; (3) the ordinance defeats the purpose of state legislation; or (4) the ordinance violates the spirit of state legislation.

16 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Double Jeopardy Particular proceedings

Mental Health Sex offenders

City ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of schools was a nonpunitive, civil regulatory measure aimed at protecting the community such that its retroactive application to offender did not violate his right of protection against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws; ordinance expressly described itself as "a regulatory measure aimed at protecting the health and safety of children"

in the City, and although the ordinance placed burdens upon offender and other child sex offenders who wished to live in City, it could not be said these restrictions were not reasonable to achieve the City's purpose of protecting against the risk that a child sex offender may reoffend. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

17 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

In any challenge to an ordinance on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds, the threshold question is whether the ordinance is punitive, as both clauses apply only to punitive laws. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1 Case that cites this headnote

18 Criminal Law Constitutional issues in general

Criminal Law Defenses

Whether an ordinance may be considered punitive for double jeopardy or ex post facto purposes is an issue of law that is reviewed independently. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

19 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Constitutional Law Punishment in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

Courts employ a two-part “intent-effects test” to answer whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, whereby they first look at the intent of the legislative body in creating the law and, if the courts find the intent was to impose punishment, the law is considered punitive and the inquiry ends there; if courts find that the intent was to impose a civil and nonpunitive regulatory scheme, they must next determine whether the effects of the sanctions imposed by the law are so punitive as to render them criminal. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

20 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

Only the clearest proof will convince courts that what a legislative body has labeled a civil remedy is, in effect, a criminal penalty, for purposes of determining whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

21 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

Determining legislative intent for purposes of determining whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses is primarily a matter of statutory construction that asks whether the legislative body, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

22 Statutes Statements of purpose, intent, or policy in general

When interpreting a statute, considerable deference must be accorded to the intent as the Legislature has stated it.

23 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

Not all forms of restraint are equivalent to punishment for purposes of determining whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

24 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

Mere presence of a deterrent purpose without more is not enough to make criminal a civil regulation, for purposes of determining whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

25 Constitutional Law Penal laws in general

Double Jeopardy Civil or criminal nature

When determining whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, a statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance, nor does the measure need to represent the best choice possible to address the problem the legislative body seeks to remedy; the question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

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On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Joseph G. Murphy of Murphy & Leonard, LLP, South Milwaukee.

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Before BROWN, C.J., NEUBAUER, P.J., and REILLY, J.

Opinion

****714** REILLY, J.

***341** ¶ 1 Todd J. Kester was convicted of sexually assaulting a child in 2000. In April 2010, Kester moved into a residence in the City of South Milwaukee that was within 1000 feet of an elementary school. The City has an ordinance that prohibits child sex offenders such as Kester from living within 1000 feet of elementary schools. Kester was told by the City that he had to move. Kester refused. The City filed an action in circuit court, asking the court to declare Kester's residency a public nuisance and to enjoin him from living in the home. The circuit court granted the injunction and ordered Kester to move.

¶ 2 Kester appeals, arguing that his residency should not have been declared a nuisance without an individual determination of his dangerousness, that his right to procedural due process was denied as he was not permitted to show he did not pose a risk of harm to children, that the City's ordinance is preempted by state law, and that the City's ordinance as applied to him violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. We disagree and affirm the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Kester was convicted on November 6, 2000, of second-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2) (2011-12)¹ for an offense that occurred while he lived in Sheboygan. In April 2010, Kester moved to a residence in the City of South Milwaukee within 1000 feet of Lakeview School, a public elementary school. The City had in effect an ordinance ***342** (the Ordinance) forbidding anyone convicted of committing certain sex offenses against children, including § 948.02(2), from living within 1000 feet of a school or other facility found to be frequented by children. SOUTH MILWAUKEE, WIS., MUN.CODE (SMMC) § 23.167-2, -3(effective Aug. 30, 2007). The Ordinance also applied to individuals found not guilty by reason of mental defect or disease of committing one of the enumerated offenses against children. SMMC § 23.167-3. The Ordinance's declared purpose was to "protect [] the

health and safety of children in South Milwaukee from the risk that convicted sex offenders may re-offend in locations close to their residences.” SMMC § 23.167–1.

¶ 4 The Ordinance provided certain exceptions: for people who had established residences in South Milwaukee prior to the effective date of the Ordinance (August 30, 2007), for those who resided in their homes prior to a children's facility moving within 1000 feet of their residences, for those living in South Milwaukee at the time of their most recent child sex convictions; and for minors or wards under guardianship. SMMC § 23.167–4, –5. For all others, the Ordinance required the City attorney, upon notification of a violation by the police chief, to “bring an action in the name of the City in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County to permanently enjoin such residency as a public nuisance.” SMMC § 23.167–7.

¶ 5 After Kester refused to move, the City filed a complaint in Milwaukee County Circuit Court requesting that Kester's continued residency be found a public nuisance and that the court issue an injunction requiring him to move. Kester admitted that he was convicted under WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2) in November 2000 while residing **715 in Sheboygan and that he currently lived within 1000 feet of Lakeview School. Kester moved for judgment *343 on the pleadings on various grounds, including those raised in this appeal. The court denied Kester's motion.

¶ 6 The City brought two motions to the court: first, for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Kester's continued residency constituted a public nuisance and, second, for an order preventing Kester from offering evidence that he did not pose a risk of reoffense and was not a public nuisance. The court granted both of the City's motions. The court ultimately issued an injunction and ordered Kester to move. Kester appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Kester raises four issues on appeal. His first two arguments are related in that he asserts that the circuit court erred in issuing an injunction without determining whether his residency constituted an actual public nuisance based on his risk of reoffending and, secondly, that his right to procedural due process is violated by applying a nuisance “per se” standard to him. Kester argues next that the Ordinance is preempted by state laws regulating sex offenders and, lastly, that the Ordinance as applied to him violates both the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

Kester's Status Coupled with his Residency Within 1000 Feet of a School Constitutes a Public Nuisance Per Se Under the Ordinance

1 ¶ 8 Kester argues that before a court may find him to be a public nuisance under the Ordinance, the City must show that he is a nuisance by his acts or his *344 likelihood to act in a detrimental way. Stated differently, Kester argues that in order to enjoin his continued residency within 1000 feet of Lakeview School, the City must establish that his residency is an “actual nuisance” utilizing the common-law definition of nuisance.² We address Kester's argument first by examining the power of municipalities to govern nuisances and finish by examining the ordinance in question.

2,3,4,5 ¶ 9 Municipalities have broad authority through their police powers to protect “the health, safety, and welfare” of their residents, including the ability to define and take action against public nuisances. See WIS. STAT. § 62.11(5); *Dallmann v. Kluchesky*, 229 Wis. 169, 173, 175–76, 282 N.W. 9 (1938). A nuisance per se may be established by law, and no actual injurious consequences are required to support a finding of a nuisance per se. *In re Eldred*, 46 Wis. 530, 543, 1 N.W. 175 (1879). When a municipality has enacted an ordinance that defines a public nuisance per se, courts should not interfere in this determination absent a showing of “oppressiveness or unreasonableness.” *Boden v. City of Milwaukee*, 8 Wis.2d 318, 325, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959). An injunction is a permissible remedy to enforce

an ordinance establishing a nuisance per se. *See Village of Wind Point v. Halverson*, 38 Wis.2d 1, 11, 155 N.W.2d 654 (1968).

¶ 10 The City of South Milwaukee determined that certain types of child sex offenders who live within 1000 feet of children's facilities interfere substantially in the enjoyment of life, health, and safety of the *345 residents of the City and constitute public nuisances. The City enacted SMMC § 23.167 to preclude such nuisances. **716The clear language of the Ordinance establishes a public nuisance per se. The Ordinance employs two criteria that, subject to limited exceptions, define a public nuisance: (1) a person who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of a mental defect or disease of one of a number of child sex crimes and (2) that person's residency within 1000 feet of any one of an enumerated list of facilities. SMMC § 23.167–2, –3. No other evidence is required to find the existence of a public nuisance for which an injunction may be issued.

¶ 11 Notably, Kester does not argue that the Ordinance's criteria (his status as a convicted child sex offender and the distance between his residence and the school) are oppressive or unreasonable. *See Boden*, 8 Wis.2d at 325, 99 N.W.2d 156. Instead, Kester argues that the language of the Ordinance requires an individual determination that he constitutes an “actual nuisance.”³ We think it clear that such an individual determination is not required by the Ordinance when read in its entirety. *See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty.*, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. The Ordinance forbids certain types of child sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of certain facilities. SMMC § 23.167–3. The Ordinance carves out exceptions to this rule, which do not involve an individual risk assessment. SMMC § 23.167–4, –5. The City attorney has no *346 discretion over whether to bring an action to enjoin a public nuisance when presented with evidence of a violation by the police chief. *See* SMMC § 23.167–7.

¶ 12 The City must prove that Kester falls within the type of sex offender identified by the Ordinance and that Kester resides within 1000 feet of an identified children's facility; the City need not prove any “detrimental acts” engaged in by Kester to obtain an injunction. The Ordinance on its face establishes that Kester's status as a convicted child sex offender under WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2) coupled with his residing within 1000 feet of a school constitutes a public nuisance per se for which an injunction may be issued.

Kester's Right to Procedural Due Process Was Not Violated

6,7,8,9 ¶ 13 Kester next argues that the denial of a hearing as to whether his continued residency substantially interferes with the safety of others deprives him of important liberty and property rights without due process. “Procedural due process requires that a party whose rights may be affected by government action be given an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked.” *Wilke v. City of Appleton*, 197 Wis.2d 717, 726, 541 N.W.2d 198 (Ct.App.1995). “[A]n opportunity to be heard in court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” satisfies procedural due process. *Id.* at 727, 541 N.W.2d 198. Due process claims raise questions of law that we review de novo. *See id.* at 726, 541 N.W.2d 198.

¶ 14 Kester's due process argument misses the mark. As we have explained, in enacting the Ordinance, the City identified the criteria for what constitutes a *347public nuisance per se. Subject to a **717 limited list of exceptions, the only material issues are (1) whether Kester was convicted of one of the child sex offenses listed in the Ordinance and (2) whether Kester was living within 1000 feet of a school. Kester had an opportunity to contest each issue before the circuit court but did not do so. Proof of future bad acts by Kester is not required nor material to a determination of whether Kester's residency constitutes a public nuisance. *See Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003). Procedural due process does not entitle Kester to a hearing on an immaterial issue. *See id.*

State Law Does Not Preempt the Ordinance

10,11 ¶ 15 Kester contends that Wisconsin's comprehensive regulatory scheme regarding sex offenders preempts the Ordinance. Whether state law preempts a local ordinance raises a question of law that we review de novo. *DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek*, 200 Wis.2d 642, 652, 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996).

12,13 ¶ 16 Wisconsin municipalities have broad authority to act under the home-rule powers granted by article XI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution and WIS. STAT. § 62.11(5). This authority is limited, however, when it comes to subject matters of “statewide concern.” *U.S. Oil, Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac*, 199 Wis.2d 333, 339–40, 544 N.W.2d 589 (Ct.App.1996). Thus, in determining whether the Ordinance is preempted by state law, we must first determine whether the subject area being regulated is one of “statewide concern.” *Id.*

14 ¶ 17 The state legislature has adopted many laws related to sex offenders, including those whose victims *348 are children. *See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 301.03(3b), (19)–(20), 301.48, 302.116, 304.06(1q), (2m), 939.615–939.617, 939.635, 948.02–948.025, 948.05–948.13, and WIS. STAT. ch. 980*. This statutory scheme is both “complex and comprehensive” and deals with almost “all aspects” of the prosecution, punishment, confinement, and rehabilitation of such offenders. *See Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n*, 120 Wis.2d 391, 397–98, 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984). Restricting where convicted child sex offenders may live in relation to where children congregate is within the discretion granted to the department of corrections. *See §§ 301.03(19)–(20), 301.48(2g), (3)(c)*. Regulation of convicted child sex offenders, including where they may live after release from confinement, is clearly a matter of both statewide and local concern.

15 ¶ 18 The fact that the regulation of sex offenders is a matter of statewide concern, however, does not preclude municipalities such as the City from using their home-rule powers to impose further restrictions consistent with those imposed by the state. *See Fox v. City of Racine*, 225 Wis. 542, 545–46, 275 N.W. 513 (1937). An ordinance regulating an area of statewide concern is preempted only if: (1) the legislature has expressly withdrawn the power of municipalities to act, (2) the ordinance logically conflicts with state legislation, (3) the ordinance defeats the purpose of state legislation, or (4) the ordinance violates the spirit of state legislation. *Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n*, 120 Wis.2d at 397, 355 N.W.2d 234.

¶ 19 Kester contends that the Ordinance defeats the purpose and violates the spirit of the state's scheme to reassimilate sex offenders into society and protect public safety, *see WIS. ADMIN. CODEE § DOC 328.04(1) (Dec.2006)*, by minimizing the population density of sex *349 offenders, *see WIS. STAT. § 301.03(19)*. Accepting Kester's contention as to the purpose and spirit of the state's laws, the Ordinance is not demonstrably contrary to these goals. **718 The purpose of the Ordinance is to reduce the risk of reoffense by child sex offenders. *See SMMC § 23.167–1*. Such a purpose advances both the reassimilation of sex offenders into the larger community and the protection of the public. Kester has not shown that the Ordinance defeats the purpose or violates the spirit of the state laws regulating child sex offenders. Accordingly, we find that the Ordinance is not preempted by state law.

The Ordinance Does Not Violate Kester's Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Laws

16 ¶ 20 Lastly, Kester contends that the Ordinance violates his right to be free from additional punishment under the Double Jeopardy and the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. The relevant protection provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause is the right of a criminal defendant to be free from multiple punishments for the same offense. *See State v. Carpenter*, 197 Wis.2d 252, 263, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). The relevant protection provided by the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the government from increasing the punishment for a crime after its commission. *Id.* at 273, 541 N.W.2d 105.

17,18 ¶ 21 In any challenge to an ordinance on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds, the threshold question is whether the ordinance is punitive, as both clauses apply only to punitive laws. *350 *State v. Rachel*, 2002 WI 81, ¶ 22, 254 Wis.2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762. Whether an ordinance may be considered punitive is an issue of law that we review independently. *State v. McMaster*, 206 Wis.2d 30, 36, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996).

19,20 ¶ 22 We employ a two-part “intent-effects” test to answer whether a law applied retroactively is punitive and, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. See *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶¶ 39–40, 42, 647 N.W.2d 762. First, we look at the intent of the legislative body in creating the law. See *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). If we find the intent was to impose punishment, the law is considered punitive and the inquiry ends there. *Id.* If we find that the intent was to impose a civil and nonpunitive regulatory scheme, we must next determine whether the effects of the sanctions imposed by the law are “so punitive ... as to render them criminal.” *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶ 42, 647 N.W.2d 762 (citation omitted). We consider a number of factors in this part of the test, none of which is dispositive to our inquiry. See *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Only the “clearest proof” will convince us that what a legislative body has labeled a civil remedy is, in effect, a criminal penalty. *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶ 42, 647 N.W.2d 762 (citation omitted).

21,22 ¶ 23 Determining legislative intent is primarily a matter of statutory construction that asks whether the legislative body, “in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citation omitted). “[C]onsiderable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.” *Id.* Kester argues that the City intended to create a punitive law by referencing the recitals to the Ordinance, in *351 which the City declared that it “places a high priority on maintaining public safety through ... dependency upon laws that deter and punish criminal behavior.”⁴ We think this one **719 reference to punishment is outweighed by express language in the Ordinance declaring it to be “a regulatory measure aimed at protecting the health and safety of children in South Milwaukee.” SMMC § 23.167–1. This clear statement supports the City's contention that it intended to enact a nonpunitive, civil regulatory scheme and not a punitive law.

¶ 24 Our finding that the City intended the Ordinance to be a nonpunitive, civil regulatory measure aimed at protecting the community may be overcome if the “sanctions” imposed by the ordinance are “so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal.” See *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶ 42, 647 N.W.2d 762 (citation omitted). We conclude that they are not. Convictions have consequences. See *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Just because one of these consequences is a legislative restriction based on an offender's status does not make it punitive. See *State v. Thiel*, 188 Wis.2d 695, 704–05, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994). A mere connection to criminal activity is not sufficient to render an ordinance punitive. *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶ 58, 647 N.W.2d 762.

¶ 25 The United States Supreme Court has articulated a list of nonexhaustive factors to be considered in determining whether a sanction is punitive in nature, see *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), for purposes of double jeopardy and ex *352 post facto challenges, see *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Kester argues four of these factors are present: (1) the Ordinance involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) the Ordinance's restrictions historically have been regarded as punishment, (3) the Ordinance's operation will promote retribution and deterrence, and (4) the Ordinance is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose. See *id.* at 97, 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Although we agree that some of the factors are present to a degree, Kester has not provided the “clearest proof” that the Ordinance is punitive, and therefore, his double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges fail.

23 ¶ 26 We start by considering whether the Ordinance constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint. We agree with Kester that the Ordinance imposes restraints upon where Kester may live within the City of South Milwaukee. But we also state the obvious: “[N]ot all forms of restraint are equivalent to punishment.” *Rachel*, 254 Wis.2d 215, ¶ 47, 647 N.W.2d 762. Minor and indirect restraints are unlikely to have a punitive effect. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 1140. As the Ordinance unquestionably involves affirmative restraints on certain sex offenders, the question for us is whether those restraints are minor and indirect. We agree with Kester that they are not. Although there are exemptions for some child sex offenders and the Ordinance leaves areas where offenders may reside, the Ordinance imposes significant affirmative restraints on Kester and other child sex offenders as to where they may live within South Milwaukee. The Ordinance constrains Kester and his family from living in a large number of residences in South Milwaukee. These restraints are neither minor nor indirect. *See id.* The fact that the Ordinance imposes an affirmative restraint on where Kester may *353 live, however, does not end our inquiry into whether the effects of the Ordinance are punitive. Many civil regulations involve affirmative restraints that are neither minor nor indirect.

¶ 27 Kester next argues that the Ordinance's restrictions on where he may live resemble historical punishments of shaming and banishment. We disagree. Banishment **720 involves the permanent expulsion of an offender from an entire community, whereas the Ordinance restricts where certain child sex offenders may reside within South Milwaukee. *See Doe v. Miller*, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir.2005). Unlike the traditional punishment of shaming, the Ordinance does not hold up a violator for face-to-face humiliation by his or her fellow citizens. *See Smith*, 538 U.S. at 98, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Equally unavailing is Kester's contention that the similarities between the restrictions imposed by the Ordinance and restrictions that may accompany probation and parole transform the restrictions into punishment. Conditions accompanying probation or parole are not punishment but rather means of rehabilitation. *See Prue v. State*, 63 Wis.2d 109, 114, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974).

24 ¶ 28 Kester also argues that the Ordinance is punitive in that it promotes deterrence and retribution, two of the traditional aims of punishment. We concede that the Ordinance has as its primary aim the deterrence of sex crimes against children, but the “mere presence of a deterrent purpose” without more is not enough to make criminal a civil regulation. *See Smith*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citation omitted). The City's regulation is aimed at deterrence and protection of its citizens, not punishing Kester. Furthermore, we do not agree with Kester that the Ordinance is retributive as it is imposed on all child sex offenders without regard to their degree *354 of individual dangerousness. The City in enacting the Ordinance was not obligated to attempt to define and differentiate the degree of dangerousness of convicted sex offenders. The City's purpose in enacting the Ordinance was to promote the safety of its citizens rather than categorize convicted sex offenders. The intent of the Ordinance is not retributive and any deterrent purpose it serves so as to protect the community is insufficient to constitute punishment.

25 ¶ 29 Kester's final argument is that the Ordinance constitutes punishment as the restrictions that it imposes are excessive when compared to its asserted nonpunitive purpose. This last argument is related to the inquiry into “whether the regulatory scheme has a ‘rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.’” *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 721 (quoting *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140). “A statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.” *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Nor does the measure need to represent “the best choice possible to address the problem [the legislative body] seeks to remedy.” *Id.* at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. “The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” *Id.*

¶ 30 Kester points to the Ordinance's application to all child sex offenders regardless of their individual circumstances or dangerousness as well as the permanency of the Ordinance's application. We state the obvious: All convicted child sex offenders have proven themselves to be dangerous. A municipality is not

required to regulate its police powers based upon someone's prognostication as to the future acts of a convicted child sex offender. Kester argues that other municipalities in Wisconsin have enacted less onerous ³⁵⁵ordinances to show that the City's objectives can be met by less drastic means. That fact may be true but, contrary to Kester's argument, our laws provide that the City may make "reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences." *Id.* at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. ⁷²¹ Such categorical judgments do not require individual risk assessments to survive challenges on double jeopardy or ex post facto grounds. *See id.* at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Moreover, the City did not have to enact the best measure to reach its aims, only a reasonable one. *See id.* at 105, 123 S.Ct. 1140. While we agree that the Ordinance places burdens upon Kester and other child sex offenders who wish to live in South Milwaukee, we cannot say these restrictions are not reasonable to achieve the City's purpose of protecting against the risk that a child sex offender may reoffend.

¶ 31 Kester fails to offer the "clearest proof" that the Ordinance is a criminal and punitive measure rather than its stated purpose as a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme. As such, the City's Ordinance as applied to him does not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.

CONCLUSION

¶ 32 We affirm as the Ordinance was properly applied to Kester. Kester has no right under the Ordinance for an individual determination as to whether he poses a risk of reoffending. The Ordinance is not preempted by state law, and the Ordinance as applied to Kester does not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. Order affirmed.

Footnotes

[†]

Petition for review filed.

¹ All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.

² "A nuisance is an unreasonable activity or use of property that interferes substantially with the comfortable enjoyment of life, health, safety of another or others." *State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc.*, 104 Wis.2d 506, 517, 311 N.W.2d 650 (1981).

³ Kester focuses on SMMC § 23.167–7, which requires the police chief, upon learning of a violation, to issue a "written determination ... that upon all the facts and circumstances and the Purpose of this Chapter, such residence occupancy presents an activity or use of property that interferes substantially with the comfortable enjoyment of life, health, safety of another or others."

⁴ *See* South Milwaukee, Wis., An Ordinance to Create Section 23.167 of the Municipal Code to Provide Regulations Relating to Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders and Directing Action for Injunctive Relief for Violation Thereof (effective Aug. 30, 2007).

Examining sexual offences through a sociological lens: A socio-cultural exploration of causal and desistance theories

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Abstract

This article considers often contrasting theoretical approaches to sexual and non-sexual offending by comparing some influential accounts of the causes of sexual offending and examining the role of socio-cultural factors in the offending process. It also examines how desistance theories may be applied to this complex interaction between psychological factors and socio-cultural ones. The article concludes that there is a strong theoretical argument for substantial socio-cultural elements of sexual offending. It also argues that desistance theories may be applied for the same reason, but also because the causal and desistance process may be thought of as two separate processes. Moreover, and related to the second point, many criminological theories position offending behaviour not in the action that is considered a crime, but the fact that this action is a crime, meaning that both resistance to and desistance from sexual offending can be viewed in the context of general criminological theories.

Keywords

Criminological theory, desistance, offending, sexual offences, offending

Introduction

Sexual crimes have tended to be neglected in major work regarding criminological and desistance theories until relatively recently, and similarly desistance theories have traditionally been omitted from psychological literature regarding sexual offending, despite empirical evidence that people do desist from sexual offending (Laws and Ward, 2011). It is often hard to reconcile what initially appears to be a fundamentally different causal

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process of sexual offending with causal factors and processes of desistance from general offending. Furthermore, whether sexual offending is explained and interpreted from a psychological or socio-cultural perspective is important. For example, how might a psychological focus on the causes of sexual offending relate to a sociological perspective on desistance? On the other hand, how does one move on from offending behaviour if such behaviour is to some extent entrenched in the values of a patriarchal society?

From a rehabilitation perspective, sexual offending is often perceived very differently to non-sexual offending, and this positions the sexual offender as the 'other'. As Ward (2014: 131) stated, 'While there may not be a gene(s) for rape or child sexual offending, there is a growing conviction that the cognitive neurological systems of sex offenders may be functionally abnormal in some way'. This is in contrast to predominant (but not all) views of non-sexual offending, which is that offending behaviour is heavily influenced by environment and social structure. This article considers often contrasting theoretical approaches to sexual and non-sexual offending by comparing some influential accounts of the causes of sexual offending and examining the role of socio-cultural factors in the offending process.

Sociological approaches to 'general' offending

In criminology, the debate over whether the main influences on criminal behaviour are individual or socio-structural has broadly tended to favour the sociological perspective (Laub and Sampson, 1991), although views on this differ. To give just one example, principles of differential association suggest that interaction with others, directly or indirectly, results in courses of behaviour consistent with the social group's actions or norms/values (Akers and Jensen, 2006), and these can include friends/family or wider influences such as the media. These associations can encourage or discourage criminal behaviour, resulting in risk or protective situations. These risk or protective factors may occur at different times in life and this may affect when a person commits crime. For instance, a protective factor when young may be a supportive family, whilst a risk factor may be residing in a disadvantaged neighbourhood (Losel and Farrington, 2012; Stouthamer-Loeber et al., 2002). If either of these situations are reversed (for instance when a person leaves home or if relationships change), then the propensity to offend may also change. In adulthood, a move towards having one's own family may be a protective factor; however, a breakdown of this family may be a risk factor.

Smallbone et al. (2008) argued that cultural norms influence attitudes and actions according to the 'proximal-distal' continuum'; that networks closest to us such as friends and family will have a stronger influence than wider society. Similarly, Wikstrom's (2010) situational action theory stated that 'humans are rule-guided actors' (p. 217), and that the decision of whether or not to commit a crime depends on a person's internal system of rules, along with those of the situation. Hence, different situations result in different moral rules, and these may change at different points in life. Akers (1990: 164) argued that association with 'norm-violating peers' is one of the best predictors of general recidivism. Theoretically, it is not hard to imagine that this may be the case, since direct association with others who normalise such activity may have a counter effect to the moral rule of society in general. Farrington (1992) also suggested that peer attachment can explain the

general life course trajectory, with criminal behaviour beginning in adolescence when offenders have a stronger relationship with their peers instead of their parents, and declining when the main influence is the spouse. There are many other theories of why people commit crime, however many of them share the view that the behaviour is heavily influenced by a person's position in society. It is interesting to consider this position in the case of those who have committed sexual offences, and surprisingly, there has been little empirical research into this.

Causal theories of sexual offending

Theories of sexual offending have taken a somewhat different route, often being studied from a psychological perspective, and offenders treated in a clinical setting (e.g. Hanson and Yates, 2013; Hanson et al., 2002). However, the literature now recognises the highly complex nature of sexual offending and presents integrated cross-disciplinary approaches that encompass psychological factors and processes as well as how these are affected by other factors such as environment.

Ward et al. (2006) described different levels of theories. Level 1 theories are multifactorial and seek to explain how many complex factors combine to get a person to a point where they offend sexually. This takes place in the context of the heterogeneous nature of sexual offending, and the fact that actually different types of offence are likely to have different causes (Ward, 2014). These level 1 theories include Marshall and Barbaree's (2006) Integrated Theory, and Ward and Siegert's (2006) Pathways Model. Level 2 theories are single factor theories and describe one element of the multifactorial theories, generally psychological or socio-cultural factors such as intimacy deficits or feminist perspectives. Level 3 theories are descriptive models that describe the offending process.

In this section, I will consider what three significant causal theories (attachment theory, feminist theory and cognitive distortions) say about sexual offending. Whilst not intended to fully encompass integrated or etiological theories (the theories outlined would be considered level 2 theories), they have been chosen since they represent influences on sexual offending that are generally not considered widely when discussing non-sexual offending. The most obvious difference between the two approaches is the focus on socio-structural influences on non-sexual offending, and in particular whether sexual offending may be amenable to change according to different environments in a similar manner to non-sexual offending. Hence, this will be discussed for each of the three causal factors.

Attachment theory

Attachment theory is well established within the neurobiological field (Kraemer, 1992) and is one of the theories most often linked to analysis of the causes of sexual offending (e.g. Bowlby, 1969; Smallbone and Dadds, 2000; Ward et al., 1996). Attachment theory describes how the infant mimics behavioural and emotional characteristics from its primary caregiver, generally the mother. This is particular to social primates and is not learned behaviour, but rather a type of imprinting. Depending on how this attachment forms, the infant sometimes has a higher risk of some form of social dysfunction.

Sometimes this manifests in intimacy deficits that results in a person committing a sexual offence in order to meet these needs. Many authors have developed models of different attachment styles (e.g. Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969), and Ward et al. (1995) devised arguably one of the most comprehensive models of attachment styles in relation to those who have committed sexual offences. They argued that the type of attachment will influence the characteristics of the offender, and hence their victim type and offence type. These are briefly defined as the following:

- In the *anxious/ambivalent* attachment style, the individual has a negative view of themselves but a positive view of others, which leads them to seek approval from others. They will desire intimacy but fear relationships. If this type of attachment style manifests as a sexual offence, they will seek someone whom they can control and who 'looks up' to them. Hence, the victim of this offender type will often be a child who is known to the offender, and offending will require minimal use of coercion or force. They are likely to groom and attempt to form a relationship with their victim.
- In the first type of *avoidant* attachment style, the individual has a negative view of themselves and also a negative view of others, seeing them as untrustworthy. They may seek a sexual relationship but avoid intimacy, and lack the social skills to form a healthy adult romantic relationship even if they desire one. This will result in the person seeking impersonal sexual contact, and some will resort to coercion if necessary. Their victims may be adults or children, and they are less concerned with a specific gender.
- In the second type of *avoidant* attachment style, the individual has a positive view of themselves and a negative view of others, blaming others for any problems in their lives. They are hostile and do not desire close relationships. This type of offender is the most aggressive and will use force against adults and children. The use of force is a way of expressing aggression and not simply instrumental to committing the act.

These theories are attractive as they attempt to explain the complexities of different types of sexual offences that other theories cannot, and there are few types of sexual crime that would not fall under at least one of those categories. It may initially appear that such attachments must be fixed for life without treatment, however there is some evidence that attachment styles can change according to socio-structural elements: 'changes in caregiver environments and stressful life events (severe illness, parental illness, divorce) have been shown to alter attachment patterns from infancy, through childhood and adolescence, to adulthood' (McKillop et al., 2012: 593). For example, Smallbone (2006) argued that being a caregiver can bring about a sexual offence since the offender confuses adult and parental attachment and seeks sexual intimacy with the child. This suggests that a person, rather than not having the opportunity, did not have the propensity to offend until becoming a caregiver. Different attachment styles may also result in different quality of relationships, where for instance the anxious/ambivalent individual may appear to have a good intimate relationship, however they may maintain an emotional distance within this relationship (Marshall, 2010). This further

complicates the situation: the mere fact of being in an adult relationship or a peer group is not necessarily indicative of secure adult attachment. Hence, attachment theories do to some extent support the possibility that experiencing different environments may actually alter the propensity to offend.

Feminist theory

Gendered theories of sexual crime consider how the position of females in society may sanction their sexual abuse. Feminist theory broadly states that a patriarchal society 'create[s] and maintain[s] male control over females' (Waldby et al., 1989: 97), and that sexual abuse is one of many ways used to dominate and suppress women in a world where women take second place to men and are merely 'object[s] for male manipulation' (Waldby et al., 1989: 98). The feminist interpretation of child abuse (of both genders) also relates to this system of power and domination of children. This is all caught up in the socio-structural lack of power that these subordinated groups experience, and is analogous to the power exerted over other groups such as race and class.

As such, an offender's motivation to offend is heavily influenced by the culture around them, which continually reinforces these messages. Whilst arguably there has been some progress in terms of society's general view towards the role and treatment of women, there remains some way to go before these views are fundamentally changed. The proliferation of new technology has meant that depictions of the commodification of women and the sexualisation of children is now more accessible, to the point of becoming mainstream (for instance through violent pornography or even mainstream media (Lim et al., 2015)). Images of female children dressed up to look like sexualised adults as well as adult women posing in infantilised positions are also common occurrences (Paul and Linz, 2008). At the very least, those who abuse others may use these facts to legitimise or excuse their behaviour. At worst, this may actually perpetuate this type of behaviour. Hence, whilst on the one hand the majority of society appears to abhor those who commit sexual offences, on the other hand feminist theory argues that in a patriarchal society abuse and oppression is widely accepted. Therefore, it may be considered that far from deviating from widely held values, those who abuse are actually acting within the patriarchal norms of society (Ward, 1985).

Schwartz et al. (2001) presented an interesting paper on a feminist approach to routine activity theory in which they examined the effect of peers as guardians who may prevent or encourage the offender. They argued that 'men who belong to these all male, patriarchal, homosocial networks are more likely than non-members to be motivated to abuse women sexually' (p. 628). This suggests that social control from a feminist perspective changes according to a particular ecological situation. Cossins (2000) also argued that gender is not a static factor but a construct of particular situations. This then implies that offending may be promoted by different socio-cultural contexts, peer involvement being one of them. There have been few studies that examined peer approval of or involvement in child abuse. One recent exception is Ashurst and McAlinden (2015), who found that young people participating in harmful sexual behaviour could very much be influenced by their peers. It is also thought that there may be a certain level of networking amongst those who commit sexual offences (Hanson and Scott, 1996), and this may be facilitated

by the growth of the internet: '[r]esearch demonstrates the strong sense of social support and reinforcement that child pornography offenders may experience as a result of their involvement in online networks' (Carr, 2012: 104)

Cognitive distortions

Cognitive distortions are one of the most commonly linked individual factors in respect of sexual offending. Put very simply, cognitive distortions are ways of viewing and interpreting the world around us which may not necessarily reflect the reality. In the case of sexual offending, these may be ways of justifying the offence. It is also thought that those who commit sexual offences develop implicit theories, based on cognitive distortions, which are unconscious scripts about their own and the victims' actions. These may be beliefs that they are not doing anything wrong and that societal beliefs are wrong when they consider the harm caused by sexual offences. This is said to explain why they offend when it is against the law and moral code of society, as their internal belief system can justify the act. These implicit theories may include beliefs that children are sexual beings and willing participants (Polascheck and Ward, 2002; Ward and Keenan, 1999), or that men are entitled to sex and it is a woman's (or sometimes a child's) responsibility to meet these needs.

However, there is also a theoretical argument, based on the feminist perspective, that cognitive distortions may be influenced by socio-cultural elements. Gagnon (1990) described different levels of sexual scripts that indicate how to behave in a sexual encounter: internal, interpersonal and cultural. The cultural script tells a person what is allowed according to the norms and values of society. In addition to cognitive elements distorting these scripts, socio-cultural views may also confirm these unhealthy attitudes towards relationships. Finkelhor (1984) also posited that social attitudes may act to overcome internal inhibitors to committing the offence. The radical feminist perspective (outlined in Ward et al., 2006: 169) also argues that 'features commonly noted in sexual offenders (e.g. cognitive distortions) are derived from being socialised as males and not from any unique characteristics associated with being sexual offenders'.

For example, Griffin (1979: 188) argued that '[h]eterosexual love finds an erotic expression through male dominance and female submission'. Seal and Ehrhardt (2003: 302) described one of the discourses for sexual intimacy for heterosexual men as sex as conquest. As one interviewee in their study stated:

... [d]ating is all about sexual harassment—sort of pushing the limits to see how far the other person is willing to let you go. Society believes that it is the man's role to test the waters. It is certainly expected by women.

Whilst this may be viewed as an implicit theory, it is arguably one held by a substantial number of people in society. This is echoed by Cowley (2014: 1262), who argued that, 'the normative elements of the traditional heterosexual sex script are eerily similar to the events that precede a sexual assault'. Similarly, other views, such as that a rape is a less serious offence if a woman is under the influence of alcohol, dressed in a certain way or has consented to some sexual activity, are also not limited to those who have been con-

victed of sexual offences. Therefore, what are sometimes perceived as cognitive distortions may actually be commonly held societal beliefs.

Discussion of the above issues has outlined the fact that there is no theoretical reason that sexual offending should not be sensitive to different social and cultural contexts. This is important to consider from a preventative point of view, although there may be some theoretical differences when compared with non-sexual offending. For instance, becoming a caregiver may result in a sexual offence either owing to opportunity or altering attachments. On the other hand, becoming a caregiver may prevent a person being involved in non-sexual offending since this activity may compromise the care they are able to give the child. Consequently, different offending patterns may appear over the life-course for sexual and non-sexual offences. Nevertheless, this viewpoint would lead us to believe that propensity towards sexual offending behaviour is something that can be lessened in the right environmental conditions.

Finally, there is some suggestion that situational factors or opportunity may provide the impetus for a sexual offence. Ouimet and Proux (1994) found some evidence that recidivism was increased for people who commit sexual offences against children whose routine activities took them in higher proximity to children. Farmer et al. (2015) also found that many of their interviewees had viewed their offending as something that had occurred in a particular situational context, that they had not sought out that particular situation and that they had been surprised to find themselves offending (although, as Farmer et al. pointed out, there may have been an element of shame management involved in their accounts). Whilst there are likely to be other factors involved in addition to situational events, it certainly seems to be a substantial contributory factor (Beauregard and Leclerc, 2007; Beauregard et al., 2007).

Desistance theories

The previous section has outlined some of the key causal factors in terms of sexual offending, and how these may also be influenced by socio-cultural elements. It is of particular importance to consider the role of these socio-structural contexts in relation to whether or not a person re-offends after their initial offence, as this is the stage at which intervention is most commonly carried out.

Desistance theories attempt to explain the journey from (arguably) relatively persistent offending to an offence-free life. Having generally stemmed from research into non-sexual offending, they are approached from a different perspective to the general literature on sexual recidivism, which is more often based on a treatment perspective. The desistance process is generally thought to be a combination of agency and environmental factors/informal social controls (Farrall et al., 2010; Laws and Ward, 2011), along with a cognitive shift (Maruna, 2001). In terms of the environmental factors, similar common life events are suggested to promote the desistance process as those thought to prevent the offending process (such as social relationships and employment), although there is a distinction in that there is thought to be a substantial element of having reconsidered one's life as a consequence of the offence.

There is some debate about the extent to which the factors which promote desistance after the commission of the offence mirror the initial cause. Laub and Sampson (2001)

suggested that the predictors of desistance are the same as (or the reverse of) the predictors for offending, although others disagree (Stouthamer-Loeber et al., 2002; Uggen and Piliavin, 1998). As stated, similar environmental events are generally suggested in relation to the promotion of desistance (relationships, employment, etc. (LeBel et al., 2008)), however whilst this may be true on an aggregate level, this is not necessarily true on an individual level. Desistance research looks at how the decision not to re-offend may be supported (or not undermined) by life events, rather than being directly related to causal elements, although these events may sometimes be similar. However, if cause and desistance are not related, this provides more evidence that desistance processes for sexual and non-sexual re-offences may be aligned.

Inevitably, though, the desistance process will have the added complication of having been an 'offender'. As Farrall et al. (2010: 548) argued, 'the process of having been convicted as a recidivist adult offender entails a degree of *social exclusion*, and – unless the offender is exceptionally fortunate – probably also an element of rupture of pre-existing social ties'. In addition to the decision to change, the desisting ex-offender will face societal difficulties that he or she did not face prior to the offence, which may be exacerbated for those who have committed sexual offences. Conversely, being detected as an offender and the subsequent associated events may also be a factor in an identity shift: '[p]ositive events are rather unlikely to elicit self-evaluative needs' (Gobbels et al., 2012: 456).

Desistance from sexual offending

Laws and Ward (2011: 99) stated that in respect of current treatment of those convicted of sexual offences, the:

... etiological assumption appears to be that sexual offending is a product of faulty social learning and individuals commit sexual offenses because they have a number of skill deficits that make it difficult for them to seek reinforcement in socially acceptable ways.

A key distinction between desistance and rehabilitation research outlined by Laws and Ward is that from a desistance perspective, changes occur 'outside the direct orbit of influence of practitioners' (p. 204): in fact for many non-sexual offenders (and arguably many sexual offenders) this change occurs without intervention. Laws and Ward also argued that 'correctional practitioners concentrate on deficiencies whereas desistance researchers pay more attention to the presence of protective factors' (p. 206). Whilst socio-structural factors are increasingly coming to attention in respect of sexual offending, it should be noted that those in the practitioner field do not generally advocate moving away from treatment of offenders and relying on 'natural' desistance supported by changes in environment, as criminological researchers have previously been more inclined to do (Laws and Ward, 2011). However, there has been a move to incorporate both psychological and socio-structural elements. Models such as the Good Lives Model (Laws and Ward, 2011) increasingly align these two different approaches.

Literature on desistance from sexual offending is in its infancy, although a small number of recent studies have looked at sexual offending through a desistance lens (e.g. Farmer et al., 2015; McAlinden et al., 2016). These studies have generally found support

both for the socio-structural (such as employment and social support) and self-narrative aspects of traditional desistance research. Some desistance theories also incorporate psychological, socio-structural and self-narrative factors (e.g. Gobbels et al., 2012). Whilst desistance research (and practice) has traditionally come from a different perspective to that of the rehabilitation of those who have committed sexual offences, theoretically these approaches can be aligned for two reasons. Firstly, this article has outlined the evidence that there is a socio-cultural element to sexual offending, which is one of the key elements of desistance research. Moreover, if the desistance and causal processes are separate, this provides more weight to the argument, since desistance theories may operate *regardless of cause*.

General criminological theory and the relationship between cause, resistance and desistance

Thus far, I have discussed how causal and desistance elements of sexual offending may be prone to socio-structural influences throughout the life-course. There are also influential theoretical standpoints from the general criminological field that the cause of any offence is less important than the fact that it is an offence. This final section will discuss the role of some of the most well-known general criminological theories in relation to causal and desistance factors, and whether these are important to our theoretical understanding of sexual offending.

Social control theories posit that a person's desire to commit a certain act is overcome by the moral code of a certain community or wider society (Hirschi, 1969). A person conforms to this code because if they do not, they risk losing something; that is, whatever benefits being part of this society brings them. Similarly, rational choice theory suggests that individual actors weigh up the consequences to themselves of embarking on a particular course of action (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Thus, the main focus is not the act itself, but the commission of the act despite it being against commonly accepted societal, moral or legal rules. Laws and Ward (2011: 208) argued that criminological (desistance in this case, however it may also be applied to causal theories) theories are 'weaker when it comes to explaining why people (and offenders) are motivated to desire and seek certain outcomes'. Of course, they do not necessarily seek to do this.

These theories therefore assume that the act has crossed our mind or is an attractive proposition: indeed, the main question is not 'why do you want to do this?', but 'how do you stop yourself doing this?'. The motivation to commit sexual offences is often harder to understand than for non-sexual offences. However, if we view intimacy, power and control (as outlined in the theories about causation) as desirable goods, this may take us closer to theoretical similarities between those who commit sexual offences and other offenders. As Willis et al. (2012: 126) pointed out, the issue is with the 'secondary goods—the activities/means individuals use to achieve primary goods—and not the primary goods themselves'. Viewing them in this way makes the connection between sexual and non-sexual offending clearer.

The act of a person countering their desire either in order to conform with those around them or to weigh up the negative and positive consequences of their actions is important as it implies a propensity to offend may be addressed *regardless of cause*.

This, then, suggests that an internal desire may be countered by external processes. There is some evidence that this is the case with sexual offences. For example, Laws (1994) found that in his study, the control group who had never committed a sexual offence were found to have some overlap in fantasies of rape and child abuse, arguing that they 'harbour many of the same feelings, have the same fantasies, but fail to act upon them' (p. 8). This, then, is relevant to the causal process, since what needs to be altered is not the desire to commit the act, but the decision, the ability, and the environmental conditions required in order to resist this desire. The original 'cause' is less important than the decision to resist. This is not necessarily in opposition to psychological theories: for instance, different attachment styles can affect self-control: '[i]nsecure personal attachments and weak social attachments in turn lead to general problems with individuals' capacity for and commitment to self-restraint' (McKillop et al., 2012). Of course, the whole process is likely to be a complex and individual one as is noted in the integrated theories.

This also appears to be particularly true of the desistance process after offending. Some people who have committed sexual offences state that a fear of returning to prison is the main reason they do not wish to re-offend (Ward and Laws, 2010). This is in line with Maruna's findings (2001) that few desisting ex-offenders came to the conclusion that an offence was wrong, only that the paths that they were on had a negative impact on their lives. Farmer et al. (2015) also found in their study that 'in the early stages of desistance, they [people who had committed sexual offences and who had desisted] made a rational choice about their behaviour based on a growing realisation of the disadvantages of persistence' (p. 328). This was based partly on the realisation of the harm caused by the offence, but partly on the concerns about the likelihood of being caught. This may be considered similar to many criminological theories that assume that the reason most people do not commit crime is because they fear the consequences, whether these are social or judicial, and as previously stated the consequences of detection may have been the starting point for a change in self-identity. This would suggest that addressing the willingness to commit an act that is against societal rules *regardless of what caused the desire to commit this act*, is an important part of the desistance process. In this way, sexual offences may be considered in a similar theoretical manner to other offences.

The substantial interaction between sexual and non-sexual offending appears particularly important here. People who commit sexual offences very often commit other offences (Hanson and Bussiere, 1998) and in fact general rule-violation has been found to be a significant predictor of sexual recidivism (Hanson and Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Tewksbury et al, 2011). Offenders with a proclivity towards sexual offences are more likely to commit a range of offences if social bonds are already weakened. As Smallbone and Wortley (2004: 295) argued, 'men who already have some experience of serious rule-breaking, dishonesty, exploitation, and/or aggression may be more likely to take the opportunities to sexually abuse a child'. This suggests that those who do not have a propensity towards general criminal behaviour are less likely to take the opportunity to commit a sexual offence, however this does not necessarily mean that they do not want to. This is consistent with Ward and Siegert's (2006) pathways model, which describes 'antisocial cognitions' as being one pathway into sexual offending.

Conclusion

This article has considered the relationship between causal theories of sexual offending, desistance theories and general criminological theories, with a focus on how socio-cultural elements may be important in these processes. The theoretical literature tends to support the case that propensity to offend, including relating to sexual offending, can and does change depending on different socio-structural circumstances, as well as for internal cognitive reasons. Decision-making in terms of the negative societal consequences of committing an offence also plays a part, particularly in terms of the desistance process. This suggests that desistance from sexual offences is not dependent only on the original 'cause', certainly in respect of the causal theories discussed in this article, and also that the underlying desistance process is similar to that of those who have committed non-sexual offences.

Whilst there is no reason to suppose that people who have committed sexual offences are not capable under the right conditions of desisting from crime, whether or not they follow the same course as other offenders is less clear, and there is a lack of empirical research into the relative importance of different life events that would assist a probation context. The point in life when these protective and risk factors occur, as well as opportunity, may be very different for those who have committed sexual offences compared to other offences. For example, gaining employment or having a family may present an opportunity to someone inclined to commit a sexual offence, whereas arguably it is more likely to act as a protective factor for other offending. The negative consequences of detection may also be more exacerbated for sexual offences than for other offences, in terms of additional stigma and labelling, and this may impede the desistance process. In addition to this, there is a more fundamental issue of whether society implicitly condones such behaviour, as suggested by feminist theory. If propensity to offend is affected by the moral rules of society, then a society that continues to support the abuse and exploitation of women and children will inevitably continue to contribute to such actions.

Of course, the difficulty lies in how we may support and encourage the desistance process amongst those who have committed sexual offences, as well as preventing these crimes from occurring in the first place. This article has argued that sexual offending is influenced by wider socio-cultural issues, and addressing these is an important yet challenging issue. There are many important treatment and educational programmes currently being developed that aim to help individuals deal with thoughts and situations that may lead to offending behaviour, and to assist them in replacing these with appropriate emotional and sexual attachments. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide critique of these programmes. Further research is needed into the impact of risk and protective factors throughout the life course in terms of sexual offences. Challenging the traditional normative masculine and feminine roles and preventing wider societal tacit approval of the abuse of women will also provide clearer boundaries of acceptable behaviour.

From a desistance perspective, following McNeill's (2012) framework of four forms of rehabilitation, in addition to assisting the individual with their personal process ('psychological rehabilitation'), there are three areas which require wider input from society as a whole. It is important to address the potentially counterproductive nature of the

aftermath of the judicial process ('legal/judicial rehabilitation'), which may be exacerbated for those who have committed sexual offences. Linked to this, perhaps the most difficult area in light of the embedded moral panic and increased stigma in relation to sexual offences, is seeking to improve society's contribution to the desistance process by accepting that those who have committed a sexual offence may desist the same as everyone else ('social rehabilitation'). As Laws and Ward (2011: 109) argued: 'the delivery of treatment is not enough. We need also to be seeking to strengthen offenders' social networks and their relationship to the world beyond the therapy room'. It is this issue that artificially constructed social environments such as the Circles of Support and Accountability (Wilson et al., 2007) aim to address; by creating the type of environment in which it is thought the desistance process is most encouraged.

Furthermore, McNeill (2012) makes an excellent point about 'moral rehabilitation', in which reparation cannot be overlooked. Restorative justice, for instance, is still in its early stages for sexual offences and has been somewhat controversial, however early research suggests positive findings (e.g. McGlynn et al., 2012), and it may give back a sense of power and control to the victim. It may also be argued that the issue of reparation may not lie solely with the offender in the case of sexual offences, but potentially with the criminal justice system in some cases (which may have re-victimised or blamed the victim), and even wider society, which provided the environment that facilitated the abuse. This reparation may take the form of allowing the victim's voice to be heard and preventing societal approval of such abuse in the future.

These theoretical reflections emphasise the need for further research to consider the socio-cultural aspects of the offending and desistance process from the perspective of those who have committed sexual offences, and to consider how we may use this information to prevent offending and encourage desistance in the future.

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122 S.Ct. 2017
Supreme Court of the United States
David R. McKUNE, Warden, et al., Petitioners,

v.

Robert G. LILE.

No. 00-1187.

Argued Nov. 28, 2001. Decided June 10, 2002.

Synopsis

State inmate brought § 1983 claim against prison officials, alleging that sexual abuse treatment program and corresponding regulations and policies violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Dale E. Saffels, J., 24 F.Supp.2d 1152, granted summary judgment for inmate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, McKay, Circuit Judge, 224 F.3d 1175, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that adverse consequences faced by state prisoner for refusing to make admissions required for participation in sexual abuse treatment program were not so severe as to amount to compelled self-incrimination.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment and filed opinion.

Justice Stevens dissented and filed opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined.

West Headnotes (9)

1 Prisons Sex-offender treatment

State's sexual abuse treatment program for prisoners served legitimate penological objective of rehabilitation; program lasted 18 months, involved substantial daily counseling, and helped inmates address sexual addiction, understand thoughts, feelings, and behavior dynamics that preceded their offenses, and develop relapse prevention skills.

54 Cases that cite this headnote

2 Criminal Law Grounds or justification for grant of immunity

Prisons Sex-offender treatment

State's refusal to offer immunity from prosecution, based on admissions of responsibility required of state prisoners under sexual abuse treatment program, served legitimate state interests; potential for additional punishment aided rehabilitation by reinforcing gravity of participants' offenses, and state had valid interest in keeping open option to prosecute particularly dangerous sex offenders.

156 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Criminal Law Compelling Self-Incrimination

Privilege against self-incrimination does not terminate at jailhouse door, but fact of valid conviction and ensuing restrictions on liberty are essential to Fifth Amendment analysis; broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in free society fall within expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered lawful conviction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

80 Cases that cite this headnote

4 Criminal Law Compelling Self-Incrimination

Prisons Sex-offender treatment

Prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear rational relation to legitimate penological objective, does not violate privilege against compelled self-incrimination if adverse consequences inmate faces for not participating are related to program objectives and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life. (Per Justice Kennedy,

with the Chief Justice and two Justices concurring, and one Justice concurring in judgment). U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

171 Cases that cite this headnote

5 Criminal Law Compelling Self-Incrimination

Prisons Sex-offender treatment

Prisons Sex offenses and offenders

Adverse consequences faced by state prisoner for refusing to make admissions required for participation in sexual abuse treatment program were not so severe as to amount to compelled self-incrimination; refusal did not extend prisoner's prison term or affect his eligibility for good time credits or parole, but rather left him subject to reduction of privileges and transfer out of unit where program was being offered. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5, 14.

200 Cases that cite this headnote

6 Prisons Housing assignments and units; transfer within facility

Decision where to house inmates is at core of prison administrators' expertise.

309 Cases that cite this headnote

7 Prisons Care, Custody, Confinement, and Control

Essential tool of prison administration is authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave, and Constitution accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit.

92 Cases that cite this headnote

8 Prisons Particular violations, punishments, deprivations, and conditions

Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion in prison context involves question of judgment; court must decide whether consequences of inmate's choice to remain silent are closer to physical torture against which Constitution clearly protects or de minimis harms against which it does not. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

37 Cases that cite this headnote

9 Criminal Law Compelling Self-Incrimination

Government does not have to make exercise of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination cost free. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

91 Cases that cite this headnote

*****2019 *24 Syllabus****

Respondent was convicted of rape and related crimes. A few years before his scheduled release, Kansas prison officials ordered respondent to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged, and might be used against them in future criminal proceedings. There is no evidence, however, that incriminating information has ever been disclosed under the SATP. Officials informed respondent that if he refused to participate in the SATP, his prison privileges would be reduced, resulting in the automatic curtailment of his visitation rights, earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures, access to a personal television, and other privileges. He also would be transferred to a potentially more dangerous maximum-security unit. Respondent refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. He brought this action for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court granted him summary judgment. Affirming, the Tenth Circuit held that the compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause; ruled that the automatic reduction in respondent's prison privileges and housing accommodations was such a penalty because of its substantial impact on him; declared that respondent's information would be sufficiently incriminating because an admission of culpability regarding his crime of conviction would

create a risk of a perjury prosecution; and concluded that, although the SATP served Kansas' important interests in rehabilitating sex offenders and promoting public safety, those interests could be served without violating the Constitution by treating inmate admissions as privileged or by granting inmates use immunity.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

224 F.3d 1175, reversed and remanded.

***25** Justice KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice THOMAS, concluded that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 2024-2032.

(a) The SATP is supported by the legitimate penological objective of rehabilitation. The SATP lasts 18 months; involves substantial daily counseling; and helps inmates address sexual addiction, understand the thoughts, feelings, and behavior dynamics that precede their offenses, and develop relapse prevention skills. Pp. 2024-2025.

(b) The mere fact that Kansas does not offer legal immunity from prosecution based on statements made in the course of the SATP does not render the program invalid. No inmate has ever been charged or prosecuted for any offense based on such information, and there is no contention that the program is a mere subterfuge ****2020** for the conduct of a criminal investigation. Rather, the refusal to offer use immunity serves two legitimate state interests: (1) The potential for additional punishment reinforces the gravity of the participants' offenses and thereby aids in their rehabilitation; and (2) the State confirms its valid interest in deterrence by keeping open the option to prosecute a particularly dangerous sex offender. P. 2025.

(c) The SATP, and the consequences for nonparticipation in it, do not combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the constitutional right not to incriminate oneself. Pp. 2025-2032.

(1) The prison context is important in weighing respondent's constitutional claim: A broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in a free society fall within the expected conditions of confinement of those lawfully convicted. The limitation on prisoners' privileges and rights also follows from the need to grant necessary authority and capacity to officials to administer the prisons. See, e.g., *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64. The Court's holding in *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless they constitute "atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," may not provide a precise parallel for determining whether there is compelled self-incrimination, but does provide useful instruction. A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective, does not violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination if the adverse consequences an inmate faces for not participating are related to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Cf., e.g., *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 319-320, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810. Pp. 2025-2027.

***26** (2) Respondent's decision not to participate in the SATP did not extend his prison term or affect his eligibility for good-time credits or parole. He instead complains about his possible transfer from the medium-security unit where the program is conducted to a less desirable maximum-security unit. The transfer, however, is not intended to punish prisoners for exercising their Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, it is incidental to a legitimate penological reason: Due to limited space, inmates who do not participate in

their respective programs must be moved out of the facility where the programs are held to make room for other inmates. The decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise. See *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451. Respondent also complains that his privileges will be reduced. An essential tool of prison administration, however, is the authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave. The Constitution accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit. See *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 467, n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675. Respondent fails to cite a single case from this Court holding that the denial of discrete prison privileges for refusal to participate in a rehabilitation program amounts to unconstitutional compulsion. Instead, he relies on the so-called penalty cases, see, e.g., *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574, which involved free citizens given the choice between invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege and sustaining their economic livelihood, see, e.g., *id.*, at 516, 87 S.Ct. 625. Those cases did not involve legitimate rehabilitative programs conducted within prison walls, and they are not easily extended to the prison context, where inmates surrender their rights to pursue a livelihood and to contract freely with the State. Pp. 2027-2028.

(3) Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves a question of judgment: Courts must decide ****2021** whether the consequences of an inmate's choice to remain silent are closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the *de minimis* harms against which it does not. The *Sandin* framework provides a reasonable means of assessing whether the response of prison administrators to correctional and rehabilitative necessities are so out of the ordinary that one could sensibly say they rise to the level of unconstitutional compulsion. Pp. 2028-2029.

(d) Prison context or not, respondent's choice is marked less by compulsion than by choices the Court has held give no rise to a self-incrimination claim. The cost to respondent of exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege-denial of certain perquisites that make his life in prison more tolerable-is much less than that borne by the defendant in, e.g., *McGautha v. California*, 402 U.S. 183, 217, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711, where the Court upheld a procedure that allowed statements made by a criminal defendant ***27** to mitigate his responsibility and avoid the death penalty to be used against him as evidence of his guilt. The hard choices faced by the defendants in, e.g., *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, *supra*, at 313, 96 S.Ct. 1551; *Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard*, 523 U.S. 272, 287-288, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387; and *Minnesota v. Murphy*, 465 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, further illustrate that the consequences respondent faced did not amount to unconstitutional compulsion. Respondent's attempt to distinguish the latter cases on dual grounds-that (1) the penalty here followed automatically from his decision to remain silent, and (2) his participation in the SATP was involuntary-is unavailing. Neither distinction would justify departing from this Court's precedents. Pp. 2029-2031.

(e) Were respondent's position to prevail, there would be serious doubt about the constitutionality of the federal sex offender treatment program, which is comparable to the Kansas program. Respondent is mistaken as well to concentrate on a so-called reward/penalty distinction and an illusory baseline against which a change in prison conditions must be measured. Finally, respondent's analysis would call into question the constitutionality of an accepted feature of federal criminal law, the downward adjustment of a sentence for acceptance of criminal responsibility. Pp. 2031-2032.

Justice O'CONNOR acknowledged that the Court is divided on the appropriate standard for evaluating compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting, but concluded that she need not resolve this dilemma because this case indisputably involves burdens rather than benefits, and because the penalties assessed against respondent as a result of his failure to participate in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) are not compulsive on any reasonable test. The Fifth Amendment's text does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. The Court's so-called "penalty cases" establish that the potential loss of one's livelihood through, e.g., the loss of

employment, *Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York*, 392 U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089, and the loss of the right to participate in political associations and to hold public office, *Lefkowitz v. Cunningham*, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1, are capable of coercing incriminating testimony. Such penalties, however, are far more significant than those facing respondent: a reduction in incentive level and a corresponding transfer from medium to maximum security. In practical terms, these changes involve restrictions on respondent's prison privileges and living conditions that seem minor. Because the prison is responsible for caring for respondent's basic needs, his ability to support himself is not implicated *28 by the reduction **2022 of his prison wages. While his visitation is reduced, he still retains the ability to see his attorney, his family, and clergy. The limitation on his possession of personal items, as well as the amount he is allowed to spend at the canteen, may make his prison experience more unpleasant, but seems very unlikely to actually compel him to incriminate himself. Because it is his burden to prove compulsion, it may be assumed that the prison is capable of controlling its inmates so that respondent's personal safety is not jeopardized by being placed in maximum security, at least in the absence of proof to the contrary. Finally, the mere fact that the penalties facing respondent are the same as those imposed for prison disciplinary violations does not make them coercive. Thus, although the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is troubling, its determination that the decision below should be reversed is correct. Pp. 2032-2035.

KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, *post*, p. 2032. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, *post*, p. 2035.

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Opinion

*29 Justice KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice THOMAS join.

Respondent Robert G. Lile is a convicted sex offender in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (Department). A few years before respondent was scheduled to reenter society, Department officials recommended that he enter a prison treatment program so that he would not rape again upon release. While there appears to be some difference of opinion among experts in the field, Kansas officials and officials who administer the United States prison system have made the determination that it is of considerable importance for the program participant to admit having committed the crime for which he is being treated and other past offenses. The first and in many ways most crucial step in the Kansas rehabilitation program thus requires the participant to confront his past crimes so that he can begin to understand his own motivations and weaknesses. As this initial step can be a most difficult one, Kansas offers sex offenders incentives to participate in the program.

Respondent contends this incentive system violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Kansas' rehabilitation program, however, serves a vital penological purpose, and offering

inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.

I

In 1982, respondent lured a high school student into his car as she was returning home from school. At gunpoint, respondent forced the victim to perform oral sodomy on him *30 and then drove to a field where he raped her. After the sexual assault, the victim went to her school, where, crying and upset, she reported the crime. The police arrested respondent **2023 and recovered on his person the weapon he used to facilitate the crime. *State v. Lile*, 237 Kan. 210, 211-212, 699 P.2d 456, 457-458 (1985). Although respondent maintained that the sexual intercourse was consensual, a jury convicted him of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated kidnaping. Both the Kansas Supreme Court and a Federal District Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain respondent's conviction on all charges. See *id.*, at 211, 699 P.2d, at 458; 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (Kan.1999).

In 1994, a few years before respondent was scheduled to be released, prison officials ordered him to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they discuss and accept responsibility for the crime for which they have been sentenced. Participating inmates also are required to complete a sexual history form, which details all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether such activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. A polygraph examination is used to verify the accuracy and completeness of the offender's sexual history.

While information obtained from participants advances the SATP's rehabilitative goals, the information is not privileged. Kansas leaves open the possibility that new evidence might be used against sex offenders in future criminal proceedings. In addition, Kansas law requires the SATP staff to report any uncharged sexual offenses involving minors to law enforcement authorities. Although there is no evidence that incriminating information has ever been disclosed under the SATP, the release of information is a possibility.

Department officials informed respondent that if he refused to participate in the SATP, his privilege status would be reduced from Level III to Level I. As part of this reduction, *31 respondent's visitation rights, earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures, access to a personal television, and other privileges automatically would be curtailed. In addition, respondent would be transferred to a maximum-security unit, where his movement would be more limited, he would be moved from a two-person to a four-person cell, and he would be in a potentially more dangerous environment.

Respondent refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He brought this action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the warden and the secretary of the Department, seeking an injunction to prevent them from withdrawing his prison privileges and transferring him to a different housing unit.

After the parties completed discovery, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas entered summary judgment in respondent's favor. 24 F.Supp.2d 1152 (1998). The District Court noted that because respondent had testified at trial that his sexual intercourse with the victim was consensual, an acknowledgment of responsibility for the rape on the "Admission of Guilt" form would subject respondent to a possible charge of perjury. *Id.*, at 1157. After reviewing the specific loss of privileges and change in conditions of confinement that respondent would face for refusing to incriminate himself, the District Court concluded that these consequences constituted coercion in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 224 F.3d 1175 (2000). It held that the compulsion element of a Fifth Amendment claim can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. *Id.*, at 1183. It held that the reduction in prison privileges and housing accommodations was a penalty, both because of its substantial impact ³² on the inmate and because that impact was identical to the punishment imposed ²⁰²⁴ by the Department for serious disciplinary infractions. In the Court of Appeals' view, the fact that the sanction was automatic, rather than conditional, supported the conclusion that it constituted compulsion. Moreover, because all SATP files are subject to disclosure by subpoena, and an admission of culpability regarding the crime of conviction would create a risk of a perjury prosecution, the court concluded that the information disclosed by respondent was sufficiently incriminating. *Id.*, at 1180. The Court of Appeals recognized that the Kansas policy served the State's important interests in rehabilitating sex offenders and promoting public safety. It concluded, however, that those interests could be served without violating the Constitution, either by treating the admissions of the inmates as privileged communications or by granting inmates use immunity. *Id.*, at 1192.

We granted the warden's petition for certiorari because the Court of Appeals has held that an important Kansas prison regulation violates the Federal Constitution. 532 U.S. 1018, 121 S.Ct. 1955, 149 L.Ed.2d 752 (2001).

II

Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation. In 1995, an estimated 355,000 rapes and sexual assaults occurred nationwide. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 1 (1997) (hereinafter Sex Offenses); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1999, Uniform Crime Reports 24 (2000). Between 1980 and 1994, the population of imprisoned sex offenders increased at a faster rate than for any other category of violent crime. See Sex Offenses 18. As in the present case, the victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles. In 1995, for instance, a majority of reported forcible sexual offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age. University of New Hampshire, Crimes Against Children Research Center, Fact Sheet 5; Sex Offenses 24. Nearly 4 in 10 imprisoned violent ³³ sex offenders said their victims were 12 or younger. *Id.*, at *iii*.

When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault. See *id.*, at 27; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997). States thus have a vital interest in rehabilitating convicted sex offenders.

Therapists and correctional officers widely agree that clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat. Institute of Corrections, A Practitioner's Guide to Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender xiii (1988) (“[T]he rate of recidivism of treated sex offenders is fairly consistently estimated to be around 15%,” whereas the rate of recidivism of untreated offenders has been estimated to be as high as 80%. “Even if both of these figures are exaggerated, there would still be a significant difference between treated and untreated individuals”). An important component of those rehabilitation programs requires participants to confront their past and accept responsibility for their misconduct. *Id.*, at 73. “Denial is generally regarded as a main impediment to successful therapy,” and “[t]herapists depend on offenders' truthful descriptions of events leading to past offences in order to determine which behaviours need to be targeted in therapy.” H. Barbaree, Denial and Minimization Among Sex Offenders: Assessment and Treatment Outcome, 3 Forum on Corrections Research, No. 4, p. 30 (1991). Research indicates that offenders who deny all allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to fail in treatment than those who admit even partial complicity. See B. Maletzky & K. McGovern, Treating the Sexual Offender 253-255 (1991).

****2025** The critical first step in the Kansas SATP, therefore, is acceptance of responsibility for past offenses. This gives inmates a basis to understand why they are being punished ***34** and to identify the traits that cause such a frightening and high risk of recidivism. As part of this first step, Kansas requires each SATP participant to complete an “Admission of Responsibility” form, to fill out a sexual history form discussing their offending behavior, and to discuss their past behavior in individual and group counseling sessions.

1 The District Court found that the Kansas SATP is a valid “clinical rehabilitative program,” supported by a “legitimate penological objective” in rehabilitation. 24 F.Supp.2d, at 1163. The SATP lasts for 18 months and involves substantial daily counseling. It helps inmates address sexual addiction; understand the thoughts, feelings, and behavior dynamics that precede their offenses; and develop relapse prevention skills. Although inmates are assured of a significant level of confidentiality, Kansas does not offer legal immunity from prosecution based on any statements made in the course of the SATP. According to Kansas, however, no inmate has ever been charged or prosecuted for any offense based on information disclosed during treatment. Brief for Petitioners 4-5. There is no contention, then, that the program is a mere subterfuge for the conduct of a criminal investigation.

2 As the parties explain, Kansas' decision not to offer immunity to every SATP participant serves two legitimate state interests. First, the professionals who design and conduct the program have concluded that for SATP participants to accept full responsibility for their past actions, they must accept the proposition that those actions carry consequences. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. Although no program participant has ever been prosecuted or penalized based on information revealed during the SATP, the potential for additional punishment reinforces the gravity of the participants' offenses and thereby aids in their rehabilitation. If inmates know society will not punish them for their past offenses, they may be left with the false impression that society does not consider those crimes to be serious ones. The practical effect of guaranteed ***35** immunity for SATP participants would be to absolve many sex offenders of any and all cost for their earlier crimes. This is the precise opposite of the rehabilitative objective.

Second, while Kansas as a rule does not prosecute inmates based upon information revealed in the course of the program, the State confirms its valid interest in deterrence by keeping open the option to prosecute a particularly dangerous sex offender. Brief for 18 States as *Amici Curiae* 11. Kansas is not alone in declining to offer blanket use immunity as a condition of participation in a treatment program. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and other States conduct similar sex offender programs and do not offer immunity to the participants. See, e.g., *Ainsworth v. Risley*, 244 F.3d 209, 214 (C.A.1 2001) (describing New Hampshire's program).

The mere fact that Kansas declines to grant inmates use immunity does not render the SATP invalid. Asking at the outset whether prison administrators can or should offer immunity skips the constitutional inquiry altogether. If the State of Kansas offered immunity, the self-incrimination privilege would not be implicated. See, e.g., *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); *Brown v. Walker*, 161 U.S. 591, 610, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896). The State, however, does not offer immunity. So the central question becomes whether the State's program, and the consequences for nonparticipation in it, combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the constitutional right. If there is compulsion, the State cannot continue the program in its present form; and the alternatives, as will be discussed, defeat the program's objectives.

****2026** The SATP does not compel prisoners to incriminate themselves in violation of the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, which applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The “Amendment speaks of compulsion,” ***36** *United States v. Monia*, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943), and the

Court has insisted that the “constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not be *compelled* to give self-incriminating testimony.” *United States v. Washington*, 431 U.S. 181, 188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). The consequences in question here—a transfer to another prison where television sets are not placed in each inmate’s cell, where exercise facilities are not readily available, and where work and wage opportunities are more limited—are not ones that compel a prisoner to speak about his past crimes despite a desire to remain silent. The fact that these consequences are imposed on prisoners, rather than ordinary citizens, moreover, is important in weighing respondent’s constitutional claim.

3 The privilege against self-incrimination does not terminate at the jailhouse door, but the fact of a valid conviction and the ensuing restrictions on liberty are essential to the Fifth Amendment analysis. *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). A broad range of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in a free society fall within the expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction.

The Court has instructed that rehabilitation is a legitimate penological interest that must be weighed against the exercise of an inmate’s liberty. See, e.g., *O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz*, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 351, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Since “most offenders will eventually return to society, [a] paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.” *Pell v. Procunier*, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). Acceptance of responsibility in turn demonstrates that an offender “is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period *37 of time than might otherwise be necessary.” *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).

The limitation on prisoners’ privileges and rights also follows from the need to grant necessary authority and capacity to federal and state officials to administer the prisons. See, e.g., *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). “Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.” *Id.*, at 84-85, 107 S.Ct. 2254. To respect these imperatives, courts must exercise restraint in supervising the minutiae of prison life. *Ibid.* Where, as here, a state penal system is involved, federal courts have “additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” *Ibid.*

4 For these reasons, the Court in *Sandin* held that challenged prison conditions cannot give rise to a due process violation unless those conditions constitute “atypical and significant hardship[s] on [inmates] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See 515 U.S., at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The determination under *Sandin* whether a prisoner’s liberty interest has been curtailed may not provide a precise parallel for determining whether there is compelled self-incrimination, but it does **2027 provide useful instruction for answering the latter inquiry. *Sandin* and its counterparts underscore the axiom that a convicted felon’s life in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen. In the context of a legitimate rehabilitation program for prisoners, those same considerations are relevant to our analysis. The compulsion inquiry must consider the significant restraints already inherent in prison life and the State’s own vital interests in rehabilitation goals and procedures within the prison system. A prison clinical rehabilitation program, which is acknowledged to bear a rational relation to a legitimate penological objective, does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination if the adverse *38 consequences an inmate faces for not participating are related to the program objectives and do not constitute atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Along these lines, this Court has recognized that lawful conviction and incarceration necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). *Baxter* declined to extend to prison disciplinary proceedings the rule of *Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), that the prosecution may not comment on a defendant's silence at trial. 425 U.S., at 319-320, 96 S.Ct. 1551. As the Court explained, "[d]isciplinary proceedings in state prisons ... involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime." *Id.*, at 319, 96 S.Ct. 1551. The inmate in *Baxter* no doubt felt compelled to speak in one sense of the word. The Court, considering the level of compulsion in light of the prison setting and the State's interests in rehabilitation and orderly administration, nevertheless rejected the inmate's self-incrimination claim.

5 In the present case, respondent's decision not to participate in the Kansas SATP did not extend his term of incarceration. Nor did his decision affect his eligibility for good-time credits or parole. 224 F.3d, at 1182. Respondent instead complains that if he remains silent about his past crimes, he will be transferred from the medium-security unit-where the program is conducted-to a less desirable maximum-security unit.

No one contends, however, that the transfer is intended to punish prisoners for exercising their Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, the limitation on these rights is incidental to Kansas' legitimate penological reason for the transfer: Due to limited space, inmates who do not participate in their respective programs will be moved out of the facility where the programs are held to make room for other inmates. As the Secretary of Corrections has explained, "it makes no *39 sense to have someone who's not participating in a program taking up a bed in a setting where someone else who may be willing to participate in a program could occupy that bed and participate in a program." App. 99.

6 It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise. See *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). For this reason the Court has not required administrators to conduct a hearing before transferring a prisoner to a bed in a different prison, even if "life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another." *Ibid.* The Court has considered the proposition that a prisoner in a more comfortable facility might begin to feel entitled to remain there throughout his term of incarceration. The Court has concluded, nevertheless, that this expectation "is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all." *Id.*, at 228, 96 S.Ct. 2532. This logic has equal force in analyzing respondent's self-incrimination claim.

****2028** 7 Respondent also complains that he will be demoted from Level III to Level I status as a result of his decision not to participate. This demotion means the loss of his personal television; less access to prison organizations and the gym area; a reduction in certain pay opportunities and canteen privileges; and restricted visitation rights. App. 27-28. An essential tool of prison administration, however, is the authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave. The Constitution accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit. Accordingly, *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 467, n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), held that an inmate's transfer to another facility did not in itself implicate a liberty interest, even though that transfer resulted in the loss of "access to vocational, educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs." Respondent concedes that no liberty interest is implicated in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. To be sure, cases like *Meachum* and ***40** *Hewitt* involved the Due Process Clause rather than the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Those cases nevertheless underscore the axiom that, by virtue of their convictions, inmates must expect significant restrictions, inherent in prison life, on rights and privileges free citizens take for granted.

Respondent fails to cite a single case from this Court holding that the denial of discrete prison privileges for refusal to participate in a rehabilitation program amounts to unconstitutional compulsion. Instead,

relying on the so-called penalty cases, respondent treats the fact of his incarceration as if it were irrelevant. See, e.g., *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967); *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967). Those cases, however, involved free citizens given the choice between invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege and sustaining their economic livelihood. See, e.g., *id.*, at 516, 87 S.Ct. 625 (“[T]hreat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion”). Those principles are not easily extended to the prison context, where inmates surrender upon incarceration their rights to pursue a livelihood and to contract freely with the State, as well as many other basic freedoms. The persons who asserted rights in *Garrity* and *Spevack* had not been convicted of a crime. It would come as a surprise if *Spevack* stands for the proposition that when a lawyer has been disbarred by reason of a final criminal conviction, the court or agency considering reinstatement of the right to practice law could not consider that the disbarred attorney has admitted his guilt and expressed contrition. Indeed, this consideration is often given dispositive weight by this Court itself on routine motions for reinstatement. The current case is more complex, of course, in that respondent is also required to discuss other criminal acts for which he might still be liable for prosecution. On this point, however, there is still a critical distinction between the instant case and *Garrity* or *Spevack*. Unlike those cases, *41 respondent here is asked to discuss other past crimes as part of a legitimate rehabilitative program conducted within prison walls.

To reject out of hand these considerations would be to ignore the State's interests in offering rehabilitation programs and providing for the efficient administration of its prisons. There is no indication that the SATP is an elaborate attempt to avoid the protections offered by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Rather, the program serves an important social purpose. It would be bitter medicine to treat as irrelevant the State's legitimate interests and to invalidate the SATP on the ground that it incidentally burdens an inmate's right to remain silent.

8 Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves a question of judgment: Courts must decide whether the consequences of an inmate's choice to remain silent are closer to the **2029 physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the *de minimis* harms against which it does not. The *Sandin* framework provides a reasonable means of assessing whether the response of prison administrators to correctional and rehabilitative necessities are so out of the ordinary that one could sensibly say they rise to the level of unconstitutional compulsion.

9 Prison context or not, respondent's choice is marked less by compulsion than by choices the Court has held give no rise to a self-incrimination claim. The “criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” *McGautha v. California*, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is well settled that the government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free. See, e.g., *42 *Jenkins v. Anderson*, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (a criminal defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege prior to arrest may be used to impeach his credibility at trial); *Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78, 84-85, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (a criminal defendant may be compelled to disclose the substance of an alibi defense prior to trial or be barred from asserting it).

The cost to respondent of exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege—denial of certain perquisites that make his life in prison more tolerable—is much less than that borne by the defendant in *McGautha*. There, the Court upheld a procedure that allowed statements, which were made by a criminal defendant to mitigate his responsibility and avoid the death penalty, to be used against him as evidence of his guilt. 402 U.S., at 217, 91 S.Ct. 1454. The Court likewise has held that plea bargaining does not violate

the Fifth Amendment, even though criminal defendants may feel considerable pressure to admit guilt in order to obtain more lenient treatment. See, e.g., *Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); *Brady*, 397 U.S., at 751, 90 S.Ct. 1463.

Nor does reducing an inmate's prison wage and taking away personal television and gym access pose the same hard choice faced by the defendants in *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), *Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard*, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998), and *Minnesota v. Murphy*, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). In *Baxter*, a state prisoner objected to the fact that his silence at a prison disciplinary hearing would be held against him. The Court acknowledged that *Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits courts from instructing a criminal jury that it may draw an inference of guilt from a defendant's failure to testify. The Court nevertheless refused to extend the *Griffin* rule to the context of state prison disciplinary hearings because those proceedings “involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime.” 425 U.S., at 319, 96 S.Ct. 1551. Whereas the inmate in the present case faces the loss of certain privileges, the prisoner in **43 Baxter* faced 30 days in punitive segregation as well as the subsequent downgrade of his prison classification status. *Id.*, at 313, 96 S.Ct. 1551.

In *Murphy*, the defendant feared the possibility of additional jail time as a result of his decision to remain silent. The defendant's probation officer knew the defendant had committed a rape and murder unrelated to his probation. One of the terms of the defendant's probation required him to be truthful with the probation officer in all matters. Seizing upon this, the officer interviewed the defendant ***2030* about the rape and murder, and the defendant admitted his guilt. The Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, despite the defendant's fear of being returned to prison for 16 months if he remained silent. 465 U.S., at 422, 438, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

In *Woodard*, the plaintiff faced not loss of a personal television and gym access, but loss of life. In a unanimous opinion just four Terms ago, this Court held that a death row inmate could be made to choose between incriminating himself at his clemency interview and having adverse inferences drawn from his silence. The Court reasoned that it “is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak. He merely faces a choice quite similar to the sorts of choices that a criminal defendant must make in the course of criminal proceedings, none of which has ever been held to violate the Fifth Amendment.” 523 U.S., at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1244. As here, the inmate in *Woodard* claimed to face a Hobson's choice: He would damage his case for clemency no matter whether he spoke and incriminated himself, or remained silent and the clemency board construed that silence against him. Unlike here, the Court nevertheless concluded that the pressure the inmate felt to speak to improve his chances of clemency did not constitute unconstitutional compulsion. *Id.*, at 287-288, 118 S.Ct. 1244.

Woodard, *Murphy*, and *Baxter* illustrate that the consequences respondent faced here did not amount to unconstitutional compulsion. Respondent and the dissent attempt to distinguish *Baxter*, *Murphy*, and *Woodard* on the dual **44* grounds that (1) the penalty here followed automatically from respondent's decision to remain silent, and (2) respondent's participation in the SATP was involuntary. Neither distinction would justify departing from this Court's precedents, and the second is question begging in any event.

It is proper to consider the nexus between remaining silent and the consequences that follow. Plea bargains are not deemed to be compelled in part because a defendant who pleads not guilty still must be convicted. Cf. *Brady*, *supra*, at 751-752, 90 S.Ct. 1463. States may award good-time credits and early parole for inmates who accept responsibility because silence in these circumstances does not automatically mean the parole board, which considers other factors as well, will deny them parole. See *Baxter*, *supra*, at 317-318, 96 S.Ct. 1551. While the automatic nature of the consequence may be a

necessary condition to finding unconstitutional compulsion, however, that is not a sufficient reason alone to ignore *Woodard*, *Murphy*, and *Baxter*. Even if a consequence follows directly from a person's silence, one cannot answer the question whether the person has been compelled to incriminate himself without first considering the severity of the consequences.

Nor can *Woodard* be distinguished on the alternative ground that respondent's choice to participate in the SATP was involuntary, whereas the death row inmate in *Woodard* chose to participate in clemency proceedings. This distinction assumes the answer to the compulsion inquiry. If respondent was not compelled to participate in the SATP, his participation was voluntary in the only sense necessary for our present inquiry. Kansas asks sex offenders to participate in SATP because, in light of the high rate of recidivism, it wants all, not just the few who volunteer, to receive treatment. Whether the inmates are being asked or ordered to participate depends entirely on the consequences of their decision not to do so. The parties in *Woodard*, *Murphy*, and *Baxter* all were faced with ramifications far worse than respondent faces here, and in each of those cases the Court *45 determined that their hard choice between silence and the consequences was not compelled. It is beyond doubt, of course, that respondent would prefer not to choose between losing prison privileges and accepting responsibility for his past crimes. It is a choice, nonetheless, that does not amount to compulsion, **2031 and therefore one Kansas may require respondent to make.

The Federal Government has filed an *amicus* brief describing its sex offender treatment program. Were respondent's position to prevail, the constitutionality of the federal program would be cast into serious doubt. The fact that the offender in the federal program can choose to participate without being given a new prisoner classification is not determinative. For, as the Government explains, its program is conducted at a single, 112-bed facility that is more desirable than other federal prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. Inmates choose at the outset whether to enter the federal program. Once accepted, however, inmates must continue to discuss and accept responsibility for their crimes if they wish to maintain the status quo and remain in their more comfortable accommodations. Otherwise they will be expelled from the program and sent to a less desirable facility. *Id.*, at 27. Thus the federal program is different from Kansas' SATP only in that it does not require inmates to sacrifice privileges besides housing as a consequence of nonparticipation. The federal program is comparable to the Kansas program because it does not offer participants use immunity and because it conditions a desirable housing assignment on inmates' willingness to accept responsibility for past behavior. Respondent's theory cannot be confined in any meaningful way, and state and federal courts applying that view would have no principled means to determine whether these similarities are sufficient to render the federal program unconstitutional.

Respondent is mistaken as well to concentrate on the so-called reward/penalty distinction and the illusory baseline *46 against which a change in prison conditions must be measured. The answer to the question whether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in the eye of the beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing, would be an inartful addition to an already confused area of jurisprudence. The prison warden in this case stated that it is largely a matter of chance where in a prison an inmate is assigned. App. 59-63. Even if Inmates A and B are serving the same sentence for the same crime, Inmate A could end up in a medium-security unit and Inmate B in a maximum-security unit based solely on administrative factors beyond their control. Under respondent's view, however, the Constitution allows the State to offer Inmate B the opportunity to live in the medium-security unit conditioned on his participation in the SATP, but does not allow the State to offer Inmate A the opportunity to live in that same medium-security unit subject to the same conditions. The consequences for Inmates A and B are identical: They may participate and live in medium security or refuse and live in maximum security. Respondent, however, would have us say the Constitution puts Inmate A in a superior position to Inmate B solely by the accident of the initial assignment to a medium-security unit.

This reasoning is unsatisfactory. The Court has noted before that “[w]e doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between ‘enhancing’ the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the ‘leniency’ he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated.” *Roberts v. United States*, 445 U.S. 552, 557, n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). Respondent's reasoning would provide States with perverse incentives to assign all inmates convicted of sex offenses to maximum security prisons until near the time of release, when the rehabilitation program starts. The rule would work to the detriment of the entire class of sex offenders who might not otherwise be placed in maximum-security facilities. And prison administrators *47 would be forced, before making routine prison housing decisions, to identify each inmate's so-called baseline and determine whether an adverse effect, however marginal, will result from the administrative **2032 decision. The easy alternatives that respondent predicts for prison administrators would turn out to be not so trouble free.

Respondent's analysis also would call into question the constitutionality of an accepted feature of federal criminal law: the downward adjustment for acceptance of criminal responsibility provided in § 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (Nov.2002). If the Constitution does not permit the government to condition the use of a personal television on the acceptance of responsibility for past crimes, it is unclear how it could permit the government to reduce the length of a prisoner's term of incarceration based upon the same factor. By rejecting respondent's theory, we do not, in this case, call these policies into question.

* * *

Acceptance of responsibility is the beginning of rehabilitation. And a recognition that there are rewards for those who attempt to reform is a vital and necessary step toward completion. The Court of Appeals' ruling would defeat these objectives. If the State sought to comply with the ruling by allowing respondent to enter the program while still insisting on his innocence, there would be little incentive for other SATP participants to confess and accept counseling; indeed, there is support for Kansas' view that the dynamics of the group therapy would be impaired. If the State had to offer immunity, the practical effect would be that serial offenders who are incarcerated for but one violation would be given a windfall for past bad conduct, a result potentially destructive of any public or state support for the program and quite at odds with the dominant goal of acceptance of responsibility. If the State found it was forced to graduate prisoners from its rehabilitation program without knowing *48 what other offenses they may have committed, the integrity of its program would be very much in doubt. If the State found it had to comply by allowing respondent the same perquisites as those who accept counseling, the result would be a dramatic illustration that obduracy has the same rewards as acceptance, and so the program itself would become self-defeating, even hypocritical, in the eyes of those whom it seeks to help. The Fifth Amendment does not require the State to suffer these programmatic disruptions when it seeks to rehabilitate those who are incarcerated for valid, final convictions.

The Kansas SATP represents a sensible approach to reducing the serious danger that repeat sex offenders pose to many innocent persons, most often children. The State's interest in rehabilitation is undeniable. There is, furthermore, no indication that the SATP is merely an elaborate ruse to skirt the protections of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Rather, the program allows prison administrators to provide to those who need treatment the incentive to seek it.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The Court today is divided on the question of what standard to apply when evaluating compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting. I write

separately because, although I agree with Justice STEVENS that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than the “atypical and significant hardship” standard we have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons, see *post*, at 2038-2039 (dissenting opinion) (citing *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)), I do not believe that the alterations in respondent's prison conditions as a result of his failure to participate in the Sexual ~~Abuse~~ ^{*49} Treatment Program (SATP) were so great as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of ~~**2033~~ the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. I therefore agree with the plurality that the decision below should be reversed.

The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Not all pressure necessarily “compel [s]” incriminating statements.

For instance, in *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), we found that an environment of police custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings only after observing that such an environment exerts a “heavy toll on individual liberty.” But we have not required *Miranda* warnings during noncustodial police questioning. See, e.g., *Beckwith v. United States*, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). In restricting *Miranda*'s applicability, we have not denied that noncustodial questioning imposes some sort of pressure on suspects to confess to their crimes. See *Oregon v. Mathiason*, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (*per curiam*) (“Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it ...”); *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (describing the “comparatively nonthreatening character of [noncustodial] detentions” (emphasis added)). Rather, as suggested by the text of the Fifth Amendment, we have asked whether the pressure imposed in such situations rises to a level where it is likely to “compe[l]” a person “to be a witness against himself.”

The same analysis applies to penalties imposed upon a person as a result of the failure to incriminate himself-some penalties are so great as to “compe [l]” such testimony, while others do not rise to that level. Our precedents establish that certain types of penalties are capable of coercing incriminating testimony: termination of employment, *Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York*, 392 U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968), the loss of a professional ~~*50~~ license, *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), ineligibility to receive government contracts, *Lefkowitz v. Turley*, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973), and the loss of the right to participate in political associations and to hold public office, *Lefkowitz v. Cunningham*, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). All of these penalties, however, are far more significant than those facing respondent here.

The first three of these so-called “penalty cases” involved the potential loss of one's livelihood, either through the loss of employment, loss of a professional license essential to employment, or loss of business through government contracts. In *Lefkowitz*, we held that the loss of government contracts was constitutionally equivalent to the loss of a profession because “[a government contractor] lives off his contracting fees just as surely as a state employee lives off his salary.” 414 U.S., at 83, 94 S.Ct. 316; contra, *post*, at 2043, n. 11. To support oneself in one's chosen profession is one of the most important abilities a person can have. A choice between incriminating oneself and being deprived of one's livelihood is the very sort of choice that is likely to compel someone to be a witness against himself. The choice presented in the last case, *Cunningham*, implicated not only political influence and prestige, but also the First Amendment right to run for office and to participate in political associations. 431 U.S., at 807-808, 97 S.Ct. 2132. In holding that the penalties in that case constituted compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes, we properly referred to those consequences as “grave.” *Id.*, at 807, 97 S.Ct. 2132.

I do not believe the consequences facing respondent in this case are serious enough to compel him to be a witness against ****2034** himself. These consequences involve a reduction in incentive level, and a corresponding transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security part of the prison. In practical terms, these changes involve restrictions on the personal property respondent can keep in his cell, a reduction in his visitation privileges, a reduction in the amount of money he can spend in the canteen, and a reduction in the ***51** wage he can earn through prison employment. See *ante*, at 2023. These changes in living conditions seem to me minor. Because the prison is responsible for caring for respondent's basic needs, his ability to support himself is not implicated by the reduction in wages he would suffer as a result. While his visitation is reduced as a result of his failure to incriminate himself, he still retains the ability to see his attorney, his family, and members of the clergy. App. 27. The limitation on the possession of personal items, as well as the amount that respondent is allowed to spend at the canteen, may make his prison experience more unpleasant, but seems very unlikely to actually compel him to incriminate himself.

Justice STEVENS also suggests that the move to the maximum-security area of the prison would itself be coercive. See *post*, at 2041. Although the District Court found that moving respondent to a maximum-security section of the prison would put him “in a more dangerous environment occupied by more serious offenders,” 24 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1155 (D.Kan.1998), there was no finding about how great a danger such a placement posed. Because it is respondent's burden to prove compulsion, we may assume that the prison is capable of controlling its inmates so that respondent's personal safety is not jeopardized by being placed in the maximum-security area of the prison, at least in the absence of proof to the contrary. Justice STEVENS argues that the fact that the penalties facing respondent for refusal to incriminate himself are the same as those imposed for prison disciplinary violations also indicates that they are coercive. See *post*, at 2040. I do not agree. Insofar as Justice STEVENS' claim is that these sanctions carry a stigma that might compel respondent to incriminate himself, it is incorrect. Because the same sanctions are also imposed on all prisoners who refuse to participate in any recommended program, App. 19-20, any stigma attached to the reduction would be minimal. Insofar as ***52** Justice STEVENS' claim is that these sanctions are designed to compel behavior because they are used as disciplinary tools, it is also flawed. There is a difference between the sorts of penalties that would give a prisoner a reason not to violate prison disciplinary rules and what would compel him to expose himself to criminal liability. Therefore, on this record, I cannot conclude that respondent has shown that his decision to incriminate himself would be compelled by the imposition of these penalties.

Although I do not think the penalties respondent faced were sufficiently serious to compel his testimony, I do not agree with the suggestion in the plurality opinion that these penalties could permissibly rise to the level of those in cases like *McGautha v. California*, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (holding that statements made in the mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing may be used as evidence of guilt), *Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (holding that plea bargaining does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), and *Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard*, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998) (holding that there is no right to silence at a clemency interview). See *ante*, at 2028-2030. The penalties potentially faced in these cases—longer incarceration and execution—are far greater than those we have already held to constitute unconstitutional compulsion in the penalty cases. Indeed, the imposition of such outcomes as a penalty ****2035** for refusing to incriminate oneself would surely implicate a “liberty interest.”

Justice STEVENS attempts to distinguish these cases because, in each, the negative outcome did not follow directly from the decision to remain silent, and because none of these cases involved a direct order to testify. See *post*, at 2039. As the plurality's opinion makes clear, however, these two factors do not adequately explain the difference between these cases and the penalty cases, where we have found compulsion based on the imposition of penalties far less onerous. See *ante*, at 2030-2031.

*53 I believe the proper theory should recognize that it is generally acceptable to impose the risk of punishment, however great, so long as the actual imposition of such punishment is accomplished through a fair criminal process. See, e.g., *McGautha v. California*, *supra*, at 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454 (“The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Forcing defendants to accept such consequences seems to me very different from imposing penalties for the refusal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testimony; in the latter context, any penalty that is capable of compelling a person to be a witness against himself is illegitimate. But even this explanation of the privilege is incomplete, as it does not fully account for all of the Court's precedents in this area. Compare *Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (holding that prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's failure to testify), with *Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard*, *supra* (holding that there is no right to silence at a clemency interview).

Complicating matters even further is the question of whether the denial of benefits and the imposition of burdens ought to be analyzed differently in this area. Compare *ante*, at 2031-2032, with *post*, at 2041. This question is particularly important given the existence of United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (Nov. 2000), which can be read to offer convicted criminals the benefit of a lower sentence in exchange for accepting responsibility for their crimes. See *ante*, at 2032.

I find the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination troubling. But because this case indisputably *54 involves burdens rather than benefits, and because I do not believe the penalties assessed against respondent in response to his failure to incriminate himself are compulsive on any reasonable test, I need not resolve this dilemma to make my judgment in this case.

Although I do not agree that the standard for compulsion is the same as the due process standard we identified in *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), I join in the judgment reached by the plurality's opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.

No one could possibly disagree with the plurality's statement that “offering inmates minimal incentives to participate [in a rehabilitation program] does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.” *Ante*, at 2022. The question that this case presents, however, is whether the State may punish an inmate's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege with the same mandatory sanction that follows a disciplinary conviction for an offense such as theft, sodomy, riot, **2036 arson, or assault. Until today the Court has never characterized a threatened harm as “a minimal incentive.” Nor have we ever held that a person who has made a valid assertion of the privilege may nevertheless be ordered to incriminate himself and sanctioned for disobeying such an order. This is truly a watershed case.

Based on an ad hoc appraisal of the benefits of obtaining confessions from sex offenders, balanced against the cost of honoring a bedrock constitutional right, the plurality holds that it is permissible to punish the assertion of the privilege with what it views as modest sanctions, provided that those sanctions are not given a “punitive” label. As I shall explain, the sanctions are in fact severe, but even if that were not so, the plurality's policy judgment does not justify the evisceration of a constitutional right. Despite the plurality's *55 meandering attempt to justify its unprecedented departure from a rule of law that has been settled since the days of John Marshall, I respectfully dissent.

I

The text of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” It is well settled that the prohibition “not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’” *Minnesota v. Murphy*, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting *Lefkowitz v. Turley*, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)). If a person is protected by the privilege, he may “refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.” *Id.*, at 78, 94 S.Ct. 316 (citing *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). Prison inmates-including sex offenders-do not forfeit the privilege at the jailhouse gate. *Murphy*, 465 U.S., at 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136.

It is undisputed that respondent's statements on the admission of responsibility and sexual history forms could incriminate him in a future prosecution for perjury or any other offense to which he is forced to confess.¹ It is also *56 clear that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right by refusing to participate in the SATP on the ground that he would be required to incriminate himself. Once he asserted that right, the State could have offered respondent immunity from the use of his statements in a subsequent prosecution. Instead, the Kansas Department of Corrections (Department) ordered respondent either to incriminate himself or to lose his medium-security status. In my opinion that order, coupled with the threatened revocation of respondent's Level III privileges, unquestionably violated his Fifth Amendment rights.

Putting to one side the plurality's evaluation of the policy judgments made by Kansas, its central submission is that the threatened withdrawal of respondent's Level III and medium-security status is not sufficiently harmful to qualify as unconstitutional **2037 compulsion. In support of this position, neither the plurality nor Justice O'CONNOR cites a single Fifth Amendment case in which a person invoked the privilege and was nevertheless required to answer a potentially incriminating question.²

The privilege against self-incrimination may have been born of the rack and the Star Chamber, see L. Levy, *Origins of the Fifth Amendment* 42 (I. Dee ed.1999); *Andresen v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463, 470, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), but the Framers had a *57 broader view of compulsion in mind when they drafted the Fifth Amendment.³ We know, for example, that the privilege was thought to protect defendants from the moral compulsion associated with any statement made under oath.⁴ In addition, the language of the Amendment, which focuses on a courtroom setting in which a defendant or a witness in a criminal trial invokes the privilege, encompasses the compulsion inherent in any judicial order overruling an assertion of the privilege. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in *United States v. Burr*, 25 F.Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692e) (CC Va. 1807): “If, in such a case, he say upon his oath that his answer would incriminate himself, the court can demand no other testimony of the fact.”

Our holding in *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the privilege applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, determined that the right to remain silent is itself a liberty interest protected by that Amendment. We explained that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak *in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ...*” *58 for such silence.” *Id.*, at 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (emphasis added). Since *Malloy*, we have construed the text to prohibit not only direct orders to testify, but also indirect compulsion effected by comments on a defendant's refusal to take the stand, *Griffin v. California*, 380 U.S. 609, 613-614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and we have recognized that compulsion can be presumed from the circumstances surrounding custodial interrogation, see *Dickerson v. United States*, 530 U.S. 428, 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (“[T]he coercion inherent in custodial

interrogation blurs the line between voluntary ****2038** and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be ‘accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment ... not to be compelled to incriminate himself’ ”) (quoting *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Without requiring the deprivation of any other liberty interest, we have found prohibited compulsion in the threatened loss of the right to participate in political associations, *Lefkowitz v. Cunningham*, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977), forfeiture of government contracts, *Turley*, 414 U.S., at 82, 94 S.Ct. 316, loss of employment, *Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York*, 392 U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968), and disbarment, *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 516, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967). None of our opinions contains any suggestion that compulsion should have a different meaning in the prison context. Nor is there any support in our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence for the proposition that nothing short of losing one’s livelihood is sufficient to constitute compulsion. Accord, *Turley*, 414 U.S., at 83, 94 S.Ct. 316.

The plurality’s suggestion that our decision in *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), supports a novel interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, see *ante*, at 2027, is inconsistent with the central rationale of that case. In *Meachum*, a group of prison inmates urged the Court to hold that the Due Process Clause entitled them to a hearing prior to their transfer to a substantially less favorable facility. Relying on the groundbreaking decisions in *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), ***59** which had rejected the once-prevailing view that a prison inmate had no more rights than a “slave of the State,”⁵ the prisoners sought to extend those holdings to require judicial review of “any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities.” The Court recognized that after *Wolff* and its progeny, convicted felons retain “a variety of important rights that the courts must be alert to protect.” Although *Meachum* refused to expand the constitutional rights of inmates, we did not narrow the protection of any established right. Indeed, Justice White explicitly limited the holding to prison conditions that “do not otherwise violate the Constitution,” 427 U.S., at 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532.⁶

Not a word in our discussion of the privilege in *Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard*, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998), *ante*, at 2030, requires a heightened showing of compulsion in the prison context to establish a Fifth Amendment violation. That case is wholly unlike this one because Woodard was not ordered to incriminate himself and was not punished for refusing to do so. He challenged Ohio’s clemency procedures, arguing, *inter alia*, that an interview with members of the clemency board offered to inmates one week before their clemency hearing presented him with a Hobson’s choice that violated the privilege against self-incrimination. He could either take advantage of the interview and risk incriminating himself, or decline the interview, in which case the clemency board might draw adverse inferences from his decision not to testify. We concluded that the prisoner who was offered “a voluntary interview” is in the same position as ***60** any defendant ****2039** faced with the option of either testifying or accepting the risk that adverse inferences may be drawn from his silence. 523 U.S., at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1244.

Respondent was directly ordered by prison authorities to participate in a program that requires incriminating disclosures, whereas no one ordered Woodard to do anything. Like a direct judicial order to answer questions in the courtroom, an order from the State to participate in the SATP is inherently coercive. Cf. *Turley*, 414 U.S., at 82, 94 S.Ct. 316 (“The waiver sought by the State, under threat of loss of contracts, would have been no less compelled than a direct request for the testimony without resort to the waiver”). Moreover, the penalty for refusing to participate in the SATP is automatic. Instead of conjecture and speculation about the indirect consequences that may flow from a decision to remain silent, we can be sure that defiance of a direct order carries with it the stigma of being a lawbreaker or a problem inmate, as well as other specified penalties. The penalty involved in this case is a mandated official response to the assertion of the privilege.

In *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), *ante*, at 2029, we held that a prison disciplinary proceeding did not violate the privilege, in part, because the State had not “insisted [nor] asked that Palmigiano waive his Fifth Amendment privilege,” and it was “undisputed that an inmate’s silence in and of itself [was] insufficient to support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board.” 425 U.S., at 317-318, 96 S.Ct. 1551. We distinguished the “penalty cases,” *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), and *Turley*, not because they involved civilians as opposed to prisoners, as the plurality assumes, *ante*, at 2028, but because in those cases the “refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege, *standing alone and without regard to other evidence*, resulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with the State,” whereas Palmigiano’s silence “was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted *61 by the facts surrounding his case.” 425 U.S., at 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (emphasis added). And, in a subsequent “penalty” case, we distinguished *Baxter* on the ground that refusing to incriminate oneself “was only one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was given no more probative value than the facts of the case warranted,” while in *Cunningham* “refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege [led] automatically and without more to imposition of sanctions.” 431 U.S., at 808, n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2132.

Similarly, in *Minnesota v. Murphy*, 465 U.S., at 438, 439, 104 S.Ct. 1136, while “the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege,” because revocation was not automatic under the Minnesota statute, we concluded that “Murphy could not reasonably have feared that the assertion of the privilege would have led to revocation.”⁷ These decisions recognized that there is an appreciable difference between an official **2040 sanction for disobeying a direct order and a mere risk of adverse consequences stemming from a voluntary choice. The distinction is not a novel one, nor is it simply offered to “justify departing from this Court’s precedents,” *ante*, at 2030. Rather it is a distinction that we have drawn throughout our cases; therefore, it is the plurality’s *62 disregard for both factors that represents an unjustified departure. Unlike *Woodard*, *Murphy*, and *Baxter*, respondent cannot invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and then gamble on whether the Department will revoke his Level III status; the punishment is mandatory. The fact that this case involves a prison inmate, as did *Woodard* and *Baxter*, is not enough to render those decisions controlling authority. Since we have already said inmates do not forfeit their Fifth Amendment rights at the jailhouse gate, *Murphy*, 465 U.S., at 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, the plurality must point to something beyond respondent’s status as a prisoner to justify its departure from our precedent.

II

The plurality and Justice O’CONNOR hold that the consequences stemming from respondent’s invocation of the privilege are not serious enough to constitute compulsion. The threat of transfer to Level I and a maximum-security unit is not sufficiently coercive in their view—either because the consequence is not really a penalty, just the loss of a benefit, or because it is a penalty, but an insignificant one. I strongly disagree.

It took respondent several years to acquire the status that he occupied in 1994 when he was ordered to participate in the SATP. Because of the nature of his convictions, in 1983 the Department initially placed him in a maximum-security classification. Not until 1989 did the Department change his “security classification to ‘medium by exception’ because of his good behavior.” *Lile v. Simmons*, 23 Kan.App.2d 1, 2, 929 P.2d 171, 172 (1996). Thus, the sanction at issue threatens to deprive respondent of a status in the prison community that it took him six years to earn and which he had successfully maintained for five more years when he was ordered to incriminate himself. Moreover, abruptly “busting” his custody back to Level I, App. 94, would impose the same stigma on him as would a disciplinary conviction for any of the most serious offenses described in petitioners’ formal *63 statement of Internal Management Policy and Procedure (IMPP). As the District Court found, the sanctions imposed on respondent “mirror the

consequences imposed for serious disciplinary infractions.” 24 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1155 (D.Kan.1998). This same loss of privileges is considered serious enough by prison authorities that it is used as punishment for theft, drug abuse, assault, and possession of dangerous contraband.⁸

The punitive consequences of the discipline include not only the dignitary and reputational harms flowing from the transfer, but a serious loss of tangible privileges as well. Because he refused to participate in the SATP, respondent's visitation rights will be restricted. He will be able to earn only \$0.60 per day, as compared to Level III inmates, who can potentially earn minimum wage. His access to prison organizations and activities will ****2041** be limited. He will no longer be able to send his family more than \$30 per pay period. He will be prohibited from spending more than \$20 per payroll period at the canteen, rather than the \$140 he could spend at Level III, and he will be restricted in what property he can keep in his cell. App. 27-28. In addition, because he will be transferred to a maximum-security unit, respondent will be forced to share a cell with three other ***64** inmates rather than one, and his movement outside the cell will be substantially curtailed. *Id.*, at 73, 83. The District Court found that the maximum-security unit is “a more dangerous environment occupied by more serious offenders.” 24 F.Supp.2d, at 1155.⁹ Perhaps most importantly, respondent will no longer be able to earn his way back up to Level III status through good behavior during the remainder of his sentence. App. 17 (“To complete Level I, an inmate must ... demonstrate a willingness to participate in recommended programs and/or work assignments for a full review cycle”).

The plurality's glib attempt to characterize these consequences as a loss of potential benefits rather than a penalty is wholly unpersuasive. The threatened transfer to Level I and to a maximum-security unit represents a significant, adverse change from the status quo. Respondent achieved his medium-security status after six years of good behavior and maintained that status during five more years. During that time, an inmate unquestionably develops settled expectations regarding the conditions of his confinement. These conditions then form the baseline against which any change must be measured, and rescinding them now surely constitutes punishment.

Paying attention to the baseline is not just “superficially appealing,” *ante*, at 2031. We have recognized that the government ***65** can extend a benefit in exchange for incriminating statements, see *Woodard*, 523 U.S., at 288, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (“[T]his pressure to speak in the hope of improving [one's] chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled”), but cannot threaten to take away privileges as the cost of invoking Fifth Amendment rights, see, e.g., *Turley*, 414 U.S., at 82, 94 S.Ct. 316; *Spevack*, 385 U.S., at 516, 87 S.Ct. 625. Based on this distinction, nothing that I say in this dissent calls into question the constitutionality of *downward* adjustments for acceptance of responsibility under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, *ante*, at 2032. Although such a reduction in sentence creates a powerful incentive for defendants to confess, it completely avoids the constitutional issue that would be presented if the Guidelines operated like the scheme here and authorized an *upward* adjustment whenever a defendant refused to accept responsibility. Similarly, taking into account an attorney's acceptance of responsibility or contrition in deciding whether to reinstate his membership to the bar of this Court, see *ante*, at 2028, is obviously different from disbaring an attorney for invoking his privilege. By obscuring the distinction between penalties and incentives, it is the plurality that calls into question both the Guidelines and plea bargaining. See *Corbitt v. New Jersey*, 439 U.S. 212, 223-224, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978) (“Nor does this record indicate that he was being punished for exercising a constitutional right[H]omicide defendants who are willing ****2042** to plead *non vult* may be treated more leniently than those who go to trial, but withholding the possibility of leniency from the latter cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed”).¹⁰

***66** Even if the change in respondent's status could properly be characterized as a loss of benefits to which he had no entitlement, the question at hand is not whether the Department could have refused to extend those benefits in the first place, but rather whether revoking them at this point constitutes a penalty

for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. See *Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). The plurality contends that the transfer from medium to maximum security and the associated loss of Level III status is not intended to punish prisoners for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, but rather is merely incidental to the prison's legitimate interest in making room for participants *67 in the program. *Ante*, at 2027. Of course, the Department could still house participants together without moving those who refuse to participate to more restrictive conditions of confinement and taking away their privileges. Moreover, petitioners have not alleged that respondent is taking up a bed in a unit devoted to the SATP; therefore, all the Department would have to do is allow respondent to stay in his current medium-security cell. If need be, the Department could always transfer respondent to another medium-security unit. Given the absence of evidence in the record that the Department has a shortage of medium-security beds, or even that there is a separate unit devoted to participants in the SATP, the only plausible explanation for the transfer to maximum security and loss of Level III status is that it serves as punishment for refusing to participate in the program.

Justice O'CONNOR recognizes that the transfer is a penalty, but finds insufficient coercion because the "changes in [respondent's] living conditions seem to [her] minor." *Ante*, at 2034 (opinion concurring in judgment). The coerciveness of the penalty in this case must be measured not by **2043 comparing the quality of life in a prison environment with that in a free society, but rather by the contrast between the favored and disfavored classes of prisoners. It is obviously impossible to measure precisely the significance of the difference between being housed in a four-person, maximum-security cell in the most dangerous area of the prison, on the one hand, and having a key to one's own room, the right to take a shower, and the ability to move freely within adjacent areas during certain hours, on the other-or to fully appreciate the importance of visitation privileges, being able to send more than \$30 per pay period to family, having access to the yard for exercise, and the opportunity to participate in group activities. What is perfectly clear, however, is that it is the aggregate effect of those penalties that creates compulsion. Nor is it coincidental that petitioners have selected this same *68 group of sanctions as the punishment to be imposed for the most serious violations of prison rules. Considering these consequences as a whole and comparing the Department's treatment of respondent to the rest of the prison population, it is perfectly clear that the penalty imposed is "constitutionally indistinguishable from the coercive provisions we struck down in *Gardner*, *Sanitation Men*, and *Turley*." *Cunningham*, 431 U.S., at 807, 97 S.Ct. 2132.¹¹

III

The SATP clearly serves legitimate therapeutic purposes. The goal of the program is to rehabilitate sex offenders, and the requirement that participants complete admission of responsibility and sexual history forms may well be an important component of that process. Mental health professionals seem to agree that accepting responsibility for past sexual misconduct is often essential to successful treatment, and that treatment programs can reduce the risk of recidivism by sex offenders. See Winn, Strategic and Systematic Management of Denial in Cognitive/Behavioral Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 8 Sexual Abuse: J. Research and Treatment 25, 26-27 (1996).

The program's laudable goals, however, do not justify reduced constitutional protection for those ordered to participate. "We have already rejected the notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves because it serves a governmental need." *Cunningham*, 431 U.S., at 808, 97 S.Ct. 2132. *69 The benefits of obtaining confessions from sex offenders may be substantial, but "claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth Amendment litigation," and until today at least "they have not fared well." *Turley*, 414 U.S., at 78, 94 S.Ct. 316. The State's interests in law enforcement and rehabilitation are present in every criminal case. If those interests were sufficient to justify impinging on prisoners' Fifth Amendment right, inmates would soon have no privilege left to invoke.

The plurality's willingness to sacrifice prisoners' Fifth Amendment rights is also unwarranted because available alternatives would allow the State to achieve the same objectives without impinging on inmates'

privilege. *Turner v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78, 93, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The most obvious alternative is to grant participants use immunity. See *Murphy*, 465 U.S., at 436, n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (“[A] **2044 State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions ... as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination”); *Baxter*, 425 U.S., at 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (“Had the State desired Palmigiano's testimony over his Fifth Amendment objection, we can but assume that it would have extended whatever use immunity is required by the Federal Constitution”). Petitioners have not provided any evidence that the program's therapeutic aims could not be served equally well by granting use immunity. Participants would still obtain all the therapeutic benefits of accepting responsibility and admitting past misconduct; they simply would not incriminate themselves in the process. At least one State already offers such protection, see *Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 197.440* (West 2001) (“Communications made in the application for or in the course of a sexual offender's diagnosis and treatment ... shall be privileged from disclosure in any civil or criminal proceeding”), and there is no indication that its choice is incompatible with rehabilitation. In fact, the program's rehabilitative goals would likely be furthered by ensuring free and open discussion without *70 the threat of prosecution looming over participants' therapy sessions.

The plurality contends that requiring immunity will undermine the therapeutic goals of the program because once “inmates know society will not punish them for their past offenses, they may be left with the false impression that society does not consider those crimes to be serious ones.” *Ante*, at 2025. See also Brief for 18 States as *Amici Curiae* 11 (“By subjecting offenders to prosecution for newly revealed offenses, and by adhering to its chosen policy of mandatory reporting for cases of suspected child sexual abuse, Kansas reinforces the sensible notion that wrongdoing carries consequences”). The idea that an inmate who is confined to prison for almost 20 years for an offense could be left with the impression that his crimes are not serious or that wrongdoing does not carry consequences is absurd. Moreover, the argument starts from a false premise. Granting use immunity does not preclude prosecution; it merely prevents the State from using an inmate's own words, and the fruits thereof, against him in a subsequent prosecution. *New Jersey v. Portash*, 440 U.S. 450, 457-458, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979). The plurality's concern might be justified if the State were required to grant *transactional* immunity, but we have made clear since *Kastigar* that use immunity is sufficient to alleviate a potential Fifth Amendment violation, 406 U.S., at 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653. Nor is a State *required* to grant use immunity in order to have a sex offender treatment program that involves admission of responsibility.

Alternatively, the State could continue to pursue its rehabilitative goals without violating participants' Fifth Amendment rights by offering inmates a voluntary program. The United States points out that an inmate's participation in the sexual offender treatment program operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons is entirely voluntary. “No loss of institutional privileges flows from an inmate's decision not to participate *71 in the program.”¹² If an inmate chooses to participate in the federal program, he will be transferred from his “parent facility” to a “more desirable” prison, but if he refuses to participate in the first place, as respondent attempted to **2045do, he suffers no negative consequences. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Although the inmates in the federal program are not granted use immunity, they are not compelled to participate. Indeed, there is reason to believe successful rehabilitation is more likely for voluntary participants than for those who are compelled to accept treatment. See Abel, Mittelman, Becker, Rathner, & Rouleau, Predicting Child Molesters' Response to Treatment, 528 *Annals N.Y. Acad. of Sciences* 223 (1988) (finding that greater perceived pressure to participate in treatment is strongly correlated with the dropout rate).

Through its treatment program, Kansas seeks to achieve the admirable goal of reducing recidivism among sex offenders. In the process, however, the State demands an impermissible and unwarranted sacrifice from the participants. No matter what the goal, inmates should not be compelled to forfeit the privilege against self-incrimination simply because the ends are legitimate or because they have been convicted of sex offenses. Particularly in a case like this one, in which respondent has protested his innocence all along

and is being compelled to confess to a crime that he still insists he did not commit, we ought to ask ourselves-what if this is one of those rare cases in which the jury made a *72 mistake and he is actually innocent? And in answering that question, we should consider that even members of the Star Chamber thought they were pursuing righteous ends.

I respectfully dissent.

Footnotes

*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

1 As a participant in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP), respondent would be required to sign an “Admission of Responsibility” form setting forth the details of the offense for which he was convicted. Because he had testified at trial that his sexual intercourse with the victim before driving her back to her car was consensual, the District Court found that a written admission on this form would subject respondent to a possible charge of perjury. 24 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1157 (D.Kan.1998). In addition, the SATP requires participants to “generate a written sexual history which includes all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether such activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses.” *Id.*, at 1155. The District Court found that the form “clearly seeks information that could incriminate the prisoner and subject him to further criminal charges.” *Id.*, at 1157.

2 Petitioners relied on two cases, *Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), and *United States v. Washington*, 431 U.S. 181, 187-188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). In *Fisher*, we held that the privilege does not permit the target of a criminal investigation to prevent his lawyer from answering a subpoena to produce incriminating documents. We reached that conclusion because the person asserting the privilege was not the one being compelled. In *Washington*, cited *ante*, at 2026, a grand jury witness voluntarily answered questions after being advised of the privilege, though not of the fact that he was a potential defendant in danger of being indicted. In neither case did the witness assert the privilege against incriminating himself.

3 The origins and evolution of the privilege have received significant scholarly attention and debate in recent years. See, e.g., Hazlett, Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 235 (1998); Amar & Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L.Rev. 857 (1995). The historical account is complicated by the fact that before *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), the privilege was treated as a common-law evidentiary doctrine separate from the Fifth Amendment. During that time, the privilege was also subsumed within general discussions of the voluntariness of confessions.

4 Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in *The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination* 181, 192-193 (R. Helmholz et al. eds.1997) (discussing historical sources which indicate that the “privilege prohibited (1) incriminating interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future punishment and promises of leniency” (footnotes omitted)).

5 See *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

6 In his opinion for the Court in the companion case, *Montanye v. Haymes*, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976), Justice White reiterated this point: “As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected are within the sentence imposed upon him and [are] not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”

7 The plurality is quite wrong to rely on *Murphy* for the proposition that an individual is not compelled to incriminate himself when faced with the threat of return to prison. *Ante*, at 2029-2030. In *Murphy*, we did not have occasion to decide whether such a threat constituted compulsion because we held that “since

Murphy revealed incriminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled incriminations.” 465 U.S., at 440, 104 S.Ct. 1136. As we explained, “a witness confronted with questions that the government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to incriminate himself.... But if he chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty as the result of his decision to do so.” *Id.*, at 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136. In contrast to Murphy, respondent has consistently asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege.

8 IMPP 11-101 provides that an inmate “shall be automatically reduced to Level I for any of the following: (1) Termination from a work or program assignment for cause; (2) Refusal to participate in recommended programs at the time of placement; (3) Offenses committed in which a felony charge is filed with the district or county prosecutor; (4) Disciplinary convictions for: (a) Theft; (b) Being in a condition of drunkenness, intoxication, or a state of altered consciousness; (c) Use of stimulants, sedatives, unauthorized drugs, or narcotics, or the misuse, or hoarding of authorized or prescribed medication; (d) Sodomy, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual act; (e) Riot or incitement to riot; (f) Arson; (g) Assault; (h) Battery; (i) Inmate Activity (limitations); (j) Sexual Activity; (k) Interference with Restraints; (l) Relationships with Staff; (m) Work Performance; or (n) Dangerous Contraband.” App. 19-20 (citations omitted).

9 Respondent attested to the fact that in his experience maximum security “is a very hostile, intimidating environment because most of the inmates in maximum tend to have longer sentences and are convicted of more serious crimes, and, as a consequence, care less how they act or treat others.” *Id.*, at 41-42. He explained that in the maximum-security unit “there is far more gang activity,” “reported and unreported rapes and assaults of inmates are far more prevalent,” and “sex offenders ... are seen as targets for rape and physical and mental assault[s],” whereas in medium security, “because the inmates want to maintain their medium security status, they are less prone to breaking prison rules or acting violently.” *Id.*, at 42-43.

10 The plurality quotes a footnote in *Roberts v. United States*, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980), for the proposition that a principled distinction cannot be drawn between enhancing punishment and denying leniency, *ante*, at 2031. This quote is misleading because, as in *Minnesota v. Murphy*, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), see n. 7, *supra*, Roberts failed to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, and we reiterated that the privilege is not self-executing, 445 U.S., at 559, 100 S.Ct. 1358. Furthermore, the passage quoted by the plurality, *id.*, at 557, n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1358, was in reference to Roberts' claim that the sentencing judge could not consider his refusal to incriminate a *co-conspirator* in deciding whether to impose his sentences consecutively. In that context, the privilege is not implicated and compulsion is not constitutionally significant. While it is true that in some cases the line between enhancing punishment and refusing leniency may be difficult to draw, that does not mean the distinction is irrelevant for Fifth Amendment purposes.

It is curious that the plurality asserts the impracticality of drawing such a distinction, given that in this case a majority of the Court agrees that it is perfectly clear the consequences facing respondent represent a burden, rather than the denial of a benefit. *Ante*, at 2035 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Our cases reveal that it is not only possible, but necessary to draw the distinction. For even *Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), conditioned its entire analysis of plea bargaining on the assumption that the defendant had been charged with the greater offense prior to plea bargaining and, therefore, faced the denial of leniency rather than an enhanced penalty. *Id.*, at 360-361, 98 S.Ct. 663 (“While the prosecutor did not actually obtain the recidivist indictment until after the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was clearly expressed at the outset of plea negotiations. ... This is not a situation, therefore, where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment had ended with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty. As a practical matter, in short, this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted [the defendant] as a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge as part of the plea bargain”).

11 Justice O'CONNOR would distinguish these cases because the penalty involved the loss of one's livelihood, whereas here respondent will be housed, clothed, and fed regardless of whether he is in maximum or medium security. We rejected a similar argument in *Turley*, when we refused to distinguish *Gardner v. Broderick*, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968), and *Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York*, 392 U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968), based on the difference between losing one's job and losing the ability to obtain government contracts. 414 U.S., at 83, 94 S.Ct. 316. We concluded that there was no “difference of constitutional magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee of the State, and a threat of loss of contracts to a contractor.” *Ibid*.

12 Brief for United States as *Amicus Curiae* 27. Because of this material difference between the Kansas and federal programs, recognizing the compulsion in this case would not cast any doubt on the validity of voluntary programs. The plurality asserts that “the federal program is different from Kansas' SATP only in that it does not require inmates to sacrifice privileges *besides housing* as a consequence of nonparticipation.” *Ante*, at 2031 (emphasis added). This statement is inaccurate because, as the quote in the text reveals, *no* loss of privileges follows from the decision not to participate in the federal program.

249 F.Supp.3d 951
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.
Franklyn HOFFMAN, Kenneth Derkson, Johnny Wooten, Eric Sanders,
Michael O'Connell, Stephen Hart, William Johnson, James Norgaard, and
Alton Antrim, Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF PLEASANT PRAIRIE, Defendant.
Case No. 16–CV–697–JPS
Signed 04/17/2017

Synopsis

Background: Convicted sex offenders residing in village brought action against village, alleging that ordinance regulating residency of child sex offenders within village violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, and seeking declaratory judgment in favor of one sex offender on the issue of whether he had to leave the village. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

Holdings: The District Court, J.P. Stadtmueller, J., held that:

- 1 claim seeking money damages was not moot;
 - 2 ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause;
 - 3 plaintiffs asserting Equal Protection claim had standing; and
 - 4 ordinance violated equal protection.
- Motion granted in part and denied in part.

West Headnotes (18)

1 Federal Courts Nature of dispute; concreteness

Federal Courts Inception and duration of dispute; recurrence; "capable of repetition yet evading review"

District court may only exercise its jurisdiction over live controversies; this requirement applies not only at the start of the litigation, but throughout its entire pendency.

2 Federal Courts Rights and interests at stake

Federal Courts Dismissal or other disposition

An action becomes moot, and must therefore be dismissed, when an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.

3 Federal Courts Rights and interests at stake

Federal Courts Available and effective relief

A case only becomes moot when it is impossible for a district court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party; as long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.

4 Constitutional Law Mootness

Convicted sex offenders' claim seeking money damages, alleging that village ordinance regulating residency of child sex offenders in village violated the Ex Post Facto clause, was not moot, even though village had repealed and replaced original ordinance, which either eliminated or limited effect of allegedly unlawful provisions. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

5 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Restrictions imposed by village ordinance regulating residency of child sex offenders in village were not rationally connected to stated purpose of protecting the health and welfare of village's citizens, and thus ordinance violated Ex Post Facto Clause; ordinance limited residency to tiny zone, imposed restrictions

based solely on prior offense, attempted to deter recidivism, prevented any sex offenders from moving into village, and banished all sex offenders in leaseholds without individualized inquiry into risk to community, restrictions were based on conjecture about dangers posed by sex offenders rather than on objective evidence, and ordinance could have had a negative effect on sex offender recidivism and community safety. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

1 Case that cites this headnote

6 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive punishment by the government. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

7 Constitutional Law Constitutional Prohibitions in General

The Supreme Court requires the clearest proof to override the government's stated intention in an Ex Post Facto case. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

8 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

To assess the punitive nature of a restriction in an Ex Post Facto case, district courts analyze five factors:

(1) whether the law inflicts what has been regarded in United States history and traditions as punishment, (2) whether the law imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, (3) whether the law promotes the traditional aims of punishment, (4) whether the law has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, and (5) whether the law is excessive with respect to this purpose. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

9 Constitutional Law Punishment in general

Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, to avoid an excessive punitive effect, a statute imposing a particularly harsh disability or restraint must allow an individualized assessment, which helps to ensure that a statute's particularly harsh disability or restraint is rationally related to a non-punitive purpose. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.

10 Federal Civil Procedure Hearing, evidence, and presentation of arguments

The district court will not craft appropriate arguments for a litigant and, particularly in the case of represented parties, will assume that the omission of apparently relevant argument was a strategic choice rather than mere oversight.

11 Constitutional Law Equal Protection

Convicted sex offenders had standing to bring Equal Protection claim against village, alleging that, prior to its amendment, ordinance regulating residency of sex offenders in village violated Equal Protection, even though original ordinance had been repealed and replaced; most of the offenders were subjected to banishment within six months of ordinance's passage, and some offenders suffered stress because they knew they would have to leave village if they ever left their current homes. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

12 Federal Civil Procedure In general; injury or interest

The standing doctrine requires that a party must actually have a interest in a case to invoke federal jurisdiction.

13 Constitutional Law Similarly situated persons; like circumstances

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

14 Constitutional Law Statutes and other written regulations and rules

Laws usually pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

15 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

To prove an equal protection claim involving restrictions imposed by village ordinance regulating residency of child sex offenders in village under rational basis review, convicted child sex offenders were required to show: (1) the village intentionally treated them differently from others similarly situated, (2) the village intentionally treated them differently because of their membership in the class to which they

belonged, and (3) the difference in treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

16 Constitutional Law Rational Basis Standard; Reasonableness

In an Equal Protection case applying rational basis review, a law must be upheld if the district court can reasonably conceive of any justification for it. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

17 Constitutional Law Sex Offenders

Mental Health Sex offenders

Village ordinance which regulated residency of convicted child sex offenders violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; ordinance made irrational domicile-based distinction between designated offenders, and there was no evidence supporting ordinance's restrictions. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

1 Case that cites this headnote

18 Constitutional Law Discrimination and Classification

The bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest in an Equal Protection case. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

Attorneys and Law Firms

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ORDER

J.P. Stadtmueller, U.S. District Judge

1. INTRODUCTION

On February 8, 2017, Plaintiffs Franklyn Hoffman (“Hoffman”), Kenneth Derkson (“Derkson”),¹ Johnny Wooten (“Wooten”), Eric Sanders (“Sanders”), Michael O’Connell (“O’Connell”), Stephen Hart (“Hart”), William Johnson (“Johnson”), James Norgaard (“Norgaard”), and Alton Antrim (“Antrim”) filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docket # 41). Defendant Village of Pleasant Prairie (the “Village”) opposed the motion on March 2, 2017. Plaintiffs replied in support of their motion to March 15, 2017. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion must be granted in part.²

2. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides the mechanism for seeking summary judgment. Rule 56 states that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); *see Boss v. Castro*, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A “genuine” dispute of material fact is created when “the evidence is such that a reasonable ***954** jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-movant. *Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc.*, 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016).

3. RELEVANT FACTS

The material facts are almost entirely undisputed.³ On April 18, 2016, the Village passed an ordinance regulating residency for child sex offenders within its borders (the “Ordinance”). Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit on June 9, 2016, challenging its constitutionality. The Ordinance prohibited child sex offenders, called “designated offenders” (hereinafter “Designated Offenders”), from residing in the Village within 3,000 feet of a “prohibited location.” “Prohibited locations” included “[a]ny school,

licensed day-care center, park, trail, playground, place of worship, athletic field used by Minors, or any other place designated by the Village as a place where Minors are known to congregate.” (Docket # 43–1 at 2). The Ordinance also prevented Designated Offenders from moving into the Village unless they were already domiciled in the Village at the time of their most recent offense. Designated Offenders were excluded from any potential violation of the Ordinance if they resided continuously in a home prior to and after its effective date. This provision was limited by a ban on renewing rental agreements with Designated Offenders which would extend for more than six months beyond the Ordinance's effective date.

The Ordinance further restricted where Designated Offenders could live with respect to each other; offenders were banned from residing within 500 feet of each other. The Ordinance applied to all Designated Offenders without any inquiry into the danger any individual offender posed to the community. It did, however, contain a grandfather clause. The grandfather clause allowed Designated Offenders to stay in their residence if a “prohibited location” was established near them after they took residence. It also permitted them to live with their close family members, provided those family members had resided in the otherwise prohibited area for at least two years.

The Court recognizes that this explanation is somewhat confusing when stated in prose. To better understand the effect of the Ordinance on various Designated Offenders, the Court has prepared the following chart:

***955**

Nature of Offender	Restriction Imposed
1) Domiciled in the Village at time of most recent offense 2) Lived in the Village when Ordinance was passed	None, as long as the offender's home complied with the distance-related restrictions
1) Not domiciled in the Village at time of most recent offense 2) Not domiciled in Village when Ordinance was passed	Permanently banned from the Village
1) Not domiciled in the Village at time of most recent offense 2) Lived in the Village when Ordinance was passed 3) Rented property that did not comply with distance restrictions	Must leave the Village by October 18, 2016, and may never return
1) Not domiciled in the Village at time of most recent offense 2) Lived in the Village when Ordinance was passed 3) Owned home or lived with family	May remain in that property, but may not move to another home in the Village. If the offender leaves their home for more than thirty days, they may never return.

See (Docket # 45 at 4–5).

In passing the Ordinance, the Village prepared a map showing its projected effect on Designated Offender residency. The map revealed that more than ninety percent of the Village would be off-limits to

Designated Offenders under the Ordinance. The remaining ten percent was largely non-residential. Moreover, the interaction between the 3,000 foot prohibited zone and the rule against Designated Offenders living near one another further limited the possible dwelling places. Most of the Village's low-income housing, which is all that most of these plaintiffs could afford, was excluded.

When enacting the Ordinance, the Village did not obtain or consider any studies or data regarding the safety risk of allowing Designated Offenders to live near the various “prohibited locations” identified above, or near one another. In fact, the Village's administrator, Michael Pollocoff (“Pollocoff”), testified that turning child sex offenders into outcasts can create “more deleterious impacts.” (Docket # 45 at 6). The Village also had no evidence that Designated Offenders domiciled outside the Village at the time of their last offense posed a greater safety risk than those who were. Pollocoff stated that the Ordinance's purpose and goal was to reduce the number of child sex offenders living in the Village.

***956** All Plaintiffs but Norgaard,⁴ O'Connell,⁵ and Hoffman⁶ were not domiciled in the Village at the time of their offense, and rented their abodes, and so fell into the third category from the chart above.⁷ Each was told that, in light of the Ordinance's passage, they had to leave the Village by October 18, 2016. Plaintiffs were variously notified of their need to vacate by a letter from the Village's Chief of Police, by conversations with their probation officers, or by conversations with other Designated Offenders. Each Plaintiff has suffered stress as a result of the threat posed by the Ordinance, the difficulties in attempting to secure new housing, and fear of the consequences of homelessness.

The Ordinance was repealed, and a new one created in its place, on September 6, 2016 (the “Amended Ordinance”). The Amended Ordinance lowered the 3,000 foot prohibited zone to 1,500 feet. This would still cut Designated Offenders out of over sixty percent of the Village's land area and seventy-five percent of its residences. The restriction on Designated Offenders living near each other was removed entirely, as was the limit on renewing leases for Designated Offenders living in a prohibited zone. Finally, the Amended Ordinance stated that it did not apply to a Designated Offender whose latest conviction was ten or more years prior to them taking residence in the Village.

4. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint advances three causes of action. Count One alleges that the Ordinance violates the Ex Post Facto Clause in Article I of the Constitution, because “it makes more burdensome the punishment imposed for offenses committed prior to enactment of the Ordinance and it applies retroactively[.]” (Docket # 30 at 22). Plaintiffs seek an injunction against its enforcement and money damages on Count One. *Id.* at 23. Count Two states that the Ordinance also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it differentiates between Designated Offenders who were or were not domiciled in the Village at the time of their most recent offense, without a rational basis for doing so. *Id.* at 23–24. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive and monetary relief on Count Two. *Id.* at 24. Finally, Count Three seeks a declaratory judgment in favor of O'Connell on the issue of whether he had to leave the ***957** Village. *Id.* at 24–25; *see supra* note 5. Plaintiffs' instant motion requests judgment on Counts One and Two as to liability only.⁸ The Court addresses each claim in turn.

4.1 Ex Post Facto

1,2,3 Initially, the Village contends that Plaintiffs' ex post facto claim is mooted by its repeal of the Ordinance. This Court may only exercise its jurisdiction over live controversies. *Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez*, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016). This requirement applies not only at the start of the litigation, but throughout its entire pendency. *Id.* An action becomes moot, and must therefore be dismissed, when “an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). A court must take care not to paint over a lawsuit's claims with a broad brush, however. A case only becomes moot “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. As long as the parties have a concrete interest,

however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” *Id.* (citations and quotations omitted).

4 The Village contends that Plaintiffs' claims became moot on September 6, 2016, approximately three months after this action was filed. On that date, the original Ordinance they complained-of in the Second Amended Complaint was repealed and replaced with the Amended Ordinance, which either eliminated or limited the effect of the allegedly unlawful provisions. Plaintiffs concede that this renders moot their requests for injunctive relief. Enacting the Amended Ordinance does not, however, do anything to address Plaintiffs' requests for money damages. *Campbell–Ewald* (as well as the Village's own citations) stands for the proposition that Plaintiffs' damages claim, and thus the ex post facto claim as a whole, remains a live controversy. *Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Reps., Inc. v. City of Chicago*, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant's change in conduct cannot render a case moot so long as the plaintiff makes a claim for damages.”). The Village's mootness argument is without merit.

5,6 The Village next asserts that the Ordinance did not actually violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not impose a punishment on Plaintiffs. The Clause prohibits retroactive punishment by the government, and as applied here, it restricts how far a governmental entity can go in limiting the rights of sex offenders. *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). The *Smith* court began its ex post facto analysis with two questions. First, did the government, in enacting the restriction, intend to “establish civil proceedings,” or impose punishment? *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). If the government intended to punish, the law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and the inquiry ends there. *Id.* The Ordinance's stated purpose is “not to impose a criminal penalty” but to instead protect the health and welfare of the Village's *958 citizens. (Docket # 43–1 at 1). The Court must defer to that statement of intent. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 92–93, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (“[C]onsiderable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.”).

7,8 Nevertheless, even if a law purports to be civil in nature, the Court “must further determine whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the Village's] intention to deem it civil.” *Id.* at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court requires “the clearest proof” to override the government's stated intention. *Id.* To assess the punitive nature of a restriction, courts analyze five factors:

- (1) Does the law inflict what has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment?
- (2) Does it impose an affirmative disability or restraint?
- (3) Does it promote the traditional aims of punishment?
- (4) Does it have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose?
- (5) Is it excessive with respect to this purpose?

Does # 1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 97, 123 S.Ct. 1140).

The Village's argument on this point is brief, conclusory, and fails to meaningfully address any of these factors. It instead gestures at a few cases which it contends have ruled in its favor on this issue, and asks the Court to evaluate and follow those decisions. The Village is mistaken on the law and the Court's duties. The most relevant decisions from across the nation reveal that the Ordinance is high unprecedented in its punitive effect. The Court will not distinguish those opinions where the Village has made no effort to do so itself.

As to the first factor, the Ordinance banished Plaintiffs from the Village. Banishment is a traditional form of punishment, and historically “involved the complete expulsion of an offender from a socio-political community.” *Shaw v. Patton*, 823 F.3d 556, 566 (10th Cir. 2016). Unlike many other laws restricting sex offender residency, the Ordinance did not simply limit where such people could live. The Ordinance prevented any sex offenders from moving into the Village and, more importantly, required all sex offenders in leaseholds to leave within six months after its passage. This is, in the Court's view, nothing short of affirmative banishment. *Id.* at 567–68 (residency provision did not resemble historical banishment because it only limited sex offender residency, but did not expel them entirely); *Doe v. Miller*, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (same). Not all Plaintiffs are in the same position on this issue, however. Norgaard, O'Connell, and Hoffman were not (properly) subject to the banishment provision of the Ordinance. However, as discussed below, this difference does not change the outcome on this claim.

Even had it tried, the Village could not reasonably contest the second factor. The Ordinance imposed severe restraints on Designated Offenders, limiting their residence to ten percent of the Village's land area, an area which is itself largely non-residential. *See Doe v. Miami–Dade County, Fla.*, 846 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2017) (this inquiry focuses on the “ ‘how the effects of the [Ordinance] are felt by those subject to it,’ ” and these offenders alleged homelessness as a result of the county's residency ordinance) (quoting *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 99–100, 123 S.Ct. 1140). The third factor is likewise present, though it is of limited importance because punishment goals often overlap legitimate civil regulatory goals. *Snyder*, 834 F.3d at 704. Still, the Ordinance advances the traditional *959 punishment aims of incapacitation, in keeping Designated Offenders segregated to tiny zones of the community; retribution, by imposing its restrictions based solely on Plaintiffs' prior offense conduct; and deterrence, in attempting to keep Designated Offenders away from children to deter recidivism. *Id.*

9 The fourth and fifth factors are usually considered together, for the less rational a restriction's connection to its stated purpose, the more excessive it will be in addressing that purpose. *See Smith*, 538 U.S. at 104–05, 123 S.Ct. 1140; *Snyder*, 834 F.3d at 704–05; *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 721–723. This is the most important consideration in the ex post facto analysis. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Further, “to avoid a[n] [excessive] punitive effect, a statute imposing a particularly harsh disability or restraint must allow an individualized assessment. An individualized assessment helps to ensure that a statute's particularly harsh disability or restraint is rationally related to a non-punitive purpose.” *Shaw*, 823 F.3d at 575; *Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't*, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Unlike the Iowa law [at issue in *Miller*], the Arkansas statutory plan calls for a particularized risk assessment of sex offenders, which increases the likelihood that the residency restriction is not excessive in relation to the rational purpose of minimizing the risk of sex crimes against minors.”).

Decisions from other circuits provide a useful contrast to the Ordinance. In *Miller*, expert testimony was received on the effect of a 2,000-foot residency restriction on sex offender recidivism. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 722–23. While this testimony was not definitive as to the propriety of that distance as compared to any others, the Eighth Circuit held that it supplied a sufficient rational basis connected to the legislature's non-punitive purpose. *Id.* In *Miami–Dade*, the subject ordinance established a 2,500-foot exclusion zone for schools, with exceptions when “(1) [t]he sexual offender or sexual predator established a residence prior to the effective date of th[e] [O]rdinance; (2) [t]he sexual offender or sexual predator was a minor when he or she committed the sexual offense and was not convicted as an adult; and (3) [t]he school was opened after the sexual offender or sexual predator established the residence.” *Miami–Dade*, 846 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted). The *Miami–Dade* plaintiffs alleged that this ordinance violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not include an individualized risk assessment, it applied to an offender for life, and was passed without any evidence connecting the restriction to an improvement on safety or recidivism concerns. *Id.* at 1185–86. The Eleventh Circuit found that these assertions stated an ex post facto cause of action. *Id.* Finally, *Duarte* highlights the importance of an efficacious grandfather clause, which in that case allowed offenders to stay in their current homes after the subject ordinance was

passed. *Duarte v. City of Lewisville*, 136 F.Supp.3d 752, 781–82 (E.D. Tex. 2015). The *Duarte* ordinance also contained “multiple affirmative defenses that, if argued and proven, exempt the child sex offender from the residency restrictions.” *Id.* at 782.⁹

***960** The Ordinance goes further than any these examples. The Ordinance bans Designated Offenders from the Village without any individualized inquiry into their risk to the community. In a similar vein, it did not offer any method for a Designated Offender to obtain an exemption, even in limited circumstances. Like the *Miami–Dade* ordinance, the Ordinance's banishment applies to Designated Offenders for life. Unlike *Duarte*, the Ordinance's grandfather clause was of limited help to Plaintiffs, because for most of them, it only permitted them to remain until October 2016. Most importantly, the Village has admitted that the Ordinance was based on its own conjecture about the dangers posed by sex offenders. No data or studies on the matter were considered in passing the Ordinance.

The lack of evidence eliminates the possibility that the Village's action was rational. In *Snyder*, the Sixth Circuit faced a comprehensive sex offender registration and residency statute. *Snyder*, 834 F.3d at 697–98. The court found that the statute was not rationally related to the purpose of reduced sex offender recidivism and public safety. *Id.* at 704–05. Though the Supreme Court in *Smith* stated that recidivism rates among sex offenders are “frightening and high,” the *Snyder* court found that support for the proposition was lacking in empirical studies. *Id.* at 704. It specifically noted that “nothing ... in the record suggests that the residential restrictions have any beneficial effect on recidivism rates.” *Id.* at 705. *Snyder* found no evidence that “the difficulties the statute imposes on registrants are counterbalanced by any positive effects. Indeed, Michigan has never analyzed recidivism rates despite having the data to do so.” *Id.*

The Village fell into the same trap as the Michigan legislature. The Village could have sought objective evidence to support the Ordinance's severe restrictions but chose not to.¹⁰ Plaintiffs were required to come forward with “the clearest proof” that the Ordinance was intended as punishment. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140. If the Village had even a sliver of factual material to support the stated goals of the Ordinance, the outcome of this claim would likely be different. As it stands, however, the Court has no choice but to find that the restrictions imposed by the Ordinance are not rationally connected to its purposes.

***961** 10 The Court concludes that, in balancing the *Smith* factors, Plaintiffs have produced sufficient proof that the Ordinance's stated non-punitive purpose is overborne by its punitive effects. The Ordinance therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on that claim. This result is clearly true for the plaintiffs who were subject to banishment under the Ordinance, namely Derkson, Wooten, Sanders, Hart, Johnson, and Antrim. The Ordinance would not have necessarily banished Hoffman, O'Connell, and Norgaard, for various reasons. *See supra* notes 3–5. As to those three, the lack of banishment makes this case much closer to the others cited above, where the law in question withstood Ex Post Facto Clause review. The Court has not differentiated between these sets of plaintiffs, however, because the Village has not argued that it should. The Court will not craft appropriate arguments for a litigant and, particularly in the case of represented parties, will assume that the omission of apparently relevant argument was a strategic choice rather than mere oversight. *John v. Barron*, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (“This court is not obligated to research and construct legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel as in this case.”); *Gold v. Wolpert*, 876 F.2d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).

4.2 Equal Protection

11,12 The Village first argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue an equal protection claim. The standing doctrine requires that a party must actually have a interest in a case to invoke federal jurisdiction. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

Though there are many nuances to standing, its application here is relatively simple. As raised by the Village, the standing doctrine requires that Plaintiffs must have suffered a concrete injury and favorable decision in the case must offer redress for their injury. *Id.* at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Village argues that Plaintiffs were grandfathered into the Amended Ordinance, and with the repeal of the original Ordinance, they now lack standing to maintain an equal protection claim.

The Village's argument misses the mark in two respects. First, as with the mootness issue, the Village focuses on the ameliorative effect of the Amended Ordinance. This is not the relevant inquiry. Plaintiffs have standing to remedy a past wrong, namely the constitutionally violative original Ordinance, regardless of whether they are suffering an injury today. Second, even when one's focus is properly directed to the original Ordinance, Plaintiffs were not grandfathered in as the Village suggests. As discussed above, most of the plaintiffs were subject to banishment within six months of the Ordinance's passage. Plaintiffs further argue that O'Connell and Hoffman suffered stress because they knew they would have to leave the Village if they ever left their current homes. As before, the Village does not differentiate between each set of plaintiffs. The Court finds, then, that all Plaintiffs but Norgaard have standing because they suffered injury by way of the Ordinance. Norgaard is different because Plaintiffs do not attempt to argue that he suffered a violation of his equal protection rights. (Docket # 48 at 4–5). The Court must, therefore, deny summary judgment to him on this claim.

13,14 The Village next attacks the substance of Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause “commands that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be *962 treated alike.” *City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (quotation omitted). Usually, laws pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause “if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” *Id.* at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249. However, when a statute burdens a person's fundamental constitutional rights, courts apply a higher level of scrutiny. *See Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez*, 476 U.S. 898, 904, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986).

15,16 The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs are members of a protected class, such that the Court would need to give increased scrutiny to the Ordinance. The Court need not wade into that fray, as the Ordinance fails to pass even the lesser threshold of rationality. To prove an equal protection claim under rational basis review, Plaintiffs must show: “(1) the [Village] intentionally treated [them] differently from others similarly situated, (2) the [Village] intentionally treated [them] differently because of [their] membership in the class to which [they] belonged, and (3) the difference in treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” *Smith v. City of Chicago*, 457 F.3d 643, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2006). “Under this lenient standard,” the Seventh Circuit instructs, a law “must be upheld if [the Court] can reasonably conceive of any justification for it.” *Shaw v. Smith*, 206 F. Fed.Appx. 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2006).

17 Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance violates their equal protection rights because it treats certain Designated Offenders differently from others without reason. Those in the first chart category, who were domiciled in the Village at the time of their last offense, were allowed to remain in the Village. Those in the other three chart categories, who were not so domiciled, were variously blocked from moving into the Village, compelled to leave in a short time frame, or forced to remain in their current home forever if they wished to stay in the Village. The Village has admitted that it has no evidence that the difference between these groups—domicile at the time of their last offense—has any bearing on their safety risk to the community.

The Village makes no attempt to address this claim. Instead, it appears to believe that Plaintiffs advance an equal protection claim based on their status as sex offenders versus non-sex offenders. The Village states its position as follows: “The Village of Pleasant Prairie certainly has a rational basis for protecting

children against the risks of recidivism of convicted sex offenders.” (Docket # 46 at 12). This is not the relevant question, and because of its misunderstanding of Plaintiffs' claim, the Village offers almost no relevant argument in opposition to the actual claim presented.

18 Even so, the Court must uphold a law if it “can reasonably conceive of any justification for it.” *Shaw*, 206 F. Fed.Appx. at 548. Thus, the Court would likely be compelled to find the Ordinance constitutional if the Village had offered any evidence providing such a justification, even as late as its briefing on the instant motion. It did not, and this failure leaves the Court no choice but to conclude that the Ordinance violated Plaintiffs' equal protection rights in making an irrational domicile-based distinction between Designated Offenders. This comports with the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. The “bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” *U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). In light of Pollocoff's comments, and the lack of evidence supporting the Ordinance's restrictions, it appears this is precisely what motivated the Village's action.

***963 5. CONCLUSION**

In light of the foregoing, the Court grant Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment as to the liability elements of Counts One and Two of their Second Amended Complaint, for all of the plaintiffs save Norgaard. Norgaard is entitled to summary judgment on Count One but not Count Two. Plaintiffs' damages on those counts will be determined by the jury. The Court treats Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief as abandoned. This matter remains set for a pretrial conference on May 9, 2017, and a jury trial beginning on May 15, 2017.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Docket # 41) be and the same is hereby **GRANTED in part** and **DENIED in part** in accordance with the terms of this Order; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to file an oversized brief (Docket # 44) be and the same is hereby **GRANTED**.

Footnotes

1 Plaintiffs spell the name “Dirkson” in their Second Amended Complaint, (Docket # 30 at 1, 9–11), and “Derkson” in their summary judgment materials, (Docket # 42 at 13–15). The Court will use “Derkson,” the name he signed to his affidavit, (Docket # 43–8 at 3), and amend the case caption accordingly.

2 Plaintiffs also requested leave to file an oversized brief. (Docket # 44). Though much of the excess of the brief was ultimately unnecessary, the Court will nevertheless grant the request.

3 The facts discussed below are drawn from the parties' respective factual briefs and responses thereto unless otherwise noted. (Docket # 45 and # 49). The Court further notes that the Village raises a number of “disputes” in its response to Plaintiffs' statement of facts. *See, e.g.*, (Docket # 45 at 8). The “disputes” are inappropriate because they cite no evidence, and are generally pure legal argument, which is reserved for the parties' legal memoranda, not factual briefing. The Court has ignored those attempted “disputes.”

4 Norgaard is the manager of the King's Motel, where a number of other designated offenders also live. He did not fear the Ordinance because he was domiciled in the Village at the time he committed his last offense, and the other offenders in the Motel would be moving away, eliminating any conflict with the 500-foot restriction. Norgaard thus fell into the first chart category.

5 O'Connell lived at a home owned entirely by his girlfriend and did not pay rent. He was thus exempt, per the fourth chart category, from having to move out of the Village, so long as he did not leave the home. He was nonetheless told that he had to leave the Village. The misunderstanding was corrected during the course of this litigation, specifically by a letter sent to O'Connell on August 4, 2016.

6 Hoffman lived with his mother rent-free, and so fell into the fourth chart category. When his mother decided to sell her home and move to senior housing, Hoffman knew the Ordinance would prevent him from staying in the Village.

7 This fact is undisputed as to Hoffman, Sanders, Antrim, and Wooten. It is not explicitly stated as to Derkson or Johnson, but the other facts related to those plaintiffs suggest that they are covered by the third chart category. In any event, it is undisputed that Derkson and Johnson were told that they were subject to the Ordinance and would have to leave the Village.

8 Plaintiffs' opening brief discusses their entitlement to compensatory damages for the stress and fear they suffered while the Ordinance remained in force. Confusingly, the brief does not explain why Plaintiffs did so; did Plaintiffs want the Court to award damages at the summary judgment stage? The Village believed so, and responded that Plaintiffs' evidence does not adequately support their claim for damages at this stage. Plaintiffs' reply clarifies that they do not seek an award of damages now, but wish to have their damages evaluated by the jury at trial. With that clarification, the propriety of Plaintiffs' damages becomes a non-issue. Plaintiffs could have prevented confusion for all involved by appropriately titling their motion as one for partial summary judgment.

9 The Village cites two Wisconsin appellate court opinions upholding sex offender residency restrictions. Neither case has much persuasive value. *Menomonee Falls v. Ferguson* decided whether an offender was protected by an ordinance's grandfather clause, and said nothing of the constitutionality of the ordinance. *See generally* 334 Wis.2d 131, 799 N.W.2d 473 (App. 2011). *City of South Milwaukee v. Kester* actually addressed the ex post facto issue. 347 Wis.2d 334, 830 N.W.2d 710 (App. 2013). *Kester* found that the ordinance passed muster under the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not banish the plaintiff sex offender and, even without an individual risk assessment, the city was entitled to make a reasonable categorical judgment that all sex offenders are dangerous to the community. *Id.* at 719–21. *Kester* is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Ordinance is different from *Kester's* ordinance because it includes an expulsion provision. Second, in line with the above-cited federal precedent, this Court disagrees with *Kester* to the extent that a broad, evidence-free assumption about sex offenders (*Kester* mentions no data or studies on the dangerousness of such persons in the community) is sufficient to make a regulation non-punitive.

10 In fact, the Village apparently had evidence that the Ordinance could be counterproductive. Pollocoff stated that the Ordinance could have a negative effect on sex offender recidivism and community safety by making them outcasts. *Snyder* discussed the same issue:

In fact, one statistical analysis in the record concluded that laws such as SORA actually *increase* the risk of recidivism, probably because they exacerbate risk factors for recidivism by making it hard for registrants to get and keep a job, find housing, and reintegrate into their communities. *See* [J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, *Do Sex offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?*, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161 (2011)].

Snyder, 834 F.3d at 704–05 (emphasis in original).

VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.

Jason R. FERGUSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2010AP2167.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 4, 2011. Opinion Filed April 27, 2011.

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was found in violation of village's sex offender residency restriction ordinance in the municipal court, Bradley W. Matthiesen, J. Defendant appealed, and the Circuit Court, Waukesha County, Linda M. Van de Water, J., affirmed. Defendant appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Anderson, J., held that defendant, whose former residence was covered by the grandfather clause in sex offender residency restriction ordinance, was required to abide by ordinance when he moved to a new residence.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (7)

1 Appeal and Error Local law; ordinances

Interpretation of a municipal ordinance is a question of law that is ordinarily reviewed de novo.

1 Case that cites this headnote

2 Appeal and Error Local law; ordinances

De novo review of a municipal ordinance is especially appropriate when its interpretation will likely have a statewide impact as a result of ordinances in other municipalities with similar language.

1 Case that cites this headnote

3 Municipal Corporations Applicability of statutory construction rules

The rules of interpretation for a municipal ordinance are the same as those for a statute.

4 Statutes Purpose

Statutes Unintended or unreasonable results; absurdity

The objective in interpreting legislation is to reach a reasonable construction that will effectuate the purpose of the legislation at issue.

5 Municipal Corporations Plain, ordinary, or common meaning

If the language of the ordinance is plain and clearly understood, the court should apply its ordinary and accepted meaning.

6 Mental Health Effect of assessment or determination; notice and registration

Grandfather clause in village's sex offender residency restriction ordinance, which exempted the new residency restrictions for sex offenders who established a residence within a prohibited area prior to the enactment of the new ordinance, applied to the residence rather than the individual, and thus, sex offender, whose former residence was covered by the grandfather clause, was required to abide by ordinance when he moved to a new residence.

1 Case that cites this headnote

7 Zoning and Planning Continuance or change of use in general

As a matter of law, when an owner of a nonconforming use modifies that use, the municipality is entitled to terminate the entire nonconforming use.

Attorneys and Law Firms

****473** On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Daniel P. Fay of Oakton Avenue Law Offices, S.C., Pewaukee.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of H. Stanley Riffle and Julie A. Aquavia of Arenz, Molter, Macy & Riffle, S.C., Waukesha.

****474** Before NEUBAUER, P.J., ANDERSON and REILLY, JJ.¹

Opinion

ANDERSON, J.

***133** Jason R. Ferguson appeals from the circuit court's judgment finding him guilty of violating the Village of Menomonee Falls sex offender residency restriction ordinance (Village Ordinance). VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(1) (2007).² The circuit court did not err. We affirm.

I. Facts

¶ 2 The facts of this case are undisputed. On June 18, 2001, Ferguson was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.02. In October 2003, Ferguson moved to an apartment on Main Street in the Village of Menomonee Falls, which was located within 1500 feet of school facilities for children. Ferguson registered himself as a sex offender and his Main Street address with Wisconsin's Sex Offender Registry. On June 18, 2007, the Village of Menomonee Falls passed a Village Ordinance, which in part provides that “[a]n offender shall not reside within 1,500 feet of real property that supports or upon which ***134** there exists ... [a]ny facility for children.” VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(1)a.

¶ 3 Also, within the ordinance, is a grandfather clause exception, which, in relevant part, states: (3) An offender residing within 1,500 feet of real property that supports or upon which there exists any of the [identified] uses ... does not commit a violation of this section if ... a. The offender is required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution or facility. [or] b. The offender has established a permanent or temporary residence and reported and registered that residence pursuant to WIS. STATS. § 301.45 prior to the effective date of [the residency restriction]. VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(3)a., b. Therefore, because Ferguson was residing at the Main Street residence prior to the enactment of the Village Ordinance, he was excepted from the residency restriction by the ordinance's grandfather clause.

¶ 4 Some time after the enactment of the statute, Ferguson moved from his Main Street residence to a Menomonee River Parkway residence, also located within the Village of Menomonee Falls. Ferguson's Menomonee River Parkway residence is located less than one mile from his former Main Street residence and is also within 1500 feet of public facilities for children.

¶ 5 On December 10, 2008, following Ferguson's change in residence, a Village of Menomonee Falls police detective made face-to-face contact with Ferguson at the Menomonee River Parkway residence and advised him that because of his change in residence, he was now in violation of the Village Ordinance and had ***135** thirty days to vacate the Menomonee River Parkway residence. After the thirty days had passed, the detective again made face-to-face contact with Ferguson at the Menomonee ****475** River Parkway residence, and on February 2, 2009, because Ferguson had not vacated the residence, the detective issued him a citation for violating the Village Ordinance's residency restriction.

¶ 6 Ferguson challenged the ordinance violation in Menomonee Falls municipal court; on November 11, 2009, Municipal Judge Bradley W. Matthiesen upheld the citation.

¶ 7 Ferguson appealed the ruling to the Waukesha county circuit court on December 4, 2009. On February 3, 2010, Ferguson filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that although his Menomonee River Parkway residence was within 1500 feet of a child safety zone as prohibited by the Village Ordinance, he was excepted by the ordinance's grandfather clause provisions because he had “established a permanent or

temporary residence and reported and registered that residence pursuant to WIS. STATS. § 301.45 prior to the effective date of [the residency restriction]” as provided by VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(3)b. Ferguson argued that the grandfather clause exception, which allowed him to reside in the Main Street residence, also allowed him to reside in the Menomonee River Parkway residence because “an individual does not commit a violation if he has established a permanent or temporary residence and registered that residence” prior to the enactment of the ordinance.

¶ 8 In response, the Village filed a Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Citation on April 29, 2010. In its brief, the Village agreed that Ferguson's Main Street residence had been excepted by VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES ***136** § 62–51(c)(3)b. However, the Village argued that once Ferguson moved to the Menomonee River Parkway residence, he lost the protection of the grandfather clause exception in effect for the Main Street residence. The Village argued that the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause excepts only the residence, not the sex offender, and thus Ferguson violated the Village Ordinance when he moved from the excepted Main Street residence to the unexcepted Menomonee River Parkway residence.

¶ 9 The circuit court denied Ferguson's motion to dismiss on May 24, 2010. The court held that the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause exception allowed Ferguson to reside at the Main Street residence. However, the court interpreted the grandfather clause exception to mean that a sex offender is no longer immune if he or she moves to another residence after the ordinance's date of enactment. The matter proceeded to trial.

¶ 10 At trial on July 15, 2010, Ferguson stipulated that he was an offender as the term is used throughout the Village Ordinance. Ferguson also admitted that from December 10, 2008, to the date of the trial, July 15, 2010, he resided at the Menomonee River Parkway residence and registered that residence with Wisconsin's Sex Offender Registry. However, Ferguson argued that although the Menomonee River Parkway residence was within 1500 feet of a child safety zone as prohibited by the Village Ordinance, he was excepted by its grandfather clause. Specifically, because he was an offender “required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution,” VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(3)a, and had also “established a permanent or temporary residence and reported and registered that residence pursuant to WIS. STATS. § 301.45 prior to ***137** the effective date of [the residency restriction].” VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(3)b.

¶ 11 In response, the Village noted that the latter half of Ferguson's argument— ****476**that his establishment of permanent or temporary residence allowed him to move throughout the child safety zone—had been dismissed by the court at the motion hearing on May 24, 2010, and was no longer at issue. The Village argued that if the court accepted the former half of Ferguson's argument—that his time at jail, prison, juvenile facility, or correctional institution allowed him to move throughout a child safety zone—it would contravene the very purpose of the Village Ordinance and lead to an absurd conclusion.

¶ 12 The court determined that Ferguson's Menomonee River Parkway residence was not protected by the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause exception. The court reasoned that the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause exception does not travel with the sex offender to allow him or her to move wherever he or she wants within the prohibited 1500 foot area. Moreover, the court held that if it accepted Ferguson's argument—that his time at jail, prison, juvenile facility, or correctional institution allowed him to move throughout a child safety zone—it would cause an absurd result by which any offender who was convicted and served time pursuant to any offense listed within the Village Ordinance would be excepted from the ordinance. Therefore, the court upheld the Menomonee Falls municipal court's ruling and found Ferguson guilty of violating the Village Ordinance.³

¶ 13 Ferguson appeals.

***138** II. Standard of Review

1,2 ¶ 14 This matter requires interpretation of a municipal ordinance, which is a question of law we ordinarily review de novo. *Board of Regents v. Dane Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment*, 2000 WI App 211, ¶ 12, 238 Wis.2d 810, 618 N.W.2d 537 (citing *Marris v. City of Cedarburg*, 176 Wis.2d 14, 32, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993)). De novo review of an ordinance is especially appropriate when its interpretation will likely have a statewide impact as a result of ordinances in other municipalities with similar language. See *Board of Regents*, 238 Wis.2d 810, ¶ 12, 618 N.W.2d 537.

3,4,5 ¶ 15 The rules of interpretation for a municipal ordinance are the same as those for a statute. *State v. Ozaukee Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment*, 152 Wis.2d 552, 559, 449 N.W.2d 47 (Ct.App.1989). The objective in interpreting legislation is to reach a reasonable construction that will effectuate the purpose of the legislation at issue. *State ex rel. Melentowich v. Klink*, 108 Wis.2d 374, 380, 321 N.W.2d 272 (1982). If the language of the ordinance is plain and clearly understood, the court should apply its ordinary and accepted meaning. See *Maier v. Kalwitz*, 134 Wis.2d 207, 209–10, 397 N.W.2d 119 (Ct.App.1986).

III. State Residency Restrictions Limit Grandfather Clauses

¶ 16 At issue here is a municipal residency restriction ordinance. See VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(1), (3). In Wisconsin, sex offenders must register themselves and their address with the department of corrections, WIS. STAT. § 301.45(1g), (2). However, Wisconsin does not have a sex offender residency restriction statute. Instead, Wisconsin ***139** municipalities are allowed and commonly do enact sex offender residency restriction ordinances. See generally CITY OF BROOKFIELD, WIS., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.34.030 (2011); VILLAGE OF BROWN DEER, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34–3 (2010); VILLAGE OF GERMANTOWN, WIS., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.50 (2010); VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51.

****477** 6 ¶ 17 Here, the unambiguous language of the ordinance's grandfather clause exception, “[t]he offender has established a permanent or temporary residence and reported and registered that residence ... prior to the effective date” leads to the inescapable conclusion the exception is for the residence and not the individual. See VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(c)(3)b.

¶ 18 This conclusion is supported by reviewing how other jurisdictions have handled similar sex offender residency restrictions. We found particularly persuasive the Iowa Supreme Court's interpretation of an Iowa statute very similar to Menomonee Falls' Village Ordinance.

¶ 19 Iowa's statute prohibited convicted sex offenders from living within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility. *State v. Finders*, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008). Like the Village Ordinance, the statute contained a grandfather clause exemption for sex offenders who established a residence within a prohibited area prior to the enactment of the statute. See *id.* Prior to the enactment of the statute, the defendant was found guilty of a sexual offense against a minor and was subjected to the state's sex offender registration laws. *Id.* at 547. Also prior to the enactment of the statute, the defendant had established a residence within a zone subsequently prohibited by the statute. *Id.* As a result, ***140** the defendant's residence was exempted under the statute's grandfather clause. *Id.* Following the enactment of the statute, the defendant moved to another residence in the same prohibited area, within 2000 feet of a school or childcare facility. See *id.* Because he no longer resided at an exempted residence, the defendant was charged with violating the statute's residency restrictions and was found guilty. *Id.*

¶ 20 On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling. *Id.* at 550. It held that the grandfather clause exemption within a state sex offender residency restriction statute only exempted an individual sex offender from the statute if the offender maintained the residence he or she had prior to the enactment of the statute. *Id.* It explained its role in interpreting a criminal statute was to “seek a reasonable interpretation that will best affect the legislative purpose and avoid absurd results.” *Id.* at 548 (citations omitted). Thus, looking to the language of the statute, it concluded that the grandfather clause exemption applied to sex offenders who established “a residence,” meaning a specific residence, and that it did not apply to a sex offender’s “residency” or “any residence” for that matter. *Id.* at 549. Therefore, the grandfather clause exemption did not apply to a sex offender who once resided in an exempted residence but moved to a new residence, even if the new residence was within the same prohibited area. *See id.*

¶ 21 The Iowa Supreme Court further explained that if it applied the grandfather clause exemption to the individual instead of the residence, it would cause an absurd result: allowing sex offenders to move in and out of the same prohibited zone with impunity. *Id.* It stated that the purpose of the residency restriction statute was to “reduce the high risk of recidivism posed *141 by sex offenders,” and the purpose of the grandfather clause was to “avoid the harsh effect of the retroactive application of the two thousand foot rule.” *Id.* If the court were to interpret the grandfather clause exemption to apply to the individual over the residence, it would undermine the purpose behind the residency restriction statute. *See id.*

¶ 22 Similarly, if this court were to interpret the Village Ordinance's grandfather **478 clause to apply to Ferguson as an individual instead of his residence, the purpose of the Village Ordinance would be undermined. The purpose and intent behind the Village Ordinance is to address recidivism “reducing opportunity and temptation” for sex offenders and “to protect children where they congregate or play in public places.” VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51(a)(1). To achieve the ordinance's purpose and intent, “certain sexual offenders and sexual predators are prohibited from establishing temporary or permanent residence” in areas around locations “where children regularly congregate in concentrated numbers.” Sec. 62–51(a)(2). Several municipalities surrounding the Village of Menomonee Falls passed sex offender residency restriction ordinances with language similar to that of the Village Ordinance, including its grandfather clause exception. *See generally* CITY OF BROOKFIELD, WIS., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.34.030 (2011); Village of Brown Deer, Wis., Code of Ordinances § 34–3 (2010); VILLAGE OF GERMANTOWN, WIS., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.50 (2010).

¶ 23 We agree with the rationale of the Iowa Supreme Court in *Finders*. If we were to interpret the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause exception to extend to an individual sex offender instead of his or her residence, it would lead to an absurd result undermining the very purpose of the Village Ordinance. We *142 will not adopt such an absurd interpretation. Though we could end our discussion here, it is relevant to note that our interpretation of grandfather clauses in Wisconsin zoning ordinances also supports a narrow interpretation of the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause.

IV. Wisconsin Zoning Ordinances Limit Grandfather Clauses

¶ 24 Although there is no Wisconsin sex offender residency restriction statute or any law on the subject of grandfather clauses in municipal sex offender residency restriction ordinances, such restrictions are similar in nature to zoning ordinances, many of which also contain grandfather clause exceptions. This court has previously held that a zoning ordinance's grandfather clause exception ends once there is a change of use within that zoning area, thus, supporting a narrow interpretation of the Village Ordinance's grandfather clause.

¶ 25 In *Waukesha County v. Pewaukee Marina, Inc.*, 187 Wis.2d 18, 21, 24, 522 N.W.2d 536 (Ct.App.1994), this court analyzed a zoning ordinance with a grandfather clause exception in the context

of conforming building and premises usage. In *Pewaukee Marina*, a county brought an action against a marina owner for expanding and enlarging the use of his property, which invalidated a county ordinance exception that allowed the owner to maintain the property as a nonconforming use. *Id.* at 20, 522 N.W.2d 536. The marina owner argued that under Wisconsin statute, the county lacked valid authority to invalidate his expansion or enlargement of his marina as an excepted nonconforming use. *Id.* Moreover, he alleged that the expansion or enlargement was valid because the marina's nonconforming use was not changed, but instead, improved. *Id.* The county, however, *143 alleged that although it lacked statutory authority, the purpose behind the relevant Wisconsin statute was to protect the original use of premises, and thus, the county had implied authority to restrict nonconforming uses of the particular premises under the county ordinance. *Id.* at 22–23, 522 N.W.2d 536.

¶ 26 We held that the county had the power to enact an ordinance that prohibited nonconforming building and premise uses. *Id.* at 20, 24, 522 N.W.2d 536. **479 However, we also concluded that the county could not prohibit nonconforming uses where that nonconforming use existed prior to the enactment of the ordinance. *Id.* at 23–24, 522 N.W.2d 536 (citing *State ex rel. Brill v. Mortenson*, 6 Wis.2d 325, 330, 94 N.W.2d 691 (1959)). We then reasoned that because the county had the authority to regulate new, prohibited uses in effect after the enactment of the ordinance, the owner's expansion and enlargement of his marina, which changed its excepted nonconforming use, violated the ordinance and was subject to county regulation. *Pewaukee Marina*, 187 Wis.2d at 20, 24, 27, 522 N.W.2d 536. In short, we concluded that, although a nonconforming use that was established before the enactment of the ordinance is excepted from that ordinance, once that nonconforming use is altered, it loses its protection. *See id.* at 24, 522 N.W.2d 536.

7 ¶ 27 Similar to the underlying purpose of zoning laws, sex offender residency restriction ordinances aim to restrict and eliminate nonconforming uses, i.e., sex offenders residing in prohibited areas. *See id.* at 29, 522 N.W.2d 536 (citing *Waukesha Cnty. v. Seitz*, 140 Wis.2d 111, 116, 409 N.W.2d 403 (Ct.App.1987)). Thus, according to *Pewaukee Marina*, if an excepted but nonconforming use is altered, both the once excepted, nonconforming use and the subsequent change of that use are invalid. *144 *Pewaukee Marina*, 187 Wis.2d at 30–31, 522 N.W.2d 536. “As a matter of law, when an owner of a nonconforming use modifies that use, the municipality is entitled to terminate the entire nonconforming use.” *Village of Menomonee Falls v. Preuss*, 225 Wis.2d 746, 748, 593 N.W.2d 496 (Ct.App.1999).

¶ 28 In this case, the nonconforming use of Ferguson's Main Street residence—housing a sex offender within an area prohibited by the Village Ordinance—was excepted by the ordinance's grandfather clause until Ferguson modified the excepted, nonconforming use by changing his residence. Therefore, the Village of Menomonee Falls is entitled to restrict Ferguson's nonconforming use and penalize him for violating the Village Ordinance.

¶ 29 We conclude that the circuit court did not err when it denied Ferguson's motion to dismiss and issued a judgment finding Ferguson guilty of violating VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 62–51. The Village Ordinance's grandfather clause exception applies to the sex offender's residence, not the individual sex offender. Analogous to this court's jurisprudence on zoning laws, once an excepted nonconforming use alters that use, it is no longer excepted and the municipality has the authority to punish that violation. Therefore, once Ferguson, whose Main Street residence was excepted under the ordinance, changed his residence to the Menomonee River Parkway residence, he lost the protection of the exception and is prohibited from establishing a new residence within 1500 feet of a child safety zone, even within the same child safety zone. Judgment affirmed.

Vill. Of Menomonee Falls v. Ferguson, 334 Wis.2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011)

Footnotes


1 The chief judge of the court of appeals converted this from an appeal decided by one judge to a three-judge panel by order dated March 23, 2011. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.41(3) (2009–10). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009–10 version unless otherwise noted.

2 VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 62–51 was enacted June 18, 2007, and the most recent version, codified through December 20, 2010, remains unchanged. All references to § 62–51 of the VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES are to the 2007 version, under which Ferguson was initially excepted.

3 Additionally, the court imposed a fine of \$1164 on Ferguson.

CITY OF GREENFIELD
OFFENDER ORDINANCE MAP

Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders
Ordinance #2641 (CC 1/28/2009)
Resolution #3269 (CC 1/28/2009)




Legend

Class

- Library
- School, Public
- School, Private
- Park
- Licensed Daycare
- YMCA, Root River Pkwy
- Oak Leaf Trail

1000 FOOT RADIUS AROUND PROPERTY BOUNDARY OF SITES:
CITY LIBRARY,
SCHOOLS (PUBLIC & PRIVATE),
PARKS (CITY & COUNTY),
LICENSED DAYCARES,
YMCA, OAK LEAF TRAIL, & ROOT RIVER PARKWAY



02/19/2009
Rev. 03/12/2018

